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VSUMMARY
This sociological study deals with the historical formation of the 
Tanzanian socialist ideology— Ujamaa— focusing mainly on the period from 
1920 to 1967. The major aspects dealt with are the systematization of 
the ideology of Indirect Rule or African Civilization by the colonial 
agents in the 1920s as a response to the forms of resistance they met; 
the taking over of the systematization of African Civilization by the 
educated Africans from the 1930s in an attempt to refute Eurocentrism 
and attain equality with other races; the transformation of African 
Civilization into Pan-Africanistic thinking; and, finally, African 
Socialism and the institutionalization of this ideology after the 
attainment of independence. The evolution of these ideas is examined
within the context of social and political struggles.
It is argued that the ideology of Indirect Rule was introduced in an 
attempt to resolve the crisis of the "civilizing mission", given the 
resistance of the colonized people as a result of their lack of faith in 
that "mission". This ideology emerged in the context of a re­
examination on the part of the colonizers of the foundations of the 
colonial mission as a means to break the resistance and make colonial 
domination effective. Consequently, they were forced to appropriate from 
the colonized those elements which did not contradict Vesternality. In 
other words, they were attempting to make the colonized understand and 
accept the "civilizing mission" from the colonized's point of view. 
Thus, Indirect Rule was an expression of concrete forms of colonial
capitalism, and it was a systematization of what was considered as
African Civilization and African social structures.
The educated Africans, who had emerged within the colonial forms of 
exploitation and racial domination and had initially surrended and 
adopted the colonizers' cultural forms, were also forced to rebel as a 
result of their rejection by the "civilization" which nurtured them. In 
the course of their rebellion, they set out to rediscover, restore and 
reassert their Africanness as a means to attain equality with the Vest, 
while at the same time refuting Eurocentism. It was the contradiction of 
being both black and Western which shaped their struggles and ideas. 
They systematized what they thought to be African Civilization, which, 
according to them, did not have objectives other than those of Western 
Civilization. They believed that this African Civilization differed from 
Western Civilization in terms of its social and political structures, 
whereby the former's were communalist. The attempt was to intermarry 
Western and African Civilization, and at the same time reject anything 
considered "communist" or "bolshevist". In content, their ideas were 
not different from those of Indirect Rule. These ideas were to take on 
socialistic and Pan-Africanist tendencies with the incorporation of 
developmentalist and statist British Fabian tendencies.
It is finally argued that developmental ism was the ideology of 
capitalism in the post-Vorld War II period which went through various 
phases, and African Socialism was the particular form it took in 
Tanzania. The institutionalization of this ideology after independence 
took place within the struggles to concentrate powers in the executive 
arm of the state and defeat the social movements under the banner of 
economic development. It is also argued that, by dwelling on questions 
of modes of production, productive forces, economic development,
vii
industrialization, etc., sociology of development has fallen into the 
trap of developmentalism and, hence, relegated to the background the 
questions of self-defense, self-emancipation and self-determination of 
the people.
CHAPTER ONE
General Introduction
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Chapter One 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
This present study is a contribution to the reappraisal of the
socio-historical origins of Tanzanian1 socialism (Ujamaa), a reappraisal 
which has become increasingly critical with the worsening of the socio­
economic crisis from the late 1970s. An attempt is made to answer some 
fresh questions thrown up by the socio-political reality of the 
country, and the period covered is 1920 to 1967. The study, also
attempts a reconstruction of historical processes to demonstrate the 
empirical reality/non-reality of the dominant theories and practices of 
development in third world social formations. Tanzania's political 
trajectory, its political ideology which was committed to the 
modernization of the country, and the personality of its first 
president, Kwalimu J.K, Nyerere "excited and fuelled hopes of many
nationalists in Africa, and humanists, liberals and socialists in other 
parts of the world"2 in the late 1960s and 1970s. It is in this sense 
that the study of the dominant ideology in Tanzania forms a very
interesting test case for examination of established accounts on 
development, given that by the second half of the 1970s critiques of the 
policies and the ideology pursued by the country were already developing 
as a result of the socio-economic crisis.
The justification of this study is that, "although the past does not 
change the present does; each generation asks questions of the past, and 
finds new areas of sympathy as it relives different aspects of the 
predecessors."3 The account and character of this study, however, makes 
no claim to the dignity of the scholarship and skills of professional 
historians. This is despite the large element of primary research
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involved. The account is mainly thematic, and it is only the argument 
which is historiographical. This study falls under what is increasingly 
becoming known as historical sociology.
However, before proceeding any further, it is important briefly to 
survey the circumstances which have brought about this dialogue with 
the past.
1.1 The Problem Area
Vith the promulgation of the Arusha Declaration in February 1967, 
Tanzania committed herself to build an egalitarian socialist society. 
This socialism was to be built on the foundation of Tanzania's past, and 
on her own design without importation of "any foreign ideology" but on 
her "own roots" by emphasizing certain characteristics of her 
"traditional organization, and extending them to embrace the 
possibilities of modern technology and enable" Tanzanians "to meet the 
challenge of life in the twentieth century world."A Underlying the 
Declaration was the assumption that Tanzanian society mainly consisted 
of workers and peasants— that feudalism and capitalism had not developed 
to the extent of endangering socialist endeavours. In regard to the 
countryside, it was noted that people still had a choice to work for 
themselves or for others. Vhile, therefore, it seemed unnecessary to 
worry about capitalist development in the countryside— whose 
implications would be obvious with the emergence of land shortages it 
was the case in the fertile and well watered areas— it was pointed out 
that:
...The small capitalist agriculture we now have is not really a 
danger; but our feet are on the wrong path, and if we continue 
to encourage or even help the development of agricultural 
capitalism, we shall never become a socialist state. On the
- 3 -
contrary we shall be continuing the break-up of the traditional 
concepts of human equality based on sharing all necessities of 
life and the universal obligation to work.®
Following the Arusha Declaration, some of the Government's major 
public policies were: curtailment of the practices among leaders to have 
more than one source of income and to be associated with capitalist or 
feudalist practices by the introduction of a leadership code; 
nationalization of some of the major means of production and exchange 
(inluding industries, banks, insurance companies, buildings, major 
trading firms, and plantations and estates); encouragement of workers' 
participation in the management of enterprises by 1971; encouragement of 
peasants to form Ujama a (communal) villages and their villagezation in 
1974/75 and introduction of village governments; abolition of local 
governments in 1972 in favour of extension of Government control to the 
local levels by decentralization; and abolition of cooperative movements 
in 1975 in favour of the Government controlled marketing boards. This 
socialism emphasized rural development, under the premise that the vast 
majority of Tanzanians worked on the land. Socialism was viewed in 
terms of a developmental strategy— as the only road to development, 
given that the capitalist road would entail dependence on foreign 
capitalism.®
It was with the beginning of the socio-economic crisis in 1973/74, 
the quashing by the state of the workers' attempts to take over the 
capitalist enterprises and control them and also the fight against 
bureaucratic tendencies in 1970/71,7 and the forcible villagization of 
the peasants in 1974/75,® that critiques of the policies and the 
ideology pursued by the country began to be generated. This criticism 
focused mainly on the outcomes of the socialist moves, centering on the
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socio-economic crisis. The symptoms of the crisis were: a gap in the 
balance of payments, low utilization of industrial capacity, shortage 
of essential consumer goods, a fall in food produce in the market, a 
fall in the production of export crops, inflation, and the falling of 
the general living conditions of the working people.9
Broadly, most critics tended to regard the policies and the ideology 
pursued by the country as the root-cause of the crisis in terms of 
either their unscientific nature, or success in retarding the 
development of capitalism and hence progress and the "failure to capture 
the peasant" for development purposes. Those who did not criticize them 
contended that the crisis was a result of natural and economic factors—  
terms of trade in the world market, economic and technological 
dependence, surplus transfer to the imperialist countries, droughts, 
management crisis, lack of good implemetation of the policies, etc.10 
Tied to these explanations of the crisis, the historical formation of 
Ujamaa Ideology was regarded in terms of its being a product of: <1) a 
move by the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" to wrangle with the economic 
power dominantly in the hands of the "Asian commercial bourgeoisie", and 
hence its petty bourgeois nature and rejection of the proletarian 
ideology;11 (2) Tanzania's failure to receive massive investments for 
industrialization and its failure to modernize the rural areas: it was a 
development strategy;12 (3) an attempt to hoodwink the working people in 
order to prevent them from rising against exploitation and make them 
favourably disposed to the leaders for development purposes: this
explains why Tanzania became more dependent internationally after the 
Arusha Declaration;13 <4) it was a result of the union in 1964 between 
Tanganyika and Zanzibar as the United Republic of Tanzania. Zanzibar had
radical elements which influenced the move;1* and <5> the personal
initiative of Mwalimu J.K. Hyerere. It is genuine and all it lacked was
committed implementors.1®
The above explanations of the problems of the dominant ideology in
Tanzania and its historical emergence are based on the specifics of the
political programmes and their outcome before and after the Arusha
Declaration or the personality of the individual: ideology is read from
economics and its functional role. The underlying assumptions are that
ideologies have an ability to generate or not to generate economic
development, or to legitimize or not to legitimize a regime in power. In
other words, it is assumed that ideologies have their independent
material efficacy. In Bienen's formulation:
Blites in the new states consciously try to devise formulas by 
which they can bridge the gap between themselves and non-elites. 
Ideologies are created to legitimize rule and also to intergrate 
traditionally and non-traditionally oriented communities. Blites 
who are indeed oriented towards economic development must find 
formulas which act as ideology for development. When a radical 
transformation of society is undertaken, extraordinary claims 
are made on the population. The norms of the state bureaucracy 
are insufficient to provide an 'ideological grease' for
development in a society which has intergrative problems and
which must undertake a big push in order to overcome
backwardness.ie
In other words, what is dominant in the above explanations is the 
functionalist problematic.
Central to the structural functionalist problematic are concepts
such as systems, sub-systems, elements and structures. Systems are 
governed by 'value systems'; and when the structural differentiation in 
a system gives rise to disequilibrium and hence dissatisfaction, this 
should be rectified by introduction of higher non-economic functional 
factors: i.e. political arrangements, superior values and even the use
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of the police and the amy. If all this prove futile, then more refined 
new ideas or institutions should be introduced so as to bring back the 
system to normal, and hence enhance development and productivity.17 That 
is:
Every social system is governed by a value system which 
specifies the nature of the system, its goals, and the means of 
attaining these goals. A social system's first functional 
requirement is to preserve the intergrity of the value system 
itself and assure that individual actors conform to it. This 
involves the socialization and educating [of] individuals, as 
well as providing tension-control mechanisms for handling and 
resolving individual disturbances relating to the values.10
1.2 Significance of the Problem and the Argument
This tendency to see the primacy of ideologies/value systems in 
processes has been quite widespread. Frantz Fanon, for example, saw the 
absence of ideology as the greatest peril facing Africa.19 Similary, Dr 
Kwame Rkrumah, one of the founders of African socialism, viewed the 
problems of neo-colonial balkanization and lack of unity and development 
in terms of a lack of a "steadying ideology".20 A cult was born in the 
Soviet Union in the 1920s: the Party was the history maker as it was the 
embodiment of correct ideas, and the "superstructure" was reduced to 
conforming or legitimizing the "economic base".21 For Gramsci, the
October Revolution had opened up new possibilities theoretically: it was 
a revolution against Karx's Capital which strengthened the importance of 
the necessity to develop class consciousness so as to combat bourgeois 
culture.22 Lucacs claimed, "the strength of every society is in the last 
resort a spiritual strength. And from this we can be liberated by
knowledge" which is "practical critical activity".23 In the last two
decades Althusser came out with the conception of ideology and
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Ideological State Apparatuses, and how Ideologies are imposed upon their 
passive recipients through schools, churches, parties, trade unions, 
etc, so that behaviour is regulated and the productive forces and 
relations of production are reproduced. In sum. ideologies impose upon 
individuals the "imaginary relationship.,.to the real conditions of 
existence." The state produces an ideology and the masses follow it. 
Ideology is a certain instance of practice which becomes effective by 
application.
In a nutshell, there has been a derailment of the ideologies from
their material foundation historically— from the foundation which gives
them their power or pertinence. The tendency has been to bow to the
idealist conception of history which regards ideologies as having an
independent material efficacy. Vith such a conception of history, it is
plans, policies, ideologies; and productive forces, industrialization,
modes of production, productivity, etc, which make history, rather than
people in the process of transforming circumstances and themselves, a
process in which people produce material goods and ideas and reproduce
themselves. Logically, it has been people with scientific or 'correct'
ideas/ideologies, planners, modernizing agents, entrepreneurs, cadres,
professionals, prophets, bureaucrats, leaders, etc, who are the agents
of that history making process. It is in this context that one of the
left-wing critics of Tanzanian ideology argued:
To begin with, it should be noted that what is at issue is not 
scientific socialism of Marxism-Leninism, but a Fabian or 
evolutionary socialism or, a Gotha Program of 
socialism...revolution is rejected for evolution; class struggle 
is repudiated; there is no conception of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat.26
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This means that ideologies are examined in terms of their scientificity 
or lack of it, and by their coherence, consistency and ability to 
achieve the desired goals, i.e. economic development.
But in essence, to examine ideologies, philosophies, policies, 
plans, strategies, etc, is to examine people in their social and 
political relations as they actively produce materially, that is "the 
connection of the social and political structure with production" and 
how the social structure and the state continually evolve out of their 
life process, within which ideas, conceptions, forms of consciousness 
are produced— both correct and incorrect.26 That is , ideologies cannot 
be read directly from the modes of production: it is people, and not 
modes of production who make history. Mendelsohn has correctly observed 
that:
It is not enough to correlate a set of ideas with one social 
group or class and believe therefore that a social basis has 
been established. Historians have to delve more deeply and 
recognize the historical process which lay behind the 
explanations of the social group itself. They must examine the 
activities in which this group is engaged which in turn could 
make use of the ideas and techniques in question. Because social 
imperatives are not uniform for all times, places, and groups 
within a society, historians must attempt to identify specific 
activities and imperatives.27
It is the importance of this consideration which will be demonstrated
by this study.
So far, ideology in Tanzania has been highly personalized in terms 
of the head of state and the "governing class" in collaboration with 
foreign interests, or seen in terms of purely economic/development 
aspects and the question of legitimacy. Thus while in the numerous 
studies on Tanzania, the existence of some processes such as, the 
differentiation of the peasants, the exploitative mechanisms,
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transformation of the communities by colonialism and the bureaucracy, 
has correctly been examined; no attempt has been made to examine the 
class formations in relation to the struggles, unities, alliances, and 
this related to the particular way in which the ideology of Ujamaa 
emerged. The method of studying ideologies has been objectivist: simply 
showing them as a product of certain antecedents, rather than examining 
the social and political struggles which created the circumstances which 
made it possible for the ideology to emerge.
While modes of production/economies, forms of exploitation, 
industrialization,etc, are important aspects in the examination of 
Ideologies, one needs to transcend them and examine the struggles of 
the social groups, their victories, defeats, transformations into each 
other, alliances, etc, and how within these relationships ideas are 
produced, transformed and systematized as ideologies in the minds of the 
intelligentsia:
Modes of production define/organize economic formations of a 
society. Contradictions defining modes of exploitation of those 
formations are the motive force of their history. Modes of 
production specify the fundamental contradiction (forces of 
production vs relations of production) and the principal 
contradiction (the exploiting class vs the exploited class). 
Very briefly, class struggles, determined by modes of 
production, taking place through economic formations (around 
modes of exploitation), political formations (around forms of 
hegemony) are the motive forces of their history of a class 
divided society.20
Broadly, the evolution, the systematization and belief in the 
magical power of ideology in the process of development and finally, its 
institutionalization after independence in Tanzania, is best grasped as 
part of the reality of a predatory, destructive imperialist domination, 
which as a despotic and totaritarian phenomenon involved the economic, 
political, cultural and psychological subjugation of Africans; and the
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struggles of Africans against it. Colonialism attempted the negation 
of African cultures as an expression of real material domination and 
Africans defended themselves within the context of material 
resistance.
The colonial ideologies of national oppression which regarded 
Africans as a people who belonged to the "child races" of the world, 
devoid of history, culture or ideology were radically changed with the 
crisis of the "civilizing mission" after the First World War. This was 
due to the threats posed by the working masses in Tanzania as a result 
of their lack of faith in the "civilizing mission" due to the War and 
the sufferings it had caused, and the general disillusionment with it 
among some circles in Europe itself. The colonialists, as a result of 
this, were forced to re-examine the foundation of their mission, and in 
the process they appropriated from their subjects those elements which 
would make the civilizing mission effective, and break the resistance. 
This was to find its expression in the attempts to create a "good 
African" who would be proud of being an African and proud of his
heritage, at the same time participating in the internal and external 
markets and acquiring a sense of individual property without losing his 
sense of community. This aspect culminated in the systematization of 
African Civilization by Europeans and the introduction of the famous 
Indirect Rule in the 1920s as an attempt at creating an African
Civilization stimulated by European culture and example. African
civilization as systematized by colonialists was essentally colonialist, 
and was an expression of concrete forms of colonial capitalist
production, given the particular forms of resistance they had to pacify.
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The African intelligentsia who emerged within the colonial forms of 
exploitation and oppression as a product of manual/mental division of 
labour, had initially surrendered and adopted the colonizers culture. 
The paradox is that, they were regarded even more disdainfully by 
Buropeans than the uneducated because of their tendency to regard 
themselves as equal to their masters after acquiring a sense of Western 
culture. Thus, the African intelligentsia was an outcast: alienated from 
the peoples' resistance against domination and exploitation and denied a 
place in the civilized circles as a result of the colonial paternal 
relations of domination. Disillusionment set in and a journey back to 
the roots began. For these civilized Africans, the rediscovery, 
restoration and reassertion of their own selves became the only means to 
attain equality with the Vest. It was in this context that they began to 
question the essence of Western civilization, and in the process came to 
the conclusion that to be civilized was to be African and proud of the 
heritage. They too began to systematize what they considered to be 
African Civilization, the very term coined by the Europeans after the 
First World War. This Civilization was to be based on African social, 
political and economic structures, while picking the best from Western 
civilization, i.e.technology.
This development began in the 1930s. It was the contradiction of 
being both black and Western which made them become self-conscious, and 
inevitably critical of the Vest. They were not non-Vestern, nor enemies 
of the Vest; and in that context, they were not sympathetic to the 
communists who were enemies of the Vest. They were for racial harmony 
because they too believed they had something to contribute to world 
civilization. Their ideas were fundamentally similar to the ideas of the
colonialists on African Civilization. In other words, the civilized 
African had been liberated by the master's attempt to co-opt some of the 
cultural elements of the oppressed, and this liberation was displayed by 
the radical aspects of African Civilization against the Vest, but on the 
other hand it signalled the victory of the civilizing mission: the
civilized African had accepted and internalized the view that his own 
world outlook had no other objectives than those of Western 
civilization.
In the 1940s, these conceptions were to be coupled with the demands 
for the country to be developed and modernized quickly by the government 
and for more education for Africans. By this time the educated had 
established connections with the Fabian Colonial Bureau, and were 
intergrating the statist ideas of Fabianism in conceptions of African 
Civilization. By the second half of the 1940s, these ideas had acquired 
a Pan-Africanist character with a heavy emphasis on the modernization of 
the country. With independence, the educated in Tanzania defined 
poverty, disease and ignorance as the enemies of the people; and as 
bearers of the ideology of development in power, the task was to perfect 
the state machinery as a tool for fighting against these three enemies. 
The state and its institutions were taken as the instruments through 
which the ideology could be effected and unity among the people achieved 
for development purposes. African Socialism, became the name of this 
ideology of development; within this ideology, society had to be rescued 
from those conflicts, characteristic of the Western capitalist 
societies, if development was to be attained: and this was possible only 
if there was consensus; a principle embodied in the state. Accordingly, 
for all this to take place, it was necessary for the civil society to
- 13 -
lose its independence ; and hence the erosion or total control by the 
government of the mass and political organizations, leaving the working 
people defenseless vis & vis capital and the state. This is because, in 
reality, the state is not neutral, nor is it simply an instrument: it is 
a real force within social relations
Thus the struggles after independence were not merely ideological; 
rather they were part of real material struggles, within which the 
intelligentsia used state power to defeat the workers and peasants, in 
the earnest belief that they were trying to emancipate the whole people 
from backwardness and class conflicts. Socialist ideology was an 
integral part of those struggles in which the working people were 
finally defeated.
That is how matters are in the broadest terms.
- 14; r
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1. Unless otherwise stated, Tanzania in this study refers to the 
mainland of the of the country only. It was called German Bast 
Africa (with nicknames such as Bundu, Byika and Safariland) 
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latter was subsequently changed to Tanzania in 1964 after the 
union with Zanzibar.
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Race (Tavistock Publications, London, 1977, p.3) writes: "As
people can understand their history only through the concepts of 
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properly understand their present. In human affairs there is a 
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is reflected in all social sciences...."
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Chapter Two 
TAIGAEYIKA PRIOR TO BRITISH RULE
It is necessary to deal with some aspects of pre-1920 Tanganyika 
which have a direct bearing on what will be discussed in the subsequent 
chapters. The reason for this lies in the fact that the developments 
that took place in Tanzania after 1920 are inextricably bound up with 
the developments that took place in the nineteeth century pre-European 
colonial period and the German colonial period <1885-1916). It is the 
nature of the social formation found by the British in 1917 which shaped 
the particular forms of contradictions, struggles and the forms of 
colonial capitalism under British rule.
The objective in this chapter is to show generally the evolution of
commodity production, the establishment of the colonial state and some
of the changes that took place under German rule. The exposition
commences with the evolution of commodity production, because, "for the
bourgeois society, the commodity-form, of the product of labour or the
value-form of the commodity, is the economic cell-form".1 Given the
nature of the available evidence initially the focus is mainly on
trade or market formation and development of exchange in general, rather
than production and this is especially the case with the pre-European
colonial period. The reason is, while it is not difficult to obtain
evidence about trade between the East African Coast and Asia for
thousands of years, this is not the case with the facts on changing
forms of production in the interior of the country. Therefore, the forms
of production are designated from exchange, which is taken as an
indicator. After all:
...the so-called exchange between dealers and dealers is by its 
very organization entirely determined by production, as well as 
being itself a producing activity. Exchange appears independent
- 19 -
of and indifferent to production only in the final phase where 
the product is exchanged for consumption. But <1) there is no 
exchange without division of labour, whether the latter is
spontaneous, natural, or already a product of historical
development; (2) private exchange presupposes private 
production; (3) the intensity of exchange, as well as its 
extension and its manner, are determined by the development and 
structure of production. For example. Exchange between town and 
country; exchange in the country, in towns etc. Exchange in all 
its moments thus appears as either directly comprised in 
production or determined by it.2
This recognition of the interdependence of exchange and production
refutes the Eurocentric view which traced the origins of the markets in
East Africa from outside through a process of diffusion.3
2.1 Evolution of Commodity Production
Literary evidence left by Arabs, Persians, Babylonians, Hebrews, 
Greeks, Romans, Indonesians, Chinese, Indians and even the East African 
feudal merchants suggest that there was a wide variety of seafaring 
people who crossed the Indian Ocean and traded with Phapta and other 
unidentified harbours. Rhapta has been variously identified as Dar es 
Salaam, Kilwa, Pangani, or Xsasani. The records show that overseas 
merchants had established beach heads along the East African coast as 
far back as two thousand years ago. The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea, 
written by a Greek ship pilot suggests that there was already trade 
between East Africa and India by the first millenium A.D,. By that time, 
merchant capital began to penetrate the interior of the coast through 
local agents, and in that process hooked up with the pre-existing Long 
Distance Trade in the interior. Gold from Zimbabwe had long ago reached 
the coast through Sofala and later on Kilwa. By the ninth and tenth 
century A. D. there had already emerged a Swahili society with an
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identifiable culture, which utilized the Arabic script in the written 
forms.A
Ibn Batuta, an Arab traveller, reported in 1331 about the prosperity 
of the coastal towns of East Africa, and one of them was Kilwa. The East 
African coast prospered as a source of ivory, tortoise shell, rhino 
horn, coconut, gold, mangrove poles and grains. By 1505, when the 
Portuguese arrived in Kilwa, they found the town flourishing because of 
the coastal .economy which rested on agriculture, fishing and commerce. 
There were already men of property who owned agricultural slaves and 
boats for trade. The villages in the outskirts of the town produced food 
for the town and for export. Other towns in existence by the time of the 
arrival of the Portuguese were Bagamoyo, Lamu, Hombasa, Sofala, 
Mogadishu, etc.®
Mot much is reported about the interior, where most of the traded 
goods came from. From the scanty evidence, there was already a marked 
division of labour and trading patterns which made it possible for the 
coastal towns to flourish. For example, some recent excavations have 
established the production of man-made iron in Kagera region (Bukoba) 
dating as far back as 500 B.C.® By the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century, there were blacksmiths in every community in Tanzania; and 
according to some explorers' reports, the implements which were forged 
and traded throughout the regional network were "hoes, spears, assegais, 
arrow heads, battle axes, hatchets, knives and daggers, sickles and 
razors, rings and wire circlets." Bells were also manufactured for sale 
to pastoralists, and pipes with iron bowls and stems and all kinds of 
pincers or pliers.7 These aspects are best summarised in a discussion on 
a thesis put forward in 1940 by Friihlich;
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Fruhlich's thesis was built on a massive compilation of 
anthropological material from numerous tribes across the 
continent, supplemented by travellers' accounts from the same 
areas. To this material is now being added the emerging 
archeological evidence that confirms the movement of commodities 
over large distances as part of the cultural totality of the 
continent dating back to early iron age. In a review which 
includes a part of Tanganyika in its source material, Fagan has 
claimed that the demand of metallugists and farmers led to 
'contacts between communities living up to several hundred miles 
apart...[and] developed into complicated barter networks 
extending over enormous areas.'e
The forms of division of labour which existed by the end of the
eighteenth gentury were to some extent quite elaborate, in some
instances extending beyond sexual and age divisions: there were also
porters, basket weavers, cotton weavers, craftsmen (and master craftsmen
in guild like units protected by magic) and professional hunters. These
divisions of labour and the unequal endowment and distribution of raw
materials (for example, clay, iron, copper, salt, etc,) explain the
emergence of the trading centres in the interior.3
Slave labour had been employed in the East African Coast for many 
centuries; but its demand in the market begun in the end of the
eighteenth century with the establishment of sugar and coffee
plantations in the Mascarene Islands in the Indian Ocean and demand for 
domestic slaves in Oman. This demand for slaves in the market increased 
further by 1800 with the establishment of clove plantations in 
Zanzibar. But by 1820s supply of slaves for the French and Oman demands 
was on the decline. This was because of the increased demand for slaves 
internally for the coastal economies and also the anti-slaverly campaign 
by Britain. Unlike in Vest Africa, slave trade in East Africa had begun 
at a time when it was on the decline on the world scale and demand for
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raw materials and creation of markets was the main concern of world
capitalism, as a result of the industrial revolution. ,
The Sultan of Oman, Seyyid Said, moved his capital and hence state
structures to Zanzibar in 1832 so as to strengthen his stronghold on the
East African Coast and inland. This was because of the increasing
importance of the East African plantations and business centres. But
more important was the fact that after the defeat of the Portuguese in
the East African Coast by 1700 by the Bast African feudal merchants in
alliance with the Omanites, the latter's colonization of the territory
had not been very successful due to the resistance of the coastal
Swahili ruling houses for two hundred years.10 The interest of the
Omanites was in the establishment of plantations, business centres,
slave recruitment posts and markets for goods. All these interests were
engendered by the world market, and hence the shifting of the capital by
Seyyid Said "in order to consolidate 'his overseas territory' for
commerce and agriculture (based on slave labour)."11 Slave trade for the
purpose of export was not rampant in the last century as it is often
purported to have been. The 1822, 1845, 1850 and 1860 legal arrangements
reflect the economic demand within Bast Africa, whereby:
'All concessions relating to the export of slaves outside East 
Africa were granted with little resistance on the part of the 
Sultan. The implication is that Zanzibar authorities were 
decreasingly interested in the foreign slave trade which was not 
considered worth defying the British about.'12
By the dawn of the nineteenth century,trade had expanded further in
the East African towns which had been handling all the caravans of the
unknown inland due to European conquest of Asia. Zanzibar and Kilwa were
being transformed into metropolitan satellites, and this period was
marked by more greater transformations of Tanganyika "Than any other
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region of Tropical Africa at the time...."13 By the second half of the 
nineteenth century, the major exports were; raw materials— gum, ivory, 
copal, wild rubber, etc; and, staple foods such as grains, cattle for 
meat, and sugar. Ivory which was originally exported to India for 
manufacturing bangles experienced a greater demand in this period due to 
demand in Burope for the manufacture of ivory combs, billiard balls and 
piano keys.14
From the coast to the interior, besides a host of lesser trade 
routes,there were three major ones: the Kilwa-Lake Fyasa in the south; 
the Bagamoyo-Fyamwezi-Sumbwa-Ujiji up to Katanga and Buganda in the 
centre; and, the Tanga-Pangani in the Forth. The complexity of 
nineteenth century Tanganyika consists in the fact that the bulk of the 
goods that were traded mostly rested on hunting and gathering of natural 
products. As a result of this, there was demand for: porters to carry 
ivory, food to feed the porters, tools to grow food and iron to make 
tools. Consequently, more communities were incorporated in 
specialization and the expansion of trade networks.
By the nineteenth century, permanent markets had already emerged in 
Ujiji, Amboni, Umba, Usambara, Upare, Uchagga, Uhehe, Usafwa, etc. The 
currencies used in exchange ranged from cowrie shells, products like 
salt, to coins— mainly the Austrian dollar and Indian pice. Coins were 
in circulation in the coastal towns and hinterland villages and some 
areas in the interior. For example, chief Rumanyika of Karagwe accepted 
notes; and the Swahili merchant Tippu Tip "secured about £1,000 in this 
way in Ubena in the early 1860s. "1B In the 1880s, Zanzibar as a major 
entrepot was second only to Brazil in the supply of rubber in the world 
market.16
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Alongside the use of slave labour among the coastal waungwana (free 
gentlemen), Vasukuma, Vanyamwezi, Vagogo, Vahehe, etc, for the 
plantations established in some of the areas, there also had emerged 
entrepreneurs who were specializing in agriculture in the central 
caravan route, among the Vanyamwezi and Vagogo as suppliers of food. 
There were many families in Unyanyembe "which employed men or bought 
slaves to assist in grain production so that they would benefit from the 
soaring prices."17 Some of these entrepreneurs resulted from the 
branching off of merchant capital into production in response to new 
market opportunities, and also some of them from being pushed out of 
trade by Asian merchant capital. The entrepreneurs of Tabora were called 
wandewa. Some of these entrepreneurs, according to Iliffe, had started 
introducing innovations in agricultural systems towards the dawn of the 
German colonial era, and one such entrepreneur in the coast was Sheikh 
Ramiya, an ex-slave in Bagamoyo, who was the major exporter of copra 
which was a purely export crop.1S
Coupled with these trading activities and the new economic 
activities in general was the settlement of Asians in Tanganyika since 
the second half of the eighteenth century. Although Asians began to 
trade with East Africa much earlier, the earliest arrivals for 
permanent settlement date back only to the 1770s in Zanzibar. It was 
this section of the Indians which formed the nucleus around which the 
present mercantile Indian community developed, and their economic role 
which was to characterise them during the rest of the nineteenth century 
was more or less defined from their early time of settlement.13 The 
Indians started displacing the Arab and Swahili traders, and turned the 
latter into plantation owners or forced them to the interior as caravan
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owners. Indians also later expanded into plantation and caravan
ownership as creditors and financiers:
Their commercial activities included customs collection, 
financing and outfitting caravans, banking and money lending, 
agricultural financing and marketing, real estate, shipping and 
exporting within the Indian ocean, and wholesale and retail 
trade....As European commercial interests expanded in Zanzibar, 
the Asian merchants assumed middlemen roles as merchants/brokers 
for the American, French, British and German importers, 
exporters and shippers.20
From 200 Asians in 1818, their number rose to 5,000 by 1860. By mid­
nineteenth century Asians were scattered in the coastal areas and right 
up in the interior "where European explorers found 'dukas' (Indian 
shops) set up in important points along the trade routes."21 There were 
230 Asians in Kilwa, 191 in Bagamoyo, 105 in Dar es Salaam, 80 in Tanga, 
and 2,550 in Zanzibar by 1871. The most powerful Asian capitalist in the 
1860s was Taria Topan of Zanzibar, who financed the majority of the 
famous traders, including Tippu Tip and Rumaliza. Asians also virtually 
controlled the technical, clerical and auditing jobs in the Sultan's 
colonial administration by 1880s.22 Their capital was generated from 
business with Europeans, Arabs and Africans.
When the German chartered trading company— Deutsch-Ostafrikanische 
Gesellschaft (DOAG) or the German East African Company— took over the 
administration of Tanganyika in 1885, it "could not compete with Arab or 
with Indian financiers who knew the country, relied on extensive 
networks of kinsmen, were willing to take high risks."23 The local 
merchant capitalist had the upper hand in the economy in general up to 
1900, and this was because all the exports were initially traditional 
exports, i.e. goods that had been being exported before the invasion of 
the country by the Germans.
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As a result of the functioning of merchant capital and its branching 
to other activities, besides slave labour being employed, there were 
also some forms of wage labour, mostly paid in kind, in existence before 
1880. Wage labour was being used by the entrepreneurs discussed above, 
traders, missionaries and European companies. The majority of these 
labourers were employed by the caravans, and they consisted mainly of 
the Vasukuma and Vanyamwezi. It is estimated that between 100,000 and
200,000 Vanyamwezi went to the coast as porters every year in the second 
half of the last century, and Bagamoyo had around 30,000 to 40,000 
porters. Trade caravan porterage was the first form of existence of 
migrant labour which was already widespread by 1880s as in the colonial
period, and "unskilled labourers in Tanga in the late 1880s earned about
thirteen shillings a month. Thirty years later they would earn roughly 
the same, and only a few shillings more."24 Finally, there were also 
"masons, carpenters, secretaries— who found paid employment with 
chiefs."26
Two major processes took place in the economic sphere with the
establishment of German colonialism: (1) The reordering of the economy
into a German colonial economy within the general interests of raw
material extraction, monopoly of the market and export of capital; with 
the former two being more dominant. (2) The taking over of some of the 
nineteenth century structures, for example, communication routes (the 
railway lines and most roads built during the colonial period followed 
the trade routes), the employment of migrant labour and the export of 
commodities which were already being produced— rubber, coffee (which was 
being produced in Bukoba for many years before German colonization), 
etc. The changes which took place under German colonialism are best
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discussed under the state forms which were established, an aspect dealt 
with in the next section.
2.2 Establishment of the Colonial state
The Imperial Chancellor Otto von Bismarck of Germany granted
protection to the Bast African Territory— Tanganyika in February 1885
after being pressurised by the merchants and industrialists who were
facing stiff, competition from British and French companies. Although
Germany had been trading with Bast Africa since 1847 and her industrial
revolution begun in the early 1870s, by the time of the Congo Conference
(Berlin Conference) which ended up in the partition of Africa, she still
believed in free trade and regarded colonies as a burden. The decision
was provoked by Carl Peters and his friends who had formed a society for
colonization and had obtained 12 fraudulent treaties from Tanganyika.
The objective needs of the imperialist bourgeoisie underlying the
colonial ventures in the end of the nineteenth century— i.e. the
exploitation of people and resources, were summed up in the following
words of one of the greatest advocates and builders of the British
empire, Cecil Rhodes:
I was in the East-End of London yesterday and attended a 
meeting of the unemployed. I listened to the wild speeches, 
which were just a cry for 'bread', 'bread', and on my way home I 
pondered over the same and I became more than ever convinced of 
the importance of imperialism.... My cherished idea is a solution 
for the social problem, i.e. in order to serve the 40,000,000 
inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we 
colonial statesmen must acquire new lands to settle the surplus 
population, to provide new markets for the goods produced in the 
factories and the mines. The empire, as I have always said, is a 
bread and butter question. If you want to avoid civil war you 
must become an imperialist.26
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As result of the partition, Tanganyika became a Germany colony for 
thirty years. After the First World War she fell under British rule up 
to 1961 when she attained independence. The centralization of capital 
under the imperialist stage of capitalism, an essential aspect of the 
existence of capital as an independent power, found its expression among 
the bourgeois agents in the brutalization and degradation of the people 
of Tanganyika manifested in the forms of domination which were to be 
established. . But before dealing with them, a general and broad 
exploration of some of the ideological aspects of imperialism and their 
background is necessary here, so as to grasp better the various 
ramifications of those forms of domination.
Marx summed up the history of the so-called primitive accumulation—  
i.e. the process of separation of the producers from their means of 
production and the accumulation of wealth in few hands, the pre-history 
of capital and its corresponding mode of production as, "written in the 
annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire."27 That is, this mode of 
production was characterised by brutalities from its very emergence as 
particular forms of domination. These brutalities extended even beyond 
the territories of capitalism's emergence; hence, hand in hand with this 
separation of the producers from their means of production and the 
accumulation of wealth in few hands was:
The discovery of gold and silver in America, the 
extirpation, enslavement and entombment in the mines of the 
indigenous population of that continent, the beginning of the 
conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa into 
a preserve for the commercial hunting of blackskins, are all 
things which characterize the dawn of the era of capitalist 
production. Hard on their heels follows commercial war of 
European nations, which has the globe as its battlefield. It 
begins with the revolt of the Netherlands from Spain, assumes 
gigantic dimensions in England's anti-Jacobin War, and is still 
going on in the shape of the Opium Wars against China etc.20
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It was within these processes that "race" and "civilization" became 
catchwords among intellectuals who were concerned with the events 
outside Europe. The essence of these catchwords was the justification of 
the increasing intervention of some 'superior' race in other countries. 
Essentially, the concepts of inferior/superior people, like colonization 
itself and even the subordination of people in general pre-dates 
capitalism. Early Greek and Roman literature, reflecting the 
institutions of slavery had wide usage of such concepts. Aristotle, for 
example, held that for some to rule and and others to be ruled was 
expedient: "From the hour of birth, some are marked out for subjection, 
others for rule....some men are by nature free and others slaves...."29 
This was the spirit of ancient civilization whereby people were either 
Greeks or barbarians, slaves or free by nature.
Under feudalism and the mercantilist era, inequalities within and 
without European societies were explained religiously. Accordingly, it 
was the wish of God for some people to be reduced to servitude. This
fact is demonstrated, for example, by the Bulls issued in 1455 by the
Pope, who supposedly represented the wishes of God on earth. The Pope 
authorized Portugal to reduce to servitude all infidels.30 According to 
C.R. Boxer:
In the fifteenth century...the average Iberian Christian— like 
any other— never referred to the Muslim and the Jewish without 
adding some injurious epithet. Hatred and intolerance, not
sympathy and understanding, for alien creeds and races was a
general rule. 'Moors', Jews and gentiles were alike regarded as
doomed to hell fire in the next world. Consequently they were 
not likely to be treated with much consideration in this one.31
Religious explanations for inequalities and subjugation of people in 
general were not enough under bourgeoisdom. The complexity of the advent 
of the bourgeois era, as classically demonstrated by the French
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Revolution and the American Var of Independence is, the bourgeoisie 
conquered political power with the "pompous catalogue of the 
'inalienable rights of man'"32 as a protest against the inequalities 
manifest in the pre-bourgeois societies. But the bourgeoisie did not do 
away with inequalities: the process of primitive accumulation, for
example, confirms not only the fact that "capital comes dripping from 
head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt";33 it also confirms 
the fact that* capitalism merely changed the forms of servitude. One John 
Vade wrote about the conditions in the industries in the United Kingdom 
in 1835: "The cupidity of the mill-owners whose cruelties in the pursuit 
of gain have been hardly exceeded by those perpetuated by the Spaniards 
in the conquest of America in the pursuit of gold".34 It was only the 
name which had changed: "For slave trade, read labour market, for
Kentucky and Virginia, Ireland and agricultural districts of England, 
Scotland and Vales, for Africa, Germany."3®
The new forms of inequality were accompanied by military and 
technological sophistication as a result of the developments in the 
sciences. As far as the social sciences were concerned, these 
developments heralded the advent of what August Comte termed the 
"scientific era", whereby everything had to be explained scientifically 
by searching the cause of changes or problems within the things 
themselves. The social problems which arose with capitalism— the ruin 
and the impoverishment of the small producers, the misery of the working 
people, the inequalities in the distribution of wealth, the degrading 
effects of division of labour and industrialization, crises, anarchy in 
production, etc— had to be explained. If according to the "catalogue of 
'inelienable rights of man'", all people were equal, the reasons for
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the objective inequalities in the society had to be sought in people
themselves. Social sciences grew up as a reflection of these
inequalities and divisions in Europe and all over the world:
Anthropologists largely studied non-Europe, apart from peasant 
folk traditions in Europe itself.,.the tendency was to link the 
study of these complex cultures with the study of the simple 
Australian aborigines and the Bushmen of South Africa. 
Sociologists, on the other hand, studied whites— dockers in the 
East-Bnd, poverty-striken 'children of the Jago' as primitive in 
many respects as the nomads at the end of the earth. The great 
danger was the disinherited of Europe might see his image in 
the dispossessed of Africa or Asia....3S
If the danger of the poverty stricken in Europe seeing their 
reflection in the dispossessed of the rest of the world was to be 
avoided, then the differences between them had to be established—  
scientifically. The hitherto existing beliefs, prejudices and stereo­
types— whether religious or simply idealist— found in the works of the 
Germans Immanuel Kant and F.G. Hegel, the Swede Carl Finne, the Austrian 
Samuel G. Morton, etc. in the eighteenth century and early nineteenth 
century were being transformed into scientific categories. As idealist 
or scientific, these categories were to be dominant in Eurocentric 
historiography and outlook in general for more than two centuries. The 
basic tenets of this historiography were succinctly summed up in the 
following words of Hegel:
Africa... is no historical part of the world; it has no movement 
to exhibit. Historical movement in it— that is its northern 
part— belongs to the Asiatic or European world,
Vhat we properly understand by Africa is the unhistorical, 
undeveloped spirit, still involved in the conditions of mere 
nature and which had to be presented here only as on the 
threshold of the world's history,..the history of the world 
travels from East to Vest, for Europe is absolutely the end of 
history, Asia the beginning.37
To transform the categories that expressed inequalities, whereby
within Europe, the workers and labour recruiters, for example in Britain
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were called "hands" and "flesh agents" respectively, social sciences 
fell back to biology. Biology, in the last century was centrally 
concerned with the theories of "monogeny", "hybridization", and 
"miscengeneration" with the aim of providing the foundation of the 
genetic differences between "superior" and "inferior" beings.30 Given 
such a preoccupation, civilization and race, modern and traditional, 
social control and social change, etc. became the major preoccupation of 
the nascent social sciences, as exampled by the works of people like 
Morgan, Comte, Spencer and Tbnnies. Vhat was to be termed "Social 
Darwinism" was essentially developed by Herbert Spencer, the great 
expounder of the principles of evolution as applied to societies. His 
main interest was in the "primitive man" as an aid to the understanding 
of the social and cultural evolution of the moden man, and his accounts 
drew evidences from travellers and ethnologists. He drew an analogue 
between Africans and children in his account.39
This elevation of racial categories— of the superiority of the 
Aryans and the non-perfectability of other people— to science was to 
find its culmination in the writings of Robert Knox the Scottish 
anatomist who devoted himself to the question of race, and Arthur de 
Gobineau the French pseudo-scientific racist in 1850 and 1853-55 
respectively.*° According to them, the inferiority of other races could 
be explained from the point of view of psychology and intelligence and 
their incapacity in this respect derived from an original inequality. 
The views that Africans were a cursed people whose very humanity needed 
to be questioned, and about African barbarism, superstition, treachery, 
moral depravity, paganism, sexuality, cunningness, laziness, fatalism, 
undeveloped intellectual faculties, etc, entered the scientific arena.
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In fact, these were exactly the same categories that had been used 
against the working people of Europe and even the pre-1917 Russian 
peasants. According to Doris Lessing, in the parts of Tolstoy's Anna 
Karenina about the land owners and peasants, where colour feelings do 
not arise, "...the interminable discussions about 'the peasant* are 
paralled by the endless talk about 'the native'. Vhat was said in the 
pre-revolutionary Russia about the peasant is word for word what was 
said about Africans— lazy, irresponsible, shiftless,
superstitious,..."A1
The elevation of these racist categories into science in mid-last
century more or less coincided with the "Opium Wars" in China in the
1840s, the Indian 'mutinies' in the 1850s, the uprisings of Africans in
Jamaica which were savagely repressed in 1865, and the transition from
competitive to monopoly capitalism marked by rivaly among the trading
concerns in Africa for monopoly of the markets. Manning Hash sums up all
these aspects in the following words:
For at least three hundred years, propositions on the inequality 
of the biological endowments of the varieties of men have been 
put forth in some 'scientific' guise or other...the hypotheses 
come and go, but they tend to cluster in time and to be 
associated with crises about relations of different ethnic 
and/or racial groups. The first bursts of contentions about the 
natural inferiority of a racially defined population came with 
the spread of the Europeans into the Hew World. The discovery of 
the American Indians, and the domination, exploitation, or 
extermination of them, precipitated the classic controversy Las 
Casas and Sepulveda... in 1550-51....Other clusters in history 
turn up at the time of the French Revolution, with Gobineau and 
the Aristocrats decrying the inferiority of the less privileged; 
the controversy between the abolitionists and the pro-slavery 
elements in the American South prior to the Civil War; the 
rising howl at the flood tide of Eastern and Southern 
immigration to the United States;...,
The 'scientific' accounts of inequality and domination, like the
"journals, newspapers, books and documents which have proved most vocal
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on the issues of race" were predominantly "middle class, referring in 
the main not to what the masses actually thought and believed, but to 
the writings of the literate minority about what they thought and 
believed their contemporaries to feel."**3 In other words, it was the 
intellectual representatives of the bourgeoisie— the "thinkers of the 
class (its active, conceptive ideologists, who make the formation of 
illusions of the class about itself their source of livelihood)"—  
creating the illusions for the "active members of the class" who had 
"less time to make up illusions and ideas about themselves."'*'*
It turns out that the first colonial lobbies in Germany, the first 
country to colonize Tanganyika after the partition of Africa, mainly 
consisted of highly specialized pressure groups, rather than popular 
response to agitation. The earliest to start were the geographical 
societies— the Gesellschaft fur Erdkunde zu Berlin (1825) and 
CentraJ^erein fur Handelgeographic (1863)— "which emphasized the economic 
value of the geographical sciences". The early explorers, such as H. 
Baroh and Emin Pasha who previously worked for foreign governments, 
later an increasingly turned to their own government and provided both 
political and intellectual support for German expansion. Missionary 
societies also provided another lobby. The Catholic church in Germany 
was linked with the merchants and administrators in the mission field. 
Missionaries wanted real politic, because "they felt that the German 
sword should be thrown into balance against slave traders and heathen 
warlords". It is all these groups which later on contributed greatly to 
the colonization of Africa.'*5
The formation of Deutsche Kolonialverein in 1882 was a result of a 
meeting between the Frankfurt and Offenbach chambers of commerce, a few
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business men and intellectuals (members of the Verein fur Geographic und 
Statistik) who pledged to support colonial commerce, exploration and 
expansion. This league derived its influence from connections with high 
ranks of the bureaucracy, universities, municipal administration and 
business men in Germany. This league was to be transformed later into 
Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft (DKG) under the leadership of Carl Peters 
who in 1884 travelled to Tanganyika and signed twelve "blood 
brotherhood", treaties for the colonization of the country.45
There were practically no industrial workers and farmers in the DKG 
as within the Pan-German league. This was despite the fact that it was 
the farmers who were supposed to be looking hardest for a living space 
outside the crowded Reich. The membership of the DKG was overwhelmingly 
derived from high school graduates with an Abitur who had served in the 
armed forces for one year as volunteers or commissioned officers. These 
were people who voted for the National Liberals and Conservatives, so as 
"to make their mark in the civil service, the army, the professions, or- 
-above all— in commerce and industry." Above all, the DKG was also 
closely linked with finance through bankers and factory owners.4,7
Carl Peters, the pioneer in German colonization of Tanganyika was 
not a capitalist: he was an intellectual who was very outspoken as a 
racist and ultra patriotic with a mixture of love and hatred for 
Britain. When he returned to Germany after his stay in London where 
German nationals were employed as migrant labourers, he opined: "I got 
tired of being accounted among pariahs and wished to belong to the 
master race." This, and numerous other statements he made, typically 
represented the widespread sense of inferiority felt by German middle
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classes with regard to Britain,Ae and it was these middle class elements 
who were to go to the colonies.
That it was mainly the middle class elements who were to go to the
colonies, also applied to settlers, diggers and missionaries— besides
the administrators. Crosbie Garstin, in his account on how they as
settlers got to the colonies demonstrates this fact. According to him,
those who went to the colonies were a mixed lot: some of them were
"younger sons kicked from the paternal doorstep with a couple of
thousand pounds, a first class passage (single), and instructions to go
to the devil somewhere out of sight...tin]— the colonies", something
which sounded "much more romantic than a son going to the devil in the
local pothouse— ..."; others were rebelling "at the dictates of office
clocks, factory whistles, or orderly— room trumpeters" and so decided to
go where such things were non-existent. And as for others, it was those
who "read, marked, learned" and were hopelessly "bamboozled by those
charming little land company booklets" found by tons everyday between
Whitehall and Temple Bar. The booklets visioned "meadows waving with
corn as golden as a chorus lady's locks, and rivers gushing a mixture of
milk and h o n e y " . T h e r e  were very highly coloured pictures on the
covers of these booklets. They showed:
the settler's rose-hung bungalow in the background (Hrs Settler 
entertaining a brace of fashionable duchesses to tea on the 
verandah), while the bearded settler himself sits astride his 
mettlesome Arab in the foreground and, with an apraised riding- 
whip, directs the harvesting of his crops. Above all gleams a 
sky as blue as the sort Mr Reckitt makes, and in the top right 
hand corner glows a full-featured, flame-whiskered sun, smiling 
and smiling away fit to tear his face in half....
'Come to the golden sunshine’, the booklet implores. 'Come 
where the sun shines all the time. Every manly man is 
sunburnt'.60
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Initially the colony was administered by Deutsche Ostafrika 
Gesellschaft (DOAG), a company which was later on transformed into a 
trading and investment concern after 1887 when various bankers in 
Germany began to finance it. Between 1884 and 1886, DOAG sent out 18 
expenditions to Tanganyika to make treaties and extend the territory, 
and by 1888 it had already established 18 small trading and experimental 
stations.
This early period was marked by violent resistance by the 
Tanganyikans— in places such as Bagamoyo, Uzigua, Sadani, etc,. In the 
latter area the resistance was led by Bwana Heri, a coastal merchant. 
This resistance by the Tanganyikans was taking place at a time when the 
boundaries of the territory had not been completely drawn: the Western 
boundary was drawn in 1884 with the recognition of the Congo Free State 
by the Germans, the Northern and Southern boundaries were drawn in 1886, 
and the ten miles coastal strip of the Indian Ocean was bought from the 
Sultan of Zanzibar in 1888. In other words, the territory, as one of the 
defining characteristic features of the state, was completely formed by 
1888.
The resistance of the people extended further inland after 1888. 
This was a result of Emil Von Zelewski's (the leader in German 
occupation) attempt to issue decrees for the creation of a "German-style 
administration", imposition of taxes, orders to property owners to prove 
their titles, and prohibition of importation of guns and ammunition.61 
Abushiri, a coastal merchant and owner of plantations led resistance 
against this in Pangani. In Tanga, a German warship was fired and 
replied by the shelling of the town. In the South of the country, 
Germans were given an ultimatum to leave Kilwa, Lindi and Mikindani.
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Bagamoyo, which was already in the hands of the Germans, was attacked by
8,000 men in 1888. The Germans responded by killing everybody at sight 
in the whole town.
Generally, the Southern part of the country was defeated in 1890; 
Moshi, Tabora, and areas around Lake Victoria were defeated in 1891; and 
Iringa was defeated in 1892— although the resistance continued until 
1898. These rebellions against the Germans were conducted by 
heterogeneous.sections of people. The only people who withdrew from them 
were the Oman Administrators and Asian merchants: '"The wealthy, the 
propertied families...saw their livelihood injured by the rising and 
therefore supported the Germans"'.®2 Estimations are, there were at 
least 84 locations of early colonial wars in Tanganyika between 1888 and 
the Maji Haji uprising of 1905-7. ®3. These wars were waged in order to 
crush the resistance of the people against colonization. The human and 
material destruction of these wars are unaccountable so far due to 
scanty information. The number of men, women and childen who died in 
these wars is unknown; and this is besides the looting of peoples' food 
and livestock by the troops and the burning down of villages and towns. 
In some instances these colonial wars involved the killing of people in 
a whole village as was done in Hondoa in Dodoma Region on 28th August 
1893; or Useje village on 10th August 1895.®A And this is besides the 
cases pointed out above about what happened in Tanga and Bagamoyo. 
Characteristically, such massacres have not entered Western historical 
and moral memory like their later counterparts like Lidice in 
Czechoslovakia— the Hazi massacre in World War II.
As far as the manner in which the Germans conducted these wars is 
concerned, most characteristic is the way they dealt with the Wayao of
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Southern Tanganyika in the hinterland of Lindi under chief Machemba.
Three punitive expeditions against the Vayao had failed initially,
because the Vayao were conducting guerilla warfare. The Germans finally
decided to use "scorched-earth policies"— policies which had already
been used in some of the coastal areas of Tanganyika. This method
involved the systematic razing of villages, bushes, farms and animals
and the depletion of all local supplies.®® Many years later, Apostle
Kolumba Xsigala was to write in his reminiscences about what he saw in
this region in 1893:
....within a few weeks I passed Kilwa on my way from 
Zanzibar.... and I disembarked at Kilwa to see the damage to the
town where it was destroyed by the German shells and to inspect
where the chiefs were hanged and the gallows set up. Many people 
died on the hill opposite the town thinking they were out of 
range where as it was nothing for the artillery. There were many 
corpses of women and children who were killed by accident being 
mistaken for soldiers....[In]...Lindi Cwe] saw many ruins....66
The result of all this destruction was famine, previously unknown in the
history of these people: these battles were "delivered with the clear
aim of teaching lessons of new power relations to undecided peoples.
This may have added to the degree of brutality and wantonness in the
fighting...."®7 The net result of all this destruction was loss of
manpower among the different peoples due to death and casualties,
systematic destruction of homes, crops and storages and capture of
livestock and total disruption of ecological control and economies.
By 1888, the DOAG had completely failed to keep the country under 
control. Bismarck, who at first refused to help, finally sent out 
Sudanese and Shangaan mercenaries comanded by Von Vissman in 1889. 
Tanganyika was then declared a colony and DOAG was relieved of its
administrative tasks so as to be able to concentrate on the economic
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sphere. As a result, the main population centres and communication lines 
were finally under German control by 1898: Bomas (military and
administrative garrisons) had been established in the areas which were 
to become provincial headquarters (e.g. in Songea, Iringa, Tabora, 
etc.). These Bomas were manned by officials surrounded by bands of 
gunmen for the maintenance of authority and order. Local leaders or 
Swahili speaking people from the coast were picked as leaders for those 
areas which had no forms of organized authority before the colonial 
conquest, as a way to extend authority. Thus, public power, i.e. the 
bureaucracy was established by 1898.
It was only with this establishment of public power and public force 
separate from the community, and hence firm control of the country that 
the government was able to Introduce taxation. Hut tax was introduced in 
1898 (the Ordinance was issued in 1887), as a means to hasten the 
monetarization of the economy and force people to sell their surplus 
produce, sell their labour power, obey the government, and to meet the 
administrative expenditures of the colony. Tax collection entailed the 
use of force— askarls (soldiers)— who at times went as far as 
confiscating peoples' property or holding a chief as a hostage until 
taxes were paid. In short, tax collection and labour supply for 
construction of railways, settler farms, plantations and porterage 
became the major task of the authorities— both local and central.^ It 
is necessary at this juncture to point out certain theoretical issues in 
relation to the state given what has been pointed out above and what 
will be discussed in the subsequent chapters.
The state was firmly established in Tanganyika by 1900. Its main 
interests were in the extraction of raw materials and the monopoly of
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the market. It has been pointed out that it was with the establishment 
of the bureaucracy and the military that it was possible to introduce 
taxation, which in turn was meant to facilitate commodity production. 
Vhat this means, is the fact that the officials, army, administration, 
judges, etc— in short the bureacracy and the military are an inseparable 
part of the state. They are that section of the material ruling class—  
the bourgeoisie, which constitutes the committee for administering the 
common interests of the productive bourgeoisie. It is that group of 
people under whom power is concentrated; power which is used for the 
organization of the society and to ensure the existence or production 
and reproduction of conditions of production, while the productive 
bourgeoisie does all the accumulation and hunting for profits. The 
bureaucracy is that "ideological strata [ standel” which to the 
bourgeoisie is "flesh of its flesh".45®
The state is the form which the bourgeoisie is "compelled to adopt, 
both for internal and external purposes"; it is that "separate entity, 
alongside and outside the civil society" (i.e.the "practical idealist" 
rule of the dominant class).60 That the state is a form of organization, 
cannot be grasped adequately without its foundation which enables it to 
impose itself politically and socially upon society by establishing 
norms and regulations while at the same time remaining a part of the 
capitalist relations. Coercion is not the distinguishing feature of the 
state under capitalism, as it often emphasized; for there is coercive 
power in every human society. It is its externality in relation to the 
civil society, i.e. "a public power distinct from the mass of the 
people",61 which differentiates the bourgeois state form.
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The externality of the state rests on the three factors under 
capitalism:62 (1) production and circulation of commodities does not
automatically reproduce the most important commodity, which is external 
within commodity production— labour power as a commodity. Historical 
studies demonstrate the fundamental and central role played by the state 
in the process of divorcing the producer from the means of production 
and hence creation of the working class in the period of "primitive 
accumulation" .• This role does not disappear after this period: the state 
goes on instituting social policies, laws, sanctions etc after that. 
Social classes do not reproduce on their own or simply by economic 
compulsions; the conditions of wage relations are ensured by the
constraining of the owner of labour power to enter into those relations. 
(2)Labour power, as the unique and specific commodity which is the
historical condition of the existence of the capitalist mode of 
production is not reproduced as a capitalist commodity. This commodity 
is bought by the capitalist in the market, and its value is not only 
determined by the socially necessary labour time, but also the 
reproduction of this specific commodity— "the value of means of
subsistence necessary for the maintanance of its owner".e3 Subsistence 
is not obtained within the production process, but in the sphere of 
circulation. The result of this is the biggest contradiction in 
capitalism; whereby the capitalists strive to reduce the value of labour 
power and struggle for more profits, while the workers struggle to 
increase it, i.e. competition between the workers and the capitalists.
The two factorsabove can be summed in that "the modern state is 
'the creation of the middle class, first as a means to break down'" the 
pre-capitalist relations, "'then as a means to crush the emancipatory
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aspirations of the producers, the working class.*"®* (3>"The immanent 
laws of capitalist production manifest themselves in the external 
movement of individual capitals, assert themselves as coercive laws of 
competition,..." and this competition among capitals whether under 
competitive or monopoly stage, is nothing more than the very "inner 
nature of capital"®® as an external necessity, because "capital exists 
and can only exist as many capitals, and its self-determination 
therefore appears as a reciprocal interaction with one another."®® Given 
such competition the state is compelled to regulate the activities of 
capitals depending on the particular requirements of reproduction of the 
system; and this at times requires the state to control or go against 
certain forms of capital in favour of others.
The above theoretical considerations are important in the case of 
Tanganyika, because, as was pointed out earlier, Tanganyika was already 
intergrated in the world market before colonialism and merchant capital 
and some forms of slave labour were being used, also some quasi wage 
labour. Vhat was to happen under colonialism was the restructuring of 
the economy in such a way that it suited the interests of the German 
bourgeoisie. And this aspect resulted in contradictions between 
different sections of capital throughout the colonial period, determined 
by the wider relations, those of wage labour and capital.
To restructure this economy to fit the interests of the German 
bourgeoisie was the task which the DOAG was to take. But the DUAG was 
economically too weak before 1900 to fulfil those interests. Although it 
had just begun to invest in various activities, it begun to reap profits 
after 1902. Initially, DOAG lacked both men and enough financial income 
to sustain itself. It could not even finance railways, and its
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agricultural work was purely experimental. In trade, this company could 
not compete with the Arab merchants or the Indian financiers "who knew 
the country, relied on extensive networks of kinsmen, and were willing 
to operate with small profits and take high risks." And it was as a 
result of this situation that the DOAG had to "maintain itself by 
levying customs duties and imposing tolls on caravans and by 
confiscating land from coastal owners by dubious legal devices".67.
In so far* as the DOAG was not yet competent to serve the colonial 
interests, merchant capital played the most crucial role, This was 
because the new exports had not started generating enough funds. At the 
same time, as middlemen, Asians were very important in terms of being 
able to sell goods to the peasants and buying of products from them, as 
retail traders and even in banking processes. The consequence of this 
was the barring of Asians from becoming settlers by the state, and this 
was fuelled further by the settlers' hatred towards them. The hatred was 
rooted in the fact that settlers were poor and financially dependent on 
the state and monopoly capital, and could not compete with the Asians in 
every respect. There were Asians like Alidina Visram, the Ismailia Khoja 
"who started by buying 'country produce' and expanded until he sent more 
caravans along the central route than the DOAG in 1898 and employed 500 
Asians ten years later."6® Consequently, Asians were confined to 
middleman's position by the state; without them in this position the 
colonial state would have faced difficulties in selling goods to the 
peasants and buying country produce.
Besides Asians being a major source of contradictions for the 
settlers, peasants also posed a persistent problem for them throughout 
the colonial period. There were constant struggles between the peasants
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and the settlers, due to the fact that they both produced the same crops
and and competed for the same fertile lands— besides the fact that they
both belonged to a non-monopoly category. The struggles were waged
between the African peasants and the settlers with the "Buropean
farmers seeking to reduce the African to a proletarian and the African
seeking to retain the maximum economic independence", The colonial
state was more interested in plantation economy— and the plantations
were established by monopoly capital. The plantations were for sisal
production, a crop which was not produced by settlers or peasants and
was badly needed in Germany at the time. These plantations were
established in dry, infertile lands which discouraged long-term
settlement and hence ensured less friction with the African peasants.
For the state, peasant production was cheaper than settler production in
the case of Tanganyika; for peasants did not require finances from the
state as was the case with the settlers.70 On the other hand, this
peasant production posed another contradiction for the state, in the
sense that it meant constant shortage of labour power for the state,
the plantations and settler farms
The use of Vanyamwezi and Vasukuma workers who already had some
history of participation in wage labour migration was not enough during
the colonial period; for instead of getting their food supplies from the
peasants (e.g. the Vabondei in. Tanga or elsewhere), the migrant
labourers were also settling in the areas around the plantations and
estates to grow food. In this way, they too begun to employ labour. This
resulted into settlers demanding the expulsion of the migrant workers:
.... the Europeans continued to need workers. Economic pressure 
having proved inadequate, political means were employed. The 
area was divided into labour divisions, each attached to a 
plantation to which the headman had to supply workers.
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Rechenberg forbade this in 1910, however, so that the 14,000 
workers on European plantations in Tanga district in 1910 
included only 1,200 local men, the remainder being long-distance 
migrants. The Bondei example shows how capitalist reiai-iuu- 
permeated a largely pre-capitalist economy, how political means 
were needed to bolster economic methods of obtaining labour, and 
how the burden came to rest on distant people rather than the 
Bondei, who tended to become peasants.71
Initially the Germans had even attempted importing indentured labour
from the Asian continent, but had failed.72
German rule in Tanganyika was generally characterized by violence
and coercion in land alienation, labour recruitment, tax collection and
in export crops production among the peasants. The period before the
Maji Maji uprising was described by Apostle Kolumba Msigala again in the
following terms: "The Germans introduced the cultivation of cotton and
sisal. The whip was continually used on the backs of the natives...."73
Sometime, between 1901 and 1909 an adventurer, failed settler and
merchant, Harius Fortie encountered an official who was building a big
fort somewhere between Tabora and Mwanza. The official boasted to Fortie
that he was doing so without costing the Government any money. His
method of doing so was in the words of the official: "...I clap in chain
gangs scores of shenzi, raw natives, with a few more skilled coast
niggers, and make them work at the fort while I investigate their
cases " He showed Fortie more than twenty chain gangs of ten to
twelve Africans each. "The men were padlocked iron collars through which
passed a chain." There were also a few gangs of momen and boys who were
roped. Vhile men and boys carried poles, sand and mortar, "women carried
water, or tamped smooth the dirty floors with crude rammers".7*
As a result of this violence perpetuated by the Germans, they became
known as Vatu wa Hamsa Ishlrinl-— people who administered twenty five
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lashes as a punishment.715 They subjected the people of Tanganyika to
corporal punishment by means of detention accompanied by forced labour,
birching and the rod, and detention in chains.7® Both employers and
administrators flogged people, and it is estimated that 64,652 Africans 
were sentenced in courts to corporal punishment between 1901 and 1913.77 
This number does not include those who were flogged without sentences.
For the Germans, like all other European nations, Africans were
uncivilized and needed— -so far as this was considered possible at all—  
to be civilized, i.e. Europeanized, Africans were viewed as sub-species 
of the homo sapiens, who belonged to the "child races of the world", and 
were "mostly weak, mentally retarded" with a deep aversion to work. They 
existed "not as human beings, but for the sake of the white economy, as 
a commodity". Of "all the lower races, the black one was the lowest", 
and Europeans were pre-ordained to reign over the earth, while all the 
other races were destined to serve them. Africans were viewed as 
hopelessly deficient, in that they could never be like the Europeans, 
"that their capacity for development and 'culture'" was infinitesimally 
small, and every thing offered simply rebounded on them. And as a low 
race of mere malevolent children who were lazy, ill natured, mean and 
crafty, they had no needs besides food and fuel. This was just an 
extension of the conceptions about the working people in Europe held by 
the middle classes. J.S. Kill, for example, had doubts about the 
capacity of the English working to be 'made rational beings'.70
The Germans stood for the Germanization of the country, and they 
kept complaining about "black peril", "the horrors of miscegenation", 
that Africans had an "atavistic longing for alcohol, contempt for work, 
... were cruel and blood thirsty", etc.79 Carl Peters, the leader of
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colonization of Tanganyika, believed that "the savage African" who was 
cunning, lazy, repulsively ugly and born a slave "needs his despot like 
an opium addict needs his pipe."00 In essence, these descriptions were 
an expression of the resistance they met in the colonization of the 
people, i.e. it was the way they grasped in their minds the meaning of 
the resistance against the "civilizing mission" and how they justified 
their actions.
It was in the educational field that this aim to Europeanize the
country was most obvious. Under German rule, education provided by both
the Government and mission centres aimed " <a)To enable natives to be
used in Government administration. (b)To inculcate a liking for order,
cleanliness, diligence and dutifulness and a social knowledge of German
customs and patriotism".01 One of the founders of the German
colonization Society, Count Pleil, advised a missionary congress in 1886
to concentrate on practical tasks of working for the Government, rather
than on the doctrines of "brotherhood and equality," to which the
congress resolved:
German missions, Evangelical and Catholic alike, should be 
encouraged to take part in the realization of a national 
colonial programme;... they should not restrict their activities 
to mission work but should help to establish German culture and 
German thought in the colonies."02
The above views were most dominant before 1907, and after that it 
was mostly the settlers who were more vocal about them. This slight 
change of attitudes among the administrators and missionaries was a 
result of the Maji Maji War of resistance of 1905-7; waged in 
resistance against forced labour recruitment, taxation and land 
alienation which involved the peoples of the whole of Southern 
Tanganyika and was unleashed by Kinjikitile. It started by the
- 49 -
uprooting of cotton plants by the Vamatumbi of North Vest Kilwa in July 
1905, where there were "Five penniless Germans" who grew cotton and 
forced people to work "for five cents a day under harsh discipline and 
to the detriment of their fields...."®3 It is estimated that between
75,000 and 120,000 Africans died because of this war and famine which 
followed thereafter as a result of the "scorched earth policies" 
employed by the Germans against the warring people who in turn had used 
guerilla tactics against the Germans, In Upangwa (Iringa Region), for 
example, "nine-tenths of the Pangwa tribe of 30,000 had been wiped out. 
In 1908 there were only 70 children in all the Upangwa area".®*
Some superficial reforms were, introduced after 1907— due to the 
uprising. Forced labour and land alienation was undertaken more 
cautiously and the colonial state turned to what it termed "scientific 
colonialism". This policy, in Governor Leutwein's terms, was guided by 
the principle of "how to make the desired profits in the surest fashion" 
while taking into consideration the fact that the deprivation or non­
deprivation of the original populations' "place in the sun" is 
determined by the profits: "the decision can not be made according to a 
single scheme, but must correspond to circumstances."®6 Even the 
Evangelical Mission Conference held in Dar es Salaam in 1911 
demonstrated some changes in attitudes towards Africans. The new 
tendency was to advocate that Africans be kept in their own nationality 
as much as possible, and that the breeding of "black Europeans" be 
prevented by all means. It was argued by Martin Klamroth and Dr Bruno 
Gutman in this conference that the best way to combat Islam— an aspect 
which became an obsession of the colonial Government in the 1920s— was 
stabilization of the tribes.®®
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As a result of the Maji Maji war of resistance, it was forced upon 
the state that Tanganyika should remain a peasant colony rather than a 
settler colony. And this was not determined by the interests of the 
settlers, commercial capitalists, peasants, etc: rather, it was the
general interests of capitalist reproduction within which the monopolist 
bourgeois interests were more dominant. In fact, the settlers in 
Tanganyika were "'reduced to a class of vassals of the DOAG', a 
colonialist had complained in 1907....n&7 They were dominated by the 
DOAG, a monopoly company which by 1905 was completely dominating the 
economy of Tanganyika. This is in spite of the fact that at the eve of 
the First Vorld War there were more settlers in Tanganyika than in 
Kenya. The settlers viewed this new policy with hostility, as they saw 
it based on "negrophily", and Governor von Rechenberg who insisted upon 
the question of taking into consideration some of the African interests 
in policy making was called a "Nigger-lover" by them, for allegedly, he 
treated Africans and Asians with laxity.00
2.3 Concluslon
It is necessary to make some remarks on Tanzanian historiography 
with reference to the Maji Maji War of resistance, as a way to sum up 
the aspects which have been discussed in this chapter. This is done in 
order to show the relevance and connection of what has been discussed so 
far to the aspects dealt with in the subseqent chapters, and the 
particular form of interpretation of the history of post 1920 taken iu 
this work.
There are two broad themes which recur in most literature on 
colonial history which has appeared since the 1960: "improvement" or
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"innovation" and "resistance" themes. Both themes, together or 
separately, are an attempt to show how Tanzanians sought to transform 
the colonial situation by either improving their lives or resisting 
colonialism directly. This history has been produced within the attempts 
to transcend the paradigms set by imperialist or Eurocentric 
historiography which sought to unravel the historical movements from the 
point of view of the ruling classes. To grasp the essence of these two 
themes, it is imperative here to follow Dr John Iliffe's arguments, who 
is the leading specialist of Tanganyikan history, in which both themes 
are interwoven. 03
In an introduction to Modern Tanzanians, Iliffe pointed out that 
"the period of Tanzania's history which seems to offer the fewest 
interesting personalities.... is the period between Kinjikitile and 
tfyerere, the heart of the colonial period from 1907 to 1954"30 That is 
the period before 1907 was marked by violent resistance against 
colonialism with heroes such as Mkwawa, Abushiri, Bwana Heri, Machemba 
and Siki; and the period after 1954 was marked by the formation of a 
nationalist party and struggles for independence which ended up with the 
victory of Tanganyikans in 1961. Prior to the Maji Maji Var, it is 
alleged, the rebellions were waged by people who lacked unity and who 
were ignorant "in the sense of technical inferiority, and their small 
scale" nature31 and hence their- defeat. The same applies to Maji Maji, 
whereby, while there was an attempt to solve the problems of disunity 
and ignorance, "the leaders of the rising tried to do this by the power 
of sheer faith. The Maji [water— C.S.L] promised unity on a larger 
scale, and it promised to overcome technical inferiority by making 
European weapons powerless."*12 Faith was able to achieve unity briefly,
- 52 -
but it did not overcame technical weakness. Thus after Maji Maji 
Tanganyikans seized upon alternative methods to combat the two problems- 
-disunity and ignorance. The period which offers few interesting 
personalities belongs to that era when Africans directed their efforts 
to finding "answers to the problem of ignorance", and most of the 
solutions tried in this period "can be summarized by the word 
' improvement'".33
Improvement, was an attempt to "change people and societies in such 
a way as, it was believed, to make them both better in themselves and 
also more able to face their rulers on equal terms." This process was 
gradual and "emphasized education, economic development and 
modernization of local government". While the heroes of Maji Maji were 
warriors and prophets, the heroes of the "age of improvement Were 
village teachers, and shopkeepers, clerks and cotton growers." The 
heroes of the age of improvement were more anxious to "advance 
themselves within the colonial framework," an approach which made it 
difficult to challenge colonialism openly.9A
This age of improvement, according to Iliffe, was also an age of 
differentiation. That is, the opportunities for improvement did not 
trickle down to all Africans: some had better opportunities than others, 
and hence, marked divisions were already in the process of formation 
socially, economically, politically and intellectually. Consequently, 
"some Tanzanians in this period, either because they were unprivileged 
or because they had unusual awareness, were alarmed by the divisions 
which improvement brought to African societies", and protested.30 The 
paradox is that from the 1930s, the vision of improvement started to 
fade I the 1930s crisis "shook the British credibility in the eyes of the
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educated Africans", the result of which even those who benefited from 
improvement started registering protest.96 It is some of the members of 
the age of improvement who later led the nationalist movement.
Such are Iliffe's premises; such is the way historical
interpretation has been undertaken in general in relation to Tanzania, 
much as the contents might be exceedingly varied.97 Apparently, if the 
early forms of resistance were marked by ignorance and lack of unity and 
the heroes were warriors and prophets, and the "age of improvement" was 
marked by struggles against ignorance whose heroes were teachers, 
clerks, export crops growers, etc; then the underlying assumptions of 
the analysis are those of the modern/traditional dichotomies. This is 
verified by the usage of concepts such as "modern Tanzanians"— who 
sought to improve themselves— the implication being, those who protested 
against "the divisions which improvement brought to African societies" 
and the fact that Maji Maji was a result of faith, were traditional 
struggles. Because those who sought to improve themselves were the 
heroes of the "age of improvement", then those who protested resisted 
against the wheel of progress. But if one is to be consistent, the fact 
that the earlier forms of struggles were heroic should imply that it is 
those who resisted against inequalities who were similary heroic. Let us 
re-examine the the interpretation of Maji Maji and establish its 
continuity with the struggles which took place during the "age of 
improvement"— aspects which are dealt with in this study from the next 
chapter.
According to Iliffe, Maji Maji cannot be explained in terms of 
colonial forms of domination or maladministration and exploitation only: 
important in it was the medicine— maji, in the mobilization of people
- 54 -
who in the rising transcended their tribal barriers and attempted at 
fighting against German rule. The cult of the ancestral spirit— Kolelo—  
played the major role. Logically, however intense the grievances of 
Africans against Germans were, there would have been no Maji Maji 
without this 'cult'--although the efficacy of the medicine is denied, 
in terms of superstition that the medicine could turn bullets into 
water.90
In the first instance, disunity is contradicted by the fact that
tribes, as is admitted by even Iliffe himself and demonstrated by the
proposal by the missionaries after 1907 above, were a colonial
creation associated with racial thinking which took it that Europeans
belonged to nations and Africans to tribes. Tribes, the way they appear
contemporarily, were formed in the 1920s.99 According to Gwassa:
Most of the peoples of the Maji Maji area were organized on 
small scale, usually into clans which constituted political 
units....Yet despite this apparent diversity and even extreme 
disunity, the effects of the slave trade and of the raids of the 
Mgoni and Yao and the constant movements of peoples had produced 
so complex an ethnic admixture that it became impossible to draw 
meaningful ethnic boundaries.... the Ngindo, who played an 
important role in Maji Maji...were scattered over the whole area 
between Rufiji and Ruvuma rivers and between the coast and Lake 
Nyasa....
....the old view that southern Tanzanian peoples had had 
little in common, that they were perpetually at each other's 
throats, that they were so divided and weak that it was 
impossible for them to combine, falls away....a complex web of 
cultural inter-mixture, and of wide-ranging social and marital 
relationships had been woven by events taking place before and 
during the nineteenth century.100
Besides the complex web of cultural inter-mixture, and more 
important, the facts about the pre-colonial forms of production and 
exchange— including the Long Distance Trade which involved most of the 
Tanzanian societies— and the social relations which were in the 
formation, support the unity thesis of the pre-colonial societies.
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According to Kjekshus and as pointed out earlier in this chapter, "The
majority of the East African peoples practiced either an agricultural
economy or cattle economy, neither of which had any built-in necessities
for extensive warfare. Where raiding took place, it is therefore
possible to understand it in limited terms"— economic. Therefore,
"...the colonial literature that whole populations were constantly
fighting each other was gross exaggeration...."101 which emanated from
the so-called "humanitarian movements" in their enterprise of advocating
"Christianity and Civilization"— part and parcel of the stereotypes and
Eurocentric historiography discussed above— which justified the
intervention of Europe in other societies. In other words, lack of unity
in the pre-1907 rebellions as an explanation underplays the "degree of
early ethnic cooperation in warfare against the colonial intruder".102
Because in actual reality:
Colonial battles and skirmishes were fought throughout the 
country from 1888 onwards often against a number of different 
tribes that acted in co-ordination against the foreign occupant. 
Armed resistance and intertribal co-operation did not commence 
with the Maji Maji wars, but were further expanded and brought 
to greater perfection in these wars than during the earliest 
encounters.103
Ignorance, then, as another problem which is supposed to be verified 
by "sheer faith" in medicine, cannot be grasped in terms of an attempt 
to bring unity or overcome technological inferiority; granted such 
premises. People who waged the Maji Maji war, as pointed out above, 
used guerilla tactics; and the Germans did not defeat the warring people 
by sheer bullets: they defeated them by employing "scorched-earth
policies"— i.e. systematic razing of villages, bushes, farms and animals 
and the depletion of all local supplies. That is, Germans used famine as 
a weapon to defeat the warring people.10,4
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The majority of people in Tanganyika were already involved in the
cash economy as labourers, peasants, artisans, etc towards the First
World War. This is verified by aspects such as the fact that, "By 1910
Africans had become accustomed to paying taxes in cash rather than
labour in kind as they had done previously."106 When this fact is added
to the question of the forms of domination, obviously the content of
Maji Maji is not contradictory. Maji Maji war was a resistance against
settlers, plantation owners, cash crops communal forms of production
under the supervision of Government agents, taxation and harsh German
rule in general. It was the resistance of peasants who owned their
conditions of labour and produced themselves against forced labour— i.e.
proletarianization. It was a struggle of the direct producers who
believed that "all Africans were one, that they were free men" who
should not work without payment, suffer oppression, pay taxes, etc.106
They disdained to be exploited and enrich others instead of producing
for themselves. The syncretist ideas of the belief in water to bestow
invulnerability against bullets, or war medicine in general was not new
among these people. According to one informant:
The reason why many people believed that bullets would turn into 
water or that they would not enter the bodyj was simply because 
that was our established tradition. Since our ancestors... these 
matters were extanct in Umatumbi, All hunters had dawa 
(medicine) and even today these still exist....107
It was because of Maji Maji war that the state began to undertake 
forced labour cautiously, accepted that Tanganyika should remain a 
peasant colony rather than a settler colony and introduced some limited 
political reforms. If examined from the point of view of the grievances 
and the reforms that took place after 1907, the belief in the medicine 
was not a result of "sheer faith": the medicine was the expression of
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the language and ideas of the struggle in the given social reality. The
leaders' claim to have acquired their will from the spirit of Kolelo was
consonant with most historical experiences whereby the forms are at
times borrowed from the traditions and yet posed as belonging to the
present, while the zeal and intensity of the struggles was drawn from
their own daily experiences— exploitation, arrogance and violence
perpetuated by the colonial agents, etc. These direct producers, already
producing for the colonial market took their forms from the past,
because as history makers, they were making their history under
circumstances given and inherited "with which they are directly
confronted", at the same time:
...the tradition of the dead generations weighs like a night 
mare on the minds of the living. And, just when they appear to 
be engaged in the revolutionary transformation of themselves and 
their material surroundings, precisely in such epochs of 
revolutionary crisis they timidly conjure up the spirits of the 
past to help them; they borrow their names, slogans and costumes 
so as to stage the new world-historical scene in this venerable 
disguise and borrowed language.100
The discontent and grievances of the direct producers were expressed 
in the spirit of Kolelo and the medicine because the essence was the 
fact that formal control of labour by capital was in contradiction with 
their own interests: it contradicted and threatened their existence as 
independent producers, and thus their way of life as bequeathed from the
dead generations. As direct producers, and already participating in the
market, they were like the beginner who had not grasped the new language
and was translating it in the mother tongue. They had not yet
appropriated the "spirit of the new language to be able to express" 
themselves freely and "manipulate it without reference to the old": the 
original language had not yet been forgotten.109 The form and content of
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the rebellion are inseparable: after all, "beliefs, values, and
practices of any society are a product of that society and should be 
seen in relation to the structure and needs of that society."110
The rebellion suffered defeat, and at the same time it scored some 
victories in terms of the limited reforms which were made in the areas 
which sparked the uprising— the colonialists' undertaking forced labour 
cautiously and halting of the process of land alienation. The 
enterpreneurs of the "age of improvement" are but to a large extent a 
product of this victory. At the same time, the content of the victory 
carried seeds of new contradictions: differentiation among the direct
producers. These new contradictions, of necessity, demanded new forms of 
struggles and self-organizations for those who were ruined by the 
processes which were unleashed, and hence their continued protests.
The so-called "age of improvement" and its "heroes"— a period which 
is the main focus of the discussion in the next chapter— is a myth which 
suits best the teleological interpretations of movements: in this case, 
the tendency to interpret the actions of the colonized in terms of the 
ultimate goals— independence and development/revolution. To see the 
capitalist elements which were in the formation as the heroes is to view 
things from the point of view of imperial history, which saw those same 
elements as spearheaders of progress. It was during this period of the 
"era of improvement" that one of the initiators of German colonies 
remarked:
....To a small section of the [German] population the colonies 
were doubtless a source of profit; the merchants and planters 
who exploited the natural and human resources of overseas 
possessions, the shipping companies which received subsidies, 
the civil and military officials who received posts— all have 
every reason to support colonial enterprise.111
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These heroes, as Iliffe admitted, did not seek to transcend the 
established arrangements; they rather sought to perfect them. In which 
case, they were not the history makers: the history makers were those 
who in Tanganyika "were alarmed by the divisions which improvement 
brought to African societies" and protested.
The history of colonialism is riddled with contradictions; and this 
is because, besides the establishment of the exploitative relations, 
there were the colonial and paternalistic relations— those of a whole 
people being dominated by another nation. The latter relations were 
embedded in the racist and colonial forms of domination which have been 
reviewed in the preceeding section. Therefore, if the very elements 
which were created by colonial capitalism became disillusioned and began 
to protest in the 1930s, this was not inconsistent with their interests 
as a social group. And it was their particular forms of contradictions 
with the colonial regime which were to shape their ideas and actions and 
hence, their turning to resistance. In which case, the changes which 
took place under colonialism (up to the stage of independence) cannot be 
grasped in terms of discontinuities— resistance/improvement/resistance—  
whose underlying assumptions are the modern/traditional dichotomies. 
Rather, they have to be grasped within struggles to transcend the 
established arrangements, and thus their essence grasped as a whole; 
that is, as a reality which is contradictory and the changes taking 
place in the social formation being shaped by the contradictions. Even 
the absence of rebellion in the classical sense of Maji Maji does not 
imply absence of struggles: there are forms of struggles— including
’apathy'— which can only be understood in terms of reactions within 
situations. The issue is how to grasp the content of those struggles and
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the facts which demonstrate their absence or presence, an aspect which 
is determined by the manner in which a problem is posed. The ideology of 
Indirect Rule and its organizational aspects in Tanganyika was a 
response on the part of the British administrators, given the situation 
they found Tanganyika in, and the responses of the working people in the 
1920s, It was a response to the problems of acquiring labour, raw 
materials and efficient administration of the people. The next chapter 
deals with these aspects.
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Chapter Three 
BRITISH RULE AND AFRICAN CIVILIZATION
In the concluding remarks of the preceding chapter, it was pointed 
out that resistance and inq^ovement are not alternative themes of 
analysis. In essence, these two themes are symptomatic of deeper 
processes of real tranformations which were taking place in Tanganyika 
under imperialist hegemony— processes which were more often than not 
resisted by the working people. Often, the forms of resistance were 
contained b y ‘the use of state power as was the case of Maji Maji War of 
resistance and other pre-1905 wars of resistance; but also, attempts 
were made to dampen them by the incorporation of the elements of the 
colonized people which would break the resistance. Fundamental, was the 
question of weakening resistance, and the main issue here was the 
question of the reproduction of the colonial state and the relations it 
defended. After the Maji Maji war, the Germans had embarked upon what 
they termed "scientific colonialism". The guiding principle in this form 
of colonialism was how to make the desired profits without necessarily 
destroying the social economic organizations of the subjects. In other 
words, they already saw the possibility of the incorporation of certain 
elements of the colonized to make colonialism more effective. The 
Germans had been forced to reconsider their policies after being 
formidably resisted more than any other colonial power in East Africa.
The British colonial agents were quite aware of these facts. Major 
Orde Browne who headed the Labour Department in Tanganyika in the second 
half of the 1920s was to point out in 1935 that:
The Englishman is an opportunist, and, unlike the Frenchman, he 
does not trouble to work out a consistent and logical policy 
with a clear end in view. Rather he deals with difficulties as 
they arise, and evolves a solution which seems to meet the needs
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of the moment, without much reference to the future developments 
or general compatibility.1
He pointed this out when he was reviewing the imperial problems; and
within this context he attempted to analyse the policy of Indirect
Rule, which was established in Tanganyika in the 1920s. Philip E.
Mitchell, who was later to become a Secretary to Native Affairs had
written to J. Oldham (one of the founder members of the East African
Group and African Research Survey which included people like Sir F.
Lugard, Sir ‘D. Cameron, Julian Huxley, Lord Hailey, Lord Lothian, B.
Malinowski, etc.) on the precise problems which they faced in Tanganyika
which resulted into the introduction of Indirect Rule in the most
succinct manner.
• According to Mitchell, the problem of the empire was not merely
the question of "painting the map red": it was a question of the
establishment of social, political and economic contacts which would
help knit together people who formed the empire, "in order that the
immense civilizing forces of the Anglo-saxon race may be free to operate
without international restrictions or racial jealousies." That is, it
was a crisis of the "civilizing mission" itself. The solution was:
we have to turn our native from a conquered subject into a 
willing and loyal cooperator; we have to regulate at present the 
relations with the other partners in order that the present 
actions of selfish or shortsighted individuals may not
jeopardise the future; we may have in the interests of the 
whole, to curtail his rights or privileges: we may have to
oblige him to take a lodger, in order to protect him from
eviction from his cottage, if I may speak figuratively.22
It is this "willing and loyal cooperator" who is termed the "modern" or
the "improver" in the resistance/improvement theme. This crafty manner
of twisting things has resulted into taking Indirect Rule as simply an
adoption of the Nigerian policies with the the arrival of D. Cameron in
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1925, or a coincidence between educated Africans' and Europeans' 
attempts to revive indigenous institutions. In Iliffe's formulation, 
while the "nationalists sought to create a national culture, so those 
who built modern tribes emphasized tribal cultures. In each case 
educated men took the lead". It was these ideas which coincided neatly 
with the European concern to revive the indigenous institutions or 
"adopt Christianity to indigenous societies according to volksmission 
principles".3
The fact is that Indirect Rule was an all embracing systematized 
ideology of African Civilization as grasped by the colonial 
administrators, educators, missionaries and reseachers in Tanganyika.
It evolved within an attempt to resolve the crisis of the "civilizing 
mission", given the situation they found prevailing in Tanganyika and 
the responses of the working people to colonialism. It was a response
on the part of the colonial agents to the problem of power and
legitimacy within which central were those of acquiring labour, raw 
materials and efficient control of the subjects. Indirect Rule developed 
and acquired "implications which went far beyond the field of 
administration per se. Social and political relationships, and later 
economic ones, were evolved.... developed into a philosophy which 
eventually covered most realms of African life."* It is these aspects 
which are dealt with in this chapter, and the circumstances which
resulted in the emergence of the Indirect Rule conceptions. Also, some 
of the forms of resistance which the British administrators had to 
confront are reviewed.
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3.1 The Changing Nature of the Ruling Ideology After Vorld War I
The First Vorld Var was a period of very intense suffering for 
Africans in Tanganyika. This was because the campaigns of the British 
and Germans were mostly fought in this country more than in any other 
country in Africa.B It is not easy to approximate the number of porters 
and soldiers who died in the campaign. The Carrier Corps employed
150,000 porters by 1917, and estimations are that there were 15,000 of 
these men who were ill or confined to bed at any time, and "over a 
period of twenty-four weeks in 1917, known deaths among porters were 
recorded as 11,484". This was an average of more than 68 per day.6 Food 
for the troops was forcibly requisitioned, sometimes by nocturnal raids 
and seizing of women and children as hostages, as a result of which 
famine spread in the country even in districts such as Ulanga, which 
used to produce a huge surplus of food. Herds of cattle were decimated 
in central Tanganyika, and above all, tens of thousands of Africans were 
killed by diseases (influenza, small pox, diarrhoea, plague and cerebro­
spinal meningitis) as a result of the armies spreading them from one 
area to another in the country, and the worst famine ever recorded in 
Tanganyika occurred in 1919.7
As a result of the Var, besides the above, there was an ecological 
havoc, peasants gave up cash crops production, settlers and missionaries 
abandoned their farms, plantation production came to a halt and the 
working class was virtually disbanded. Chaos also reigned in business, 
as a result of which people were compelled to use some ingenuity in 
manufacturing goods and medicine which were normally imported.®
Due to the chaos which ranged in business, a Bishop of Zanzibar 
wrote in 1918, Indians had become very unpopular among Africans because
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of their misconduct. They had involved themselves in blackmarketeering, 
and had generally made scandalous profits during the Var: "The Africans 
have in times of famine paid them almost their last piece, and pledged 
to them their hard-won crops, for the right to live."3 It was this 
period which marked the beginning of anti-Asian sentiments in general 
among Africans. This was because, while they were making scandalous 
profits during the Var, a section of the Indian bourgeoisie in 
Tanganyika, Kenya and Zanzibar with the support of the Aga Khan was 
campaigning for Tanganyika to become an Indian sub-colony. They wanted 
to be given Tanganyika in the manner Australia was given Samoa or South 
Africa was given Namibia. The struggle was mainly by the Ismailia 
group— the oldest immigrants in East Africa and the largest Asian 
community by Vorld Var I. Aga Khan quipped that Ismailia had an annual 
income of over £400,000 and capital worth £4 million, and that is why 
they needed Tanganyika as a sub-colony.10
By the end of 1918, the Indian Association in East Africa had begun 
co-ordinated campaigns in Britain and Tanganyika for the purpose of 
gaining Tanganyika as a sub-colony. Resolutions were passed in Nairobi 
and Zanzibar and the scheme was endorsed even in Tanganyika. 11 This 
illusion of a sub-colony was finally dispelled in 1920, when the Paris 
Peace Conference declared Tanganyika a Mandated Territory under British 
Rule. Their final pleas were made in July 1920. The matter, of course 
did not end there: in 1929, for example, it was reported by the
Tanganyika Times that Indians claimed to have the right to be treated on 
exactly equal terms as the other British subjects in respect to 
franchise and political rights. This according to the European community 
was undesirable, because Eastern races had lower living standards and
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the inevitable result would be "to push out those whose standards of 
living is higher". Therefore it was necessary to place barriers to their 
entrance as had been done in many other countries, where wherever they 
took roots, their tendency was to "partly if not wholly thrust out the 
white inhabitants".12 Also, as a result of political problems in India, 
the Government in Tanganyika got scared that the agitation of the Indian 
Congress Party and Gandhi would result in a widespread sedition for a 
"pay no taxes" movement. The Government decided to scrutinize all the 
Legislative Council (LEGCO) members who supported the Congress and stop 
them.13
From the start, the Indian campaign was vehemently opposed by the 
British officials and the European community in general in the name of 
African interests. They even claimed that Africans wished Britain to 
protect them from Indian rule by citing the example of the prayers of 
some elders from Tanga. But in reality, the settlers and administrators 
opposed the Indians campaign because of their own interests which were 
at stake, given the competition they faced from merchant capital. The 
constant accusing finger and attacks against the Asian traders for their 
rapacity in the exploitation of the peasants during the colonial period 
were an expression of these struggles between them for the control of 
the territory. The Asians were feared because of the economic power in 
their hands. And throughout the colonial period the struggle against 
them was waged in the name of the peasants.
As far as Africans were concerned, when the British regime settled 
and initially retained the same German political structures, every thing 
was the same as before. In their comparisons, they often favoured the 
Germans because, "'The Germans beat us, but they paid more than the
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British for agricultural products we sold them."' which was true; then, 
"' Vith the Germans we knew where we stood, with the British who can 
tell?"'1* In actual fact, the general "attitude of the population... was 
potentially dangerous since, although some Africans had been sympathetic 
to the British, the people at large had remained loyal to Germany during 
the fighting."16
Vhen the British authorities assumed responsibility in 1917, 
Tanganyika had become unmanageable in almost every respect: transport 
networks had 'been destroyed and the economy and ecology ruined. More 
alarming was the fact that, while in 1914 Europeans used to boast of 
having "suppressed the constant violence of intertribal war in Africa. 
But by 1919 that boast seemed a little empty." this was because in the 
four years of Vorld Var I "more African natives had been killed or had 
died of disease or even starvation as a result of a white war than in 
forty years— perhaps a century— of the old primitive warfare of the 
blacks", as Huxley wrote in 1931. This experience, according to him, had 
resulted in a "not very pleasant" reaction "either for blacks or for 
white" for the "native has lost his child like belief in the white as an 
inherently superior being. He has become more critical and more 
restive;..."16. This was the situation after the First Vorld Var, whereby 
Europeans were discredited by the Var in the eyes of Africans in 
Tanganyika. "The war has taught the natives", wrote a German missionary 
in 1919, to see "the whiteman from the point which he never knew him 
before, the native has seen him in his hatred, his hypocricy, brutality, 
dishonesty and immorality. He often could justly say 'the blacks are 
'better men. ' " 17
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Given the above general feeling, upon assuming responsibility in the
territory the British authorities were very alarmed, by the fact that
Swahili language had spread almost throughout the territory by the early
decades of this century and was almost smashing the so-called tribal
barriers, and facilitating geographical mobility and intercommunication
networks. Moreover, besides the trials of the Var and its aftermath:
The situation in Tanganyika was disturbing.... The diverse tribes 
of Tanganyika had reached different stages in their contact with 
Vestern civilization.. ..Isolated villages were coming more and 
more into touch with the habits and thoughts of others, whether 
they ‘were Europeans or only the tribe next door. The process of 
detribalization, that ambiguous term which is nevertheless 
indispensable, had begun, and Africans who left their home areas 
in search of work began to shed many of their old ways of 
living.1e
In a minute written in October 1917 by the Private Secretary to the 
East African Protectorates (Kenya) Acting Governor, the administration 
acknowledged that as a result of participation in the First Vorld Var, 
Africans had unprecedentedly enlarged their ideas because of contact 
with Africans of other colonies. It was feared that some Africans had 
become acquainted with Pan-African ideals of the Ethiopian Church, and 
possibly, there were more Africans who held the conception of Africa 
for Africans. According to this minute, the possibity was that this 
conception, if linked with Islamic propaganda, would be really dangerous 
as it would involve fanaticism. This was possible* because there was 
already a "tendency on the part of the natives to call themselves 
members of the Mohammedan nation" with propaganda being disseminated 
from Mecca: this "is almost sure to be of anti-European character." The 
minute went on:
German East Africa is common ground for Pan-Islam and Pan- 
Africa; many of the natives educated in German secular schools 
have embraced Islam, and the German administrators have 
confessed to a feeling of apprehension respecting an African
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Jehad, i.e. a conjuction of an African political Islam against 
Europeans. ...13
This fear of some Pan-Africanist islamic renaissance persisted in 
the 1920s and 1930s.20 In the above quoted minute, views on the best way 
to implement the suggestion that a "definite policy of encouraging 
strong and isolated tribal nationalism may be one of the most effectual 
barriers against a Pan-African upheaval..." were raised.21 In other 
words, it was a question of establishing an effective local 
administration which would be able to deal with all the social, 
political and economic problems created by the Var. This was to be the 
main preoccupation of the British administrators in the early 1920s. It 
was to be given impetus by the appointment of Sir Donald Cameron, 
formerly working in Northern Nigeria under Lord Lugard, as the Governor 
of the territory in 1924.
Indirect Rule or Native Authority, the policy which was to be passed 
under Governor Cameron in 1927, did not begin with his arrival, much as 
the 1927 Paper was based on Lord Lugard Vs Paper in Nigeria.22 As early 
as 1920, the British administrators in Tanganyika were already 
contemplating the "policy of encouraging strong and isolated tribal 
nationalism". The first Governor, Horace Byatt was by 1921 giving 
priority to the establishment of native authorities in his plans. In 
this year, he promulgated an Ordinance to Regulate Native Authority—  
Native Authority Ordinance No 16 of 1921.23 In 1923, there was passed 
the Native Authority Ordinance No 25, which expressed the aim to set up 
native authorities so as to substitute the German system which utilized 
akidas and jumbes. As it was laid down in this Ordinance, the duty of 
these authorities was to maintain order and good government, and in
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particular to prevent crime. These native authorities were to function 
as part of the Government machinery.
Several months before the arrival of Sir D. Cameron in October 1924, 
a conference of senior commissioners, under the Acting Governor John 
Scott resolved on the creation of native authorities and their 
organizational s t r u c t u r e s . P e o p l e  like Charles Dundas, Philip 
Mitchell, John Scott, and Douglas Jardine who were to become Native 
Affairs Secretaries at different times in the country, had already drawn 
conclusions on Indirect rule long before 1924. Charles Dundas' wife Mrs 
Anne Dundas, for example, wrote in the early 1920s that what ±he 
missionaries were supposed to be doing was to educate "the native to a 
better understanding of his own language and customs, and giving him 
deeper insight into his own delightful lore, revealing to him the 
dignity of ancient tribal customs...." That is, the essence was to 
create a "good African" embued with a sense of responsibility with a 
vision "of higher civilization, attainable through use and development 
of his latent powers— ....H2S
This policy had nothing to do with the influence exercised by the 
League of Nations under Article 22 of the Convenant, where it was 
stipulated that the development and well being of the native peoples was 
the sacred trust of civilization. The Secretary of State to Colonies, 
Leonpard Amery openly claimed in June 1925 that Tanganyika was 
"permanently incorporated in the British empire", that, although there 
were obligations of the League of Nations, there was "not one whit less 
British nor" did it make their "tenure there one whit less permanent."26 
When summing up his six year experience as Governor of Tanganyika, 
Cameron later admitted that the policy he passed had nothing to do with
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the Mandate position of the colony: it was a result of the British
colonial policy in the "dependent countries", while the precise 
principles embodied in the Mandate were in accord with his views which 
had grown in Algeria.27
Most colonial officers in Tanganyika admitted that the objectives 
set by the League of Nations did not have any practical meaning at all. 
Eric Reid, a District officer in the Southern Highlands, wrote a book, 
Tanganyika Without Prejudice, basing himself on his experience and 
personal enquiries. His major concern in this book was to refute the 
"mistrust; misrepresentation and calumny engendered in the minds" of his 
"countrymen at home by ill-informed and irresponsible writers and 
speakers, many of whom seem to take a perverse delight in befouling 
their own nests"— Tanganyika— "of these, the chief are the ridiculous 
fables about the insecurity of the mandate...." He set out to prove to 
his countrymen that in actual fact Tanganyika was a colony like any 
other.20 In the same spirit, Judge Gilchrist Alexander remarked that to 
all intents and purposes, Tanganyika was a colony just like any other.29
The philosophy underlying the policy of Indirect Rule was explained 
in a Vhite Paper published by the British Government in 1927. The policy 
aimed at dealing with "with the problems arising from what appeared to 
be conflict of interests of the African population and those of European 
enterprise,..."30 Because of this conflict of interests, the Government 
had become convinced that there was a necessity to incorporate the 
natives in the government, and hence native authorities, which aimed at 
"making it possible [thus] to evolve in accordance with their traditions 
and their most deeply rooted instincts, as an organised and displined 
community within the State...."3'1 In a Memorandum by Cameron in 1925, it
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was stated that this policy was "the strongest safeguard, the surest and 
safest foundation" on which the Africans of Tanganyika could be built, 
for it enlisted "on the side of the law, order and good government all 
responsible elements in native society", and it aimed at preserving the 
society intact and protected it from disintegrating "into an 
undisciplined rabble of leaderless and ignorant individuals."32 As soon 
as he arrived in Tanganyika, Cameron had written to Lord Lugard that on 
arriving in Tanganyika he found the country lacking in coherent 
administrative policy. As a result of this, matters had reached an 
extent where each District Officer was doing whatever he pleased. 
Political work had been neglected and Indirect Rule was fictitious, and 
consequently, "The people are out of hand because the chiefs can no 
longer punish them.1,33
It was the post-World Var I despair which was the driving force 
behind these policies, rather than the question of copying from Nigeria 
or the Mandate position of the territory. Discernible from these 
statements is the fact that they were responding to real social and 
political situations which could not be expressed otherwise except as 
political proposals or policies. And this was especially the case 
because from the start, Britain had to wage propaganda war against 
German's claim for her colonies and Britain had to portray the best 
possible picture of her rule to convince international opinion. The 
other issue in this policy was the practical administrative advantages 
of the system. The German system which administered through 
representatives (akidas and jumbes) was found inadequate by the British 
authorities given that there was insufficient supervision over them "and 
moreover the use of the agents whose chief interest was in Islamic
- 81 -
culture tended to result in the disintegration of tribal customs."3A It 
was impossible to supervise the government agents because "It is 
impossible for the Administrative Officer to get in touch with the whole 
primitive people, and it is impossible for financial reasons largely to 
augment that service." In other words, it was impossible to employ a 
sufficient number of administrative officers for the whole country.35
The financial constraint emanated from the fact that Tanganyika was 
completely dependent on Treasury loans in London and the country was 
riddled with debts. As a Mandate Territory, Tanganyika could only borrow 
in the London market if Parliament guaranteed the interest on the loan, 
"even if the loan was to be used for development purposes specifically 
authorized by the Mandate."35 Tanganyika could not get a loan in the 
London market because the guarantees of the colonial stock did not apply 
to Mandated territories. She was able to float a loan in the London 
market for the first time in 1929, and she could do so again after that 
because by then the Colonial Development Act had been passed, although 
she still needed the approval of the Treasury. Cameron managed to raise
two loans and a third one was raised in 1932 as an emergency measure.
More loans were raised after that.37 Thus, more revenues had to be 
generated internally, which meant an increase in taxes and exhortation 
to people to produce more export crops. Only native authorities could
assist in this, and after all, initially chiefs were not paid by the
Government: they were paid from the taxes they were able to collect. The 
Secretary of State to Colonies, Vinston Churchill had pointed out at the 
time that since money would not be allowed for some time for Tanganyika, 
the territory would not equal the achievements under German
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administration, and the only altenative for the country was to increase 
taxes.30
The fact that Cameron's policy was in accord with the British
colonial policy in general in respect to the colonial dependencies was a
result of the rise of a wave of nationalism in some of the colonies
which Britain experienced in in early 1920s in Egypt, India, Ireland and
other countries. Cameron was to write in 1925:
I am .not satisfied with the place. The economic development of 
the country has been forced and little else has been thought of. 
The native is being detribalized and Europeanized and no thought 
has been given to the place that he is to fill in the political 
future of the country, with the result that we shall, if we 
continue the practice of the past, create another India or 
another Egypt.39
The most dangerous elements in the territory, according to the 
administrators, missionaries, settlers, diggers, and soldiers, were the 
"Europeanized Africans", and hence the necessity to use the indigenous 
institutions and create a "good African". For Cameron, it was the duty 
of the state to develop the Africans in such a way that they were not 
westernized and turned into a "bad imitation of a European". 
Accordingly, the whole educational system was to be directed towards 
that end: it was not necessary to destroy the "African atmosphere, the 
African mind, the whole foundation of his race"— a thing which could 
only be achieved if the tribal organizations were not swept away.
This issue of "keeping the natives in their own nationality as much 
as possible; .... and to prevent with all means to breed a kind of black 
European" had been noted even by the Evangelical Mission Conference held 
in Dar es Salaam in 1911, which was to be the antecedent of the 1930s 
Tanganyika Missionary Council. This aspect was pointed out in the 
preceding chapter. One of the Missionaries who talked about this
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question was Dr Bruno Gutman, who was to be quite influencial on Sir 
Charles Dundas and his friends in the 1920s. According to Dundas and 
Mitchell, the whole concept of Indirect Rule was mainly built up within 
the controversy of the forms of British rule that should be established 
in Tanganyika given the fact that the country was unmanageable.
Mitchell, one of the most ardent supporters of Indirect Rule, had 
even taken some time to go to South Africa to study the native policies 
there. When attending a Joint Parliamentary Committee on Closer Union of 
the East African Territories in 1931, Mitchell had suggested that 
Tanganyika be split into native and mixed areas, and in 1935, as an 
Acting Governor, he approved the Identification Ordinance Mo 13 of 1935 
which he had drafted himself as soon as he became Assistant Secretary to 
Native Affairs in 1929.*'' This Ordinance was supposed to inaugurate a 
pass system in the country. In Lupa, for example, passes had been 
introduced since 1933. After his retirement from the colonial service in 
the 1950s, Mitchell became a settler in Kenya, although he had initially 
wanted to buy land in Tanganyika. Dundas had settled as a settler in 
South Africa.
According to Mitchell, Indirect Rule was an attempt to resolve the 
difficulties by adaptation of the "old tribal forms and authorities to 
modern needs and conditions."**2 Within this context, it was impossible 
"for example...giving Africans votes to reproduce the British 
constitution in Africa". It was not because of the admiration of the 
tribal system as such, "but because it was there, could not be ignored, 
and it was capable of being modernized and developed. It is of course, 
essentially and strongly democratic."**3 With native authorities, 
Africans:
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will be making a comfortable living and be governed— as far as 
local government is concerned— by an extremely democratic system 
which will be attractive to them because it stretches back into 
their own past and is adequate to their needs because they will 
have modernized it under the guidance of British officers. It 
will know nothing of ballot boxes, but it will be 
representative and will be able to bring direct preasure to bear 
on him.AA
Mitchell concluded, Indirect Rule was the only way to get Africans to 
rise "above a narrow nationalism" and be able to "look other races in 
the face".45
When Cameron saw the Vagogo of central Tanganyika in 1925, he 
pondered much about these "primitive people", and wondered what could 
be made of them if they were brought suddenly and sharply into contact 
with western civilization in the market square where they sold their 
cattle. As it became obvious to him and the other officers, the only 
answer to this social problem was Indirect Rule, because , in any event 
"what was the object of destroying the institutions of the natives?" 
given that it was impossible to govern the whole country by British 
officers, even if their number quadrupled. He could not foresee any 
future political state in which that was possible "except under a 
completely Europeanized system of government in which the native would 
express himself through the ballot box.... Why then destroy the 
instrument that we must use?"45 It was necessary to train the African in 
"accordance to his environment to which he is bound in the soil, instead 
of being given a European veneer and outlook totally out of keeping with 
the conditions under which he must live in Africa." An African was to be 
made to feel "proud of being an African....on the basis of African 
civilization stimulated in the first instance" by European culture and 
example. To destroy the loyalty of the people to their native
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institutions without creating others, was to create "political chaos and 
anarchy where some order had previously existed."47
The desire, as Cameron and his collegues admitted, was not simply to 
"preserve and fortify the true fabric of native society" which they 
admitted was impossible "at this stage of development." The reason was 
one could not "close the doors and deny the primary products of tropical 
Africa to the world and its markets." Africans could participate in the 
internal and external markets "and thereby acquire a sense of property 
in the individual without destroying at the same time his conception 
that he is a member of the society in which he and his forbearers have 
nurtured." If the "untutored African" remained in the state of nature 
and produced only subsistence crops, he would be decimated by disease.40
The native authorities were to be part of the government machinery 
and they were to issue orders on subjects such as: prohibition or
regulation of intoxicating liquors; prohibition of gambling and 
possession of weapons; prohibition of acts or conduct which might cause 
riot or disturbance; prohibition, restriction or requiring matters or 
things to be done by virtue of "native law or custom for the time being 
in force and not repugnant to morality or justice, or to the Statute 
Law." Other duties were, to make orders on matters "of vital importance 
to the native society" such as pollution or obstruction of water sources 
and cutting or destroying trees; prevention of spread of infectious or 
contagious diseases— to human beings and animals; caring for the sick; 
registration of births and deaths, regulation of movement of stock, 
burning of grass or bush for purposes of preventing or exterminating tse 
tse fly:
the requiring any African to cultivate land to such an extent
and with such crops as will secure an adequate supply of food
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for himself and his family. ..and for any other purpose which may 
be approved by the Governor by order, e.g. destruction of 
locusts, hunting of game, cultivation of poisonous plants and 
roots, burning of cotton plants to prevent disease, cultivation 
of native coffee, etc.49
There was an elaboration of a whole philosophy on this question of 
the creation of a "good African" and African civilization in general and 
the attempt to save the African from annihilating himself. This 
philosophy ranged from religious, educational, economic up to social 
structural issues. In terms of social structures, the issues revolved 
around the question of the collapse of the communal tribal societies 
which had resulted in the "remote undeveloped countries'" inability to 
keep its members at home because of the new economic relations, and the 
fact that there was need to reconcile the new and the old by the 
creation of African institutions which were capable of retaining people 
there, instead of leaving production in the hands of old men and 
women.50
Missionaries too contributed in the elaboration of this philosophy.
Their change in attitude, from Europeanization of Africans to their re-
Africanization, was due to the fact that even before Christianity had
been able to scarcely establish itself against the secularizing impact
of the philosophies of natural sciences and the application of
scientific method to Biblical studies, as an integral part of the
civilizing mission it also suffered immensely the impact of World Var I:
This catastrophe shattered the faith in the moral values which 
it had inherited from the nineteenth century, and gravely 
injured the churches which had seemed to be closely connected 
with those values.... public opinion...no longer felt that 
western civilisation had incalculable benefits to confer upon 
inferior races, and which was even being stimulated by the 
discoveries of social scientists to a revival of romantic cult 
of the noble savage.51
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Besides this, missionaries were becoming aware that the spiritual 
future of Africa was at stake,62 that there were the Africans themselves 
who were not a "passive clay to be moulded according to the pattern 
desired by the present rulers."63 Western civilization which was 
irresistably drawing the people of Africa, by this time was, to the 
missionaries, a "mixture of truth and untruth"; and early missionaries 
had been "in the main uncritical" towards it, something which had become 
no longer possible to sustain. While western civilization had made real 
advancement in science and technology, of which Africans needed to 
share, there was, however, another side of this civilization: "While it 
brought about an immense liberation of human personality and opened vast 
possibilities of development," it also gave "birth to boundless egoism" 
which threatened to annihilate the society itself. All the bonds and 
social institutions which unite men— the family and other larger social- 
-units are in the process of dissolution, and society is becoming 
atomized: the only bond existing is economic necessity.64
Dr Bruno Gutman, a veteran missionary in Kilimanjaro, discussed the 
problem of how African institutions were being affected by western 
civilization. He believed that Africa still possessed an organic unity, 
in contrast to the disastrous atomization of western societies. In 
Africa men remained bound to one another in mutual obligations in the 
life of the family, clan and tribe, and the content of the African 
existence was to be found in connection with his fellow men in the 
cultivation of common life. This, according to him was lost in the 
western societies, and needed to be preserved in Africa, because western 
civilization was doing more harm than good to them. Religion and 
education needed to preserve these qualities in Africa.66
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Gutman regarded the state as a power whose character is determined 
by the use of force and its distinction from the neighbouring states "by 
its dealing with the organic bonds in which the life of the people finds 
expression, and by its success in absorbing into and developing within 
its structure the underlying spirit of these bonds." Accordingly, the 
origins of the state's consciousness of its power lay "at the point in 
the interlacing roots of tribal organization where the tension between 
associations based on kinship and those based on age brings about change 
of balance, and the leadership begins to pass to the latter,..."ee
The above aspects of the state became even more complicated, 
according to him, when a superior race established a state for an 
inferior colonized race. Therefore, under those circumstances, it was 
necessary and important that the colonized race should retain its 
spiritual identity which was inseparably bound up with the structure of 
the tribe and its organic leadership. It was necessary not to allow it 
to disappear; and the task of every colonial government was to do 
everything to prevent the disintegration of the social life of the 
colonized races committed to its charge into a formless mass or 
individual households. This kind of disintegration is the shortest cut 
to catastrophe.6-7 The colonial state's duty was to introduce the 
associations:
not only to be supervised by the state, but the state itself, on 
the principle of voluntary association, takes over the 
introduction and organization and, where possible, also 
leadership through an official specially for the 
purpose.... Organizations which do not actually serve their 
declared objects are to be disbanded.6®
Honey, Gutman declared, was the most dangerous substitute for goods, 
because it dissolved the organic bonds. It was pitiable that
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civilization was destroying the organic community groupings, indigenous 
educational systems, etc.. He concluded that, their task was to help the 
African "to preserve and strengthen the ties of kinship and the common 
occupation of the soil of their fathers." The native tribal spirit was 
built upon that structure, and it could not exist without them: 
"Sheltered by this stable home of his culture he will learn without
great difficulty to contribute to and take part in the increasing
material and intellectual wealth of the world, which is civilization."63
The belief in the essentially communal social structures of Africans 
led to the concentration of populations in almost the whole of Western 
Tanganyika from the 1920s to 1940s by the state. At first the 
concentrations took place under the guise of sleeping sickness
eradication, and therefore, the native authorities played the central 
role. Later on, the justification for concentration was found in 
developmental reasons. People were forcibly moved, and health reasons 
were quoted. In reality the motives were administrative expediency, 
labour recruitment, efficient peasant produce collection, soil
conservation and game conservation.60 Mitchell, for example, had written 
in 1926 that the land of the tribe was normally occupied in as much as 
people chose to, and that occupation was "generally concentrated round 
the village of the chief, since concentration was necessary for safety, 
and, since the European occupation of the country, has tended to spread 
outwards from the centre...." Because the political policy of the 
government was based on the tribe, it was necessary, in his view that 
the land policy be based on the same thing.61 Mitchell recorded in his 
diaries many incidents concerning concentrations in the late 1920s and 
1930s.
When the Provincial Commissioner of Lindi, for example, proposed to 
concentate the population in 1927, he gave out tse tse fly eradication 
as the reason.62 In 1932, when the world recession had hit the country 
and the Government was engaged in the "Plant more Crops Campaign", it 
was bluntly proposed that the concentration of people would make it 
easier to administer them and collect the produce: "As populations
concentrate it is easier to administer them and, as the produce 
concentrate, the surplus of production immediately takes on a practical 
aspect."63
In the 1940s, developmental reasons were quoted in the proposals and 
attempts to concentrate people. In a memorandum in 1945 by Rooke 
Johnston, the Provincial Commissioner of Lindi, concentrations were 
described as focal points for purposeful government action, services and 
fast economic development: "Thus concentrations were described as
centres of medical aid, education, agricultural extension work, 
veterinary services and marketing organizations."6,4 This scheme, it was 
alleged, was acceptable to Africans, because "the movement into large 
settlements would not be a departure from, but rather a return to 
tradition". He described the pre-colonial settlements as consisting of 
large nucleated villages which were built for defence purposes against 
slave raiders and tribal wars. This pattern, according to him, was 
broken up by European pacification. Therefore, there was need to restore 
the historic continuity in the form of "closer settlements", given that 
there was how a more enlightened breed of colonial administrators. The 
conclusion was:
I am convinced that the policy of closer settlement can be 
beneficially applied to large areas of Tanganyika and that it is 
indeed a condition precedent to real progress on the part of 
African population. I even go as far as to suggest that it
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should become part of the declared policy of government, and an 
integral part of post-war development. 66
The scheme was unanimously accepted by the provincial commissioners.
The settlements that were begun in the 1920s and 1930s, it was 
reported, were attempts to "save the African from himself".66 People 
were moved to create wildgame sancturies, examples being such as the one 
at Gombe Stream in Kigoma, where 500 people were removed so as to save 
50 families of monkeys and a number of chimpazees; the case of Mbulu 
Game reserve in the end of the 1920s; and the gazetting of the areas 
surrounding Dodoma town as a game reserve in order to preserve a herd of 
greater Kudu in the 1930s.67 Other instances took place in Mpanda(1931), 
Manyoni(1931), and Liwale(1940s). In the latter case, people were moved 
to make room for the largest game reserve in Africa— the Selous60 (named 
after one of the major early British game hunters who also fought 
against the Germans in the First World War). It was reported in 1944 
that the process of settling individual natives had been quite advanced 
by 1937 when there were approximately 224 settlements of which 171 were 
in Lake Province. There were also already taking place experimental 
settlements for "progressive farmers".69
During the Governor's Conference with Senior Administrative Officers 
in 1929, it was noted that there was a tendency in the country for the 
emergence of co-operative societies among some export crops growers. It 
was further noted that "in any District or Province where the time was 
thought to be ripe for the development of co-operative methods of 
agriculture and animal husbandry they should be so developed." The main 
stress was on the provision of staff, because experience had shown that 
"undue haste, injurious action, insufficient consideration of local
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customs and conditions are undesirable in any attempt at establishment 
of a co-operative movement". It had become apparent that co-operatives 
were essential and needed to be established, registered and inspected.70
It was within the conceptions of Indirect Rule that the Government 
decided to establish the co-operative societies. In the 1920s the 
Government had tried to establish monopoly marketing boards— in places 
like Songea, for example. This attempt had completely failed.71 When 
discussing the question of labour tax in the Government House with 
other officials in 1931, Mitchell had emphasized to his collegues that 
"The crux of the tax position lay in crops and marketing and not in 
trying out experiments". He told them that while it was necessary to use 
the existing methods which have been well tried, it was essential that 
adequate marketing facilities be provided.72
The attempt to create monopoly institutions for marketing of
agricultural produce was being made within the context of trying to
resolve the tax problem, and this was despite the fact that the native
authorities had made the problem less burdensome. Mitchell had
theoretical economic reasons for this. When the Excutive Committee
discussed the new Trades Licencing Ordinances and the Marketing
Ordinance in 1932, Mitchell entered in his diary that, the Governor felt
it would cause much opposition from the "smaller Indians". But according
to him the problem was:
If we do not organise and control marketing it is perfectly 
clear to me that we shall not be able to keep our little place 
in the world of economics: indeed, however much we may dislike 
it the days of ' free trading' are over for good. The 19th C 
individualist, captain of his soul, free to acquire wealth for 
himself alone or destroy society to suit himself is gone, I hope 
for ever.73
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To establish them, an accusing finger was pointed at the Asian petty 
traders for their scandalous behaviour of adulterating crops and 
exploiting the peasants.7A The Government undertook the task of helping 
the peasants to establish the co-operatives with the justification that 
it was trying to stabilize the prices and weights and eliminate 
adulteration.7®
Of course, what was said about the Asian traders was true. But 
beyond this, there were other contradictions: especially the
productivity of the peasants, as Tanganyika was the country most hit by 
the 1930s Great Depression in East Africa.7® Besides the conflict over 
the question of control of the territory and suspicion of each other, 
the other problem was that of marketing the produce. The supporters of 
the co-operatives maintained that with their organization and control it 
would be possible to "collect native produce in bulk at a given place 
and at a given time and thereby attract firms with capital" who would be 
"able to offer a better price for the produce in bulk than petty traders 
could for the same amount of produce, collected in driblets over a
period of time."77
The other consideration was the organization of markets that are
offically known. The supporters pointed out that the formation of co­
operatives would naturally concentrate exchange activities in locations 
that seemed most suitable for efficient tax collection. Hawkers and 
pedlars (the petty traders), as far as the 1920s had been viewed by the 
Government as undesirable compared to government controlled markets*, 
Vhile it was true that the petty traders paid up to 50 per cent less 
than the official price for the peasant goods, the official markets 
reduced the chances of hut and poll tax collectors' evasion, as the
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"cash nexus" often became the "cash net", and this was besides the 
transport costs and market dues.7® In other words, rather than a defence 
of the peasants, the struggle against the Asian traders was a struggle 
for tax collection.
So, like in other struggles, the whole issue was seen by the state 
as an attempt to introduce an African institution. Mr Stickland, who 
advised on the issue of co-operation, pointed out that this institution 
"creates a new integration, a new social fibre, new communal restraints, 
and is of great value to the community and the race." According to him, 
it was not possible to divorce the economic from the social and 
religious life of the African. This was because, "Every man is a human 
unit and a whole". Although western economists talked in the past of the 
economic man, they knew that this was an abstraction: "An African has, I 
think, some difficulty in forming abstract ideas, and will never in 
practice work in cooperation on purely economic lines..." Therefore,
without guidance and control, the co-operatives were going to deal with 
other issues from the point of view of the government, because the
societies not only dealt with better prices, but also credit, education 
and health, housing and consumer goods, improvement of material life of 
the community in general "by repressing litigation (arbitration
societies) or for the better of the social customs (better societies)"73 
The co-operatives were viewed as a return to the original African 
institutions, and the necessity of the co-operatives emanated from the 
fact that:
In a sense every Bantu village is in fact a co-operative
society, for there are many farming operations in which mutual 
assistance is now given; the idea is neither new nor at all 
difficult for the natives to grasp, and this makes its 
mobilization in the manner suggested by no means impossible,
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given adequate supervision from the right kind of European 
staff.00
In 1934, the Director of agriculture, Mr Harrison was to allege that the 
"natives are interested in cooperatives and it is in the bones of many 
native groups in this territory, they have maintained themselves by a 
form of co-operation for centuries."01 The Cooperative Societies 
Ordinance was passed in 1932.
The conceptions of tribal institutions, concentrations, 
cooperatives, etc. and the state playing the central role under the 
guidance of enlightened European Officials lay at the heart of Indirect 
Rule or African civilization by Europeans. Behind this nation of 
Indirect Rule was the notion of the tribe, which, supposedly had been 
broken down by German occupation and hence resulted in undesirable forms 
of nationalism. This was as far as the Government was concerned, and if 
there was to be any success in controlling and ruling the rebelling 
Tanganyikans there was need to make him a "good African" who is not 
uprooted from the traditions, and hence obeys the authorities: it was an 
attempt to make Africans internalize the idea that the civilizing 
mission had the same objective and outlook as theirs.
In essence, all the ideas which were raised by the colonialists were 
simply aimed at making colonialism effective and at the same time 
breaking the resistance of the African masses. This resistance is quite 
explicit from the fears they raised and the general threat posed by the 
Tanganyikans. The irony is, some officials would later admit, Tanganyika 
"had no developed tribal system, in which, indeed, the Germans seem to 
have done their best to destroy such a system."0'-2 Mitchell was later to 
admit that even Sir D. Cameron, "surprisingly" enough lacked in
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there was to be any success in controlling and ruling the rebelling 
Tanganyikans there was need to make him a "good African" who is not 
uprooted from the traditions, and hence obeys the authorities: it was an 
attempt to make Africans internalize the idea that the civilizing 
mission had the same objective and outlook as theirs.
In essence, all the ideas which were raised by the colonialists were 
simply aimed at making colonialism effective and at the same time 
breaking the resistance of the African masses. This resistance is quite 
explicit from the fears they raised and the general threat posed by the 
Tanganyikans. The irony is, some officials would later admit, Tanganyika 
"had no developed tribal system, in which, indeed, the Germans seem to 
have done their best to destroy such a system.HO:2 Mitchell was later to 
admit that even Sir D. Cameron, "surprisingly" enough lacked in
knowledge of Africans and the forms and nature of tribal authority".03 
Cameron was later to admit that in some "tribes" there existed no forms 
of aurhority in the sense of paramount chiefs as heads. Societies which 
did not have paramount chiefs were such as the Vanyakyusa, Vachagga, 
Vamasai, Valuguru, Vazaramo, Vamatumbi, Vasukuma, etc.. The colonial 
officers had to forcibly create chiefdoms or continue using akidas and 
jumbes.eA Some of the forms of resistance from the 1920s are reviewed in 
the next section.
3.2 Protest and Resistance in the inter Var period
The inter-War period poses many difficulties, especially when 
reviewing the forms of protest, because of the suppression or mutilation 
of some of the facts by the British colonial officers. In the 1920s, 
even the members of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of 
Nations which watched over Tanganyika complained that they "could not 
understand the territory's financial position based on information in 
the official budgets... the administration would not publish certain 
kinds of detail for understandable reasons."es Besides the Mandate 
position there was the fact that Britain was trying to prove to the 
world that Tanganyikans were more comfortable under their administration 
and discredit the Germans. There raged a propaganda war in the 1920s 
between the British and the Germans, with the latter trying to demand 
their colony back on the ground that the Tanganyikans wanted them 
back.3® In Mitchell's diaries, for example, one finds the following 
recordings for February 8, 1929 and June 10, 1929: "A memo from the ACPA 
for the S of S the usual mixture of deliberate lies and half truths, but 
it took me a long time to draft the covering despatch"; when in Iringa,
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"I think there must be a lot of cases not recorded. Punishments are 
severe but the Vahehe are said to need it.'"07
In spite of such suppression of facts, the discussion in the 
preceding section demonstrates that the administration was confronted 
with resistance, Vhat is discernible from the statements of the colonial 
officials is what they were responding to. Therefore most of what is 
discussed in this section is a direct continuation of the preceding 
section. The forms of resistance discussed here, are not simply placed 
exclusively within anti-colonial context as has been the tendency on 
most studies on Tanganyika: other forms of social struggles and
struggles against arbitrariness in.general are also considered.33 All 
that is done in this section is to come forward with a broad 
generalization, rather than a detailed discussion of the forms of 
resistance, within the context of the theme dealt with in this study.
Besides what was discussed in the preceding section one of the most 
obvious indications of disturbances in the early 1920s is discernible in 
the distribution of ordinary budget of the government expenditure in 
those years. For example, the total expenditure for 1923-4 was 
£1,519,931: of this amount, £201,533 were used for education,
agriculture and health; £227,003 for territorial administration 
(Governor, Secretariat, legal departments, district administration, 
etc); £291,266 for military, police and prisons; and £572,377 for public 
works, railroads, highways, posts and telegraphs: "The expenditure in
Group III for military, police and prisons, amounting to 20 per cent of 
total, is considerably above the average in British colonies. This is 
doubtless due to necessary reorganization of the population after the 
disruptions of the war."39 Such a high amount of expenditure for
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prisons, police and the military, testify to the fact that the
administration had to deal with a rebellious population.
In the first report to the League of Nations in 1920, Sir Horace
Byatt pointed out that there was a highly uncertain state of the African
opinion in the territory. He further noted that, "occassional individual
outbreaks, involving possibly the death of some government officials,
would seem inevitable".90 In January 1919, for example, with the dealers
selling goods at 300 and 400 per cent profit, askaris had complained to
the officers‘that the prices are too high. The officers had told them
that if the prices are too high, then they should not pay anything. As a
consequence of this, Indian shops in Dar es Salaam were stormed and
plundered: "Shots were fired, Englishmen were maltreated— two are
supposed to have been killed, though this was not confirmed. Natives
rose in a tumult, and were very embittered with the English."91 It was
more or less as a result of such disturbances that the Government in
1921 introduced a Collective Punishment Ordinance which "permitted the
government to impose punishments on recalcitrant tribes or communities,
for native cooperation was still not taken for granted",92
The early 1920s period saw a variety of people coming and going out
of the country with a great many ideas; some of which were openly
hostile to European rule. One of such people was Hanoc Sindano, from
Mbozi in South-Western Tanganyika. Sindano had worked in South Africa,
where he became familiarized with the Watch Tower Church and later
became a member of the Independent Watch Tower Church. He was deported
from Southern Rhodesia in 1917 because of his anti-European stance.
Sindano preached that:
God made [Europeans] know [Africans] and sent them with good 
things and many things we see to come and give us free, and
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teach about God, and when they get into the country they hide 
everything and teach us very little about God; they teach us how 
to write but they did not give us things free what God gave 
them to give us. They make us work very hard and give us very 
little for work we have done to them, and there fore if we pray
very hard with all our hearts, God will hear our prayers and
will clear all the Europeans back home to England and everything 
will be ours, and we will be as rich as they are.93
He went on preaching that, "The English have no right whatsoever in the
country, they are committing injustice against the natives in
pretending to have rights."9*
As far as the colonizers were concerned, Sindano's preaching was not
reflecting what could be considered an "African attitude": it was
subversion. According to the beliefs of the Independent Vatch Tower
Church, "The world was in its last age; the great empires and nations
were instruments of Satan; so also were the historic churches,.... All
these were to be overthrown in one last struggle. The world would then
become the inheritance of the true believers, the witnesses of the
intentions of God, irrespective of colour or race."9® Religious
syncrentist movements were part of the opposition, just like in Maji
Maji.
This issue of direct hatred to Europeans was but one among others. 
By the 1920s, inequalities had already emerged among Africans because of 
differentiation as a result of colonial capitalist development, The 
history of these inequalities pre-dates colonial occupation. Even in the 
19th century, "the ideal golden age of communal unity, brotherhood and 
equality had never fully existed in Tanzania". The same century also saw 
the emergence of fears of witchcraft which "was a reflection of a 
general sense of insecurity and division". Given that in its 
participation in the abolition of slave trade, Christianity gave hope
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for equality, brotherhood and dignity, it was hoped that it would 
provide "an answer to divisions within African societies; that 
Christianity could provide an answer to witchcraft". But with further 
increase of witchcraft fears, people felt that Christianity had failed 
to bring brotherhood and unity which they hoped for.9®
To reinforce this aspect, missionaries had all along preached 
individualism. Vith the increase in differentiation, the protests that 
became widespread were those against inequality.97Thus in Rungwe, for 
example, one of the few areas where many independent churches became 
established, people looked upon Christianity as a way of "bringing 
peace and prosperity to a whole community". "  In Ufipa, the tendency was 
for the pagans to "see Christians as a divisive element opposed to 
traditional village comradeship and unity."99 In many areas of 
Tanganyika, disillusionment expressed itself in a resentment against 
both missionaries and African converts. Very often, Christians were 
taken as people who undermined customary communal life.
Far more important than the independency churches in Tanzania were 
the revival movements. These were brought from Bukoba in the end of the
1930s. "By 1946 balokole ('saved ones') were at work in Dodoma and
cl} u f  c V\
during the next twenty years they influenced every protestant cXmrbh".
They demanded public confession of sins; and they were a "reaction
against factors of disengagement in the church"100;
It caught fire in a church where the idea of sin had been taken 
too lightly, where drunkenness, heathenism, superstition, 
adultery, idleness, and levity flourished under the cloak of 
nominal Christianity. One could no longer distinguish, by their 
behaviour, who was a Christian and who was not. The church had 
become worldly,, and the world churchly.101
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What the "saved ones" did was to set the anarchy of personal experience 
against worldliness and institutionalization. They created communities 
which superseded the family and the clan in their fellowship of local 
cell and mass assembly, and this fellowship was open to even "Europeans 
who were saved and abandoned pretensions of superiority." They prided 
themselves on lacking organization and leaders. In places like Bukoba, 
they criticized the missionaries and the converts, and their movement 
was designatedly egalitarian. Unlike the other movements, the "saved 
ones" were more hostile to African cultures than the missionaries. They 
rejected even secular dancing, alcohol and polygamy. This movement was 
finally broken in the 1950s.102
Some of the independent churches which were established in the few 
areas in Tanganyika in the 1920s and 1930s were; Watch Tower, African 
National Church, African Inland Church, The Last Church of God and His 
Christ and the Malakite Church. When Sindano established the Watch Tower 
Church in Mbozi in 1919, the British officials became very afraid of 
this movement. Their fear was based on the possibility of this movement 
getting into contact with Pan-Africanism and "thereby producting] a 
great network of anti-white controlled religious movement throughout 
East and Central Africa...." When the leaders of this movement began 
what they termed "a campaign of vilification of the recognised 
missionary societies, i.e. the London Missionary Society and the Roman 
Catholic Church" in 1923, the Government served a deportion order to 17 
Watch Tower followers. These refused to go, and were finally jailed.103
The Watch Tower movement went as far as setting up villages, within 
an attempt to resolve the problems in the rural areas. These villages
were called Jerusalem. The members of these villages refused to share
in the so-called colonial development.
By rejecting authority of the chief and the customs of the tribe 
and at the same time rejecting the authority of the British 
administration and the teachings of the missionaries, the Vatch 
Tower believers did create new societies on small scale. 
Informants today comment in Ufipa upon the 'fraternal life the 
faithful lived in these Watch Tower villages' and upon the 
supposed fact that witchcraft fear does not exist there.10*
On the other hand, the African National Church among the Wanyakyusa
produced statements of a religious, social and political nature which
stressed the importance of christianizing the whole community and
attacked the elitism of missionaries. They criticized the missionaries
for not imparting Christ and education in "such a way as to fit with the
manners and customs of the people" and stated that they believed that
"the immoralities...prevailing among" them were a direct "result of the
unnatural position into which the African had been driven,..."; that
they believed in the "fatherhood of God and brotherhood of man
regardless of colour and creed, and that the African religion with its
traditions, laws and customs was instituted by Him so that Africans may
realise Him by their own observance."10® This aspect of the cultural and
communal aspirations was also one of the issues which the Last church of
God and his Christ stressed.
Besides the African independency and religious revival movement, 
other movements which expressed discontment with the divisions brought 
about by colonial capitalism in the 1920s and 1930s were: African Islam, 
which expressed the views of people who did not control the Islamic 
establishment; and movements which were neither Moslem nor Christian, 
led by prophet-like figures who "promised an end to fear and social 
tension and inequality, and an end to withcraft".1°® Taken together, all
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these ideas were concerned with the problems which had arisen as result
of the emergence of rich people and privileged groups among Africans:
Many people regarded such groups as selfish deserters from the 
community. Moreover many people in the rural areas did not
understand the working of the wider world; they feared that it 
would destroy their own community and wanted to find some means 
of getting back to the understandable, and more or less
egalitarian, social groupings of the past.107
The latter is the same feeling which prevailed during Maji Maji when
African Christians were called upon to repudiate the white ways and
rejoin African societies.103
In the area where the Maji Maji war begun, there emerged a movement
called Ngoja cult by around 1925. It was unleashed by Ngoja bin Kimeta,
a Mngindo. It is reported that this movement almost resembled the Maji
Maji affair in content. Ngoja had mobilized followers, at first claiming
to smell out witches by agency of water— called kimehe— with magical
power through a series of trials by ordeal. This developed to detecting
crimes standing several years undetected. The disciples of the movement
spread throughout the southern part of Tanganyika among people who
participated in Maji Maji. Anybody who drank the water, it was asserted,
could be invulnerable against wild beasts, poisoned arrows and spear
thrusts. A colonial official wrote that this movement had a "certain
amount of success among weak-minded old women, and their activity caused
a degree of uneasiness."109 Thus:
Vhen the chiefs, whose former powers had been restored to them 
by the British system of indirect rule, awoke to the dangers of 
these claims, they took prompt action. Ngoja disciples were 
rounded up and fined heavily, their takings being confiscated. 
Ridicule and derision did the rest. But from the beginning to 
the end the progress of this movement was thoroughly known to 
the authorities.110
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Mitchell, when visiting the Southern parts of Tanganyika in early 1929 
had made an attempt to comprehend the essence of this movement. At the 
end of this year he recorded in his diary: "Ngoja on the go again. Lindi 
this time... I have an uneasy suspicion that we are being damn silly 
about it."111
Although the official above reported that the movement was stamped 
out with the help of the chiefs who were restored, the fact is that the 
Vangindo, like most of the communities around this area were a stateless 
community: the chiefs were imposed upon them. When Margery Perham
visited them in 1929, the Vangindo had categorically denied their 
participation in Maji Maji on the pretext that they fled to the bush; 
and that they did the same thing during the First World War. They could 
not admit having participated in movements which were not approved by 
Europeans. In fact, the Vangindo, as was pointed out in the preceding 
chapter played a very central role in Maji Maji. They were not telling 
Perham the truth on this regard. Asked further by Perham, most of them 
admitted that they were non-Christians and non-moslems: "Did they
believe in God? No. Nor yet in devil? Pressed as to who sent rain they 
now admitted, obviously to please us, that there might be a God. But it 
was no devil who withheld it: it must be the same God in a difficult 
mood. For themselvelves annihilation was the end of life. No spirit 
survived."112
The significance of Ngoja becomes even more obvious when examined 
from the point of view of the next movement: Mchape. This movement was 
to spread in the early 1930s, It spread from Malawi, and was very 
"critical of the failure of Christian missions and converts to bring 
love and end fear: it was very critical of the inequalities caused by
- 105-
missions." The followers of the movement wanted to "'purge' the country
and save the people by casting away all evils which have been in force
for many years."113 One of the Mchape leaders had asserted:
Your missionaries came in this country some 50 years ago. They 
tried all their best to save the people and teach you not to 
kill each other yet without success. But we feel sympathy with 
you for you have lost your dear friends, not because God took 
them away but by being poisoned by these wizards whom you will 
see today. We follow the commandment of God which says 'Thou 
shalt not kill.1 This commandment is being observed and 
fulfilled by us more than other religions. For they all fail to 
serve the people but we do. I know that some of you Christians 
argue...but you must not trust Christians, they are the people 
who are hiding in this religion and are great wizards more than 
anyone.11*
As for the Moslems, their struggles go way back. In 1914, there
emerged arguments about having an Africanized and democratic Islam. By
this year, Moslems in Tabora were objecting to the power of the ruling 
Arab oligarchy. They wanted Islam to acquire a character approved by the 
members. In the 1920s and 1930s Moslems had become divided between Left 
and Right. There was an argument, by this time, about the ceremony known 
as Zikri, in which the Left stood for drumming in the mosque and more 
participation of women, and in general, a more Africanist Islam. The 
British administrators were sympathetic to the Right, just as they were 
sympathetic to missionaries against independency movements. This was 
clearly because of the political nature of the very struggles, because 
it was this Left which was associated with what the Government called as 
Pan-Islamic influence. In 1933, Mitchell had to send a confidential 
circular to all provincial commissioners and commissioner of the police 
cautioning them on Zikri.11B
In the early 1920s, many Moslems had been deported on political
grounds as a result of this struggle. One of the Moslems who were
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deported was Majaliwa Habibu of Tabora. He was departed under His 
Excellency's Order of 11th January, 1922, because he was one of the 
people who cauised "friction among members of the Mohammedan community in 
1922." D.J. Jardine, the Acting Governor in 1933 stated that Majaliwa 
was deported "on the grounds that he was a person conducting himself so 
as to be dangerous to peace and good order in the territory."11®
Broadly, the above ideas of protest in the 1920s and 1930s were an 
expression of real struggles against the colonial forms of 
domination, exploitation and inequalities. Anne Dundas was to remark 
that, "At present day almost every political disturbance in Africa has 
its roots in some mischievious belief or supposed supernatural 
agency...."117 The struggles manifested themselves in a variety of ways; 
hence, the British response: Indirect Rule. Following below are some of 
the known African responses practically, besides the movements reviewed 
above.
As soon as the Native Hut and Poll Tax Law was introduced in 1922 <a 
law which aimed at forcing Africans to turn to wage labour and also to 
produce raw materials, and did not count the man, but also the number of 
wives in terms of the huts owned) people in Songea began to build "one 
big house to hold all the family like the coastal houses, to lessen the 
burden of taxation" instead of the round conical roofed houses.110 Other 
societies also protested, as was classically done by the Vanyakyusa in 
the 1920s by direct refusal to pay taxes. The tax boycott by the 
Vanyakyusa was led by the Amafumu— "a very powerful hereditary people 
whose business is to represent and protect the commoners or the 
peasantry" as Mitchell defined them.119 The protest against taxation was 
a protest against proletarianization on a wider scale. Africans refused
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to enter wage labour, as Mitchell and Major Orde Browne noted in those 
years, taxation did not seem to yield the necessary results in terms of 
forcing them to enter wage labour or produce export crops. As a result 
of this, "At other times there have been individual employers who could 
not get labour when they needed it urgently, or in some cases at all," 
The Government responded to this by an introduction of a "policy of 
forced labour, camouflaged as voluntary, against their advice and that 
of the Chief Native Commissioner...."; so wrote Mitchell. According to 
him, there was reluctance to "leave the home village and go out and 
work. .. certainly due in part to the bad treatment of the porters in the 
Var and the lamentably excessive casualties among them."1:20
Methods which were employed to create/acquire wage labour by the 
British administrators were even more shrewd than those of the Germans 
who employed direct forced labour, given that the Mandate provisions and 
later on in the 1950s the International Labour Organization Convention 
forbade the use of compulsory labour except far "essential public works 
and services". The British had to constantly provide rationalizations or 
suppress information on the use of force. There are three main forms of 
forced labour they used.
The first one was the so-called 'communal' or 'tribal turn-out': 
This was the requisition of labour of villagers for a definite period of 
time— once or twice in a year. This practice began in 1919 when people 
were forced to work for 60 days in a year. It was given legal 
recognition in the Native Authority Ordinance of 1927, whereby the 
provision of labour was for 20 to 30 days in a year. The justification 
for this practice was found in the so-called extermination of tse tse 
fly. These 'turn-outs' were quite widespread, According to Shivji, the
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Provincial Commissioner of Central Province (what is now Dodoma and 
Mpwapwa), for example, proposed to call 40,000 people in 1948; 24,000 in 
1951 and 67,000 in 1954 to work for ten days on roads, bush clearance 
and dams, wells and contour banks building. The earlier figures which 
are not available must have been higher, as is discernible from some 
observations made in those years.121
Vhen in Tanganyika in 1929/30, Margery Perham at some point 
accompanied a Provincial Commissioner of the Coastal Province to 
Rufiji, besides meeting people who were worn out "with the law's delay", 
and many other problems, three naked and shy Africans came to their tent 
to complain to the Provincial Commissioner "that by someone's orders 
eighty of them have been called up for a long journey to do forced 
labour on the road." These people did not even know whether they were 
going to be paid or not; and their main concern was the fact that they 
were being taken at the time of the year when they wanted to get back to 
work on their farms if they were to avoid faring badly. The Provincial 
Commissioner got angry about this, the reason being the fact that these 
people came to complain when a researcher on the colonial problems was 
there. He claimed that the order must have been given by an unsupervised 
junior, and it was unjustifiable; that the execution must have been done 
by an "unsupervised and unpleasant native foreman, with all the petty 
oppression and cheating that may mean."122 The following discussion took 
place between Perham and the Africans who came to complain:
' Is it the custom of the Serikali (Government) to force labour
for roads?'
'Yes, it is the custom.'
'Do they get paid?'
' Ve don't know.'
'You are ill.' (This to one man who looks ready to faint).
'Yes very ill in head and stomach.'123
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According to Brett, the labour recruitors employed very rough 
methods in recruitment. These included beating, and other corporal 
punishments, bribing the chiefs and even direct cheating, "and labour in 
the estates was often reported to be 'unruly'".12* As a result of the 
corruption of the Native Authorities in labour recruitment the Master 
and Servant Ordinance of 1923, Section No 57, tried to minimize this 
practice by prohibition of bribes to the Native Authorities through 
"gifts" or "offer of money for serving labour".12S Accompanied by the 
above method* was the requirement that "all Africans had to register 
themselves and move with passes indicating whether or not they had 
performed labour on plantations" as a way to force Africans to go and
seek for wage employment.12® There was also a law against "Destitute
Persons", introduced in 1923, which required that all persons without 
"visible" or sufficient means of supporting themselves to be brought to 
court or detained for a month while some work was found for them.
The second method involved the so-called "Tax defaulters". According 
to the 1922 Hut and Poll Tax Ordinance, one could pay taxes in kind by 
labour in public works or pay in cash.127 Between 1933 and 1942, an 
average of 25,000 tax defaulters were put to work annually,120
Mitchell's diaries have numerous scattered entries on the fact that tax 
evasion was a very serious problem in the country. At some point he even 
commented that it was thanks to the establishment of Native authorities 
that the number was not as spectacular as it was in the early 1920s. In 
his view, tax defaulters could manage to get away because they sold
their produce to Indian petty traders.123 When in Njombe, towards the 
end of 1933, he met a case of two messengers who had been beaten up by 
the people when they were sent to collect tax: "The tax position is
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fair,...But the default rate is much too high, and tax labour should be 
called out."130
The last method was labour conscription. This method became 
especially rampant during the Second Vorld War, whereby Native 
Authorities had to supply labourers to work for 60 days. As for the 
other times the following figures indicate the magnitude of the usage of 
this method. 27,000 men were required to work under this method in 1927, 
and in the 1940s and 1950s an average of 9,000 men were conscripted 
annually. Within this policy, there was also forced military services: 
between 1940 and 1943, a total of 67,000 Africans were conscripted for 
military service by force. During the Second World War, there was no 
distinction between private and public works, and this was especially 
the case with the fall of the British allies in the East (Java, Malaya 
and Phillipines). East African colonies had at this time to provide food 
and sisal for the troops. As a result of the Compulsory Service 
Ordinance of 1940 (No 23), by the end of 1944 over 35 per cent of labour 
in rubber production and 25 percent in food production was conscripted. 
60 per cent of the conscripted labour was employed by private capital. 
There were 86,000 workers who were conscripted between 1942 and 1945.131
Officially, forced labour was finally done away with in 1954.132 But 
besides forced labour, there was also wide usage of female and juvenile 
labour. It is not easy to determine the extent of the employment of 
these forms of labour in the pre-World War II period, but many non­
official sources indicate its existence. Mrs A. Dundas, for example, 
made the following observation about the early 1920s:
...side by side with the interests in the services and the 
augmentation of church membership (which in turn augments the 
offerings to the mother church) is the cultivation.and marketing 
of output from their own plantations, in which are employed
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many children and adult Christians, whose labour is inexpensive. 
The mission schools minister also to the agricultural needs of 
the mission, pupils attending two or three days a week during 
the planting season, and working in the mission fields the 
remainder. Actual school terms are generally confined to the 
rainy season, when little coffee cultivation is possible, and 
when the fewest number of children can attend because of
inclement weather.133
It was in 1938 that female employment in night work was for the first
time legally prohibited. The Employment of Women and Young Persons
Ordinance of 1940, which was amended in 1943 also proves the fact that
employment of these forms of labour was widespread. While this Ordinance
prohibited the employment of children, it also legalized their
employment in the diamond sorting from gravel and tea industries. The
essence of this Ordinance was simply to provide some limits to child and
female labour rather than prohibit it.13*
Enumerations conducted in the 1940s and 1950s showed that child and
female labour constituted between 10 and 15 per cent of total wage force
and child labour was almost M of this. Most of it was employed in
agriculture— weeding and clearing, coffee picking and harvesting,
picking pyrethrum flowers and kapok. Child labour was also employed in
in sisal estates on drying lines; in mining for breaking ore; and in
ginneries in feeding gas. This was the cheapest labour compared to the
other forms. In Mbagala estate, for example, women were paid shs 7/= for
thirty tasks and men were paid shs 10/= for the same tasks in 1941.
Women constituted % of the male counter parts in Lusanda estate, lu
1933, wages for unskilled children varied from shs 2/50 to shs 3/50
including food rations, while wages for unskilled adults varied from shs
8/= to shs 10/= including food rations. In fact the colonial
administration and the policies defended juvenile labour.13®
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The above methods of acquiring labour are an indication of the 
problems of labour acquisition which the colonial government was facing 
in the 1920s. This fact is confirmed by the admittance by the Labour 
Department in 1929 that the "Native Authorities appeared to have a 
beneficial effect on the flow of labour...."13S In spite of this help by 
the Native authorities, the problem of labour recruitment still remained 
acute. This problem was compounded with that of contract breaking, 
absence without leave, refusal to work, etc.. A lot of contract breaking 
cases were reported in Arusha and Moshi during this period. It was also 
observed that as far as contracts are concerned, "The African workmen 
is, in fact proving distinctly shrewd and apt in acquiring knowledge of 
conditions of employment and, particularly, in exploiting his very 
strong position owing to the demand for labour being always in excess of 
supply."137 The other cases were those of desertion. These were also 
very common in the 1920s, but became less in the 1930s.130
It was reported in these years that there was a problem of "certain 
tribes [who] definitely dislike the wage earning system and prefer to 
better themselves by the sale of their produce, even though this may 
entail more work for less result." This was especially the case among 
the sections of the population which were "formerly exposed to 
continual calls for forced labour", people like the Valuguru, Vangindo, 
and others. These people would not accept wage work at all "even at 
convenient seasons". If they took, work for a while, soon they got 
alarmed and went home. This was a slight change compared to "some six 
years ago when it was virtually impossible to obtain a single labourer 
from these people except by a direct order from a government authority." 
It was concluded that there was no doubt that the "hatred of forced
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labour persists, in the subconscious mind is a distaste for any kind of 
work for an employer even under attractive conditions."139
Even the concentration of the people in settlements and the 
imposition of quarantines in the 1920s and 1930s, it is reported, could 
not have been successful without "energetic measures which had been 
assisted by the police and the administration".1AO In these struggles, 
whereby the police and the administration had to be used, it was mainly 
the chiefs who were the most resented by the people. It was felt that, 
besides the privileges they had, they were nothing but government tools 
at the local levels. Chiefs and the native authorities in general 
consisted of people with official favour, and they were the ones who 
were involved in labour recruitment, forcing people to produce what the 
colonial government required, measures to eradicate tse tse fly, 
prevention of soil erosion, concentration of population, control of 
grazing, tax collection, etc. The result was that refusal to pay taxes, 
to become wage labourers, to be concentrated was also active opposition 
to the native authorities and the government itself individually or at 
the local level in general.
In fact, according to Major Orde Browne who headed the Labour 
Department towards the end of the 1920s, it was "not necessary to expect 
action in form of mob-violence or armed resistance" in the 1920s and 
1930s. Vhile these could occur in isolated instances, the tendency was 
to form other forms of organization because, according to him, the 
African had already seen that he could not win with 'impis' . 1A1 In 1932 
he was to point out that it was "indeed almost impossible to discover 
any sort of governmental activity as regards the native" which did not,
hold the potentiality of serious conflict with tribal customs,
and corresponding trouble; less conspicuous, but even more
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important, is the unforeseen or unknown effect that may be 
produced on village life by the introduction of some 
administrative improvement, or it is believed.... The creation of 
a detribalized mass of cynical sceptics who revere no law and 
respect no authority except the rule of force, is a menace to 
all civilised governments....'Les rdvolutions qui commencement 
sont en rdalitd les croyances qui finissent.'1*2
In other words, the government did not necessarily facd another Maji
Maji; instead, it was resisted in other forms, which were mostly
articulated in the bills, methods used to acquire labourers and force
people to produce raw materials, ordinances and policies; but passed
officially unrecorded.
Vay back in 1922, the Vamasai were engaged in a fierce struggle 
against the Veterinary Department. The relations had deteriorated 11 Lu 
the point of far too frequent fights with the veterinary guards." In an 
incident which took place at Longido, the Director of Veterinary tried 
as hard as he could to harangue on the value and wisdom of his 
department, "the duty of obedience, especially in matters of quarantine 
and stock movement and so on." When he finished, one of the Vamasai, an 
01 Gores (elder) spoke for the rest of them after conferring briefly: 
"'Is it quite impossible', he said, 'to teach a European anything about 
cattle? Could you not let us have a few of your Laiok— boys of nine to 
twelve— whom we could teach? Ve do really want to help you.'"1*3 In 
December of the same year, it was reported that "By a succession of 
untoward happenings, unrest among a section of the Masai tribe has 
culminated in an outbreak of a party of young warriors, who have taken 
to the forest and are defying authority. ..." It was suggested that the 
best method to suppress them was to use the Walumbwa who were the 
ancient enemies of the Vamasai, The editor of the East African Standard 
who reported this incident objected to the use of such a method and
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suggested that it would be much better to use the Kings African Piffles. 
This unrest spread up to Kenya.v**
Around the same time, Charles Dundas as a Provincial Commissioner in 
an official tour, encountered his first difficulty with the porters in 
the same district. It was the custom to send back to their homes each 
day the porters who had carried the loads from the last camp, "but not 
until a substantial meal has been given them and as many hours* rest as 
they chose to take." In Masailand, "they were unaware that the Bwana's 
orders were 'to be obeyed or penalities incurred." There was no meat 
awaiting the official's arrival, nor were there any porters for the 
following day's journey, and their "own men were tired and in an ugly 
mood."1*s
When a "ragged-looking Masai chief", according to Anne Dundas (The 
Masai had no chiefs— C.S.L.), arrived with two followers, Charles Dundas
demanded to know the "meaning of this defection". Mo excuses were
accepted, and several porters among those who were discontented were
sent in "pursuit of the herd of cattle which had lately passed", and 
soon came back "with two or three bulls". Before the matter could be 
settled, there was heard a cry that a bull had escaped. A young Masai 
had come to rescue the bull, and no attempt had been made by the
porters to stop him. Charles Dundas was very angry and ordered the 
confiscation of the rest of the bulls. The result of this was to make 
the porters who were on strike go without food, and the affair was to be 
dealt with the next day. In the morning, it was found that one of the 
bulls held at "ransom" had been strangled by the striking porters—  
"presumably out of revenge for deprivation of their usual feast, and to 
prevent the Mohammedan members of our household from enjoying any of the
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meat..." Mew porters had to be brought from Kilimanjaro and the 
rebellious porters were taken as prisoners.1*®
In 1927, while in the same province as a Provincial Commissioner, 
Mitchell was to complain that the Vambugwe who lived in the south of 
the Vamasai who had most of the donkeys were refusing to sell them. This 
was in February 1927.1*7 Four months later, when he was on his way back 
to Arusha from big game hunting "a hooligan threw a stone" at his car. A 
few days later he wrote that there were "Reported attempts to derail 
trains near Lembeni" in the same Province.1*0
As far as the agriculturalists were concerned, much of the 
Government efforts in the 1920s were given to location of areas which 
could be incorporated in export crop production, so as to hasten the 
post- Vorld Var I economic recovery. Some research stations for 
introduction of new agricultural husbandry were established in various 
areas, among them being Singida and Rufiji. Mr Vakefield, one of the 
ablest agricultural officers (according to the colonial government), 
established the Mpanganya Research Station in Rufiji. This station 
concentrated on experiments such as sowing of seeds, early weeding and 
spacing of cotton and rice. According to Vakefield, if these experiments 
and instructions were followed by the peasants, productivity could be 
enhanced. However, the instructions and the guidance were not followed, 
and Vakefield blamed this on the lack of "tribal authority" among the 
Varufiji. He quipped that Africans were indolent, who required firmness 
if they were to be developed.1*9 The latter goes to show that all the 
claims about Africans being lazy, stupid, fatalistic, etc, are also an 
expression of the resistance the colonialists faced.
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As for the cotton experiments, Vakefield observed in 1928 that "the 
native population, apart from the resident in the western area of the 
district, did not undertake the planting of cotton during the year, 
relying upon their harvest of food stuffs to pay their taxes."1®0 Vhen 
Vakefield left Rufiji in 1934, he claimed to have made headway. But as 
soon as he had gone, it was reported, the Varufiji forgot everything. 
The Department of Agriculture was left wondering what was wrong with 
them. The Department finally concluded that for the time being the 
Varufiji "would provide a psychologist with a lifetime study".1®1
Like the Vamasai and the Varufiji, the people of Dodoma and Singida 
did not fair any better in the eyes of the colonialists. Most often the 
people of Dodoma refused to part with their land for agricultural 
purposes and preferred to pay their taxes by selling cattle, while the 
Government encouraged them to cultivate groundnuts. The Vanyaturu of 
Singida resisted a fixed percentage take-off of everyone's cattle on 
the basis that it would make the rich richer and the poor poorer, lea In 
1933 it was feared that there might be violence among the Vagogo, when 
they refused to accept Chief Omari Mpendu who was imposed upon them by 
the Government. The Government decided to coerce them to accept him, 
much as it was known that the Vagogo had openly said that Mpendu was not 
their chief.v®3
Even in areas where, supposedly, the idea of "improvement" had been 
accepted, the colonial agents did not have a smooth time in the 1920s.
Vriting about the irrigation system of the Vachagga in the 1920s, Anne
Dundas noted that the peasants had cunningly diverted the countless 
streams from the rivers to the extent of causing dissention among
settlers, who also needed the water for irrigation.1®*
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In a nutshell, in the countryside in general, protests centred
around questions of anti-erosion measures (compulsory tie-ridging and
terracing, destocking, control of grazing, etc.); improved methods of
cultivation, animal husbandry and those aimed at famine "prevention"
(compulsory cultivation of crops such as cassava and groundnuts). That
is, it was mostly issues which surrounded the question of land-use. The
measures were mainly enforced by the native authorities under the powers
given to them. The anti-erosion rules were in existence in almost all
districts by_ 1937. During the same period, attempts were being made to
regulate the cultivation methods of export crops. These were introduced
in Bukoba in 1930, in Kilimanjaro in 1932, in Lake and Eastern Province
in 1935. After the introduction of further rules in Bukoba— rules which
provided for the inspection and enforced improvement of the quality of
coffee— , there were widespread reactions which ended up in a riot
against the native authorities. The same thing happened in Kilimanjaro;
and such reactions were to become even more widespread after the Second
Vorld Var when more agricultural schemes were introduced. These aspects
will be discussed further in Chapter Five. The above is summarised in
Bates formulation:
The feeling of Africanism manifested itself in one major sphere- 
-concern for land. As population increased and settled 
cultivation became the rule, sensitivity about control of land 
increased markedly. The Chagga nearly rioted in 1933 over a 
suggestion that certain European species of trees be planted, 
believing that this might give Europeans rights in the land 
involved; in the 1940's alienation was felt to be a major 
grievance in Sukumaland, although no agricultural land in that 
area had ever passed to a non-African.1se
Even the youths had their own grievances in those years. For 
example, in April 1933, there was a rebellion of youths in Musoma. The 
Provincial Commissioner of Musoma reported this in May 1933 to the
Secretary of Native Affairs, these disturbances took place in the 
chiefdom of Ikizu, where "some youthful members of the Vaikizu attempted 
to flout the authority of their parents and elders." The youths had 
openly defied the native authorities and the elders and had "threatened 
that any attempt on the part of the messengers or headmen to arrest and 
bring them before the Native Court would be resisted by force." The 
trouble had arisen as result of the some youths being summoned to 
appear before the native court for hunting lions in Serengeti Complete 
Game Reserve. They refused , and proceeded to "blow the horns" 
throughout Ikizu, calling a meeting of the youths.1®6
When the Chief sent a clerk messenger and elders to ask them to 
abandon their "folly" and come to court, they "threatened them and 
chased them away". Some of the youths were advocating the boycott of the 
Native Court, also "to ignore any orders particularly those by the 
elders relating to cultivation of crops, hunting game, etc." The youths 
" (a)... resented their elders ordering them to cultivate, (b)... wanted to 
be allowed to hunt, particularly lions without restrictions." The 
district authorities had to intervene with the police. Finally, the 
ringleaders were collected, the elders complained bitterly that the 
youths were lazy and refused to help in the farms, and that the famine 
of 1931 was largely due to the refusal by the young generation to 
cultivate. The elders had been ordered to cultivate food and cash crops 
and the Native Authority had imposed a penalty in the form of sheep or 
goat for failure to cultivate. Mitchell's comment on this incident is 
very telling in relation to the general situation and the attitudes of 
the youths during this period and the part supposed to be played by 
Native Authorities:
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The insurbodination of African youths which is a result of 
disobedience to parental authority is beginning to make its 
appearance. The most difficult problem which faces African 
parents to-day is the disobedience of their children. Some 
people attribute it to slackness on the part of the parents and 
some to other causes. Personally I think it is due to the 
transitional period between primitive and advanced life 
(civilization). Independence of living which is brought about by 
the individual earning of money is at the root of the 
evil....The remedy lies, probably, in strict tribal and school 
discipline; and the Native authorities have an important part to 
play in this work in order to preserve not only the tribal 
fabric but also the peace of the country.15-7
These problems of the "transitional period" were not confined to 
the peasants* only. There are unrecorded instances of strikes among the 
workers, such as that of the porters who worked for Dundas, and other 
local strikes on sisal estates and elsewhere before the 1930s. In the 
1930 Department of Labour Report— a Department which was established in 
1927— it was stated that one of the most unfortunate things was, in one 
of the estates which allegedly had a good reputation "The rising rate of 
mortality and sickness was concealed for sometime owing to the 
reprehensible failure of the manager to report deaths, which eventually 
amounted to seventy-eight in six months in a labour force of about 
2,100".1GQ The Labour Department took notice of this after it had 
reached a serious stage. This aspect is mentioned in order to show 
extent to which information was concealed by the employers; things were 
reported only when they had reached an alarming situation.
Even where labour disputes were reported, the Labour Department 
presented them in such a way that it was made to be understood that they 
were uncommon things and also repulsive. This kind of reporting is 
besides the falsification of information which was quite common in these 
years, as it has been demonstrated by Mitchell's comments about most of 
the reports which were quoted above. For example, it was mentioned in
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the same report that due to the reductions of wages as a result of the 
depression, disorders were expected because of "lack of communication 
between various groups, and absence of any popular press....M As a 
result of the cuts, "the obvious corollary" was a "strike or outburst of 
violence". Thus;
One ugly riot occurred on an estate, where a large party of 
armed natives threatened the manager with violence, and began to 
do serious damage to trolley lines and other property; happily a 
labour officer arrived before the situation had become critical 
and he was able to pacify the majority of the crowd and persuade 
them to resume work. The eight ringleaders were arrested and 
taken for trial to the Government station, where they received 
sentences ranging from 9 months imprisonment downwards. One or 
two other incidents of similar nature, but of minor importance, 
occured, ...169
One of the so-called minor incidents which was not reported in this 
year, as a result of the reduction of the wages and discharging some of 
the workers took place in the K. Jivanjee and Company sisal estate at 
Mikindani. The workers in this sisal plantation went "about in a great
state shouting that there is war and they are not going to pay taxes and
so on."160 Also in 1933, there was a strike in Dar es Salaam "of the
coolies on the Golf course; very modern."161 But none of these appeared
in the official reports.
That is how strikes by the workers were generally regarded in those 
years, and hence the suppression of information. One such strike was 
staged by the joiners in Kwiro mission in Morogoro in 1924.162 Another 
example of a dispute of which very little was reported took place in 
1927, when the African moter drivers and mechanics in Moshi attempted to 
form a trade union, called the Motor Drivers' Union, and even attempted 
to stage a strike for higher wages. The authorities dispersed them very 
quickly. The Moshi workers were the first to try and organize themselves
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in a trade union. As far as the Labour Department was concerned, the 
Moshi workers movement deserved no sympathy, after all, it was alleged, 
there were "reasons to believe that the whole episode was not the
product of African brains alone."163
In a statement which appeared in the original report of the Labour
Department in 1929, but did not surface in the final report, it was
stated that the cases of workers who were injured "as a result of 
deliberate disobedience" on their part were not reported, because they 
were caused by the "natural recklessness of the African" who , according 
to the Department, was capable of going as far as removing "some safety 
arrangement that appears to him to be constructed simply to hamper his 
work". It was further stated that, this happened especially with the 
workmen with a considerable experience.16* The question of breaking the 
tools as a form of protest, as can be observed from this statement,
used to take place, but never appeared in the official reports.
In some of the Provincial reports, these protests by the workers 
appeared as complaints about a problem, rather than issues involving 
cocial conflicts. Thus, for example, the Provincial Commissioner of 
Iringa, Captain Berne, complained in 1932 that the conduct of African 
workers in Lupa goldfield was not so good. It was especially the semi­
proletarian workers (so-called migrant workers) who gave more trouble, 
because of their fractiousness and bad morale,16® Also, the Labour 
commissioner of Lindi complained that the problem of poor average turn­
out of labour needed an immediate remedy, because it had been found 
that "on an average an estate is compelled to have about twice the 
number of laborers on the books in relation to the daily average turning 
out work."166
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The Labour Department was suppressed in 1932, only to be re­
established again in the end of the 1930s. Thus it is not surprising
that not much information on labour disputes is available for this 
period. The Tanga Report of 1938 by Mr R.C. Jerrad, the Assistant
District Officer, revealed that as far back as 1937 there were no
doubts that the workers were discontented "with the present conditions. 
This discontent is not as many German planters (in ever increasing 
numbers) describe as communism or bolshevism, rather it can be traced to 
the fact thdt they feel they should be given an opportunity to advance 
and profit commensurate with their efforts".167 Jerrad was called to 
settle 48 disputes in his district in 1937. The most serious one was
staged by the 250 wharf labourers who staged a strike for two days in
Tanga. In the same year, Asian skilled workers employed by the African 
Wharfage Company staged three strikes in Dar es Salaam. In both cases 
the strikes were sporadic and spontaneous without a formal 
organization.160 The disputes were over tasks, short rations,
repatriation obligations, abolition of shs 3/= premium as a result of 
the cuts, and bad management.169
By 1939, the Labour Inspector of the territory reported that
"strikes amongst the labourers in the Territory are almost a daily
occurrence". In this year, there was a strike in Moshi which involved 
1,000 Africans, another in the Nothern Province, also in the shipping 
coast from Mombasa, Tanga to Dar es Salaam. It was quiesced in Dar es 
Salaam, but developed into a riot in Tanga, where there were "parades, 
demonstrations and intimidations."170 The domestic servants, under their 
trade union which was formed (although not registered in the same year) 
were also engaged in a struggle. Saleh bin Fundi their leader was
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detested by the colonial regime because of the radicalism he displayed 
during the confrontation.171 The strikes in these years were mainly 
conducted by the casual workers who demanded an increase in the daily 
wage, increase in night-shift pay, a mid-day rest, sickness and accident 
compensation, better treatment on the job-in general— grassroots 
demands. The 1940s saw a wave of strikes. Most of them will be dealt 
with in Chapter Five. At this point, it is important to try and 
recapitulate some of the important institutional changes that emerged 
within the state and among Africans as a result of the workers' 
struggles..
Compulsory registration and control of trade unions was the "key 
weapon in the arsenal of law,..." in the colonies.172 This,in general 
was a result of the constant fear expressed by most colonial officers 
concerning such organizations. Major Orde Browne was to point out in 
1929, for example, that although trade unionism had not yet established 
itself, there was every indication of it doing so "at by no means remote 
date. Once the native is organized, the potentialities before him in a 
way of boycott or the general strike, will need no emphasis." According 
to him, if such movements arose in one country, "through ill-judged or 
misapplied laws," the trouble would spread to its neighbours even if the 
neighbours avoided the same mistakes.173 Within this general fear, a 
compulsory registration of trade unions legislation was introduced in 
1932, when there existed only one trade union of Buropean journalists 
(National Society of Journalists). Besides the attempt by the workers in 
Moshi to form a trade union in 1927, there are no records which indicate 
the existence of movements of this kind before that.
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Although there were no trade unions, there existed other forms of 
organization among the workers and townsmen, some of which dated as far 
back as 1912— such as the Pogoro Association. These were self-help 
associations, which it is said were based on tribal lines. Where tribal 
lines were smaller however, they "federated with other related groups 
into a multi-tribal association. Such was the Ukami Union, which brought 
the Kwere, Doe, Zigua, Kutu, Vidunda, Sagara, and Kami tribes 'for unity 
as in the past"'.17* Not much is known about these organizations; but in 
general, they were formed for the purpose of mutual help— in terms of 
funerals, accommodation, Jobs, sickness, etc.
Some of the things pointed out by the 1938 Labour Department Report 
seem to indicate that the government was aware of labour disputes as 
far as the 1920s. In this report it was painted out that workers had 
been despatching complaints to the labour officers on the conditions in 
the estates since 1927— the year when the Labour Department was 
formed.17® It would seem that it was within the context of the existence 
of such forms of organization as those discussed above and the reality 
of labour disputes that the Trade Union Ordinance No 23 of 1932 was 
introduced. It was promulgated at the behest of the Secretary of State 
to Colonies, Lord Passfield, who on September 17th, 1930 had sent a
Confidential Circular to all colonies arguing that governments should 
give attention to the question of enaction of trade union 
legislation.17® The rationale behind this was the fact that there was a 
need to guide the workers organizations along proper channels by the 
government, because, as it had become clear in South East Asian 
countries and the Caribbean, workers* parties were playing a big role in 
establishing trade unions.177
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The Ordinance provided for the compulsory registration and control
of trade unions. Although the government was aware of the non-existence
of trade unions, as it had shown no sympathy to such movements as
classically demonstrated by the Moshi affair,the Secretary to Native
Affairs, Sir P.E. Mitchell insisted that this legislation which was
advocated by Mr Sidney Vebb (then Secretary of State to Colonies) in
1932 be passed. According to him, the reason for passing such a
legislation lay in the fact that;
it is a matter which has been under consideration in crown 
colonies, Protectorates and Mandated territories recently, and 
the time is adjudged ripe to enact this simple legislation on 
the principle that it is better to be prepared for movements of 
this sort, which are to be expected, rather than legislate
subsequently when perhaps, undesirable events have occured or
some harm has resulted from absence of this legislation....170
It was because of the unrest among workers in other colonies and even
Tanganyika itself that the necessity to have this legislation arose.
Mitchell advanced the analogy that it was no use saying that because "my
house has not yet been burned down and therefore I do not propose to
insure it". Accordingly, this legislation was supposed to prevent the
emergence of "bogus trade unions"— those organized "by two or three
semi-educated people ostensibly to promote the benefit of subscribers
but primarily to provide salaries for the organizers". This Ordinance
made provision for compulsory registration of trade unions and control
of their finances by the government. In this way the registered trade
union would "afford information to the Government of what it is engaged
upon" lest such bodies appeal to people to resist to "lawful authority
and other undesirable things."179
In other words, the Ordinance drew a framework within which all 
trade unions were either to emerge or not to emerge, and the Labour
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Department which, ironically, was closed down the same year, was to play
the role of an advisory body on how to organize trade unions— so that
unions which would emerge would be;
any combination, whether temporary or permanent, the principle 
purpose of which are under its constitution the regulation of 
the relations between workmen and masters, or between workmen 
and workmen, or masters and masters, or imposing restrictive 
conditions on the conduct of any trade or business, and also* the 
provision of benefits to members; whether such a combination as
aforesaid would not, if this Ordinance has been passed, have
been deemed to have been unlawful combination by reason of some 
one or more of its purposes being restraint of trade. 1 0 0
The Ordinance empowered the Registrar to refuse registration of any
trade union if in his opinion it was expedient to do so. Some members of
the LEGCO protested, as they felt this was an attempt to encourage the
formation of trade unions— a thing which was seen as dangerous and
undesirable, as it smacked of bolshevik tendencies, as some members
argued. The Ordinance was passed however, and the Government was to play
the most central role in the establishment of "sound trade unions" and
in the prevention of the emergence of "bogus" ones. The essence of the
legislation, as Mitchell pointed out, was to prevent the emergence of
trade unions.101
The first trade union to be registered under this Ordinance was the 
union of shop assistants in 1933 by Asian clerks, bookkeepers, 
accountants and typists, with the main demand for a short working day. 
Then there was the Asiatic Labour Union which was formed in 1937 of both 
skilled and unskilled workers, which engaged in a strike within a month 
of its formation.102 And finally, the Labour Trade Union of East Africa 
which began in Kenya in the mid-1930s, originally as Kenya Indian Labour 
Trade Union. This union was founded by Asian artisans who were numerous 
in Kenya and Tanganyika. It changed its name within two months of its
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formation to become a non-racial organization on the advise of Makham
Singh who became the general secretary. According to its Constitution,
one of the duties of this Union was;
To attain a class consciousness and for the betterment of the
labour class to promote such class conciousness in others and 
never to miss the opportunity of gaining their trust. (Class 
consciousness is the stage when a worker begins to feel the 
difference between capitalist and himself; when he comes to know 
that in fact he is being robbed by capitalists and when he 
begins to make propaganda against such robbery)103
The Union was registered in 1939. It remained mostly Asian and was
almost inactive in Tanganyika. It ceased its activities during the
Second World War and was removed from registration in 1947.
The 1932 Trade Union Ordinance was amended in 1941, although no 
African trade union was registered under it, except for the three Asian 
unions which were mentioned. When the amendments were introduced in the
LEGCO, the reception of the members was hostile just like in 1932. If it
were not for the fact that the Secretary of State to Colonies had 
threatened a refusal of funds if the Bill was rejected, it would not 
have been passed. The amendments were necessary because there were 
threats of strikes all over the British Empire. One of the most 
important issues which was introduced by the 1941 Bill was picketting. 
This was a direct outcome of the experiences in most colonies. In this 
Bill, only peaceful pickets would be considered lawful, but those aimed 
at intimidating and breaching the peace— such as abstaining from work—  
were considered as an offense, for which the participants had to be 
punished.1e*The struggles of the workers and peasants in the 1940s will 
be considered further in Chapter Five.
Another important indicator of resistance during this time is the 
use of corporal punishment, which was rampant. The information on
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corporal punishment is important in terms of indicating the 
insurbordination or rebellion of people vis A vis the authorities and 
employers at individual or group level. One of the settlers' ideologists 
in Tanganyika, F.S. Joelson was to write the following in relation to 
this practice; "Harshness I would not defend, leave alone advocate, but 
anyone with African experience knows that there are times when nothing 
but corporal punishment administered without loss of time will serve the 
ends of discipline and justice."ieB
The information on whipping in Tanganyika is quite scanty; and the 
reason for this, besides the reasons given above on most of the facts 
about Tanganyika, was the fact that "in British East Africa whipping was 
not regarded as a punishment to be inflicted by a judge, but a mere 
police measure which an official could administer without or with 
supervision"106 The practice of flogging people was widespread during 
British rule to the extent that the High Court Judge in the 1930s Mr 
Gilchrist Alexander commented, "At the outset in Tanganyika it was 
found that statistics of flogging showed alarming approximation to 
statistics in German days".107 Flogging was practiced by all categories 
of the colonial agents— settlers, diggers, administrators and 
missionaries. It was in 1950 that the United Nations Organization 
suggested the abolition of corporal punishment in Tanganyika and 
Cameroon. Even then Tanganyika abstained from voting.16"3
In native courts alone, for example in 1942, the recorded 
information shows that 573 people were punished by whipping only, 180 by 
whipping and imprisonment, and 60 by fine and whipping. These figures 
include adults and juvenile.109 There was a desire at around the same 
time to increase the power of whipping by the authorities. This was a
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legal punishment for offences against "Native laws and customs", under 
the Native Courts Order of 1929 No 5. The power of using the cane 
(kiboko) had been granted to the native courts in 1921. The authorities 
were demanding an increase in the power of flagging because some were 
of the opinion that "failure to cultivate enough land or to assist in 
pig drives are offences for which whipping is a legal punishment" In a 
letter dated 29th July 1929 to the Provincial Commissioner of Eastern 
Province Districts from the Administrative Officer, it was stated that 
"...in advocating the use of the cane or kiboko in all cases of hunt and 
disrespect to the authorities themselves" there was unanimous agreement 
among chiefs for the use of kiboko. 190
There were many overt and covert brutal practices which were
committed under British rule which passed unrecorded. There were
instances when huts were burnt down; but as far as the colonial
government was concerned, such a practice was non-existent. In 1935, the
Colonial Officer, Sir Villiam Cecil Bottomley, sent a despatch to all
colonial governors inquiring an the "necessity far recourse to the
burning of huts, or similar reprisals, as a means, for example, of
bringing tribesmen to parley". He also inquired in regard to whether 
this practice had disappeared or not. In this despatch, there was also a 
draft proposal for which, it was hoped, it would be sent as an official 
one after getting suggestions for legislating on the use of this method. 
The officials in Tanganyika refused to have such legislation and denied 
the fact that this method was in existence,191 The reason for the 
refusal was the fact that there was already in existence the Collective 
Punishment Ordinance of 1921 which was amended and passed by Sir Donald 
Cameron. This Ordinance was enacted with the aim to punish people
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collectively— villages or communities in certain cases. The Governor 
could impose fines on all inhabitants of a village or district or 
community for various acts, one of them being, if the peoples' conduct 
"or conduct of any of them has been such as to require the bringing of 
soldiers or police against them for the purpose of preventing or 
suppressing disturbances, or enforcing lawful orders or the payment of 
taxes leviable under the law of the territory".192
In the 1930s an adventurer in Tanganyika wrote that "Tax defaulters, 
even women, were transported to forced labour hundreds of miles from 
their homes. The huts of defaulting indigent old people were burnt."193 
This adventurer saw more than that in terms of human oppression. Vhen 
passing through Mahenge in Morogoro and Usangu in Mbeya in the same 
period, all he saw was bare land. Villages were inhabited by old people 
and children who were tending cotton fields but could hardly spare a 
basketful of millet meal: "Under compulsion, under the pressure of
taxation in cash, I saw the natives raise with spasmodic success export 
crops: cotton, coffee, tobacco, peanuts. I did not find a single food
crop, not a vegetable, not a fruit added to the village economy."19* He
was to summarise the mandate rule of Tanganyika in terms of the fact 
that, despite "the express injunctions of the mandates, despite sincere 
official intentions and assurances, the natives everywhere, but 
especially in remote districts", were at the "mercy of petty white
administrators, and of native chiefs" who were only too ready "to
harrass their countrymen in order to curry the whiteman's favours and 
rewards".
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The next section explores the interests which were being defended in 
these forms of oppression within which the Tanganyikans resisted and 
sums up the various ideological and philosophical issues of Indirect 
Rule,
3.3 The "Bureaucratic Paradise"
The tendency for the British administration in Tanganyika was to 
harp on the policy of multiracial society in which African interests 
were supposedly paramount. Indirect Rule was an attempt towards this 
direction of multiracialism, although as a policy, multiracialism became 
more pronounced after the Second World War. Racism was not the official 
policy of British administration in Tanganyika, but nonetheless, race 
distinctions clearly existed: "the principle of segregation was patent, 
so obvious, in fact, that no explicit statement of policy or legislative 
restrictions was necessary".195 The so-called egalitarianism which was 
the official policy "operated only within the framework of occupational 
contacts or semi-official activities,"19e
In Tanganyika, Europeans assumed a sense of ^isolation, keeping a 
distance from the "natives", and these race distinctions operated both 
residentially and in public services with the legitimation of health and 
sanitation. That is, desirable standards could only be maintained by 
isolation of Europeans in separate residential areas, prisons, schools 
and hospitals. The result of this was that in all towns in Tanganyika, 
there existed separate residential areas for Europeans, Asians and 
Africans.
Most towns which emerged or developed during the colonial period in 
Tanganyika displayed a layout and architectural diversity of social and 
economic divisions based upon race, religion and education.197 Generally
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the towns were divided into three residential areas: Uzunguni or
European residential areas, Uhindini or "bazaar" areas where Asians 
resided, and Uswahilini or African residential areas.The European 
residential area was an area with spacious "erected fine villas, raised 
above ground level and mostly, double storeyed, with thick whitewashed 
stone walls, airy rooms and verandahs". This was a very well planned 
area, in which the land between the villas, "as well as empty spaces—  
was treated as one botanical garden". It is reported that after the 
First World* War, the British colonial government in Tanganyika 
"neglected for years the scientific and medical services" which had 
began so wellunder German rule and instead, spent a great deal of money 
in "building a new Government house" to impress the population with 
"their superiority to Germans" 19,9
Scientific and technological work was ignored generally during the 
inter-war period for the sake of such impressive structures and the 
building/creating what was to be known as "bureaucrats' Paradise"200 as 
a result of the number of civil servants and government officials 
employed, the luxuries they indulged in, and hence the exorbitant 
burden of taxes and the use of compulsion on people. In fact, it was 
during the German period that scientific and technological advancement 
had of any significance had been undertaken. During this period railway 
lines were built and German scholars and missionaries started scientific 
investigations in many fields, and their greatest claim lay in the realm 
of medicine and hygiene. As early as 1897 the British Foreign Office 
admitted that the scientific work done by Germans was quite advanced.201 
In the medical field, Germans had made attempts to introduce both 
preventive and curative methods of combating diseases: "In , the
prevention of Malaria, they instituted an elaborate system of source 
reduction and source treatment through environmental modification and 
oiling of mosquito breeding sites in urban areas." Germans administered 
quinine massively, and produced locally both quinine and small-pox 
vaccine, and launched limited campaigns against diseases such as 
trypanosomiasis and plague. They even built a laboratory in Dar es 
Salaam. 202
This balance of curative and preventive methods was dismantled with 
the introduction of bismuth by the British in the 1920s and 1930s. Vith 
the British, more emphasis was placed on curative methods. Besides 
researche in medicine, another achievement of the Germans was the 
establishment of the Amani Research Station in Tanga during the early 
1900s. This station was founded as a biological and agricultural 
research station. During the First World War this station was used for 
manufacturing medicine and other war materials,203 This station went 
almost derelict after the First World War. From 1927 to 1948 it was 
named The East African Agricultural Institute, and after 1948 it was 
transferred to Nairobi.
When discussing the possibility of establishing research on empire 
problems and making recommendations in 1925, Lord Balfour pointed out to 
the British government that some of the policies of the British 
government were not agreeable to the pride of the country. This was 
mainly in reference to research. policies in general. On Tanganyika 
specifically, he pointed out that while they had been "humane on the 
whole", they had also been negative, "more benign than the Germans 
perhaps, but less creative...." He reported that a commission which was 
sent to Tanganyika saw Amani Station:
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'for all practical purposes, lying derelict, its laboratories
unoccupied, its costly apparatus dismantled, the living quarters 
deteriorating, the magnificient and priceless collection of
books and scientific records and specimens unused. Instead of 
supplying the five territories in particular, and the scientific 
. world in general, with contributions to their knowledge of 
tropical plants, soils, and insects...its only output at present 
consists of penny packets of seeds. 1:20/1
It was only after the Second World War that many agricultural
research institutes were established, and this was with the aim to "find 
solutions to the problems facing export crops so that production of such 
crops could be increased.205 In a review of scientific progress in 1952, 
for example, it was pointed out that among the most "important" 
researches which were being conducted in Tanganyika were the 
archeological excavations at Olduvai Gorge by Dr L.S.B. Leakey, to 
uncover the "early Chellean man. In zoology, it was the study of the 
birds of East Africa--a research which had been of great interest for 
quite sometime.20G In one article which appeared in 1941 entitled
"European Storks in East Africa", there was a report about "ringed" 
birds found dead in Lake Province. The rings were sent to the curator of 
the King George V Memorial Museum to prove whether the birds were 
European storks or not. It was proved that they were European storks. 
Other "important" reseaches were such as those of the possibilities of 
moving people to other areas and their concentration to suit colonial 
interests, and customs and traditions of the different communities in 
Tanganyika.207
Beyond these researches, which were in line with the whole colonial 
enterprise in Tanganyika, and in spite of the secondary contradictions 
within the colonial ruling class (for example between missionaries and 
the administrators, settlers and the administrators, missionaries and
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the settlers, etc.), the European community usually maintained a 
"monolithic image of European solidarity". This was expressed in terms 
of a strong pressure among themselves to participate in "community 
activities such as the Saturday curry lunch, the weekend club dance, or 
sports tournaments." The symbol of their solidarity was the club—  
something which towards the end of the colonial period became "more 
explicitly a symbol of racial exclusivity, but even when the Europeans' 
status was not in jeopardy, it provided an important physical focus for 
community action". It was in the club that they passed their time 
telling tales, recounting their experiences, discussing happenings, 
etc.20® As a result of this solidarity, by the 1920s they had already 
evolved a language called "kisettla" (from the word settler) which was a 
jargon of nine tenth English and one tenth Swahili. This language was 
chiefly spoken by "the memsahibs on the plantations and in the 
towns.WZOB
When Chief Saidi of Tabora District embezzeled £10,000 from the
native authority in collaboration with some European officers at the end
of the 1920s— a practice which was very common in most districts210— he
was departed as a punishment and the whole affair was blamed an
Africans' inability to manage their affairs. Alcock, one of the European
officials who was also responsible in the embezzlement of funds was not
punished and the only thing which happened to him was "stoppage of
increment."211 When one European official, Pennington, came back from
Europe in 1934, Mitchell recorded the following in his diary:
I gave P. a severe wigging over the woman shauri [case— C.S.L.I, 
over expenditure, and Michael Alcock; embezzlement. I told him 
he had failed in the trust imposed in him, let me down. But I 
added I was not going to hurt him or take disciplinary measures 
and relied on him to enable me to forget the whole thing.212
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These are but just some examples on European solidarity, even where 
corruption was involved.
A former high court judge in Tanganyika, Gilchrist Alexander,
published a book in 1936 which depicted the various aspects of the lives 
of the administrators. In this book, the author admitted that the 
various aspects he avoided analysing were things such as "racial, 
administrative, or political problems, except in so far as they impinge 
upon matters of law or prove of popular interest". Besides the above, he 
also avoided aspects such as "red tape, statistics, and the musty
records of law..." Most of all, he did not want to offer "the
conventional picture— the author presented, gun in hand, with foot on 
the carcass of lion or elephant".213 In short he avoided discussing 
most of those things which were part of the colonial heritage.
According to Alexander, the conditions of service offered by 
Tanganyika were more reasonable and generous than in most Crown
colonies: the salaries were good, houses were provided free of rent,
"and furnished with the main articles of furniture. One was entitled to 
free medical and even dental attention and medicines. Transport
arrangements and allowances were adequate."21*4 Alexander himself, for 
example, used to draw a salary of £200 a month, and paid no income tax, 
rents, taxes and repairs. This was besides the allowances he drew. 
According to him, there was no way that one could complain about
remuneration: "In fact, one fared practically as well as, if not better
than, a judge of High Court in England".216
In the big houses in which the Europeans lived were a number of 
house servants (house boys). Thus according to Anne Dundas, given such 
services, unless European women knew how to occupy "the long hours of
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enforced inactivity" the situation was difficult. Vhat the women had 'to 
do was to use the time with "good books, restful memories and happy 
plans for the future...conscientiously studies the language, history and
t
customs of native races surrounding her....if she loves the blue skies 
that smile on her flowers, the silver stars that glisten through the 
night,... allows her sense of humour...."216 In fact, these women did 
nothing, to the extent that Anne Dundas admitted: "Of course you
would tell the poor thing (African) the proper way to wash her clothes 
when you've ‘never washed as much as your handkerchief".217.
Such was also the case with even the missionaries' wives, who never
lifted a hand to manual labour, because the converts offered services to
the household. Otherwise, they were provided with "three or four
Christian 'houseboys', and a cook, at an infinitesimal wage". The woman
did not have to rise "to fetch her thimble":
It is questionable if the majority of missionaries could eke out 
a living in any profession, as few are equipped for the modern 
struggle for existence and competition in business: hence the 
Protestant missionary in Africa is regarded as a super-fortunate 
individual of his class; a man of abundant leisure, with living 
for himself and family provided, with practically no effort on 
his part, and conditions of life are far superior to those he 
could command at home.213
As part of the attractions and emenities for Europeans, according to
Reid, the cost of living was quite low. It needed some £400 in the 1920s
and 1930s for a year to keep a cook, scullion, a table boy, a garden
boy, a car boy and sometimes an Ayah for looking after children— even to
"tolerate the horde of native women folk, relations, and children which
these domestics brought to batten on their white master,..." In short,
there was plenty of comfort.219
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It was this kind of life which the colonial agents had to defend. It 
was within this context that Joelson explicitly admitted that, 
prestige was the force by which they ruled "savage Africa": it was the 
force which kept "millions of natives in subjugation to a few thousand 
Europeans." According to him, this force resulted in a mixture of 
respect and fear, "a feeling of devotion to the ruling race evoked by 
moral force" without which the foundation of the empire would 
collapse.220 This prestige was reflected in the conceptions they held 
about Africans and other non-European races and the life they had to 
defend in the colonies.
They never hesitated to talk about the life they led in the most 
revering way. Anne Dundas, for example, could write in 1924 that, "For 
all purposes of general amusement and recreation there are practically 
no 'class* distinctions, save those of colour and race...."221 The 
colonial ruling class was virtually united when it came to the identity 
of "them and us", otherwise, the life they led would crumble easily. 
Thus, she rhetorically asked: "Where else could you find a community of 
some twelve of fifteen men supporting a two court tennis club and a fair 
nine-hole golf course, reclaimed in a year from impassable bush plains? 
The cheapness of black labour in Africa naturally aids in the 
metamorphosis...."222 Usually, after playing the games, small parties 
would "gather at various houses for the evening drink, which" was "rated 
as indispensible to health in the tropics...."223
The most central aspect of this life was the drink— just mentioned 
above as indispensible. The chief item in the "average European's 
expenditure" in Tanganyika was alcoholic beverages, which according to 
the calculations on the basis of the customs import duties done by a
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Treasury official in the early 1930s, "one-third of the average man's
income went an drink! The silly habit grew and grew."224- In 1931
Mitchell noted that the settlers of Arusha were "boozing and throwing
money just as freely as ever— £45,000 has been sunk in the Burka
uselessly,..."226 No wonder that Joelson, who was the founder editor of
a weekly journal, Bast Africa, opens his book with a description of the
harbours and the arrival of a mailship— the most important aspect in
this description being the drink:
Soon the barges are alongside, and into the depths are lowered 
cases of whisky— pride of a place must be given to this, to many 
a white man in the tropics the most important 'foodstuff' sent 
from home!— bales of cotton, bundles of corrugated iron sheets, 
and hundred and one other products which the undeveloped East 
must needs import from advanced lands.226
Alongside this habit of drinking heavily was another "amusement"—  
women. When the British troops took over Bukoba in 1915 from the 
Germans, for example, Colonel Daniel P. Driscol was approached by one of 
the commanders who requested permission for the troops to loot the town. 
The Colonel granted permission on the proviso that they did not indulge 
in drinking and violence. The result of this was "All semblance of 
discipline had gone" wrote Meinertzhagen, the British commander mainly 
concerned with spying: "drunkenness was rife and women were being
violated...."22-7 A European woman in the colonies, wrote Anne Dundas, 
was the "'Little bit of fluff* the negligible quantity which gives an 
added note of colour to the surroundings, and chiefly because of her 
rarity she receives a high valuation than at home." Upon this woman 
befell the "task of keeping alive the perception of true womanhood in 
all men who have left their women-folk and home ties for long periods of 
inhibition in the uncivilised countries...."22®
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As a result of this scarcity of European women, the tendency for 
some of the colonial agents was to obtain African women by various 
means— most often by force or some other shrewd means. In a letter from 
Kimamba, Morogoro, which appeared in Kwetu on 2nd August 1938, it was 
stated that Africans were often victims of discord of European employers 
in the countryside. Europeans who did not have their women-folk around, 
according to this letter, tended to grab women from their employees— the 
"boys". It was stated that, an employer would send a servant to several 
errands so as to keep him out of sight; and when the servant came back 
finally, his wife would already be in the hands of the employer. The 
letter cited an example of a Greek settler who framed his employee for 
stealing Shs 15/= so as to get the worker out of sight after having 
taken away his wife. It was also pointed out that very often, the 
workers were forced to find women for their masters— very often their 
own sisters--so as to avoid losing their jobs.229
Besides clubs, golf, tennis, swimming, fishing, football, gardening, 
drinking and amusing themselves with women, another important amusement 
was "big game massacres and beserk drives"230 The "pursuit of 'big game' 
in Africa" was "one of life's greatest sports" looked forward so 
“eagerly by all Europeans as a crowning achievement in the way of 
adventure...."231 The same people considered it destructive and barbaric 
for Africans to hunt, because according to them, they were motivated by 
lust for meat and they lacked "sportsmanship", while with Europeans it 
was the "....old fashioned safari of whiteman in Tanganyika— that is, a 
leisure affair of porters, tents, and chops of boxes, where one covered 
a dozen or fifteen miles a day for weeks at a time, starting at day 
break and getting under canvas by midday. .. .',:232
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It was for this reason that Tanganyika was in those days famously 
known as Safariland. It was also this kind of attraction which drew even 
the famous novelist, Ernest Hemmingway, to Tanganyika in the early 
1930s. He was to reccount his experiences of the one month big game 
hunting in Tanganyika in his autobiographical novel, The Green Hills of 
Africa. In this novel, and the other short stories he wrote233 
Hemmingway potrayed his love for unspoiled natural beauty of this green 
hills of Tanganyika, the cool nights and the wonders of game hunting. In 
these writings, what one gets is a picture of someone deeply in love 
with the primitive world, a world where men who want to escape from the 
corrupted industrial world should go. That is contentment was to be 
found in Africa. In the green hills of Tanganyika one could forget the 
cities and their neurotic inhabitants and instead plunge into the world 
of greater kudu hunting, camp fires, books and a lot of booze. This love 
of Africa, for Hemmingway, was a symbol of masculinity and purity.
The literary productions by the Europeans on Tanganyika were
dominated by such "cultural primitivistic" themes, but also on a wider
scale. It was observed in these years that:
There is observable in recent literature a deepening 
dissatisfaction...,and a growing recognition of the 
impoverishment that has come to western society. The desire is 
becoming stronger to recreate the bonds which unite men and 
their fellows.... It would be a tragedy if the science, the 
machinery and industrial organization of Europe were to 
reproduce in Africa the conditions from which the best minds in 
the west are seeking a means of escape.234
The tendency in these themes was to seek a civilization which had not
been contaminated by the effects of the industrial world, and to yearn
for the "glorious past". And Africa, for these writers, seemed to
possess a secret which was lost in Europe, and also, it had a certain 
innocence to offer to the world.
In Evelyn Waugh's Scoop,236 for example, a novel attacking in a 
satirical form the colonial administrators and the whole idea of 
"modernization" of Africans, the ideas of the administrators were seen 
as having no impact on the African world outlook and only ended up 
benefitting the Syrian merchants (Asians). The Mandate Territory of 
Azania (Tanganyika was that mandate territory), in this novel, Is ruled 
by a foolish young Oxford trained emperor who got all his ideas from 
Western books and destroyed himself and his country with theories. The 
territory did not benefit from its association with European culture, 
and Europeans exploited Africans senselessly. The Europeanization of 
Africans was viewed with outright disgust and Buropean civilization was 
regarded as decadent.
Winifred Holtby, in Handaa Handaa satirized the tourist agencies and 
Europeans who brought decadence and amoral ity' to Africa. An 
anthropologist who decried the "modernization of Africa" because it 
destroyed the habits of primitive people had the following to say in 
this novel:
If you could know how we envy you! We, who are victims of an 
effete intellectualism. You, who still dare to retain the— shall 
we say— purity of primitive sensation. You, who lose your 
individual consciousness in your corporate dances. My dear 
Talal, if you knew what anguish we suffered through the loss of 
our power of spontaneous and corporate ecstasy...your natural, 
sinless, cool, lustful completion of bodly bliss. Unself­
conscious, unafraid. Your wholeness with the community! Your 
deep tranquil blood-unity!236
Talal is an African Prince who incorporated some of the worst features
of western culture into his society and ends up paying heavily for this
folly; and the hypocricy of Europeans in Africa is rejected.
- 144-
These writings are a few examples to demonstrate the nature of 
literary production which supplements the other writings of this period 
depicting the life the colonial agents lived. Thus, in a nutshell, to 
the chagrin of the missionary teachings, Europeans were virtually doing 
the very things they strove to prevent Africans from doing. An 
administrator, a settler, a digger, and even a missionary himself "was 
not averse to gambling, dancing, or other secular amusements, and 
certainly not averse to alcohol".237 It was an inherent contradiction 
within this "civilization".
It was the above European interests which were being defended by 
the administrators and their policies. Thus Fortie, when passing in 
Tanganyika was to remark that taxes were extemely high under British 
rule, and this was despite the injuction "to consider the interests of 
the 5,500,000 natives paramount". According to him, "Great Britain was 
setting up in this primitive land costly and complicated administration 
for the benefit of ten thousand whites and thirty thousand Asiatics." He 
went on:
...a growing tendency to load the burden of a costly 
administration upon the illiterate, voiceless, helpless 
African,... using taxation to compel him to toil for aliens and 
buy alien trash....I saw in many directions dishonest efforts, 
paraded as progress and civilization, to inflict on Safariland, 
as already accomplished in South Africa, the industrial
sweating, economic slavery, the social injustices that have 
become impossible and even criminal in the Vest.
During the next two years of Safari I saw hundreds of
villages depopulated by exodus of nearly every male between the 
age of eighteen and forty five, gone to mine and plantations to
earn tax money. Tax defaulters, even women, were transported to
foced labour hundreds of miles from their homes. The huts of 
defaulting indigent old people were burnt.233
The next section sums up the various aspects discussed in this chapter.
3. 4 Conclusion
Sir D. Cameron, Sir C. Dundas, P.E. Mitchell, J. Scott, Major Orde 
Browne, etc. were in contact with a group of people like J.H. Oldham, 
Lord Lugard, B. Malinowski, M. Perham, J. Huxley, Lord Hailey and 
others, most of whom had attempted to form an East African group with 
the aim of studying the problems of the empire and emulating the right 
imperial spirit. Olham and Lugard had formed the International Institute 
of African Languages and Cultures, which was to be supported by the 
Rockfeller Foundation and Colonial Offices of several European Powers. 
The aim, in the formulation of the anthropologist Maiinowiski, was to 
research and study "questions of race, population, the administration 
and economic development of natives, as well as the adaptation of 
European culture to the society". It was to be a science of colonial 
politics whose forerunners were the pamphleteers and propagandists who 
defended the interests of the "colonial people" on the one hand, and. 
those who demanded "repressive measures against the dangers of race" on 
the other".239 Their aim was to deal with with issues concerned with 
economic development— "the primary motive of colonization", according 
to Malinowski— which could "be done either directly or by native 
enterprise controlled by Europeans". Accordingly* "indirect development" 
offered fewer difficulties. Direct exploitation which involved a 
substantial transfer of land was viewed as "one of the main causes of 
trouble on a large scale and lasting for generations", also, another 
source of cronic trouble in relation to direct exploitation was labour, 
and this was the reason why labour was recruited in the colonies by the 
use of the most objectionable devices, hence the need for "indirect 
exploitation".240
In 1926, Malinowski had written to the Rockfeller Foundation
informing them that a new trend of anthropological theory had been 
developed in America and Europe: "The Functional School". This school, 
unlike the previous schools, did not involve itself with the private 
affairs of the Missing Link, or the reconstruction of histories at all 
costs. Its main concern was inquiry into the nature of human 
institutions and above all their functional value. The practice of 
condemning the "savage" religion and beliefs as something useless, wrote 
Malinowski, had to be abandoned:
Recently a new turn was given to the studies of primitive 
religion and magic. It is recognized that they possess a
definite value, that they fulfil a specific and unique function, 
that they are at work like other aspects of culture. Magic has 
been shown to be a principle of order and co-ordination. It has 
to its credit a number of economic advantages; it provides a
time sequence in those activities which it controls, such as
gardening, fishing, industries; it establishes leadership; above 
all, it gives primitive man the moral stamina indispensable in 
many enterprises. Even sorcery is now regarded as a moral power, 
a displinary principle used often to terrorize, selfishly at
times, but usually used for the administration of actual
justice, hence important as a principle of organization in 
native society.241
In the new anthropological approach and colonial policy in general, 
besides the functional value of the institutions being an important 
issue, the very study of the "human factor" had also become equaly
important. This was the influence of the so-called "human relations 
school". It was stated at some point that, "Since industrial welfare 
became an important subject of scientific study, the discovery has been 
made that human nature is the dominant factor in every enterprise".242 
The "welfare" for the African population was dictated by utilitarian 
motive. Africans were regarded as the greatest "asset" of a colonial
country because of their potential value as labourers: "The same
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argument applies to the good treatmrent and good feeding of a horse or 
plough-ox, or the increase of stock. Even if the native be an 
independent producer, his value as an 'asset' is reckoned by his 
productive output, and his capacity to purchase imported goods."246
It was the race question which was at the heart of these changing 
views in Tanganyika. This was because the question created a lot of 
problems in East Africa. Oldham wrote to Cameron that, while Vest Africa 
was generally recognized as an African country and the problems were 
relatively simple there, or in South Africa where the attempt was to 
establish a "Vhite Civilization"; the destiny of East Africa appeared to 
be in "some sense a black and white man*s country". It ws this aspect 
which determined everything.244 It was pointed out that, the relations 
of white and black constituted one of the greatest "questions of this 
century" and it was hoped that this question was going to be tackled in 
East Africa before it was too late.246
Thus on arrival in the country, Cameron had expressed his 
disatisfaction with the country because of the enforced economic 
development, the detribalization and Europeanization of Africans without 
any consideration of the political future of the country with the result 
that if this practice continued, there was a possibility of creating 
another Egypt or India.246 It was expressed further, that the most 
important question in Tanganyika was to lay the "foundations of a*state 
in which the natives will have a place in the machinery of 
administration, founded on their own traditions and customs and 
instincts". Such a machinery would prevent them from becoming servile 
and unable to express themselves "except through the ballot-box— which 
is unthinkable." The failure to establish such a machinery would result
in another India. " (It is interesting to read that before he died Das 
was advocating much that Lugard advocated in a letter to the 'Times'
some few years ago, namely the administration of India on eastern and
not western lines)"24'7
Western civilization demanded raw materials and food crops which 
were necessary to the living standards of the "principal nations", and 
Indirect Rule was concerned with such an issue; and it is this issue 
which constituted the empire problem, thought Mitchell. If the tropical 
inhabitants could not produce them for themselves, they had to be 
compelled to do so or give way for some other race which could. 
Therefore:
As a world problem,... our first care must be so to regulate
matters that the weak races who we govern are able, with the
least disturbance of their social structure, the least moral or 
physical damage, and the least hardship, to meet the calls of 
western civilization upon them to such an extent as to satisfy 
reasonable men, and to prevent the application to them of 
compulsion or pressures which sacrifice justice to economic 
necessity and will create political bitterness and race feelings 
in the future and so introduce into the already sufficiently 
difficult problem antagonisms which are at present in the main 
dormant.249
According to Mitchell, it was the honest and final settlement of the 
land questions which determined the policies, given the general feeling 
of insecurity which was becoming widespread, as a result of which no 
African believed a word the Europeans said in so far as this question 
was not settled.260
The settlers in the 1920s were being discouraged, not because 
capital in agriculture was undesirable, but rather because of fear of 
the emergence of a class of "poor whites": the presence of Europeans 
eking out a poor existence in the midst of Africans was undesirable from 
any standpoint as they could not support themselves financially, and
hence would become a burden.261 There was, of course a place for large
scale planters. Large scale agriculture was considered desirable
provided it did not involve the deprivation of African occupied areas.
Also settlers could be welcome, provided their activities involved a
holding company which supervised them. Otherwise, the crux of the matter
which was the deciding factor of the policies was the:
economic side of the thing... we have by no means a free choice 
of white settlement or native development. The former is 
conditioned by the fact that black competition will make certain 
types of farming impossible for white farmers and that within 
by no' means a long period. The latter at the mercy of the 
market.262
Major Orde Browne was to add that at the heart of the conflicting 
schools about the administration of the colonies, was also the question 
of labour; whereby the employers simply stood for profits, the 
philanthropists for welfare, and the government and the scientists for 
welfare, profits and the future,263 "[T3he importance of labour, Cis] 
the rock upon which the conflicting European administrative methods are 
most likely to split". This was partly due to the fact that the workers 
who were 'detribalized* posed a threat, especially if they became 
unionized. Also there was the problem of insufficient labour supply or 
the resistance of Africans to becoming wage labourers; and this aspect 
was further complicated by the race question, and hence the big threat 
posed by the migrant labourer.264
In essence, underneath all these aspects were the same old dominant 
European racial prejudices. The aim was to keep European privileges 
intact, while keeping the African in his place within the hierarchies of 
"world civilization" as an attempt to avoid conflicts. The whole 
question had nothing to do with the "welfare of the natives" or the
- 150 -
preservation of African societies in themselves: all the Indirect Rule 
ideologues admitted that it was not their intention to do so. Major Orde 
Brown was was to comment cynically about the enthusiasts of
internationalism who advocated a mixed regime: "The Tower of Babel was
an attempt to scale Heaven: a reproduction of its social features holds 
out little promise of better success in achieving an administrative 
paradise".2SS Even Mitchell was to say, the desire was not to revert to 
some "anachronistic tribalism" nor did they hope "to use the old
fashioned savage to bottle up with the progressives": rather they aimed 
at giving the African time to modernize his institutions and bring them 
in the main current of the twentieth century, "so that with becoming 
civilized he may remain African, and so keep his respect and his pride 
if the race."266
Vhat is clear from what has been shown in this chapter is the fact 
that the rebellion of the masses was a continuous process. It was due to 
these rebellions that the colonial state was forced to to change its 
outlook in the 1920s. The colonial state was forced to appropriate those 
elements within the African societies which would help to make the
Tanganyikans effectively colonizable— even though some of the 
conceptions may seem philanthropic. It was within this context that 
they reached the conclusion about the necessity of creating a "good 
African", who is not uprooted from his traditions, as the basis of 
African Civilization. It was at this time that a whole body of 
conceptions about Africanity was created, and most of these conceptions 
were based on myths, as is classically demonstrated by the beliefs in 
tribes. Included in these conceptions was the essentially communal 
nature of African societies and the cooperatives.
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The struggles of the working people were waged for self defense 
against colonial onslaught even in the guise of "African Civilization", 
as is demonstrated by their resistance against native authorities, 
improved methods of cultivation and animal husbandry, soil conservation, 
etc. The masses' resistance, it can be said, unveiled the mystifications 
of the civilizing mission which was based on the the negation of 
African cultures. In an attempt to resolve the crisis of the European 
civilizing mission generated by the rebelling masses, the colonial state 
and its agents were forced to re-examine their philosophical 
foundations, and hence "African Civilization" became the new 
philosophical stance for the colonialists. It meant, a civilization 
based on African traditions developed and systematized by Europeans for 
Africans. What they were doing was was to incorporate the elements of 
the people who were to be civilized which were not subversive to the 
colonial project in their own outlook. Their main concern was the best 
way to make the masses accept the civilizing mission from the masses 
outlook: the aim was to make colonization more effective and break the 
resistance of the masses. "It was necessary to invest in the terrain of 
the enemy: to get the [African] internalize the idea that his own way of 
viewing the world, his own outlook has no other ultimate objective than 
the European civilizing mission. For him there is no other future 
history."26-7 In other words, it was a struggle against the syncretic 
movements, cultural resistance, rebellion against imperialist forms of 
production and social and political forms of domination.
The masses' struggles were waged against domination, exploitation, 
hierachization, inequalities, violence, arbitrariness, etc.; in a 
nutshell, their struggles were an attempt to transcend the established
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arrangements. The colonial masters took from the masses what they
considered not dangerous elements from the point of view of imperialist 
arrangements. Thus it is not surprising that the labour movements were 
resisted so much by the colonial state. Their formation was viewed as a 
product of communist or bolshevik influence, as was commented on the 
1927 Moshi case or in 1932 when the Trade Union Ordiance was being 
introduced. On the other hand, the other forms of protest, like the
religious syncretic movements and other cultural movements including 
those against inequalities and imperialist forms of production were 
viewed from the point of view of Pan-Islamic/Pan-African influence or 
problems of transition as a result of Africans' lack of grasp of the 
civilizing mission.
The co-operatives were accepted by the colonial state as African 
institutions. In fact the co-operatives represented the interests of the 
middle peasants and the rich farmers who were already incorporated into 
colonial capitalism. They were accepted because of the state's struggles 
against Asian merchant capital, and the fact that initially the rich 
farmers and middle peasants did not contradict the colonial forms of
production, because they were seen as progressive elements from the
point of view of colonialism and capitalism in general. This aspect and 
their development will be examined in the next chapter, alongside other 
"improvement" elements, as Iliffe would call them. Next chapter 
demonstrates how the "modern Tanzanians took over the systematization of 
"African Civilization" from the colonizers and turned it into their own 
as an expression of their own contradictions with colonialism.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Systematization of African Civilization
Chapter Four 
THE SYSTEMATIZATION OF AFRICAN CIVILIZATION
The African "teachers and shopkeepers, clerks and cotton growers"—  
the very elements which were a product of colonial capitalism, have to 
quite some extent been documented and their role in the nationalist 
struggles in the 1950s is a known story.1 It is the manner in which 
ideas about African Civilization and Africanity in general, later on to 
be systematized into Pan-Africanism and African Socialism, emerged which 
is obscure. This chapter ventures in that sphere and demonstrates the 
forms of contradictions which shaped their struggles and hence the ideas 
within the framework of colonial domination and paternalism.
The focus in this chapter is mainly on those aspects which helped to 
shape the ideas in the 1930s and 1940s, how those ideas were 
systematized by Africans, and the connection of those ideas with the 
ideas of Indirect Rule. The chapter commences with a general examination 
of the emergence of mental labour as a particular form of practice 
within the colonial capitalist forms of production, and the relationship 
of mental labour to commerce, commercial agriculture and the power 
structures. This is followed by an examination of the forms of 
struggles and the institutions created within the struggles; and, 
finally, an examination of some of the ideas/literature which emerged in 
this period in relation to the other two aspects,
4.1 Manual and Mental Division of Labour in Tanganyika
Dr David Livingstone's appeal for help to Africa in the 19th century 
mainly concentrated on the "great social evils of African society" 
(slave trade, tribal wars) and the necessity of opening Africa to
commerce and civilization. Christianity was to teach the virtues of 
personal hard work and thrift and the intergrity of enlightened 
Christian families. As with all missionaries, with Livingstone, 
religion was the sole agent of civilization. Vithout those virtues 
commerce would not prosper easily,2 In essence, these virtues were 
nothing more than an expression of the need to westernize Africans: 
commerce for them was the need for Africans to participate in the 
production of articles for sale in the world market— as a remedy for the 
slave trade-^-that "great evil".
Missionary education in Tanganyika was introduced as early as 1868.3 
More than a decade before German colonization of the country, the French 
Roman Catholic Order of the Holy Ghost established a school at Bagamoyo, 
North of Dar es Salaam. Shortly thereafter, this practice was emulated 
by the Universities Mission to Central Africa, Church Missionary 
Society, Lutheran Mission of Berlin and several other Roman Catholic 
orders."1 Besides this form of non-indigenous education, there was 
Islamic education through Koranic schools which had established itself 
for centuries along the coast and was being used even by some of the 
rulers who employed court clerks in the interior— as far as Kilimanjaro- 
-before colonialism. s
When the Germans took over the country, they were much more 
concerned with the establishment of law and order and the opening up of 
the country to commerce— Livingstone's second concern. But this was not 
going to be a possibility without an establishment of a junior "local 
civil service for their administrative machinery". The result of this 
was that "they were soon forced into creating an educational system to 
staff it."e Unlike the British government later on, the German
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Government was not interested in the mission schools out-put; instead it
set out on its own to train "clerks, tax collectors, interpreters,
accountants, and artisans needed for the government service. The German
Governor von Soden, who founded the government system in 1891, had very
clear ideas about" the form of education he needed.7 The qualifications
"demanded for the first German education officer were agnosticism and a
thorough knowledge of Swahili." The only people respected by von Soden
were the Muslims— "he was prepared to pay Muslim teachers who visited
government schools to give religious instruction". This early attempt
to link Koranic schools with the government ones was defeated by the
fierce missionary opposition it roused.®
The German education system was an "instrument designed to meet a
narrow, strictly vocational need." At the outbreak of the First World
War the Education Department had 24 European staff. There were 99
government schools by then— ten of which were principal schools and the
rest elementary. There was a plan to build some 20 elementary schools in
that year. In 1913 there were 2,394 and 3,706 pupils in principal and
elementary schools respectively. These were besides the "108,550
children on the registers of the 1,832 schools conducted by the
missionary societies."® A 1921 report to the British Parliament noted
the following about the German education system:
The result of their system are today evident in the large number 
of Natives scattered throughout the country who are able to read 
and write, and it must be admitted that the degree of usefulness 
to the administration of the Natives of Tanganyika Territory is 
in advance of that which one has been accustomed to associate 
with British African Protectorates.10
Broadly, besides Africans being trained in new trades and crafts and
as civil servants— hence being very useful to the colonial governments
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as it is admitted in the above quotation— -the missionary converts were 
taught and encouraged to participate in commercial agriculture by 
cultivating cash crops such as coffee, wheat,etc.. The Wachagga converts 
in Kilimanjaro were taught and encouraged by missionaries to grow coffee 
as early as 1902.11 When the British colonial administrators were busy 
organizing Native administration and re-establishing colonial economic 
activities in Kilimanjaro after the First World War, "educated Chagga, 
mainly mission trained teachers such as Solomon Nkya, Yohanne Kimambo, 
Aron Lyimo, Yakobo Lyimo and Ndesariyo Moshi and a few other individuals 
like Joseph Kerinyo, Nathaniel Ktui and Onesmo Lema who were working in 
the colonial administration embarked on promoting education and 
commercial agriculture among their own people."12
It was the missionary L. Blumer who arrived in Arusha in 1907 who 
taught the Waarusha how to build houses different from the traditional 
ones, how to cultivate coffee and develop commerce and how to use the 
plough. People who mostly benefited from these efforts were the 
Christian converts.13 Among the Wameru, it was people like Matayo 
Leveriya Kaaya, one of the first young people from Akeri village "to be 
educated formally and become Christian...who were among the first to 
introduce coffee-growing into the area, an innovation which was in time 
to transform the economy of the village."1"1
Despite the adverse impact of the First World War on the education
system, by 1923 there were 5,000 pupils enrolled in 65 government
schools who were taught by 135 African teachers under the direction of
five Europeans. In addition to this there were 115,000 pupils in 2,200 
schools taught by 2,200 African teachers under the supervision of 150 
European missionaries.115 Especially from the 1920s, Africans had
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embarked on establishing schools on a self-help basis— mostly in those
areas with developed commercial agriculture. These schools became known
as Native Authority Schools. The efforts to establish these schools were
a result of the fact that "[even] before the 1930s, schooling was
already regarded as a necessary qualification in entering the political
and socio-economic status structures of the colonial state."1sThe
essence of the matter was:
Chiefs were now appointed to the office on the basis of their 
education and employers of the Kilimanjaro Native Planters 
Association were elected on the basis of their education. The 
government was employing educated youths as clerks, agricultural 
instructors, medical workers and forestry workers. Missions 
were retaining educated youths to train as teachers and 'native' 
priests. Others were employed by the railways, post office and 
commercial firms on the basis of their education.17
In sum, the above discussion demonstrates that the schism between 
manual and mental labour in Tanganyika was associated with commodity 
production within the colonial forms of production. Education and the 
privilege of intellectual work and its importance to the colonial forms 
of transformation was not enshrined in its own immanence: "as
commercialization developed, more and more Africans realized that 
schools opened the door to paid employment with the colonial 
administration, the missions and business".1® In other words, the secret 
of education and the privilege of intellectual work lay in the 
development of colonial capitalist forms of production and exchange, 
given that commodities, as products of the labour of individuals working 
independently of each other required a society organized on the basis of 
division of labour— one such division being intellectual work and 
manual work; and intellectual work by social thinking had become 
absolutely essential within the forms of sicio-economic organization and
their associated political/administrative structures. The interest here 
is the social role of these educated classes as thinkers of a class— as 
a strata who foster certain ideas as theoretical, ideological and 
philosophical expression of practical movements. The extent to which 
the emergence of educated elements had appeared indicates the extent of 
division of labour and hence colonial capitalist relations and therewith 
the possibility of the emergence of more or less 
systematized/theoretical social thinking.19
The systemization of African Civilization and defence of Africanity 
in general anong Tanganyikans can only be comprehended within the 
framework of these educated elements emerging as part of the division of 
labour under the colonial capitalist forms of production, the history of 
intellectual work and social thinking becoming increasingly independent, 
as a systematization of social practices from the proletarianization 
process.20 Thus, when Martin Kayamba, one of the most educated 
Tanganyikans who died in 1938, championed education for Africans in the 
1920s and 1930s as the only means for progress, he was theoretically 
expressing this division of labour as the foundation of the social 
system which was in the process of formation. According to him,
education had the most important role to play in the shaping of what was
known by then as "the African contribution to civilization".21
Martin Kayamba, a tall, powerful man, elegantly dressed and well-
educated, widely travelled and with fluent command of English; whose
father was the first Tanganyikan to be educated in Britain before the 
German invasion of the country, was a model of "sophistication to which 
the young men aspired" in the 1920s. He was to be the head of the 
Distict Office in Tanga under Philip Mitchell in 1923 and later on
worked in the office of Secretary to Native Affairs. Vhen in Tanga, 
Kayamba was part of a group of educated East Africans— most of them 
being a product of Kiungani school in Zanzibar.22
The educated of the other parts of East Africa were politically 
more advanced in the 1920s than those of Tanganyika, as Mitchell 
observed. According to him, the reason for this was the fact that colour 
questions were major issues in those countries. That is, "if the 
educated native" wanted "to do anything more effective than merely 
’advise' (blessed word!) the Assistant District Commissioners" he was 
driven to do it through a political association which is an excellent 
thing in the hands of fairly civilized folk but dangerous with the first 
generation of literates— "23 This was not the case with the educated in 
Tanganyika, who as the 1921 Report to the British Parliament noted were 
"useful to the administration of the Natives". According to Mitchell, 
the difficulties with the educated of the other parts of East Africa
were absent in Tanganyika "because of the native administrations". It
was not the prospects only which affected or rather influenced their 
situation:
but the fact that in addition to chiefs and sub-chiefs,
counsellors, and so on, there is of course what really amounts 
to a very large civil service, which bffers careers to the 
educated and industrious, positions in which they are actively 
occupied about the daily affairs or their tribe. I need not tell 
you how strong a pull that is with Africans.2"1
That is, the educated had been made effectively colonizable by being
coopted in the 1920s by being turned into champions of African
Civilization which ultimately had no other objective than the European
civilizing mission— the very objectives of the policy of Indirect Rule
in Tanganyika. These coopted elements were progressive from the imperial
point of view: they did not pose a problem as was the case with those
of other parts of East Africa.
The educated of the inter-Var period had varied attitudes towards 
African cultures and life in general2® depending on their abjective
relationship to the colonial structures. But they generally regarded 
themselves as Westernized. This Westernization ranged from uncritical
acceptance of Western views and values to critical acceptance; and the 
Westernized elements were mostly found among young people especially in 
the urban areas. Among those who were ageing by the 1920s were people 
like Ganisya who had held the view that "Africans did not want to 
preserve their cultures"; Peter Njau from Kilimanjaro, who at some point 
lamented, "I wish I could tear off this black skin of mine. We are every 
whit as good as the whiteman and as fit to control the country".2S In 
the 1920s such views were to be found among people like Martin Kayamba 
and the educated circles in general— though with some modifications. As 
late as 1940s people like Dr E.F. Mwaisela, when petitioning about the 
incommensurable remuneration they received, based their arguments on 
the education status and the life situation expected from them. As a 
Medical Officer Mwaisela wrote in 1943:
The general outlook at present as far as my life is 
concerned, is very gloomy. I have been brought up to such a 
level in life that I can neither cope with my own peoples life,
nor that of a civilized man. To get married to a girl of any
reasonable standard, for instance, in order that I should 
maintain that standard of education I enjoyed at school, is 
literally to commit suicide.27
This frustration, eloquently put by Dr Mwaisela was part of the issues
which fuelled the transition of the assimilated from the position of the
coopted to that of rebellion from the 1930s.
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The opportunities to enter the government service and other
privileged positions were offered to people with a good command of
English. Such education was mostly offered in the urban areas, while
most elementary schools in the countryside centred on the establishment
and propagation of commercial agriculture. According to the Director of
Education, Mr Rivers-Smith, the policy of education in the 1920s was
mainly determined by the "primitive native and the economic resources".
A future development in which agriculture did not occupy the foremost
position was inconceivable:
...the educationist must if he has any faith in his work at all, 
see in his imagination a Tanganyika of 50 or 100 years hence 
peopled with a type of native agriculturalists better housed, 
cultivating several times the acreage that he does today and by 
methods which he does not yet know, and growing crops which he 
has never heard of. Everything therefore points to agriculture 
as the basis of our education system in elementary stages....20
And this was within the framework of an attempt to create a "good
African". In the field of education, people like J. Raum, argued that
education had to prepare Africans to remain faithful to the family, the
clan and the tribe; that is it had to conserve the African heritage, and
hence, it was necessary to employ tribal languages as the first medium
of instruction in the early years of school.29 If this was to be
possible, then it was necessary to have segregation in the education
system: African, Asian and European with the latter two using English as
the medium of instruction rather than the vernaculars.
This segregation, according to Rivers-Smith, was quite healthy for 
political reasons: as a result of the political upheavals in India,
integration would result in "political repercussions" among Africans "in 
the future years of the development of a closer liason between the two 
races." Therefore, the rivalry and growing race consciousness among
Africans and the feeling of resentment towards Asians was viewed as
being healthy, because breaking it would "eventually lead [them] to make 
common cause for political ends...." From the point of view of 
administration it was necessary to retain this "very valuable asset."30
The British colonial government had established a government school 
in Tabora in 1922 for the sons and heirs of chiefs who were to be 
educated on English public school lines. This school became famous as 
the Eton of Tanganyika. Discipline in this school was adapted for
African conditions and maintained by a tribal system. The boys were 
organized on tribal lines, each with a chief and sub-chiefs. In the 
Southern Highlands, a government school was founded at Malangali in 
1927. This school attempted to use traditional forms of education to 
prepare the aristocracy for their position within their traditional 
societies. V. Brynt Mumford who was the headmaster of this school 
betweem 1928 and 1931 attempted to design the school in such a way that 
it complemented the ideology of Indirect Rule.31 Malangali became a 
laboratory for assimilation by simple steps of the elements of European 
civilization and culture for happy inter-racial relations and the
development of indigenous culture, so as to build a truly African 
education system.32 Elders were selected as moral tutors and uniforms 
worn were the traditional toga-like wraps. Also, there was spear 
throwing, indigenous dancing and indigenous lore in lieu of other forms 
of entertainment; and academic courses took examples from the immediate 
environment. Mumford also embarked upon the possibility of basing 
education on initiation ceremonies, as was tried by some of the 
missionaries in Masasi, Southern Tanganyika.33 The aim was to adopt 
education to "the mentality, aptitudes, occupations and traditions of
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the various people conserving as far as possible all sound and healthy 
elements in the fabric of their social life."3*
As was pointed out in Chapter Three, Indirect rule— practically or 
ideologically— had nothing to do with a commitment to the actual 
preservation of African social structures and institutions: it was the 
manner in which the civilizing mission of Africans by Europeans took 
place in Tanganyika. Mitchell visited Malangali school in 1929. For 
him, Mumford had a "better idea of the sort of life" Africans "must live 
for as long as" they could foresee, than "most people in the Department 
of Native Affairs." The chiefs needed not be over-estimated in their 
capacity, for in several generations the institutions for progress 
would be coming from Europe and stimulated by Europe: "Indeed it is the 
capacity which the African probably lacks altogether; it is a catching 
complaint with which we hope to infect him, but he is not yet
infected."3S Mitchell was to echo the same message in 1931 when talking
to chiefs from Bukoba. He advised them not to "shove their noses into 
high politics" which they did not understand, and instead give their 
attention to "fundamental things necessary to their own welfare". He 
warned them of the "folly of listening to racial mischief mongers": all 
civilization came from Europe "and all that they need in the future 
[could] only come from that source."3®
The dilemma with this education system and the attempt to create a 
"good African" who was "not a bad imitation of a European. ..a half 
educated African who considered himself quite as good as, if not better 
than, the white man who governed him," as John Scott, the Chief
Secretary defined him,37 was the fact that it contradicted the
aspirations of the very elements created/brought forth, by colonial
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transformations: the educated and rich Africans who saw education as a 
means to participate in the administration of the country and attain a 
better social status materially, which in turn demanded a sound command 
of English. It contradicted the aspirations of Africans who sought to 
participate in the colonial socio-economic and political forms, and at 
the same time influence the terms of their participation— whether in 
commerce, agriculture, industry, education or administration. For these 
Africans, it was necessary to gain full control of the colonial 
institutions so as to be able to "improve and modernize" themselves.
The "modern Tanganyikans" opposed such a system of education—  
education "for Africans only."30 Such a policy did not fare well with 
people like Martin Kayamba, who became a . member of the Advisory 
Committee on Native Education in 1929. The missionary members who 
believed in teaching Africans in Swahili or their own vernaculars were 
horrified when Kayamba told them "it was a waste of time to go beyond 
the teaching of reading and writing in Swahili." Kayamba, "Like most 
members of his generation,... had no time for this. Vhat was the point, 
he asked the Committee, of teaching African school children to build 
African houses, when they already knew how to do it? Instead, he pressed 
the need for advanced literary education in English."30 He was to state 
in his life account that those who thought literary education 
unsuitable for Africans ignored "the fact of its importance and 
indispensability to any sort of education," and therefore denied 
Africans the very "means of progress."*0 According to Kayamba, without 
European education there was only a narrow chance for Africans to 
achieve power in society.*1 He flared up in 1934 when it was proposed
that there should be devised a method of testing African mental capacity 
so as to adopt the educational techniques to it.*2
The reaction of the "modern Tanganyikans" to this system in the 
inter-Var period was to establish schools on the basis of self-help. For 
example, in Uchagga, there was a big struggle mounted against both 
missionary and government control of schools, which culminated in the 
Vachagga building their own schools on a self-help basis. According to 
them, the existing schools were not giving the children adequate 
training in agricultural modernization; thus, they "decided to use the 
same European instutions of education and commercial agriculture to 
bring about changes in the community. Western education was already 
accepted and internalized by the Chagga...." The Vahaya in Vest Lake, 
were the first people to establish schools on the basis of self-help 
"and used them to spread western education and Christianity to their own 
people," and they had already done this by 1924. This practice existed 
in almost all the advanced areas of the country. **
The demand for better education for Africans was to be linked with 
the demand for African representation in the Legislative Council (LEGCO) 
which was established by Donald Cameron in 1926 with a European majority 
and some Asian members. Africans were excluded from the LEGCO and had no 
representation in the territorial administrative machinery, because all 
they needed, according to the government, was the native authorities. 
Chagga politicians were among those who advocated for representation at 
territorial level.*3 The government could not accept this; and it was 
only towards the 1950s that some degree of representation was granted 
to Africans. The Governor of Tanganyika said in 1933, while in Geneva, 
that Kayamba could not speak English well enough to be in LEGCO; that he
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could be isolated and hence unable to take part in public business and 
so on. One Indian paper had an offensive article about this issue. This 
question infuriated Kayamba so much that he threatened to resign from 
his position in the Department of Native Affairs.*® This perhaps 
explains why his stance politically became so much altered in the 1930s, 
and his decision to go back to the countryside in Tanga to farm,
think and write. Even when he got his appointment within the Department 
in 1932 as an Assistant Secretary, the East African Standard had come 
out with a very offensive leader about it: "the real grievance being an 
African,.... (an) African, getting a job".*7
The demand for a European type of education was an expression of the 
need to control the colonial processes, hence the struggles that took 
place within the native authorities— for control of power, education and 
wealth. In these struggles, tribal histories were reconstructed and 
tribal unions formed to oppose the native authorities; marketing co­
operatives, associations etc. were also formed to oppose various 
arbitrary actions by the local authorities. The practical impact of 
Indirect Rule becomes obvious here: it succeeded in localising the
grievances of the "Modern Tanganyikans"; and the above mentioned 
movements were formed by the wealthy and the educated. In the 1930s, 
there were bitter conflicts "between two wealthy groups, one with 
official status and the other without". In the two most capitalist 
developed areas of the country, Bukoba and Kilimanjaro, "[the] conflict 
was over which of the groups should have control of the improvement of 
the tribe— improvement which each group wanted, but which each thought 
it best qualified to carry out. It was a conflict between competing 
modernizers". *8
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The conflicts of the "modernizers" were extended further: in the
commercial sphere there was a conflict with the Asian commercial 
bourgeoisie and the government's various restrictions on the advancement 
of the African commercial elements; and there were struggles of the 
educated for racial equality in all spheres. All these struggles were to 
find their expression in the writings which were to appear in the 1930s 
in defense of African Civilization and African!ty in general. To grasp 
the ideological content of African Civilization, it is imperative to 
explore first ‘the other conflicts— in commerce and agriculture.
4.2 The "Modern Tanzanians" Struggles
As pointed out in Chapter Three, the early 1920s were very difficult 
years for the British administrators in Tangayika. This was not only 
because of the consequences of the first World War— in terms of famine, 
disease, economic disruptions etc; and the potential threats posed by 
the people. It was also due to the fact that the Territory was 
financially dependent on loans from the London market. Hut and Poll Tax 
and custom duties contributed approximately K of the governments 
revenue; and even in custom duties nearly 40 per cent was derived from 
cotton goods for Africans, and the rest was from kerosine, tobacco, 
cigarettes and hardware— mostly for Africans.*9 Because of this 
financial difficulty under which the government was labouring, and the 
expansion of the bureaucracy which was taking place in the 1920s, it was 
necessary to increase taxation.
Therefore the government introduced the Trade Licencing and Profits 
Tax in 1923. This ordinance was designed to tax and licence non-African 
traders who were overwhelmingly Asian wholesalers and retail traders
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rather than European companies. This Ordinance also compelled the Asians 
to put their accounts in English and not in Gujarati. This Resulted in 
was opposition by the Asians which was spearheaded by the Indian 
Association. The conflict culminated in a 54 days strike, whereby all 
the Asian shops were closed throughout the country.60 Although the 
European Chamber of Commerce also opposed this form of taxation, it 
nevertheless supported the government in its struggles with the Asians. 
It supported the Asians because it feared that the same form of taxation 
would be introduced to Europeans; but it also supported the government 
because of the competition which existed between Europeans and Asians. 
The Legislation was repealed in 1927 as a result of several years of 
agitation.
With the defeat of the government in this attempt, taxation for 
Africans was increased instead, because in Tanganyika "financial policy 
was made by people who assumed that taxation led Africans into paths of 
economic virtue by forcing them to produce cash or work for wages." As 
for non-Africans, it was believed they "should pay as little as decently 
possible in order to maximize their desire to settle or invest."31 The 
Asian strike was called Hartal. It started on 1.4.1923 and ended on 
25.5.1923. After the strike, even the demand that Asians should put 
their accounts in English was dropped.
There were 338 wholesale trade licences, 3,222 retail trade licences 
and 13,106 "native licences" by 1923. The two former were in the hands 
of Europeans, Indians and Arabs.32 As a result of the strike by the 
Asians, African traders who solely depended upon purchasing commodities 
from Asians were hard hit. But there were also African traders who took 
advantage of this strike to crack down on Indian monopoly. The strike
stimulated the growth of trade among some African traders to the extent 
that they started encroaching on the Asian controlled business areas. In 
a letter by a "Native Observer" in Dar es Salaam, it was claimed that 
the Profits Taxation Ordinance "is the most important Ordinance ever 
produced by the Governor since the occupation of the territory,... for it 
has opened ajar to us a barred door leading to natives prosperity."33 
The letter went on, Africans had prospered with the closing of Asian 
shops because they were able to apply for retail shop licences and 
purchase food! wholesale from the market and sell it retail to their 
friends. They were able to help each other "until the whole town was 
filled with Native retail shops". African traders were very happy with 
the strike and did not want the Asians to open their shops again."3*
African traders were eliminated from the Asian controlled areas 
after the strike, and the government helped in this regard by 
legislation which blocked the growth of a strong African commercial 
class which would link itself with the import/export economy. One such 
item of legislation was the Credit to Natives (Restriction) Ordinance 
of 1923. This legislation, according to the government, was supposed to 
protect the "natives" from the "potential incidence of undesirable 
Asiatic behaviour".33 Mitchell, then a District Commisioner in Tanga 
wrote "The Credit to Natives Ordinance fills a long felt want and will 
do more than anything to prevent the African from selling or encumbering 
his land".33 The land question was one of the obsessions of the colonial 
government in the 1920s. For Cameron, it was the fact that Africans had 
a sense of security in the possession of land and a place in the body- 
politic in the country "which he understands and appreciates (as he 
does) we shall be establishing the best foundations on which to build up
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a prosperous and contented peasantry, aided by all that the state can 
give it in the way of education, agricultural and veterinary instuction, 
public health instruction, and so on."®7 Mitchell was later to write to 
Oldham that, without a quick settlement of the land question they would 
"forfeit all confidence among the natives" because he felt that a 
general feeling of insecurity was spreading, given what he had been told 
about the Vasafwa in Mbeya who feared so much for their land.®8
As far as the colonial government was concerned, Africans were 
simply to be* export crops producers and semi-proletarians. This was 
determined by the very conditions of the state's reproduction in 
Tanganyika— some of which have already been pointed out in the previous 
chapter. There were legal enactments such as the Identification Law 
which was mentioned previously, which restricted the mobility of 
Africans if deemed to be endangering the production of export crops 
production. The fact is, it was the peasant producers, who since the 
early colonial days, had produced the bulk of export goods. The fear of 
Africans selling their land, probably to Asians— the only ones who had 
the capital without necessarily having recourse to state assistance— was 
based on the assumption that this would increase insecurity among 
Africans and also diminish agricultural production. The latter would 
happen because settlers and large scale farming in general were mainly 
involved in the production of coffee and later tobacco— of which they 
never produced enough for the requirements of export; and they also had 
to be financed by the state or some monopolies, something which the 
state could not afford in the 1920s and 1930s, because Tanganyika had to 
generate funds internally, as was shown above.69 But the peasants
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produced all types of crops, except sisal which was a plantation crop 
introduced by DOAG.
Mitchell admitted this fact when he wrote to Oldham that:
6. Now the actual facts are that we have every kind of non­
native agricultural enterprise from large sisal company to 
small Indian or Arab cultivator....
7. On the other hand.. . we have a huge block of Territory 
containing nearly half the native population of the country, 
who are capable and industrious agriculturalists and 
stockowners and produce probably two thirds of the total 
exportable crops of the Territory.... Finally on the Meru and 
Kilimanjaro, and less acutely in the Usambara mountains we 
have areas densely populated by capable and hard working 
natives...isolated by geographical conditions and 
intervening areas alienated for European settlement, who 
have already come into economic conflict to a certain extent 
with their European neighbours and who are already feeling 
to a limited degree the need for more land.60
These policies on white settlement, land reservation etc. were
determined by the reactions of the people of Tanganyika. But more than
that, as Mitchell was to admit, these policies were also determined by
"the economic side of the thing"— the economic was the deciding
factor:"we have by no means a free choice of white settlement or native
development. The former is conditioned by the fact that black
competition will make certain types of farming impossible for white
farmers and that within by no means a long period,"61 Besides that, on
the relative effectiveness of large and small scale agriculture, large
scale agriculture meant "machines or depressed— even serf-labour". True
enough, low wages could enrich "the landlord but do the trade of the
country little good and its soil and agricultural practice less."62
In a nutshell, obviously "peasant development was far easier and, if 
the word can be used, more 'natural' than the creation of settler 
economy. The latter required massive administration and economic 
injections on behalf of an economic structure which found it difficult
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to compete effectively on world markets.M Peasants required very little 
capital and could work for long hours with small returns.e3 The fact 
that peasants produced the bulk of export goods is demonstrated by the 
following table which shows that non-African agricultural production, 
excluding sisal plantations contributed the least percentage of the 
exports.
TABLE 1: TANGANYIKA, SOURCES OF AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS (1923-37) <%>
YEAR 1923 1925 1927 1931 1933 1935 1937.
Africans 61 55 48 42 49 49 44
Sisal 25 26 49 49 40 40 50
Other non-African . 14 19 9 9 11 11 6
TOTAL 100 100 .. .1.0.0.. _1.00L._ . 100
oo
...10.0_
SOURCE: E.A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment 
in East Africa, Heinemann, London, 1973, p.222.6A
Restriction of credit to African traders was not enough to prevent 
the emergence of a strong African commercial class. In 1927 the 
government introduced the Itinerant Traders Ordinance which was prompted 
by what the Treasurer informed the Chief Secretary to be the existence 
of a "distinct class of native traders in the territory, far more 
numerous than pedlars," who travelled around districts as agents or on 
their own behalf "buying produce from the peasantry"6S This legislation 
restricted African traders in their activities in favour of approved 
markets which could purchase peasant goods in bulk. Bulk purchase was 
also favourable from the point of view of the government in the sense 
that it made it possible for efficient taxation of the peasant, as 
markets could also be turned into tax nets. And the latter was a very 
serious problem for the colonial government, as was shown in the 
previous chapter. This could not be expressed otherwise and in a better 
form than what Mitchell recorded in his diary— that shopkeepers were
blood suckers of the community who never did a days honest work and
needed to be torn off:
...the shopkeeper now rules the world and such minor persons as 
producers and consumers can never expect reasonable protection 
against his uncontrolled rapacity. The right to live like a 
blood sucking tick, on the community, and never do an honest 
days work is now firmly established for the shopkeeper as 
inalienable and I should be tarn to pieces were I to have it: 
but I will have at it, if any sort of opportunity offers.ee
The shopkeeper had no right to rule the world— especially if that eroded
the very interests the state sought to defend— which determined all the
other processes. Thus more legislation was to follow to this effect in
the 1930s and 1940s.
It was not only Africans who were being pushed out of the sphere of 
peasant produce marketing. Asian petty traders were also being 
confronted by the state on the pretext that they exploited the peasants. 
Much as the struggle against the Asian petty traders also goes back to 
the 1920s, its roots being in the struggles between Asians and Europeans 
for the control of the colony, its nature was best formulated in 1935 
when it was stated: as African producers became more literate there
would be no need to protect them. This of course was not anticipated as 
being accomplished even in fifty years time, Meantime there was the 
need to safeguard them "with firmness to all parties." Traders had 
encouraged production "prima facie....but not in every case," as 
experience had shown in the Southern Highlands where they were more 
interested in profits than anything, and hence paid the peasants less 
than the official price. The traders, the government stated, were 
hampering production and were unable "financially to purchase the whole 
crop so that only a portion is sold". It was necessary to devise another 
scheme which would ensure direct state control.er
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In the government's opinion, there were several classes of peasant
produce which required collective or group marketing methods. , A
computation in one district had shown that "by regulating and
supervising marketing of one crop an additional £5,000 at least went
into the hands of the natives" of that district; a sum which was
initially taken by the buyers:
For years the trader has done much as he liked and beyond the 
murmurings of the producers and those whose interest it is to 
assist and guide them, there was no particular opinion than that 
held by the common trader. The day was sure to dawn when the
situation would be examined with at least a view to the
correction of evils, even if only in the moral interests of the
indigenous inhabitants quite apart from their material
interests, eo (emphasis added)
The East African Standard quoted this remark by the Director of
Agriculture, Mr Harrison, and considered it as racially biased..Dr the
Hon K.S. Bajwa, the Indian representative in the LEGCO protested against
this remark and expressed the opinion that Asian petty traders should be
allowed a place in the "new economic order". And the Asian Chamber of
Commerce asserted that Asians had given their best to civilize the
Natives and encourage agricultural development. The Asians, broadly
defended themselves as a community rather than as traders.70
As far as the colonial government was concerned , the petty traders 
were not essential in the "new economic order" when it came to the 
purchase of peasant produce. They had to be eliminated in this sphere in 
favour of state controlled monopolies and marketing co-operatives. The 
former were tried in Songea and ended in complete failure. The 
government had to control the marketing of crops because, it was 
anticipated, this would increase production and also enhance efficient
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tax collection. Thus within the attempts to control marketing of peasant 
produce, marketing co-operatives were introduced .
The sentiments against Asian traders were to be exploited to the
full by the African traders and kulaks who offered themselves as the new
intermediaries between big business and the peasants,71 These African
traders were such as Klemens Kiiza of Bukoba and Issa bin Imangi of
Mwanza. The latter, for example, wrote to Governor Sir Symes in 1932
protesting against credit restriction to Africans.72 These sentiments
were to be fully articulated by the Tanganyika African Velfare and
Commerial Association (TAVCA), which was established in 1934, with the
aim of safeguarding the interests of Africans and their undertakings; to
prevent cruelty among the people; and, to care for the sick.73 This
Association was organized by Erica Fiah, and it mainly consisted of
African shop and stall keepers. The Association tried to help "Africans
to meet the strong competition of Indian merchants and to deal with the
government over licences and other official matters."7* The bylaws of
this Association stated:
Since the Africans are not represented in the Legislative 
Council, this Association, as the central body looking after the 
welfare of all Africans in Tanganyika Territory, would always 
watch carefully any laws proposed by the Government which may
affect Africans and after proper consideration would make such
representations to Government and the members of Legislative 
Councils as the Association consider it proper in the interests 
of Africans ....Every African is bound to obey the Association, 
whether he is contributing or not, just as he obeys the 
Government.75
The Association established the first independent African paper—  
Kwetu— in 1937 as a "means whereby it may be able to spread knowledge
among the sons of the soil who could read and write." It was also the
first African association to own a press. Among the things it did was to
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open evening classes to teach Africans to read and write and languages 
(Swahili and English). A debating society was also opened. According to 
Erica Fiah (the editor), there was no better profession in the world 
than commerce. Those who thought it was best to be a civil servant were 
wrong, because "Any country which does not know how to trade will never 
succeed". Foreigners would go on taking the resourses out of the country 
if local people did not grasp this truth. He then asked: "Is there any 
black person with a storeyed house or a motor car?" and answered, 
"There is none. This is because we do not want to help each other in 
trade." (my translation) He emphasized the necessity of Africans buying 
from the shops of their fellow Africans instead of buying from shops 
owned by foreigners as was the practice, so as to be able to command the 
respect of foreigners who looked upon them contemptuously. Above all, it 
was necessary that Africans should establish co-operative shops— after 
all, these were encouraged by the government, as it supported the 
marketing co-operatives.75
The paper constantly attacked the colonial racial arrangements, 
what the editor called "the ugly colour bar", as one of the impediments 
in the uplift or improvement of Africans in all aspects. In 1938, Kwetu 
reproduced a letter from the Tanganyika Herald and Tanganyika Opinion, a 
letter which condemned the question of "stoppage of sale of sweepstake 
tickets to Natives because they were natives". If sweepstake was an 
objectionable thing, it was stated in this letter, then it was so "for 
all God's creatures, whites and browns and blacks, it would not have the 
feelings of some of the educated natives as the letter in question 
certainly did." In sum, the argument was:
Ve are tired of being treated as babies in anything. If
lotteries are bad for natives, are they good for Europeans and
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Indians? Or is it God's will that a man of white or brown colour 
alone can indulge in sweepstakes either to satisfy his gambling
instincts or worship the Goddess of luck, hoping therefore to
make good use of windfall if it does come.77
This letter went on that, if the government thought that "a native 
has to be protected against himself" then why did it allow the pombe 
(beer) market in the centre of the town. This also should have been
closed then: "Let the protection begin at home before you extend it to
evils flowing from Europe." Vhat was good for the European was equally
good for the African; and this denial to Africans of some of these
things was "racial contempt and unnecessary discrimination intended to
add insult to injury." This message broadly summed up the attitude of
the educated and the wealthy in general. The conclusion was:
Ve black people today want to enjoy the same privileges as 
white people, we want good stone houses, motorcars, aeroplanes,
etc., what is good for the whites is also good for the blacks:
colour makes no difference. Everything in the world has got its 
own colour and cannot be regarded as useless on account of non­
white or brown colour provided it was made by the Almighty.
Further more we want to send our sons in colleges in Europe, 
America and India, etc, we want to open big Dukas too....76
The motto of the Tanganyika African Welfare and Commercial 
Association and its paper was: "Educated Africans are the agents of
African Civilization." In which case, the questions of racial 
segregation were raised even in relation to the civil service. There was 
an article, for example, which denounced the practice of not giving 
African clerks and supervisors leaves, while at the same time granting 
paid leaves to Europeans and Asians. It was also pointed out that 
certificates that were acquired by Africans were rotting because of the 
failure by the government to engage Africans.79
Although, during the Second Vorld Var, the paper, like most educated 
people in Tanganyika, supported the Allies and attacked Nazism, the
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attack on the colour bar did not cool down at all. If anything, it
actually increased and was put in more categorical terms, as is
exemplified by the following words from a 1940 issue:
Many people in this country do not realize that there is any 
colour bar at all; they think of the British Empire as one happy 
family, the only place in the world where men of many races live
side by side in equality and freedom. In truth the British law
contains few racial distinctions; in East Africa, South Africa 
and Rhodesia there are definite regulations depriving the
African of some of his rights in order to prevent competition 
with white people...,eo
The problems of the educated with the European community in
Tanganyika started in the early 1920s. In those years, the missionaries
were blamed for educating Africans perniciously. The "mission boys", a
category which included "all those who had attended any mission, either
scholars, inquirers or believers, and who Chad] assimilated at least a
superficial knowledge of elementary education" were regarded as
inordinately proud and their general bearing tending "towards
superciliousness".®1 The "mission boys", according to Europeans, were
the most untrustworthy people; because they regarded themselves as
equals to the Europeans. The settlers suspected and even at times
criticized the government for seemingly encouraging such illusions among
the educated Africans. "Prestige being vital to our tropical colonies,"
according to the settler mouthpiece, "anything calculated to undermine
it naturally arouses the ire of the settlers, who therefore look with
unfriendly eye on anyone who spreads the doctrines of equality between
white and black, ruler and ruled."®2
The aim of Western civilization, as has been repeatedly pointed
out, was to "educate the Native into a good African and not a repellent
imitation of a European". This "good African" was a person who
"discarded the dark and close-knit mesh of fear and fetishism, sorcery
and superstition which enrap his tribal consciousness, yet [succeeded! 
in retaining discipline, manners and social obligations" in his family, 
clan and the tribe in general.e3 The government and the missionaries in 
Tanganyika were aware that the only "good African" was a Christian. 
Although the European residents were imbued with such a belief, "after a 
few years of experience of Natives," they very often ended up declaring 
that they would never employ Christians.®* Julian Huxley wrote in the 
1930s:
It is indeed remarkable to see how widespread (though by no 
means universal) and deep rooted (though often unconscious) is 
the feeling of white men against the europeanized, educated, or 
even progressive black. And the feeling is often strongest in 
those who have a whole hearted liking for the unsophisticated 
native.... the assumption underlying government of black by white 
is that white ideas and methods are superior to black; and the 
aim of the control and education we thrust upon them is to give 
them Western ideas, skill and individual self-reliance, and, in 
the case of the mission education, western religious beliefs and 
ideals as well. Yet if they really begin to put these new ideas 
in practice and try to live up to the new standards Europe, in 
the persons of local Europeans, is hostile....There are settlers 
who will not engage a native if he can read, and will even 
dismiss their most skilled men if they are discovered guilty of 
this crime.es
Europeans regarded it their sacred duty to "keep the black in his 
place". This process consisted chiefly of "snubbing educated natives on 
principle". Europeans were in favour of increased efficiency of 
Africans; but when Africans profited by their efficiency to become 
economically independent, they ran the risk of being denounced as 
selfish.05 Due to these contradictions of the colonial civilizing 
mission, all Huxley could comment was: "Our economic system seems to be 
a Frankenstein monster which may destroy its inventors;..."07 Some of
the assumptions which were "felt rather than thought out" among the
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administrators in Tanganyika, the chief was "black men are in their 
nature different from white men and inferior to them." The other was, 
"since white men know how to do a great many things of which black men 
are ignorant, they therefore know what is best for black men and are 
entitled to lay down what they ought to do and how they ought to 
live."00
Eric Reid, one of the former Rungwe District Commissioners, lamented 
that the African who went out to seek employment, was the type of native 
who disdained manual labour and insisted that he can only work as an 
overseer, a clerk, or a superior house servant. "Such men with their 
cunning determination to keep their hands clean and get rich quickly by 
lording it over their fellow men have existed in all times and are to be 
found in every race and community. The religion they profess is but a 
veneer...."09 Europeanization, according to the Europeans as pointed 
out in the previous chapter, alienated the African from good citizenship 
and undermined the belief in tribal customs and traditions. This 
enstrangement very often led to rebellion against the established 
authorities— central or local. It was held that the native Christian who 
defied authority of the chiefs also defied the authority of the 
government and such an "obstreperous Christian" was an undesirable 
citizen.00 To tear down the "fabric of Africanism" was not the aim of 
the fatherly British government: "...to encourage the native to ape the 
European manner, dress or speech is equally to weaken his potentiality 
as a good citizen of his country."01
The alleged potential problems of the educated elements were real as 
far as the colonial administrators were concerned. As was cursorily 
stated in the previous chapter, the authorities were alarmed by the
fact that Swahili had spread almost throughout the country and
geographical mobility and intercommunication networks were very much
developed.92 This fact was demonstrated by such things as the spread of
a popular culture known as Beni JlTgoma throughout Tanganyika by the time
the British took over the administration of the territory. This dance
took its name from its musical feature:
the attempt to reproduce the effect of military brass-band, the 
the elaboration of this attempt might vary from the provision of 
a full bugle, pipe, and drum detachment to the beating of a 
single big drum in some rural variants of Beni, The dances done 
to this Beni music have also varied considerably but all have 
been based on the idea of military drill. Sometimes the dance 
took the form of a parade, a procession, a march past; sometimes 
it took the form of a dance in platoon form; sometimes it took 
the form of circling drill step.93
It was an imitation of the ceremonial side of European military, naval
and proconsular life, in which songs played an important role in the
performances. The language in the songs was mostly Swahili "and they
normally took the form of simple rhyming commentaries of current
affairs."9*
Organizationally, Beni Ngoma had an elaborate hierarchization of
male and female officers, "ranks, uniforms, and titles of honour". The
hierarchies of the officers had European titles— from emperor or king to
generals, lieutenants, etc.. Beni societies originated in the highly
literate coastal traditions of Kenya and Tanganyika in the 1890s. They
involved the imitation of European dress and conduct.95 In Tanganyika,
Beni sprung up in Tanga and Pangani; it began to spread in the interior
from Dar es Salaam; and by 1914, it had spread throughout the territory.
The dominant factions of Beni in Tanganyika were Marini (Marine) and
Arinoti bands which had a long rivalry between them— with Marini as the
society of the elite, the educated, the smart— no matter what 
their origin.... Arinoti remained essentially the society of the
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unskilled labour migrant, 'the unclean ones', even though it had 
its own quota of literate men with bureacratic skills. This 
division between the 'posh' and the 'vulgar' one,...was present 
from the start in Tanganyika towns.99
Beni, whether Marini or Arinoti, had one common characteristic: it
eschewed anything in the nature of kishenzi (savagery). Especially with
those who belonged to Marini, the tendency was to regard themselves as
coastal people, civilized and favoured by God as they were able to read
and write and "speak the language of Europe".97 After World War I Marini
represented the wealthy and Arinoti was associated with the poor. The
activities of these societies were co-ordinated throughout the country:
the members could travel to any place in the country and receive the
hospitality of the members irrespective of tribe or community. For the
British authorities, Beni was a detribalizing element. According to the
Censor’s general report of 1919, there was a political motive behind
these societies because of:
the fact that most of these societies appear to be organized by 
educated natives, who held posts of some little local importance 
under the Germans, coupled with adherence to the German system 
of organization and discipline, would render them valuable aid 
to any person who might be entrusted with the work of anti- 
British propaganda among native tribes.99
In sum, Beni was considered by the British to be subversive. They found
it necessary to reverse the efforts of their predecessors who had
worked so hard to Europeanize Africans: they were suspicious of the
very elements which had been created by the civilizing mission. Beni was
viewed by the administration as a symbol of defiance of European
presence and not simply an attempt to ape. But the fact was, on the
whole, Beni was not an oppositionist movement: it was a social and
mutual aid movement which by 1920s had gone as far as accepting ideas of
self-help and economic enterprise— in short "self-improvement".99
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Education, commercial agriculture and commerce were organically 
linked. The former, besides helping the latter was also determined by 
the latter, as it was the possibility of being in a position which 
materially enabled one to send a child to school which mattered. 
Education was seen as a means to control and determine the colonial 
system for the interest of "self improvement". But given the 
paternalistic nature of colonialism, the educated were regarded with 
suspicion and even outright hostility.
It was within this background that the elite in general started to 
withdraw from Beni in favour of other forms of organization. In March 
1922, the Tanganyika Territory African Civil Service Association was 
formed in Tanga with the aim to: "...initiate fellowship of all African 
and Arab members" of the government; "promote a social and educational 
development among its members"; "...foster the welfare of its members in 
the various Government Departments"; "encourage its members to take 
active part in sports"; etc. It was partly a welfare association and 
partly a tiny trade union, which as it spread expressed the same energy 
and met the same needs previously catered for by Beni.100
This Association set up a branch in Dar es Salaam; and also 
stimulated the formation by the educated Bahaya of the Bukoba Bahaya 
Union in 1924. 1 0 1 The latter was an organization of the unofficial Haya 
elite which mainly consisted of civil servants in Bukoba, who 
established it in order to stimulate the development of their area. It 
was an organization which aimed at seeking to establish "a system for 
the simple way to civilization" for their "mutual advantage", i.e., 
"literary education, coffee, and equality of opportunity." Bukoba Bahaya 
Union was formed so as to oppose the British colonial government backed
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privileges of the chiefs; and its members believed "literary education 
to be the key to equality with Europeans". As a result of this belief, 
the union protested in the 1930s when "the only secular post-primary 
school in Buhaya was transformed into a bad agricultural school during 
the depression".102
The leader of Bukoba Bahaya Union was Klemens Kilza, a missionary 
educated aristocrat who in the 1920s founded a Native Trading company 
and by 1928 had a coffee-hulling business and was about to erect a 
coffee factor^ in 1931. Due to debts, he almost became bankrupt by 1934; 
as a result of which he got involved in a conflict with the government 
for its refusal to grant him a loan. He finally succeeded in erecting 
the factory in 1936. He also organized a Native Growers Association, 
"partly to supply coffee to his factory". Under his leadership, the 
coffee farmers were able to engage in a series of riots against coffee 
cultivation rules, and this led to the imprisonment of some of its 
members.103
The Bukoba Bahaya Union was to became more or less a branch of 
Tanganyika African Association (TAA), like many other tribal unions. 
TAA, a pan-tribal association, was founded in 1929 by the civil 
servants and also involved some of the other capitalist elements (e.g. 
traders). It was founded by people of some education under the advice of 
the Governor Sir Donald Cameron. TAA is the predecessor of Tanganyika 
African National Union (TANU), the nationalist party which was to be 
farmed in July 1954. TAA was formed at a time when the educated Africans 
and farmers and traders were experiencing a sharp and almost 
catastrophic decline in status and income in the 1920s and 1930s as a 
result of the world recession. It was a time when the credibility of the
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British to "modernize" Tanganyika alongside Africans began to shake in 
the eyes of the educated Africans. The idea of Indirect Rule had began 
to frustrate the educated due to the loss of the vision of 
"improvement". In 1931, for example, promotion of African clerks in the 
government was suspended. There was also a marked decline in government 
expenditure in African education during this period. All these measures 
were taken as an attempt to offset the effects of the recession from 
ruining the economy.
If the Commercial Association which was formed in 1934 had less 
impact later on and was forced to collapse, it is because it expressed 
narrower sectional interests and was not favoured by the government as a 
result of its more radical stance. TAA also represented even those 
interests which the Commercial Association sought to defend; but unlike 
it, TAA had the official backing of people like Cameron and Mitchell, 
because of its usefulness in the East African Closer Union controversy. 
It was viewed as the African voice representing the people in 
opposition to East African closer union far fear of domination by Kenya 
settlers. More tribal unions affiliated themselves to TAA, in the 1930s 
and 1940s.
The aim of TAA was to unite Africans and represent their views to 
the colonial government, and this was especially to do with their 
apposition to closer union with Kenya and Uganda. This issue of closer 
union was also opposed by the government and the Asians for the same 
reason. The composition of the members in this Association was a mixture 
of Tanganyikans and non-Tanganyikans; hence its initial name as simply 
African Association (the word Tanganyika was added in 1947 with the 
break off of the Zanzibar branch). Beyond that, TAA was heavily grounded
- 200
in the Beni Ngoma tradition, the Association which preceded it, in terms 
of the non-tribal basis, and hence the more "Africanist" rather than 
tribal or simply territorial thinking.10* The "modern Tanganyikans" 
formed this Association, because Europeans and Asians had their 
associations and were represented in the LEGCO while Africans were not. 
"'The leaders of business in Dar es Salaam,' stated the association's 
constitution, 'shall have the power to open a branch of this Association 
in any town if they wish. "'105
Vhen a branch of this Association was opened in Dodoma in 1933, a 
branch which was to become the most active in the territory in the 1930s 
and 1940s, it was stated that, Africa being their "cow" it was lawful 
and right that Africans should "drink milk from [their] mother,..." In 
terms of the aims and objectives, the Association had strong anti-Asian 
sentiments, complaining about the exploitation of Asian traders, and 
proposed the formation of "African Cooperative Syndicate of African 
Association in view of aid of assisting African welfare, hospitals, 
education, Civilization and so on as to enable the progress of the 
country". TAA had become an association which incorporated other 
sections of the elite such as the business people, and was airing the 
anti-Asian sentiments of the traders.109
Thus , the Chagga kulaks, under the leadership of the educated and 
early coffee farmer Joseph Merinyo, founded a marketing association,the 
Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association (KNPA), as early as 1925. This 
marketing association was partly encouraged by Charles Dundas and D. 
Cameron, who saw it as an extension of Indirect Rule in the economic 
sphere. By 1931 it was discovered that Merinyo had embezzled £21 and had 
obtained "£121/16 from the firm of Sharif Jiwa and Co*, by false
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pretence." Merinyo was imprisoned for this.107 The original conception 
by the government that KNPA was, as a cooperative for marketing, useful 
was called in question. KHPA was abolished by the government in 1932. In 
its place was formed the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union (KNCU), 
which, according to the government was to separate economic activities 
from politics. Vhat the government wanted was a marketing association, 
and not an association involved in other aspects of social, economic and 
political life.1oe The government appointed A.L.B. Bennet, an Irishman 
as an economic advisor of KNCU. In essence, the abolition of KNPA was 
not due to corruption. Around the same time Sultan Saidi, the chief of 
the largest native administration (Tabora), had wholesale 
misappropriated £10,000 from the native treasury funds in his charge. As 
it pointed out in the previous chapter, Saidi was deported with a light 
sentence; but the native authority was not abolished. The essence of the 
question was the political nature of the association, and hence the 
government's attempt to separate politics from economics.109
KNPA had 10,894 members by 1927. This was also the year when African 
traders in Moshi formed an association to defend their interests. One of 
the rules of KNPA forbade its members to mortgage land to non-Africans 
without the Association's permission; and it was such wider interests 
which brought KNPA into opposition first to the government and then to 
the chiefs. In 1928 the Association had opposed the government's attempt 
to register all landholdings in Kilimanjaro. Consequently, the 
government suggested that the Association be merged with the native 
treasury, which meant subordination to the chiefs. Due to the collapse 
of coffee prices in the world market as a result of the recession in the 
1930s, and the chiefs' decision that KNCU should have a monopoly of all
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coffee grown in Kilimanjaro, there were riots in some chiefdoms, which 
turned into angry demonstrations against chiefs. When the debates on 
East African Closer Union which started in 1923 were still going on in 
the late 1920s, KNPA, fearing almagamation with the settler dominated 
Kenya had asked for representation in the LEGCO which had European and 
Asian members only.110
KNPA was the first co-operative movement to be formed. When the Co­
operative Societies Ordinance was passed in 1932, more co-operative 
societies for the purpose of marketing were established. According to 
the annual reports the progress of co-operatives up to the end of the 
1940s was as follows:
TABLE 2: COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES, MEMBERSHIP AND SHARE CAPITAL (1934-1949)
YEAR 1934 _ 1938 1943 1948 1949"
Number of Societies 23 37 45 77 79
Total membership 16,800 33,474 44,717 58,012 60,445
Share Capital t 928 1,519 17,251 70,582 78,019
Surplus and Reserves 3.756 Jffil --.236.386 . 2Z6i 0.40... .
SOURSE: TNA 37192, "Cooperative Development— Annual 
Reports" Vol 1, 1949, P.3 & P. Ngezi, Ushirika
Tanzania, TPH, Dar es Salaam, 1976, p.14.
"By 1952 there were 152 co-operative societies, of
which 2 were European, 5 Asian, 2 all races and 50 
distributive.
The existence and the development of co-operatives, as has been 
observed, was due to the efforts of the rich peasants and the educated. 
The other group which was equaly important in these movements was the 
traders. All these groups used the co-operatives as a platform in their 
struggles to control the colonial marketing processes. This fact is 
demonstrated, for example, by the case of Victoria Federation of
Cooperative Unions which was established in 1949 in Lake Province, and
became one of the biggest marketing co-operatives in Africa in the 1950s
- 203 -
and. early 1960s, as well as the most active union in the struggles for 
independence after the formation of TANU.
The beginning of the co-operatives in Usukuma was due to discontent 
among the farmers as a result of being exploited by Asian middlemen. The 
racial question was at the heart of the matter in the formation of these 
unions.111 The founder of this Co-operative Union was Paul Bomani, a 
Seventh Day Adventist missionary school product who was denied a chance
to join a government school because of the missionaries' campaign
against him for his refusal to join the mission. According to Maguire, 
the organization grew out of a group of traders in Mwanza town organized 
into the Mwanza African Traders Co-operative Society. Chiefs and headmen 
were never allowed to hold responsibilities beyond those of other
members in this Organization. The group which started the organization 
was hard pressed by the stiff competition of the Asian traders which 
resulted in their ventures collapsing. As a result of the establishment 
of this organization, the traders were able to extend their concern to 
the marketing of peasant produce within three years.112 The co-operative 
movement, itself supported by the government, had brought "opportunities 
for self-advancement in a social situation where entrepreneurial 
business opportunities were blocked because of racial 
stratification."113 Accordingly, Bomani "worked with native authorities, 
more often with traders and ambitious cotton farmers, and sometimes,
too, with the traditional village leaders."11*
By the end of the Second World War, the existence of enterpreneurs 
in the countryside was a normal feature. This is one of the aspects 
which explains the protests against inequalities in the rural areas 
which were discussed in Chapter Three. It is also the presence of these
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entrepreneurs which explains the rapid development of the co-operative 
societies. By the end of the Second World War, differentiation among the 
rural producers had become quite marked in some areas, and production 
for the market among them could no longer be considered an accidental 
feature:
Wage labour among African employers was increasingly common in 
Tanganyika by 1930s. It was estimated in 1926 that some 20,000 
Hangaza and Rundi labourers were employed each year by Haya 
coffee growers (even occasionally, to carry the employers to 
church on Sunday), The Bondei employed Nyamwezi immigrants to 
cultivate for them. Ha migrants travelled every year to 
cultivate rice in Luiche Delta for the townsmen from Kigoma and 
Ujiji. A survey made in Mbozi in 1944 suggested that 45 per cent 
of all Nyiha coffee growers employed labour for wages....115
Although there existed small African traders as pointed out above, 
generally the tendency for the government in the period in question was 
to attempt to prevent the African capitalist elements from entering into 
non-agricultural activities. It was because of this that the 
capitalist elements which emerged as a result of the the colonial 
processes of transformation found an outlet in the co-operative 
movements, which in turn were used as a platform for struggles against 
the government, the native authorities and the Asian bourgeoisie. This 
prevention of these elements was due to the fact that peasant production 
was cheaper for the state than any other form of production, and posed 
less contradictions for labour acquisition given that the peasants used 
their own labour and that of the family. The colonial state, on the 
other hand, struggled to control these co-operatives, but to no avail.
The Asian capitalists, despite their being the richest in local 
capital had to go on struggling with the African capitalists in the 
sphere of commerce, because they were facing obstacles on their part 
1 from the colonial government which sought to prevent them from
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transforming themselves into settler capitalists or undertaking business 
outside specified townships and trading areas. This was besides their 
being prevented from participating in industrialization. Asians were not 
allowed to hold senior posts in the civil service and banks, 
import/export houses, insurances, etc., in sum, in the real reigns of 
the economy, which were held by European monopolies.119
By the 1930s, merchant capital was already seeking to transform 
itself into productive capital. But the government's attitude during the 
inter-Var period was "to discourage industrialization unless it was an 
essential part of some agricultural production programme, and to 
discourage non-British investors, even if it meant that what they would 
produce had to be imported from Kenya." This move was extended even to 
Asians "who wanted to start factories.... who were squeezed out in 
favour of British firms such as the Tanganyika Cotton Company in the 
1930s".117
Despite this move by the government, local capital was able to 
establish some industries to a limited extent. The discouraging of local 
capital from moving into manufacturing was dictated by the colonial 
capitalist interests: the extraction of raw materials, export of capital 
and the monopoly of the market. For example, when the Tanganyika Cordage 
Company of Tanga begun to manufacture and export some quantities of 
sisal binder to Britain, the British Rope, Twine and Net Makers 
Federation reacted by protesting to the British government. It stated 
that "their home market was being menaced by the sale here by the 
Tanganyika Cordage Company of binder twine produced by the low-paid 
African labour in Tanganyika." Consequently, the British government 
imposed 100 percent duty on binder twine imported from colonies, and the
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factory in Tanganyika was closed down within a year. Other examples 
include the refusal of the establishment of a match factory in 1928, 
and attempts to stop the importation of cheap Japanese goods in support 
of Lancashire cotton trade.113
It was not only the capitalists in Britain who opposed the 
establishment of certain branches of industries in the colonies: even 
trade union leaders participated in this opposition for fear of 
competition from other imperialists' exports which were cheaper, and 
competition from the colonies. "'Ought there not,'" Ernest Bevin, the 
prominent leader of the Trade Union Congress of Britain asked in the 
1930s, "' to be some control against the development of coal mining in 
Tanganyika?' Vhen it came to the pinch, what were colonies for if not to 
sacrifice themselves for the mother country?"113
The instances, whereby, the state backed the interests of British
corporations are numerous; and the state did this either by preventing
the setting up of industries or by closing down an already established
industry. The state's interests in the opposition to industrial
capitalism in Tanganyika were succinctly summed up by Sir Villiam
MacLean in 1935 when he pointed out that:
The suggestion, however, that colonies should actively promote 
industrialization is quite another matter, and requires special 
consideration, because it has serious limitations. It is obvious 
that manufacturing countries like ours could not afford to 
provide free or assured markets for manufactured goods in direct 
competition with their own. All questions of starting new 
industries in colonies must, therefore, be examined with on 
their merits, and with due regard to the welfare of the colony 
as a whole as a primary producer.120
\
Thus the Asian had to fight it hard against the African capitalist 
elements, and hence the antagonism between the two. S.A. Kandoro, once a 
member of TAA and later on a founder member of TAHU and also one of the
famous nationalist poets, was later on to recall that he left the 
government service in 1944 on his own accord because commerce, 
agriculture and politics started to pre-occupy his time. When in his 
shop, the questions which recurred in his mind all the time were: How 
come that Africans lacked wealth and health; farmed and yet never got 
rich; and were colonized by foreigners?121 In the early 1950s, he 
worked with the Victoria Federation of Cooperative Unions in connection 
with TAA.
The co-operatives had become organs of the rich and middle peasants, 
traders and the educated in their struggles against obstacles in their 
further development within colonialism. This was contrary to the very 
objectives of the colonial state in introducing the Co-operative 
Societies Ordinance in 1932. Their struggles later took a more political 
form because of the racial problem which became more threatening with 
the re-surfacing of the settler question towards the end of the 1930s, 
as a result of the introduction of the Land Bank to facilitate European 
settlement and the proposals for land alienation. These aspects had been 
under government consideration since 1932 when Governor Symes took over. 
And within this framework, their struggles became more or less linked 
with those of the workers and peasants. The dream of advancement which 
colonialism had promised for these elements were being dispelled by the 
colonial paternalistic relations.
The world recession played a crucial role in the erosion of the 
illusion of advancement of these elements. As a result of that, they had 
to fight against their own creator. In this struggle, they used one of 
the instruments which was purpoted to be African: the marketing co­
operatives. It was within those struggles that they systematized
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theoretically what they considered African, while at the same time 
making a critique of the colonial and imperialist forms of social, 
political and economic organization. The next section discusses the way 
the struggles of these capitalist elements were systematized 
ideologically.
4.3 Nature of some of the Literature Prior to the 1950s
The changes of attitudes towards the colonial system among the 
capitalist elements essentially started in the 1930s. This was also 
reflected in the literature that appeared before and after that period. 
In the 1920s, the intellectuals wrote on the history of chiefs and 
chiefdoms and traditions. These were people like Martin Kayamba who 
wrote the history of the Vashambaa and studied the customs of the 
Vadigo,122 and Francisco Xavier Lwamugira who was an administrator, 
compiled the Haya traditions and the history of the Haya aristocracy. 
According to Lwamugira, it was a shame "to see that (if you are a young 
man or an adult) you know that Dr Livingstone was the first European to 
see the River Zambezi or that it was Moses who led the Israelites out of 
Egypt, and yet you fail to know Kibi of Kiziba....or how Omukama Ruhinda 
came to Karagwe and founded the Bahinda Empire...."123 This message 
generally summarises the spirit of those writings, and their standpoint 
in general.
There was Nathaniel Mtui who was murdered in February 1927 at 
Marangu, Moshi. Mtui was the "greatest of Chagga authors and poets. He 
wrote many interesting historical books on chiefs and chiefdoms of 
Kilimanjaro".12'* Others were J.M. Kadaso of Bukwimba, Dominikus Chabruma
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in Mshope, Matayo Leveriya Kaaya of Meru, and many others who "filled
countless exercise books with local traditions".12® According to Iliffe:
Each of their works concerned one tribe or smaller unit, unlike 
the larger canvas of coastal writers using the Islamic 
framework.... tribal historians were obsessed with origins, 
migrations, and genealogies. Their histories were accounts of 
conflict between powerful individuals: migration leaders,
warrior rulers, individual European officers or missionaries, 
great contemporary chiefs.... In this, as in much else, African 
and European thinking converged.12e
The convergence of European and African thinking was mainly due to 
the fact that this was the period when the colonial government was 
trying to implement its Indirect Rule policy. Therefore, it was within 
the struggles for legitimacy among the different families which 
contended for leadership that these histories were written. This 
explains even the pride which Kayamba had in prefacing the references of 
his descendence from Chief Kimweri in all his applications; or even the 
engagement of European administrators such as Charles Dundas in the 
reconstruction of Chagga history. This latter case shows another aspect: 
the encouragement of this practice by Europeans. When Kaaya wrote the 
history of the Meru, he was "responding to advice given to students 
while in training at the mission". He and the others had been urged by 
their pastor to write a history of their tribe, because, otherwise, "it 
would be very difficult to prove that the country belonged to Meru when 
invaded by a powerful enemy.w'z7 The powerful enemy was nothing more 
than another claim to rule the country by another family; in a nutshell, 
power struggles which would ensue between different families which had a 
claim on the throne.
The change of attitude is clearly evident from some of the things 
which were cited above from Kwetu, a newspaper which first appeared in
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1937 and ceased publication in 1951. Kwetu was the first African 
independent paper. There were other papers such as Kambo Leo (affairs 
today) and Mwanafunzi (Learner) owned by the government, and also Baraza 
(Council) the Swahili weekly published by East African Standard Limited 
(also local ones, for example in Bukoba). People like Shaaban Robert and 
many other prominent writers and poets, first published their writings 
in Hambo Leo. As it happened, the articles and the poems underwent 
government censorship before publication.123 The publisher of Kwetu was 
also the leader of the Tanganyika African Welfare and Commercial 
Association since its establishment in 1934. This was Erica Fiah, who 
was born in Uganda and came to Tanganyika in 1917 as a carrier corps 
hospital worker. After that he worked as a sanitary inspector in Tabora, 
a typist, a railway clerk, and in few other jobs. He resigned as a 
railway clerk in 1925 because he was given a job which had originally 
belonged to an Asian, without the attendant remunerations. From October 
1925 he worked with Smith McKenzie & Co Ltd up to 1932 when he resigned 
after quarrelling with the new manager and became a shopkeeper. Erica 
Fiah, it has been observed, was acquainted with "the pan-African 
writings of black Americans and Vest Indians like Marcus Garvey and 
George Padmore."123
Kwetu's sub-title was: "The Key to Civilization". The aim of the
paper was to do "social and humanitarian work and establish a contact 
between natives and non-native communities".130 According to one issue, 
the question of civilization was related to the "subject of African 
heritage" which had received more notice in other countries among 
enlightened circles than in Tanganyika:
Some people are imagining what a benumbing disappointment will
meet the African child centuries hence when among the pageant of
the world personages he anxiously studies faces and skins to 
identify his ancestors and he finds none! This has done much to 
cause a revival in traditional study and advancement; to blend 
the new with the old and give a unique civilization singulary 
' Africanistic' as a friend suggests, worthy of treasure in the 
heart of posterity. That is exactly what behoves the present day 
African to do for his progeny, if indeed he deems himself the 
veritable paver of the way for them.131
The paper's main focus was on general issues of racial discrimination,
European control of political power and economic exploitation. Fiah and
other Africans who had more radical ideas went as far as attacking some
of the "men of improvement" who emphasized personal improvement rather
than political and social change, for their elitist attitudes.132 This
was best exemplified by Fiah's attack of Martin Kayamba after his death
as a "selfish African who rose to the highest rank in Government service
without being of any use to his race",133
Africans know that they command no respect in the world, it was
painted out in one of the issues, but very often do not seek to know the
reason for this, "especially young Africans of today". It was necessary
that the young people should find ways to improve themselves and be
ready to help others as a way of setting an example.1341 There was need
to establish strong organizations like the co-operatives for
commercialists, farmers and other groups, it was advocated. The problem
with Africans was seen as that of an inferiority complex: "[the] white
or yellow skin has come to be the pass word for social supremacy in
beings susceptible to all moral aberations found in Africans". But
Africans are "physically strong and mentally robust" just like the other
people of the other colours. So, were Africans to "take up arms or use
sheer beastly force against" those who denigrated them? The answer was:
Mo! Only experiments in commerce with fair knowledge of
economics will bring us to that level to which our.friends have 
risen. Vhat we very much require at present is solid
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organisation to guard the interests of African commerce, minor 
associations on the lines of coffee Association of our Moshi 
brothers; smaller branches in the prosperous provinces of 
Tanganyika will do the trick.... It was a trite remark of the man 
who suggested that colour feeling, so well known in South Africa 
. and America and the Indian fall under the same category, can 
only be defeated by a personally directed colour feeling: 
meaning of course that if you allow a man to note that you 
underrate the importance of your colour, then you ask him 
politely to look upon you tin] a colour derision.
After World War II a new group of newspapers in other communities
continued with Fiah's arguments on a territorial basis— in Dar es
Salaam, Tabora, Bukoba, Mwanza, etc.. These papers went as far as
spreading the thought that "Tanganyika could be an independent country
with a single widely-known language, Swahili, and one leader, an
African."13S
Martin Kayamba’s book, African Problems,13e written in 1936-7 is the 
generally most systematic account of the thinking of the "modern 
Tanganyikans" of that tine. This book, which is almost unknown today, 
set out to demonstrate "how fully the African, while remaining wholly 
African, could build towards a genuinely African future by wise study of 
and selection from all that the new forces of civilisation had to 
offer,"137 Kayamba had worked with Mitchell and the other ideologues of 
Indirect Rule. He was well travelled within the country and East Africa 
in general. He went to Europe twice in the 1930s where he met with 
Africans from Vest Indies, Vest Africa and other parts. He had also met 
with people like Lord Hailey, Lady Margery Perham, Sir Hilton Young, 
Professor B. Malinowiski, J.H. Oldham, Mr Vhitely who in 1931 was a 
joint Secretary of the Labour Party, etc.— virtually all of them 
advocators of Indirect Rule who belonged to groups which were concerned 
with empire issues, such as the East African African Group or the
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African group formed later on.13e He had also contributed an article to
Africa— a journal— on the problems of transition in Africa.139 When
Kayamba met a famous Africam merchant from Gold Coast (Ghana) in
Brussels in 1936 he commented:
Ho wise African can be spoilt by travelling in Europe nor can he 
be Europeanized. An African knows quite well that he is an 
African and is always proud of his colour and nationality. He 
has a valuable place among his own people and if he can help 
them it is to his credit and to the benefit of the people.140
From a defender of all things that are European, and the tendency to see
everything African as backward, Kayamba had tremendously changed. He was
now even proud of his colour and saw pride in Dr Aggrey's wish to be
blacker than he was.141
According to Kayamba, African governments in pre-Europe days were of 
two types: those with headmen and elders and those which were evolving 
towards kingship. There was no taxation; but only contribution or 
tributes to specific objects. Punishment was in most cases in the form 
of compensation. The kingship conditions pertaining in Africa then were 
"very different from those of real African patriachal system of elders 
in council, but in pre-European days the movement away from democratic 
towards aristocratic and autocratic was already evident in many 
areas",142 Leadership in those days was generally good; although there 
were things like burying other people— mainly women— with the king 
while still alive, which were not good. But there existed "African 
chivalry" under those systems: this "proves that there is good that can 
be learned even from primitive people". There is much to learn from the 
famous Africans whose "lives were influenced by no ulterior motives or 
other considerations, but pure sacrificee for those whom they served, 
provided they were treated well."(p. 14)
African governments worked very well, and there is no doubt about
that, until foreigners introduced a "different and evil form of
slavery".(p.19) Even then it must be remembered that "Africans know that
there was much to be praised in their earlier forms of government in the
days before other people came with power in their hands". (p. 19) Because
of the contact of Africans with civilized peoples, the normal life of
the African was being disturbed. The contact:
undermines much that is good in his life without at the same 
time replacing it with what is new and of similar value.
Unfortunately, the two things do not run together for the simple 
reason that the change is so rapid and widespread that 
sufficient workers to replace what is good is changed in the
intrinsic African life are not available.(p.20)
The evils brought about by the changes could only be rectified by 
education and Christianity. The education which could perform this 
function was the one which could help Africans pick what was best from 
the foreigners and "dilute it with what we hold" so as to evolve a 
"civilisation of our own if we are going to have a separate civilisation 
in the future which others sometimes doubt."(p.24) Education which was 
imperfect and resulted in the production of semi-educated people was no 
good at all. The danger of such education was, it put the African in a
"false mental position" which was dangerous to himself and those about
him because it made him unable to select what was good and what was bad 
in the imported customs and habits and, so far as imitation is 
concerned, they imitated everything indiscriminately.(p.23) The aim of 
the so-called primitive education was to "produce defenders and useful 
members of the community.... Both these objects were properly fulfilled 
to the undoubted advantage of the African communities", (p.61) This form 
of education was vanishing slowly, being replaced by foreign education.
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This was wrong: education should "not be only to read and write but
should teach to think deeply for the benefit of the community which it 
serves and raise the standard of the people. Education of the head 
without education of the body and»the soul is of no use".(p.66) This, as 
can be seen, amounted to a virtual disillusionment with the civilizing 
mission of the Europeans given the practical reality of colonialism.
By the time he was writing this book, Kayamba had already been able
to distance himself from his earlier views of the 1920s; while standing
for the cause'of advancement of Africans, he did not want any indulgence
in politics and at times condemned politics and strikes by workers as
abominable things. When he addressed an audience of 2,500 people in a
missionary annual meeting at Westminster in 1931, he had, for example,
said: Africans, as it is known,
are backward people, are the most backward race in the world. Ve 
are helpless, we cannot stand on our own in the present world. 
Ve want your help. I appeal to you on behalf of my brothers and 
sisters of Africa. Ve want to co-operate with you, to be 
friendly with you. Ve have our African priests, but they cannot 
do without you. God is working in Africa through them and
you. 1 ,d3
But by the end of the 1930s, it was a question of Africans needing a lot 
of sympathy when dealing with them— and also a lot of patience, because 
of the artificiality of the African transitional situation and given the 
problems of the old and the new. It was no longer simply a question of 
Africans being backward and in need of European help.
African customs were changing, and some of them were good. For
example the customs of initiation were the "African school of training 
for adult life". They taught bravery and service to the community.
Whatever was bad in some of those things, "it may be that the early
civilized Christian pioneers were too hasty in uprooting them,
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especially among Christians." The transitional phase was resulting in 
Africans leaving what they should not leave behind and grasping 
imperfectly what did not fill the gap between the past and the present. 
One of the problems which needed to be examined was that of land tenure. 
"In most parts of Africa, if not all, the original land tenure was 
communal". But due to penetration of "aliens and in some parts through 
progressive growing of economic and permanent crops, this system has 
been and is being changed over into semi- or full individual 
tenure." <p.33)
Africans were by nature agriculturalists and land was the primary
wealth. If Africa did not present difficult problems connected with
poverty as in the other continents, this was because of the "hoe and
land, which provide every one with daily bread....The simple life of an
African has its origin in his subsistence living".(p.35) This life was
not progressive under the new conditions because it could not raise his
standards, although it saved him from world misery, "such as in other
lands has reduced millionaires to penury". The simple life of the
African was being undermined by civilization:
The life of these peaceful and contented peasants, living in 
their own world, is being subjected to prodigous industrial 
transformation and both families and whole communities are in 
consequence being disintegrated. Ho amount of laws, segregation 
or labour regulations would keep them for long. These are mere 
paliatives to a widespread and virulent epidemic. The effect of 
the elements which dislocate the life of this once undisturbed 
peasantry is far reaching and infinitely deleterious. It remains 
to be seen what nature itself will do to adjust it. But it must 
be obvious that the transformation forces are gigantic, 
rapacious and fatal to African village life. Only the African 
parent, so deeply affected by it, can understand its 
ramifications and magnitude.(p.13)
Kayamba was lamenting, and it took a man of his experience to grasp the
fact that even the laws and regulations which were being instituted or
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had been instituted, whether segregative, or cast in terms of labour 
controls and others, could not be more than simply palliatives.
Capitalism was dislocating the life of the people in the countryside. 
This, to Kayamba, was already an established fact. Therefore, it was 
necessary to look for a remedy to this system which had adverse effects 
on Africans.
Vhile labour in the civilized countries was protected and could 
defend itself, this was not the case in Africa where it was "vulnerable 
to exploitation".(p.37) The wages of African labourers were low and 
their diet bad. The transplantation of the workers away from their 
environment, the disintegration of families and general destruction and 
depopulation of communities was a lamentable thing, the moulding of the 
peasants into workers was a "virulent state": due to the need for
labour, there was a "steady process of turning Africans in hordes from 
useful agricultural, productive life to a formidable mass of men in 
detribalized servitude" and this was becoming daily a "crying 
necessity".(p.37) It was "industrialisation, with the forced importance 
of money in the European type of life" which created the African's 
position: "the danger to Africa will not lessen so long as these forces 
exist." <p.39) The so-called civilized factors were to blame for all 
these problems.
Thus, capitalism and the creation of wage labour were seen as the 
underlying forces behind rural Africa's destruction. This was not the 
system which Africans were acquainted with. Africans were naturally
communal and possessed great powers of cohesion: and this had existed
before Europeans came with their power. This communal nature had been 
reduced because of "industrialisation", and their real association could
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be brought about again by economic and social forces,(p.43) The 
disintegration of the communal aspects was reflected even in commerce 
where Asians monopolized trade, and Africans preferred to buy from 
Asians rather than Africans: "Africans are ready and quick to buy
anything that is produced by their own people from their own farms or 
tribal industries, but hesitate to buy imported goods from the shops of 
their own people" . (p. 7 4 ) This was very bad, because "trade makes 
wealth for the people".(p.73) There was a need for more African traders, 
and this was not necessarily nationalistic; but the "slogan, 'Buy from 
your own people' could rectify the matter in time."(p.73) There was also 
a necessity for the traders to develop co-operative trade as a means to 
assist their progress. It was essential, also, to establish a federation 
of tribes so that people could think "as Africans or nations...rather 
than localised thinking." <p.76)
Fundamentally, the solution for the problems in Africa lay in the 
attempt by Africa to establish its own civilization. Africa could evolve 
its own civilization, notions that civilization was only European were 
false: "it should not be forgotten that Africa once had Egyptian
civilization to its credit; probably one of the oldest of all."(.86) 
There were also the "ruins" of Zimbabwe which clearly showed that Africa 
had its own civilization, and also the Ethiopian civilization.<p.81) 
European civilization had contributed in economics, medical science, 
etc.: "In inventions it is unique and incomparable with any of the past 
civilisations. And yet so many of these inventions are liable to be 
destructive to itself— surely this is the most pathetic part of it all." 
Vars, and armament in general, were not things to be proud of at all:
To me it seems that whatever happens, unless the present
civilization is completely destroyed, which I think almost
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impossible, the African will shape his civilization according to 
the model before him; like a painter who paints a 
landscape....Vhen the two [civilizations— C.S.L3 meet halfway, 
the best each has preserved of his civilization will merge, thus 
producing one excellent whole. It sounds utopian but it is not 
outside the realm of possibility.(p.81)
There was no doubt, according to Kayamba, that Africa would shape
her own destiny, assisted by outside influences from which she would
select that which she wished to retain. Contrary to the belief that
Africans had nothing to contribute to world civilization; they had. This
consisted in "their pristine life" which was communal. This life was
"neither communistic nor bolshevist" although it was disintegrating into
individualist patterns owing to foreign systems.(p. 90) Some of the
problems created by the foreign systems could be rectified by better
wages, better living conditions and better service conditions. It was
necessary to let Africans be free, "and economically free, to co-operate
with foreign industrial activities on their own will and never under
coercion or poor conditions obtaining in their own areas" and hence
forcing them into detribalization as a means to satisfy their "most
elementary needs and obligations placed on them by non-African rule in
which they are allowed no part or share." (p.93)
The only way Africans could protect themselves against the forces of
"industrialism", according to Kayamba, was by building tribal industries
and agriculture in their own home areas. This could only take place
through the transformation of village life by the people themselves
while making use of ideas and technology from the Vest. Villages were to
be changed in such a way that they formed the "nucleus for Africans’ own
civilization". The villages were to be on the following model:
a village containing 50 houses with few smaller villages dotted 
about it on surrounding hills, the central village of fifty 
houses, being the model of progress for Africans' own
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civilization, should have brick houses with roof using tiles 
which can be locally produced by villagers. It should have in 
addition a church, a mosque, a dispensary with a ward, an 
artesian well, a spring-water pipe or irrigated water, bridges 
over any intersecting rivers, a school with a playground, a 
council house with its court and office, a small village hall 
for village meetings and amusements, a few shops owned entirely 
by Africans and a market-place in the centre of the village for 
the use of all surrounding villages. A small postal agency, 
also, in one of the shops (a very simple one) and a post office 
savings-bank branch. A small lock-up perhaps. Nice roads and 
farms surrounding the villages. Drains and public 
latrines.(p. 77)
These, broadly, were Kayamba's conceptions. He, Erica Fiah and 
many others who wrote in Kwetu and even in Mambo Leo, however varied 
their particular views were, from the 1930s were more or less defending 
what they considered to be African Civilization. When the government 
attacked Fiah in the 1940s for what he published in Kwetu, Fiah defended 
himself and those who published in Kwetu in terms of the fact that they 
were Africans and "(not Bolshevists, Marxists, Nazis, Anti-British Dutch 
in South Africa or so-called sophisticated and Europeanized Negroes of 
America)".1AB
The Second World War opened a forum for other issues for the 
educated Tanganyikans. In 1941 it was declared that "Cthel African is 
awakening from his long slumber".1AG Besides the question of African 
Civilization,another dimension was added: the question of the future. On 
May 1, 1942 a question was posed: given that Africans were supporting 
the Allies and participating in the War, "will the African native be 
allowed a better place and a little more voice and responsibility in the 
administration of his country, or will he continue to remain as a clerk, 
last of the list, as he has always been?"1Ar By 1947 it was being argued 
that "Africans should regain their former glory". Peter Mtambao wrote to 
Kwetu:
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The line of progress must be planned not by the tutors alone, 
but by cooperation of the tutors and the taught.... Civilization 
started in Africa long before the other countries of the world 
awoke, but Africa's progress was retarded by the awakening of 
other countries.... Now she is awakening from her long siesta.1*3
In, .artistic production, Shabaan Robert is the figure who looms 
powerfully in this period under discussion. Shaaban Robert, from Tanga 
began to write poetry in 1932. By the mid-1940s, through poetry, he was 
arguing people to unite under TAA, so as to be in a position to fight 
subjection.130 This was also reflected in his prose writings of around 
the same time— Kusadikika,131 Kufikirika,1S2 and Utubora Kkulima.'&:* The 
novels are generally more elaborate and combine a sense of social 
realism and social commentary. The former two were written in a 
satirical form. They were about imaginary kingdoms and they satirized 
the injustices perpetuated under colonialism in Tanganyika and advocated 
the creation of an ideal society with social justice.
Broadly, Kusadikika stood for a society ruled by law which ensured 
justice and freedom; material development through social co-operation 
rather than individual forms and exploitation; in which friendship 
rather than war governed; in which the glorious heritage was valued; in 
which there was a unified belief, nation and one language; and above all 
it was a society devoid of inequalities and segregation. Kufikirika 
carried more or less the same message. Beyond that, it castigated 
superstitions and all forms of superstitious education, and championed 
an enlightened type of education and modern medicine from abroad. It 
stood for a type of education which combined the training of the mind 
and the body. This was not a renouncement of what was indigenous, 
rather, it was an advocation of synthesizing what was good from the 
indigenous and the non-indigenous.
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Shaaban Robert had written an epic poem during the Second World War 
in support of the Allies and in condemnation of fascism and those who 
supported it.133 In 1946 he finished writing Utubora Mkulima, a novel to 
which the conception that farming was the most honoured work in Africa 
(which also appeared in Kufikirika and Kayamba's African Problems') was 
central. According to this novel, Africans were peasants by tradition, 
and they needed to preserve this tradition. This novel told the story of 
Utubora, who although highly paid as a merchant's clerk, decided to go 
back to the countryside to farm. Utubora was fed up with employment and 
wished to secure his freedom, "by living his life in this God's world 
the way his grandfather, Adam, lived."132 He wanted to live the way the 
first man to be created lived in the Garden of Eden, by his own sweat 
rather than work he did not desire. Money was seen as the source of 
evil: it could not satisfy all the needs of man. Therefore people had to 
be emancipated from this evil.133
This in general, was the way the "men of improvement" systematized 
their ideas. This is the way they conveived African Civilization. An 
important development in the 1940s was the beginnings of an association 
between the educated Tanganyikans and the Fabian Colonial Bureau in 11 
Dartmouth Steet, London. The Fabian Colonial Bureau was formed in 1940, 
with Rita Hinden and Arthur Creech Jones as chief advisors and most 
responsible people. The necessity to form the Bureau arose in the 1930s 
as a result of the world recession. During that time there was "a spate 
of troubles in Britain's own dependent colonies" and demand for former 
colonies by Germany and Italy, which threatened the policies and 
demanded the reconsideration of these colonial policies: "in Africa and 
the Caribbean, Mauritius and Cyprus and Palestine, there were riots and
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racial tensions, strikes, violence and unrest. The investigations of a
series of commissions revealed conditions of poverty and disease, 
political neglect and administrative difficulty".137
The advisory committee had people like Julian Huxley, V. A. Arthur 
Lewis, Lady Margery Perham, the TUC official Andrew Dalgleish, the
Labour Party whip Lord Listowel, etc.— some of whom had belonged to the 
former East African group and were amongst the ideologues of Indirect 
Rule policy. The Bureau's journal, Empire, had been circulating in the 
colonies since 1938 and from 1940 it was turned into a "Socialist 
Commentary an Colonial Affairs." This journal was renamed Venture in 
1949. Among the diverse issues the Bureau dealt with were 
"constitutional development, monopolies and restrictive practices,
labour relations and conditions, housing and education, racial 
discrimination, land settlement".1se The Bureau associated itself with 
national movements and political parties in general, and was renamed the 
Fabian Commonwealth Bureau in 1958.
The Bureau corresponded with the Tanganyika African Association,
Kilimanjaro Natives Co-operative Union, Tanganyika Railway African 
Association, etc. and individuals such as 6.P, Mkandawire who worked as 
a headteacher of Mwanza Medical School and established a cultural centre 
(Euro-African Discussion Group of Mwanza), S.M. Mtengeti who worked in 
the office of the Secretariat in Dar es Salaam, Tom Marealle who became 
a paramount chief of the Vachagga in the 1950s, Stephen Mhando who was 
the President of TAA before Mwalimu J.K. Nyerere took over the seat in 
1953, Hamza Mwapachu who worked with the social welfare department, 
Chief Kidaha Makwaia, Mwalimu J.K. Nyerere, and others. This list 
expanded further in the 1950s.139
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During the Second World War, as was pointed out above, the 
Tanganyikan elite had supported the Allies; and they also had high hopes 
for reforms within Tanganyika after the War. Their illusions were 
dispelled; for there was more land alienation within a short period than 
had ever taken place since the British first took over the country. 
Also the settlers had become more unified with the disappearance of the 
German settlers and were forming alliances with their Kenyan and South 
African counterparts in their struggles for a settler dominated 
Tanganyika. For some time, the settler interests were able to gain an 
upper hand in the state, and this victory of the settler interests was 
coupled with unprecedented forms of racial hostility and contempt of 
Africans. These aspects will be discussed more elaborately in Chapter 
Five. To the educated Africans, the settlers were seen as fascists who 
were "close to Nazi". The Fabian Colonial Bureau became an ally during 
this time because it seemingly championed more humanly interests and 
was concerned with the problems which affected Africans and their 
development by the state. True enough, the Bureau stood for some reforms 
in the colonies, but on a limited scale, as is demonstrated by their 
refusal to publish some of the more radical views of Africans.130
Evidence for these radical views is scanty, sis most papers in East 
Africa and abroad could not publish them. One comes across some 
indicators which imply their existence through some of the assertions of 
some of the officials, or attempts by Africans themselves to dissociate 
themselves from anything connected with communism. Major Orde Brown in 
1932 wrote: "The African is an astonishingly keen letter writer, even in 
a semi-educated stage,...and I have seen natives in Northern Tanganyika 
pouring bewilderment over the propaganda publications emanating from the
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South, with symbol of harmer and sickle complete." Mitchell was to 
inform the members of the African Group in 1930 that there was a certain 
amount of Moscow activity here and there in the country: "The 'Negro 
Worker' for example is being sent to a few people and I occasionally see 
letters written by natives in a familiar strain but it does not at 
present amount to much."131
The fact that most papers refused to publish radical views in the 
1940s is verified by some letters which were never published. One A.K. 
Juma wrote to‘ the Venture in 1949* He was asking the "British socialists 
to take notice of the embarrassing situation in which the present day 
trend in the colonies is placing them and the Party". According to Juma, 
the socialists were facing a graver colonial problem than ever, because 
of the whole "attitude and outlook of settled Europeans" in parts like 
East Africa. The settlers were determined to sever Tanganyika from the 
United Nations Organization and halt "African political progress and 
blunting over political aspirations". He went on:
Outbursts of 'living space' 'the Indian menace' and 'growing 
Native problem' (settler problem to be correct) 'dominance of 
Europeans in Government' etc. are to be heard everyday. A 
fascist regime is growing right under our feet! What is British 
Socialist reaction to this challenge? If this sort of thing is 
to be allowed under a socialist regime what is to happen to us 
under a reactionary Tory one?.... Socialism (in the colonies) 
will stand or fall by what happens in East Africa and the 
responsibility lies at the door of the British men and women who 
believe in justice and fair play.132
This letter was never published.
More scathing views, perhaps by the same author, signed W. B. Julius, 
were refused publication by the Tanganyika Standard. One long letter to 
the editor was titled "Moscow, Berlin or Rome?" It was castigating the 
projected European organization in Tanganyika. It stated that the much
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talked about dangers of communism were by "no means the only dangerous 
'ism* that Tanganyika" had to watch out for: "Fascism is just as bad and 
the East African atmosphere is just as thick with it at present." The 
organization projected was racist and shared the views of the "BRITISH 
UNION OF FASCISTS" which was a violently "un-British sort of unity." A 
certain Mr Anderson, whom the letter called the European community's 
"Poet Laureate", had overeached even the Fiihrer. This had to be stopped, 
because the settlers assumed that the UNO is crazy, which most probably 
included "mother Britain in the crazy gang of their reference"— a thing 
which was stupid and totally against the interests of Africans. The 
letter is worth quoting in extenso:
Goebbels' Dictionary is being freely quoted from. One hears 
quite Ca lot] now of such talk as 'future of Europeans in 
danger', 'who owns all the nice big cars?— The Indians.' 'The 
Government of Tanganyika is taking Africans seriously.' Hitler 
had to have a scapegoat and he started with the Jew. Jude! Jude! 
He then invented the myth of the racial superiority of the 
Germans, the Nordic people, the Aryans, the chosen race, the 
destined rulers of the world and died in a chancellory singing 
' Deutsch-land uber alles'.
....Others are crying out KULTUR! KULTUR! and wasting so 
much time over 'what did your grandfather do' sort of talk 
instead of getting down to the many problems of the moment. No 
time to define culture here, but suffice it to say that African 
music (which America and Europe have made full use of), African 
stories, proverbs, folk-lore, etc. are still part of his 
culture. Of course you beat him flat when it comes to the atomic 
bomb, but then one does not know whether to be thankful or 
regretful of this particular portion of your material culture!
Now, if East Africa is to go ahead in peace and with the 
willing co-operation of all races these dangerous ideologies 
must be clipped early in their growth. Goebbels, Rosenberg, 
Streicher and all started exactly like this. Little did the 
Vorld realize the harm they were doing until the Vorld woke up 
in Var. But the German as any rule by force is likely to fall. 
Tanganyika and indeed East Africa must wake up to this 
danger....of FASCISM for which the soil is being prepared so 
painstakingly well....Not only must we resist it but must argue 
the Government to take strong and immediate steps to put to a 
stop to the maneouvres which hitherto East Africa was proud of.
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Please do not allow your settlers to run down all the 
European civil servants as they do on all occasions. They and 
the Missionaries— not settlers— have made Africa what it is.133
And so, by the end the 1940s, socialist terminology was already in 
circulation in Tanganyika. This was taken from the British Fabian 
socialists as an example of what was best from Europe— something which 
was acknowledged by the Vest, which could not be anything near 
communism. Central to these conceptions was the role of the state and 
some individuals, e.g. the socialists, in being able to prevent/not to 
prevent the'emergence of certain processes such as fascism or dominance 
of the settlers in Tanganyika. This aspect will become more clear in 
Chapter Five where some of the developmental conceptions of these 
educated elements are discussed within the context of the rise of 
nationalism and its triumph. The above conceptions were a direct 
response to European accusations which saw African resistance as either 
pro-Vest or pro-Communist. British socialism, for them, was furnishing 
the weapons to attack the adverse forms of imperialism and capitalism in 
general. Kayamba had viewed his attack on colonial capitalism as based 
on communalist assumptions; but made it clear that these could not be 
equated to communism. But the social structures were those based on
egalitarian principles.
The educated Tanganyikans had rejected the feeling of inferiority;
reached the level of being proud of their colour; and more than that,
they rejected the claims that Africans had no civilization. They took 
the view that Africans had contributed to civilization and world 
culture positively. Vorld civilization's cradle land was Africa— in
Egypt. Vestern civilization, although progressive materially, was 
essentially destructive. "Industrialism", as Kayamba pointed out, "with
-228-
the forced importance of money and the European way of life" was to 
blame for the problems in Africa. It was only by the creation of another 
civilization that Africa could be salvaged. In its worst form, Western 
civilization had created the atomic bomb, and . produced fascistic 
tendencies; things which people could not be proud of at all.
With Kayamba, Shaaban Robert, Erica Fiah and the others, the lost 
past was rediscovered; this glorious past needed to be preserved while 
at the same time absorbing Western civilization critically, so that it 
did not destroy the distinctive African Civilization. These Tanganyikans 
had reached the conclusion that one could not simply take advantage of 
European civilization. They were Africans who had been brought up in 
Western civilization, yet never allowed to blend in a natural and normal 
way with that civilization. It was this contradiction of being both 
black and Western which made them become self-conscious, and inevitably 
critical of the Vest. They were not non-Western , nor enemies of the 
Vest; and in that respect, they were not pro-communists who were enemies 
of the Vest. They stood for racial harmony rather than hostility, 
because they too believed they had something to contribute to universal 
civilization. Thus, it was in this way that Tanganyikans reached Pan- 
Africanist conclusions. These ideas were a result of the struggles of 
the elite which emerged within the colonial forms of transformation. 
This elite had seized upon what was considered as Africa's contribution 
as a way to enter into social, political, economic, cultural and 
intellectual equality in a hierarchical world.
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4.4. Conclusion
Obviously, there was a fundamental continuity between the ideas of 
the ideologues of Indirect Rule and those of the educated Tanganyikans. 
This continuity is not simply terminological, e.g. in the usage of the 
term African Civilization: it also lies in what was considered to
constitute Africanness, whether in terms of social structures or 
political arrangements. They all based their ideas on the Eurocentric 
anthropological material which was available to them. The most obvious 
and tempting conclusion would be to urgue that the educated 
Tanganyikans were simply echoing or aping the Europeans; and that they, 
along with the ideologues of Indirect rule, were the kind of people who 
were keen to retard the development of capitalism because they were 
willing to have the peasantry without rural capitalists, the development 
of capitalist commodity production without its unacceptable 
consequences, etc.. There is a grain of truth in this; and in this sense 
it could be said that the educated Tanganyikans were liberated 
theoretically by the attempts of the masters to coopt the African 
elements which would make Africans effectively colonizable. But to 
simply conclude so would be to wish things away too easily.
Such a conclusion is a simplification which makes it difficult to 
grasp the different experiences of the advocators of these ideas. The 
Europeans' ideas were a response to the problem of making Tanganyikans 
colonizable, given the crisis of the civilizing mission generated by the 
resistance of the workers and peasants of Tanganyika; and it was not an 
abandonment of the colonial mission, racism or the civilizing mission in 
general. It was a result of the re-examination on the part of the 
colonialists of the "ideological foundations of the civilizing
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mission"'&A and so, the ideas remained essentially colonialist. All that 
they did was to "incorporate in the philosophical foundations of the 
civilizing mission even the cultural elements" of the people to be 
civilized.1es They picked from the colonized those elements which could 
facilitate the civilizing mission. The crisis of the civilizing mission 
was put in the following words in 1925:
Ve have little cause for complacency about our humanitarian 
progress and the high levels to which we seek to raise native 
races. Though governments make laws, it is the people who have 
to keqp them, and it is the good will and support of the people 
in Africa, as in Europe and the United States, which gives life 
to law. Vithout change of heart and outlook the law has no life. 
Ve have uniformly done, not what the native peoples want, nor 
what they— poor, misguided 'savages’!— think right, but what we 
consider it best for them; unless we modify our policy in this
respect we are in for a very rude awakening, for we are
deliberately teaching and emancipating native races everywhere, 
educating them to articulate, and they are beginning to learn 
how to marshal their ideas, and to talk.133
That was the colonialists' experience. Added to this was the
colonialists' disillusionment with some elements of their own
civilization— aspects which were dealt with in Chapter Three— and the
attempts to look for alternative forms of social organization in the
lives of the "Noble savages".
The educated Tanganyikans, on the other hand, as products of 
imperialist transformations, having grasped the truth that they were 
rejected by the very civilization which nurtured them, began to question 
the edifice of Vestern civilization itself. "To the chagrin of the
assimilated the system was recognized to be not imperfect but cruel. It 
had built its whole edifice on racial ideology;" it had, more than that, 
cheated and deified the instruments of exploitation instead of man, 
because for this system, man did not count: "he was exploited, tortured, 
discriminated against, persecuted and used to produce profit for a few
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selfish men." Thus logically, it was essential to create a more humane 
civilization.137 They turned around and looked at the African way of 
life, which was now viewed from a more humane and sympathetic angle, 
seeking for alternative forms of social and political arrangements which 
excluded the arbitrary forms introduced by colonialism. In the forms of 
African life, they sought out those aspects which would refute 
Eurocentrism; and at the same time they exposed those elements within 
Vesternality which were destructive while picking out what they 
considered useful.
The experience which led them to the same content ideologically as 
the colonialist is not the same as that of the colonialist. The so- 
called traditional African way of life they presented depicted the 
peasantry from the point of view of capitalist forms of commodity 
production and division of labour. What they sought to present as 
African, was in essence represented by the peasant who produced for the 
market— progressive and capable of assimilating Western technology and 
living in modern villages. This was essentially the middle peasant, who 
was a favoured product of colonial capitalist transformation. For the 
colonialists this category of peasants could do better than settlers in 
the production of export crops, given the conditions pertaining in 
Tanganyika; and for the educated Tanganyikans it was this category which 
represented the ideal form of social organization, because its members 
did not base themselves on the exploitation of others. The ideas 
represented those elements which sought to "improve themselves"— the 
middle and rich peasants and traders, i.e. the petty bourgeoisie.
The claim, for example, that Africans lived in villages, made by 
both colonialists and the educated Tanganyikans, is refuted by G.
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Milne's observations in the 1930s. Milne died in 1942. He was a soil
scientist at Amani Station who was also versed even in the philosophical
foundations of soil science. Taking the examples of Usambara Vest,
Upare, Uchagga, Ubena, etc. and some others from Kenya and Uganda, and
basing himself on some German records, he asserted:
Often enough no true villages exist because the people have no 
motive for being gregarious; there may be no need for the 
craftsman or shopkeeper or doctor or entertainer to live hard by 
the primary producer they serve, because, in so far as these 
functions are specialized at all, they are carried out part-time 
by the folks who are most of the time primary producers 
themselves, and, like the rest, live mast conveniently on the 
pieces of land they cultivate. Thus where, there is no threat 
from the enemy or enclosure, habitations are scattered pretty 
uniformly through the cultivable lands— not, of course, as 
single houses, for a man may have several wives, a widowed 
mother, and a poor relation or two, all of whom live around the 
one compound, but these are hardly villages.1 eet
These did not preclude the existence of markets. Markets existed. In
Usambara, "tall] trade is done at the weekly markets held a few miles
apart on different days, where you do see humanity being gregarious, and
very picturesque and fascinating these markets are....close proximity of
residence is of no particular use to anybody and they do not have
it."139
Vhat Milne was pointing out was the fact that concentration or 
living in close proximity in villages, the way they were pictured by 
his contemporaries— bath colonialists and people like Martin Kayamba—  
was a requirement of the colonial capitalist forms of organization. It 
was with the establishment of mission stations, police, court, churches, 
schools, hospital; the settlement of shopkeepers, carpenters, "tailors 
and other artisans set up in business, and you have something much more 
like the European village springing up.... Similarly, a district 
administration headquarters becomes a small township, railway station or
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cotton-buying post or ginnery becomes a centre of trade or lorry 
transport,..." Besides the peasants who had been concentrated, large 
villages could be found in the mining areas and districts where there 
were European-owned sisal or coffee plantations: "there are large
'villages' where the (mostly immigrant detribalized) labour lives."170
The graphic model of Kayamba's village was a representation of a 
petty bourgeois village; a village of small scale capitalism which did 
not suffer from the acute contadictions of capitalism. And the 
colonialists’ conceptions that Africans in pre-colonial Africa lived in 
villages were based an the same assumptions of capitalist forms of 
production. For them, there must have been villages, given that wars 
were chronic in those societies, and the villages were probably for 
defence purposes. Even the conception of co-operatives, whether among 
Africans or Europeans, was based on the operation of the market or 
assumptions based on exchange, and not the socialization of the means of 
production. In other words, both the colonialists and the educated 
Africans did not contradict capitalism as such; because the forms of 
production and division of labour they defended are the very foundations 
of the capitalist system.
More radical ideas were not allowed publication, as has been 
pointed out. Shaaban Robert was to note that some of his manuscripts 
were lost while with the publishers as a result of their refusal to 
publish them. He had written histories and essays besides his poetry 
and novels. This explains why he had to employ Aesopian methods in his 
novels and some of his poetry. Towards the end of the 1950s, Shaaban 
Robert was moving towards utopian socialist ideas and grounding them on 
the working class position.171
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An example of an author who could not publish his work is the late
Aniceti Kitereza of Ukerewe. Kitereza finished writing what is stillthe
longest novel in Tanzania in 1945. Unlike the writings of his
contemporaries which had the heroes and rulers— kings, chiefs,
governments, etc—  as the principle characters, the community was the
principle character in this novel. Kitereza had also written historical
chronicles, and transcribed oral literature and proverbs, which were
never published.172 The novel was originally written in Kikerewe and was •
published in 1981 in Kiswahili. It told the story of the pre-colonial
Kerewe society of the 17th or 18th century and attempted at depicting
Kerewe society at its most unadulterated stage, showing the modes of
production, the gods and modes of warship, aesthetics, commitment to
work, ethics, forms of authority and punishment, and the roles of rulers
and priests, medicinemen and rain makers; the sense of community,
philosophy of life, social organization, forms of division of labour,
etc. Professor Gerald Hartwig aptly remarked about Kitereza:
Unlike his contemporaries, his writing voices no protest, fights 
no battles, is not defensive of his heritage, nor is it aimed at 
a European audience. His writing is simple [and]unsophisticated, 
extolling the virtues of earlier values and traditions; his 
intended readership— the young people of his community."173
Kitereza did not criticise or glorify the pre-colonial societies; 
nor was he attempting an intermarriage of the pre-colonial cultures and 
Western civilization. He aimed at making the young grasp the nature of 
those societies and understand their driving force; so as to be able to 
grasp the kind of transformations which had taken place under 
colonialism. In other words, without any mystifications or apology, he 
was more successful in demystifying the myths of the civilizing mission 
than most of his contemporaries. And moreover, he wrote, in the very
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language of the people he wanted to address. After all, even 
missionaries had translated the evangelical works into vernaculars so as 
to make them accessible to more people. Kitereza, from the point of view 
of the civilizing mission, was not an authentic thinker.
The struggles of the educated and the capitalist elements in the 
1930s and 1940s remained ineffective as far as the colonial arrangements 
were concerned. It was only when they began to utilize the struggles of 
the rebelling workers and peasants who struggled against anti-erosion 
measures, improved methods of crops and animal husbandry, arbitrary and 
violent forms of domination, and generally for better living conditions, 
that the educated were able to lead a successful nationalist struggle. 
They were compelled to support even those "traditional" aspects to which 
they were fundamentally opposed from their "modern" point of view, so 
as to wage a successful struggle. They were pushed to this position, and 
they too had to invest in the terrain of the workers and peasants to 
attain their goals. This aspects will be discussed in the next chapter 
which deals with the nationalist phase.
- 236 -
NOTES
1. J. Iliffe, "The age of Improvement and Differentiation" in I.E. 
Kimambo & A.J. Temu (eds), A History of Tanzania, EAPH, Nairobi, 
1969, p.124.
2. J. Cameron & V. Dodd, Society and Schools Progress in Tanzania, 
Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1970, p.54.
3. Margaret Bates, "Tanganyika Under British Administration" Ph D 
Thesis, Oxford University, 1957, p.456.
4. D.R. Morrison, Education and Politics in Africa: The Tanzanian 
Case, C. Hurst & Company, London, 1976, p.44.
5. For the discussion of this aspect see, Z.E. Lawuo, Education and 
Social Change in a rural Community, DUP, Dar es Salaam, 1983.
6. Cameron & Dodd, op cit, p.55.
7. ibid.
8. ibid, p.56. The alliance between the Germans and the Moslems was 
an attempt on the part of the Germans to buy off the Coastal 
people as a result of the resistance they had put up during 
colonial conquest. On the other hand, there was the alliance at 
home between Germany and some Islamic states, e.g. Turkey.
9. Quoted by T.J. Jones, Education in East Africa, Edinburgh House 
Press, London, 1924, p.178.
10. Quoted in ibid.
11. Lawuo, op cit; See also "German East Africa," Annual Report
1902/3 (translation in East Africana, University of Dar es 
Salaam).
12. Lawuo, ibid.
13. L. Sefania Ole Sumuley Mallei, "Habari za Vaarusha: Historia,
Mila na Desturi zao", Utafiti No 1, Municipal Council Library, 
Arusha, 1981/2, pp.89-92.
14. A. S. Mbise, "The Evangelist: Matayo Leveriya Kaaya", in J.
Iliffe <ed), Modern Tanzanians, EAPH, Nairobi, 1971, p.27.
15. Jones, op cit, p.179.
16. Lawuo, op cit, p.84.
17. ibid.
18. Morrison, op cit, p. 44.
On manual/mental division of labour, see Alfred Sohn-Rethel, 
Intellectual and Manual Labour: A critique of Episteaology,
Macmillan, 1978, p.78; Also H. Draper, Karl Marx's Theory of 
Revolution Vol II, Monthly Review Press, Hew York, 1978, 
Chapters 16-18.
E. Vamba dia Vamba, "Philosophy in Africa: Challenge of the
African Philosopher", Department of History, University of Dar 
es Salaam, 1983, (mimeo).
H.M.T. Kayamba, African Problems, Lutterworth Press, London, 
1948, p.87.
J. Illffe, "The Spokesman; Martin Kayamba", in Modern 
Tanzanians, op cit, pp.72-3. His father Hugh Peter Kayamba, was 
one of the first Christian converts, who was educated by the 
University Mission to Central Africa. He spent two and a half 
years at an English public school, Bloxhams, between 1883 and 
1885. There were many Tanganyikans who were educated in Kiungani 
school during the German colonial period. It is those who were 
educated in Kiungani who were the first to be recruited by the 
British when they took over the country.
Vischer to Oldham, "Extract from Personal letter to Mr Vischer 
from P.E. Mitchell, Secretary to Hative Affairs, Tanganyika 
Territory", n.d., in Mss Brit Emp. s. 1829, "Papers of Joseph 
Houldsworth Oldham"
ibid.
J. Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika, CUP, London, 1979, 
p.334.
ibid.
A letter by Dr E.F. Mwaisela in Mss Brit Emp s. 365, "Papers of 
the Fabian Colonial Bureau".
Rivers-Smith to J. Scott, 12.9.1921, SMP 3118, Vol I.
J. Raum, "Education Problems in Tanganyika Territory", in 
International Review of Missions, Vol 19, 1930, pp.564-5,
Confidential letter from Rivers-Smith to Chief Secretary,
24.7.1925, SMP 3118.
See V.B. Mumfard, "Hative Schools in East Africa", in Journal of 
African Society, 1926-27, p.237.
See V.B. Mumfard, "Malangali School", in Africa Vol III, July 
1930, pp.265-292; V,B. Mumford, "Education and Social Adjustment 
of Primitive Peoples of Africa to European Culture", in Africa 
Vol II, April 1929, pp.138-161.
- 238 -
33. See Marcia Wright, German Missions in Tanganyika, Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1971; and T.O. Ranger, "The Apostle: Kolumba
Msigala", in Modern Tanzanians, op cit, for information about 
the Masasi experiment.
34. . Great Britain, Education Policy in British Tropical Africa, His
Majesty's Stationary Officer, London, 1925, p.4.
35. Mss Afr r. 101, Sir Philip Euen Mitchell: Diaries, 1927-1938, 
12.5.1929.
36. ibid, 14.2.1931.
37. Quoted by M. Mbilinyi, "African Education During the British 
Colonial Period", in M. H.Y. Kaniki, Tanzania Under Colonial 
Rulef Longman, London, 1979, p.253.
38. Iliffe, "The Spokesman....", op cit, pp.75-6.
39. ibid.
40. Martin Kayamba, "The Story of Martin Kayamba Mdumi, MBE. of
Bondei Tribe, Written by Himself", in Margery Perham, Ten 
Africans, North Western Press, London, 1936, pp.247-8.
41. Iliffe, "The Spokesman...." op cit, p.76.
42. Tanganyika Territory, "Advisory Committee in African Education
10th Meeting", 22/23 November 1934.
43. Lawuo, op cit, p.105.
44. ibid, p.135.
45. Iliffe, "The Spokesman..." op cit, p. 79. On the denial of
Africans participation James F. Scotton ("Tanganyika's African
Press, 1937-1960: A Nearly Forgotten pre-Independence Forum", in 
African Studies Review, Vol XXI No 1, 1978, p. 3) points out
that, "The British in Tanganyika regarded African self- 
government as the ultimate goal under the League of Nations
Mandate, but they saw no place for such radicalism in the 
process which would lead to that goal. [Reference here is to
Erica Fiah's radicalism— C.S.L3 In their view, African
participation in the government should for some time be limited 
to his traditional institutions. The African could only for hope 
a direct part in national politics in the distant future." Also 
see B.F. Chidzero, Tanganyika and International Trusteeship,
OUP, London, 1961, p. 19.
46. Mitchell Diaries, op cit, 9.10.1933.
47. ibid, 17.1.1933.
48. Iliffe, in Kimambo & Temu (eds), op cit, p.137.
- 239
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
Martha Honey, "A History of Indian Merchant Capital and Class 
Formation in Tanganyika", Ph D. Thesis, University of Dar es 
Salaam, 1982, p.314.
ibid., p.313.
E.A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa, 
Heinemann, London, 1973, p.143.
TEA 7596 Memorandum from Treasurer to Chief Secretary,
19.5.1925. "Profits Tax— Question of Abolition of".
TNA 2712 "Letter from Hative Observer", Market— Dar es Salaam 
1919-1926, Trade Tax Ordinance.
ibid..
D.M.P. McCarthy, Colonial Bureaucracy and Creating 
Underdevelopment: Tanganyika 1919-1940, The Iowa State
University, Ames, 1982, p.39. In this book there is a lengthy 
discussion of many of the laws which affected the various 
commercial groups.
TNA 1733/23 Tanga District Report, by P.E. Mitchell, 1923, p.1. 
Cameron to Oldham, 12.1.1927, in Mss Brit Emp s.1829, op cit. 
Mitchell to Oldham, 29.6.1929, in ibid.
The question of Tanganyika generating her own funds was pointed 
out in Chapter Three. As a matter of principle, Cameron, Dundas, 
Mitchell, Harrison, etc. were not opposed to non-African 
settlement. All they demanded was the settlers to have enough 
capital of their own or be under the auspices of a monopoly, to 
ensure that there was no emergence of "poor settlers". Mitchell 
himself had initially planned to acquire land in Usambara or 
Arusha for his own settlement, and there were even plans that 
the colonial officers should be able to get land to settle after 
their retirement. Charles Dundas became a settler in South 
Africa after retiring from colonial services;
Mitchell to Oldham, 15.4.1926, in Mss Brit Emp. s. 1829, op cit. 
Mitchell Diaries, op cit, 14.9.1930. 
ibid, 15.1.1933.
Brett, op cit, p.217.
See also for example TNA 11740, Annual Reports, Agriculture 
Department, Dar es Salaam. These also demonstrate this aspects.
Ordinance No 2 of 1927: "An Ordinance to provide for Licencing 
of Itinerant Traders"; see also McCarthy, op cit, p.27.
-240-
66. Mitchell Diaries, 28.98.1930.
67. THA 11740, op cit, p.10.
68. ibid.
69. East African Standard, tfairobi, 23.8.1935.
70. TJTA 11740, op cit. Also see Legislative Council Proceedings 10th 
Session, 12.11.1935,
71. See Bonaventure Swai, "Imperial Proconcul and the Marketing of
Colonial Produce: the Origins of Cooperatives in Tanganyika",
University of Dar es Salaam, (Mimeo), n. d.
72. Quoted by McCarthy, op cit, p.48.
73. Kwetu, 7.12.1937. Initially it was simply a commercial
association. The welfare dimension was added in 1936.
74. Scotton, op cit, p.2.
75. Quoted by ibid, p.3.
76. Kwetu, 7.12.1937. This applies to all the information obove.
Kwetu means our home.
77. Kwetu, 2.2.1938.
78. ibid, Dukas means retail shops.
79. Kwetu, 22.11.1938.
80. Kwetu, 24.5.1940.
81. F.S. Joelson, The Tanganyika Territory, T. Fisher Unwin, London, 
1920, p.89.
82. ibid, p.97.
83. Eric Reid, Tanganyika Without Prejudice, East Africa, London, 
1934, p.196.
84. ibid.
85. J, Huxley, The African View, Chatto & Vindus, London, 1931, 
pp.440-1.
86. ibid.
87. ibid, pp.443-4.
88. ibid, p.377.
-241-
89. Reid, op cit, p.198.
90. Anne Dundas, Beneath African Glacier, H.F. & G. Vitherby,
London, 1924, pp.106-7.
91. ibid, p.112.
92. J. Londsdale, "Some Origins of nationalism in Tanzania", in L.
Cliffe & J. Saul (eds) Socialism in Tanzania, Vol I, EAPH, 
Nairobi, 1972, pp.25-6.
93. For an elaborate discussion of this topic in general, see T.O. 
Ranger, Dance and Society in Eastern Africa 1990-1970: The Beni 
Ngoma, Heinemann, London, 1975, p.5.
94. ibid.*
95. ibid. p.6.
96. ibid, p.40.
97. ibid, p.53.
98. Quoted in ibid, p.59.
99. In some rare cases protest was also carried in this movement.
When the Bishop of Ufipa met Mitchell in 1929, he expressed the 
fact that there was a general feeling of unrest and anti- 
Europeanism in the country. He blamed Beni far this. He reported
that, Mkulwe, the members of Beni openly sang defiance to the
missions and the government,, Most of the missionaries were very
hot on the Beni. Mitchell also believed that there was a sense
of truth of what the Bishop said. (Mitchell Diaries, 20.6.1929)
100. Martin Kayamba (President) and Alkhidhiri bin Likhidhri (Vice 
President) to Chief Secretary, 5.4.1922. TNA SMP 3715/1. See 
also Iliffe, "The Spokesman..." op cit, p.73; and Ranger, ibid, 
pp.92-3.
101. Iliffe, ibid, p.74.
102. Iliffe in Kimambo & Temu (eds), op cit, p.139.
103. ibid, pp.134-140.
104. Daisy Sykes Buruku, "The Townsman: Kleist Sykes", in Modern 
Tanzanians, op cit, p.101. Also see Ranger, 1975, op cit pp.94-
5.
105. G.G. Hajivayanis, et al, "The Politicians: Ali Ponda and Hassan
Suleiman", in Modern Tanzanians, op cit, p.235. See also TNA 
61/385/31 "The African Association: Kanuni na Sheria za Chama 
cha Umoja wa Vatu wa Africa", a copy, 1937.
- 242 -
106.
107.
108. 
109.
110.
111 .
112.
113.
114.
115.
Hajivayanis, ibid, pp.235-6.
TNA 26034 "Report on Prosecution Against J.P. Molloy (ex-Manager 
of ) Monkton and Co's Branch at Moshi and J. Merinyo (ex- 
President of KNPA)"
See S.G. Rogers, "The search for Political focus on Kilimanjaro: 
A History of Chagga Politics", Ph. D. Thesis, University of Dar 
es Salaam, 1972.
Huxley, op cit, p. 172. Pius Ngeze, Ushlrika Vetu, TPH, Dar es 
Salaam, 1975, p.4. It is Mitchell who reveals the fact that 
there were some Europeans involved in this scandal. One of them 
was Mr Alcock. [Mitchell Diaries 12.7.1929] Also in his travels 
he recorded that books were faulty or money was lost in almost 
every district.
Iliffe in Kimambo & Temu, op cit, p.139.
Ngeze, op cit, p.139.
For an account of the development of the marketing co-operatives 
in the the Lake Province, and also the role played by Paul 
Bomani, (who was to become a minister in the post-independence 
era) in the development of politics in Usukuma , see A.G. 
Maguire, Towards Uhuru in Tanzania: The Politics of
Participation, CUP, Cambridge, 1969, pp.83-111; Also J. Saul, 
"Marketing Cooperatives in Tanzania", in Cliffe and Saul (eds) 
op cit; and L. Cliffe et al (eds), Rural Cooperation in 
Tanzania, TPH, Dar es Salaam, 1975.
Saul, ibid, p.143.
Maguire, quoted by ibid, p.86.
J. Iliffe, Agricultural Change in Modern Tanganyika, EAPH, 
Nairobi, 1971, pp.26-7. If one is looking at processes in terms 
of absolute categories of either/or— either capitalism or no 
capitalism, either workers or no workers in terms of complete 
separation of the producers from the means of production or 
being migrant or non-migrant workers, etc. then this is not 
capitalism. But what is forgotten in such an outlook is the fact 
that capitalism develops through various stages: it cannot be
taken as an ideal type. This tendency see either workers or no 
workers, given the links with the means of production was also 
common among the Russian Narodniks. And Lenin remarked against 
them that: "This.... circumstance particulaly confuses the
'friends of the people", who, as befits true metaphysicians, are 
accustomed to think in naked and direct contrasts: 'Yea, yea—
nay, nay, and whatsoever is more than these comes from the evil 
one. '
If the workers have no land— there is capitalism, if they 
have land— there is no capitalism. And they confine themselves 
to this soothing philosophy, losing sight of the whole social
- 243 -
organisation of the economy...and forgetting the generally-known 
fact that ownership of land does not in the least da away with 
the dire poverty of these landowners, who are most shamelessly 
robbed by other such 'peasant' landowners.
They do not know, it seems, that capitalism— while still at 
a comparatively low level of development— was no whereable to 
separate the worker from the land.. .capitalism of simple co­
operation and manufacture has never been connected anywhere with 
the worker's complete separation from the land, and yet, 
needless to say, it has not on that account ceased to be 
capitalism. ( V.I. Lenin, Collected Works Vol 1, Progress 
Publishers, Moscow 1972, p.209)
116. Honey op cit.
117. A. Coulson, Tanzania: A Political Economy, Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1982, pp.77-8.
118. For more examples of this aspect see Honey, op cit p.460. Also 
her article, "Asian Industrial activities In Tanganyika", in 
Tanzania Notes and Records, no 75, 1975.
119. B. Davidson, Africa in Modern History: A Search for New Society, 
Pelican, Suffolk, 1981, p.136.
120. Brett, op cit, pp.274-5.
121. Saadani Abdu Kandoro, Mwito wa Uhuru, Blackstar Agencies, Dar es 
Salaam, 1978, p.l. This book was the first attempt by a 
Tanzanian to write the party history. This book was first 
published in 1961.
122. See Kayamba in Perham, op cit; Iliffe, "The Spokesman.,.." op 
cit.
123. I.K. Katoke & P. Rwechumbiza, "The Administrator: Francis
Lwamugira", in Modern Tanzanians, op cit, p. 61. One of his
manuscripts is with TPH.
124. Kwetu, 12.3.1940. His notebooks are available in microfiche at 
the University of Dar es Salaam.
125. Iliffe, 1979, op cit, p.331.
126. ibid, pp.337-8.
127. ibid; A. S. Mbise, "The Evangelist: Matayo Reveriya Kaaya", in
Modern Tanzanians, op cit, p,40, Charles Dundas wrote the
history of Vachagga: Kilimanjaro and its People, Vitherby,
London, 1924.
128. Mambo Leo was a government paper for Africans. It appeared in
the early 1920s. People like Shaaban Robert first published in 
this paper before they published their books. Most of the
-244-
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
material in this paper had to be approved by the government 
before publication. That is why the focus here is mainly on 
Kwetu. Of course, even Fiah "adopted the practice of sending at 
least some critical letters to the government before publishing 
them." <Scotton, op cit, p.6.).
Most of the above information is from Kwetu, 4.8.1940; and the 
question of his being acquainted with the Vest Indian literature 
has been pointed out by Iliffe, 1979, op cit, p.377.
Kwetu, 7.12.1937.
ibid, 16.10.1939.
Scotton, op cit.
Kwetu, 29.6.1940.
ibid, 2.8.1938. Unless indicated otherwise, all the following 
and the quotations are from the same issue.
Scotton, op cit, p. 2. Some of the papers which presented the 
African view were Herald and Dunia (Indian owned), the African 
Voice, and many more papers were to appear in the 1950s.
Kayamba, African Problems, op cit.
ibid, p.7.
See Martin Kayamba, Tulivyoona na Tulivyofanya Ingereza, Sheldon 
Press, London, 1932; and An African in Europe, Lutterwork Press, 
London, 1948.
H. M. T. Kayamba, "The Modern Life of the East African Mative", in 
Africa Vol V Mo 1 January 1932 pp.50-60.
Kayamba, An African in Europe, op cit pp.13-14.
Kayamba, in Perham, op cit, p.261.
Kayamba, African Problems, op cit, pp.13-14. Unless indicated 
otherwise, the following summary is from the same book. The page 
numbers are put in brackets.
Kayamba, in Perham, op cit, .p.261.
This was also Fiah's lament. For him the reason for buying from 
Asians rather than Africans was jealousness.
Kwetu, 12.3.1940.
ibid, 26.12.1941.
147. ibid, 1.5.1942.
-245-
148. Iliffe, 1979, p.379.
149. Kwetu, January 1948. See in Iliffe, ibid.
150. . Shabaan Robert, "Chama cha Vaafrika", in Pambo la Lugba, <1946)
Oxford, 1966, p. 10.
151. Shabaan Robert, Kusadikika, (1948), Kelson, London, 1951.
152. Shabaan Robert, Kufikirika, (1946), Oxford, 1968.
153. Shabaan Robert, Utubora Hkulima, (1946), Kelson, London, 1968.
154. Shabaan Robert, Utenzi wa Vita vya Uburu, (1939-1945), Oxford, 
1961.'
155. ibid, p.9. My translation.
156. ibid, p.59.
157. Mss Brit Emp s. 365, "Papers of the Fabian Colonial Bureau", 
Introduction to the collection, pp.1-2.
158. ibid.p.13.
159. ibid, "Correspondence". Other aspects related to the Fabian 
Colonial Bureau will be discussed in the next Chapter.
160. The Fabian Colonial Bureau's journal, Venture, usually never 
accepted for publication articles which were considered to be 
too radical. Exauqjles of such articles are cited below. The 
Venture also refused to publish Kyerere's article on racism in 
East Africa. This article appeared in Freedom and Unity, OUP, 
Kairobi, 1967 as the first article in the book.
161. Major Orde Browne, "Primitive Cultures and Modern Theories", 
1932, p.4, in Mss Afr s. 1117 "Orde Browne Papers". A copy of a 
letter from Mitchell to Vischer, 2.8.1930, in Mss Bri Emp 
s.1829, op cit.
162. A.K. Juma to Editor of Venture, 26.10.1949, in Mss Brit Emp 
s.365, op cit.
163. V.B. Julius to Editor of Tanganyika Standard, 27.10.1949, in 
ibid.
164. Vamba dia Vamba, op cit, p.2.
165. ibid.
166. Frank Melland, "Our Colonial Complacency", The Nineteenth 
Century, August 1935, London, pp.3-4.
- 246 -
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
Masizi Kunene, "Introduction" to Aims Cesaire's Return to Native 
Land, Penguin, London, 1970, pp.20-21.
G. Milne, "African Village Layout", Tanganyika Notes and 
Records, Dar es Salaam, Ho 13, 1942. This article was published 
posthumously, it was originally a letter to a friend.
ibid.
ibid, p.5. Emphasis added.
Shabaan Robert, Naisba Yangu na Baada ya Niaka Hamsini, (1936 & 
1960), Kelson, London, 1966, p.78.
I am most grateful to M. M. Mulokozi of the University of Dar es 
Salaam for most of the information used here. I am also grateful 
to Valter Bgoya, the General Manager of Tanzania Publishing 
House for granting me permission to go through the Project File 
Ko K. 54 of the book, Bwana Kuyombekere na Bibi Bugonoka, 
Ntulanwalo na Bulibwali, (the book by Aniceti Kitereza, TPH, Dar 
es Salaam, 1981) I have also used Mulokozi's interviews with the 
late Kitereza.
173. K.54, ibid.
CHAPTER FIVE
The Triumph of the Nationalists
Chapter Five 
THE TRIUMPH OF THE NATIONALISTS
It was shown in the previous chapter that the defenders of African 
Civilization and Africanism in general, i.e. the educated and the 
wealthy, in essence did not refute or reject capitalism or western 
civilization: they rather sought to intermarry what they considered to 
be the best from African and Western Civilization. They rejected Western 
civilization in so far as it denied them equality and appropriated from 
African civilization what was acceptable in universalistic paradigms. 
The colonial agents and the African capitalist elements were virtually 
in agreement on the question of material development and the fact that 
it was the Western world which had a contribution to make in this 
regard.
The African capitalist elements were rejecting what was bad for them 
in Western civilization, and at the same time aligning with it in the 
rejection of communism. Writing to Creech Jones in 1946, J.K. Nyerere 
protested against the proposed East African Federation by the Colonial 
Office. He wanted Africans to decide for themselves if they wanted it or 
not. He went on: "...WE WANT ALL THE CHIEF RESOURCES OF THIS COUNTRY 
SUCH AS GOLD, COAL, DIAMOND AND TIN MINES TO BE DEVELOPED BY THE 
GOVERNMENT AND THE MONEY OBTAINED TO BE USED FOR OUR EDUCATION AND 
GENERAL DEVELOPMENT". 1 This economic demand more or less sums up the 
aspirations of the "modern Tanganyikans" in their transformation into 
nationalists and, as will be demonstrated in this chapter, the post- 
World War II conceptions of planning by the colonial state.
The economic roots of nationalism were in the demands for the 
creation of modern economy.2 To bring about this modern economy, it was
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necessary to grapple with the political problem in terms of entry into
political decision making. The efforts of the colonial state in the post
World War II period were geared to the transformation of Tanganyikan
economy by accelerated investments in industry, agriculture and services
more than ever before. As has been observed in some studies, the
nationalists' challenge to colonial rule did not result from
inadequacies of the implementation of the changes by the colonial
government, and even the rapid growth of nationalism in the 1950s "was
not the consequence of a widespread undermining of older loyalties nor
of the growth of powerful new social classes with aspirations wich could
not be contained within a colonial system."3 Long after independence,
Nyerere was to comment on Sir Edward Twining, the Governor who came to
Tanganyika in 1949— under whose governorship most changes took place.
Twining, he said, was one of the great governors—
to the extent that I can appreciate colonial governors. If I 
were to write a history of the colonial period, I would give an 
important place to Twining, and to Sir Donald Cameron: they were 
the most prominent.
Twining came at a wrong time, and he stayed too long. But 
you must give him credit; he had ideas. But he had a fault....He 
did good things. The British did little to develop this country, 
but to the extent that development took place, it was pushed by 
Cameron and Twining. The deep-water berths in the port are from 
Twining's time; the new Dar es Salaam airport is Twining; the 
tarmac road to Morogoro, the big school at Iringa, all Twining, 
Politically, he didn't like anyone near the throne.... But we 
clashed in 1954. In his vague mind, I stood for racial 
domination, and his party was 'multi-racial'. By 1955 he had 
come to realize he couldn't fight us alone, and he tried to 
revive the European voice— but it was too late.A
The historical view presented by Nyerere above is predominant, and 
it is this view which is taken by the " improvement" approach which was 
criticized in Chapter Two. Most studies have tended to view the
political climate in the post-Vorld War II period as largely determined
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by government policies and ideas "with some small influence to be 
assigned to individual British settlers and very occassionally, an 
Indian businessman or African chief."® This period is usually seen as 
marked by British social-engineering— attempts at economic development 
and political reforms, at the end of the 1940s, by the paternal colonial 
government working in alliance with sympathetic settlers, businessmen, 
missionaries and "members of the small westernized African community". 
This social-engineering involved a substantial shift from the inter-war 
period premises about preservation of African societies: it was a period 
of "second colonial occupation" which was embodied in plans for 
development of secondary industries, expansion of cash crops production 
and agricultural improvement schemes, reforms, of local governments, 
constitutional changes, and educational advancement.®
Although such were the features of "modernizing imperialism", it is 
acknowledged that these developments increased the control of Tanganyika 
by imperial forces; and this control "antagonized subjects who had often 
acqueisced in lighter suzerainty. Active government created grievances 
to stimulate political activity and provided resources to make it 
effective," hence the emergence of nationalist politics which involved 
simultaneously an internalization of "colonial values, while at another 
level changing relationships among men went alongside human gains over 
nature." The last days of colonialism in Tanganyika provide a complex 
history.7 The victory of the independence struggles was due to TANU's 
success in making people understand the possibility of peaceful methods 
of struggle: because the failure of Maji Maji rebellion and earlier wars 
of resistance Tanganyikans had turned to self-improvement which in turn 
taught them the necessity of peaceful methods:®
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Only the TAA survived the onslaught of the colonial 
administration in the inter-war years. And so it is of special 
importance to us not only because it lived to keep African 
politics alive and bridge the gap between the politics of the 
inter-war years and those of the period after World War II but 
in that it gave birth to the Tanganyika African National Union 
(TANU) in the fifties.®
The contradiction in this view is, even TAA itself was experiencing 
an organizational collapse and general political decay by the time the 
reforms were being introduced, according to Iliffe, due to the end of 
war time austerity. After the 1947 General Strike, urban wages rose and 
shortages were eased, economic controls disappeared and prices for 
exports rose. Development had started to take place, and the 
establishment of the trusteeship system had removed some of the doubts 
about the future. TAA's organizational collapse was due to the fact that 
after 1949 "the British government seized the political initiative in 
Tanganyika for the first time since Cameron's departure and channelled 
politics into new directions".10
The above, in the final analysis, amounts to arguing that the forms 
of resistance of the working people in Tanganyika had little to do with 
the post-World War II transformations to the point of the emergence of 
the nationalist politics. What was taking place in this period was an 
attempt ;to modernize Tanganyika: and it was those elements which shared 
this view which were making history. This chapter attempts to 
reconstruct the processes after 1945 and demonstrates the actual motive 
forces behind the transformations and how the nationalists triumphed. 
It demonstrates the social and economic basis of the nationalist forces 
and their relationship with the workers and peasants. For the sake of 
exposition, the chapter commences with an outline of the political- 
economical transformations after 1945.
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5.1 The post-Vorld War II Policies and Strategies
As correctly noted by the "modernization"/"transformation" history 
above, the ideology of "preservation of African societies" economically, 
socially and politically had become outmoded by the 1940s.11 The Ten 
Year Development and Welfare Plan for Tanganyika Territory (1947-1957) 
was projected to cost £18 million of which £11 million was to be 
provided from Tanganyika resources and £7 million from the colonial 
development and welfare grants. The allocation of the funds were as 
follows in the Plan: £5 million for communication (most important here 
were roads, aerodromes and telecommunications); £50,000 for the 
establishment of social welfare centres; £5te million for social services 
(public health, education, training of ex-servicemen and loans to 
municipalities for African housing); £2te million for development of 
townships, public buildings, land settlement and land bank; and £2 
million for railway and ports and road services operated by the 
railway.12 By the end of 1945 Tanganyika had received £5,250,000 from 
the Colonial Office for the Ten Year Plan. The Colonial Office was 
putting on more pressure for the development of productive investments 
rather than infrastructure. Tanganyika, on the other hand, insisted on 
getting more money for education although she finally ended up spending 
less on education than most other colonies and more on infrastructure 
than the other colonies.13
The Trusteeship Agreement substantially modified the Open Door 
clauses. As a result of this, after 1945, Tanganyika was able to receive 
more loans from Britain than ever before.'In 1948 Tanganyika was granted 
the right to raise money on the London Market on its own guarantee, and 
to raise local loans as well. Tanganyika raised a series of overseas
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loans between 1951 and 1957, and there were attempts to get more such 
finances. Britain increasingly became Tanganyika's source of capital in 
the 1950s. In 1950 Tanganyika was given a loan of £1,750,000 which bore 
interest at the rate of per cent per annum. This loan was to be 
redeemed between 1970 and 1973. In 1953 Tanganyika got another loan of 
£4,410,000 with an interest rate of 4% per cent per annum, to be 
redeemed between 1967 and 1972; and, in 1957 she was given a loan of £3 
million with an interest rate of 59t per cent per annum, to be redeemed 
between 1978 and 1982.
The historical antecedents of these changes are in the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act of 1940. This act constituted the manifesto 
of "modernizing imperialism"; it also provided imperial finances for 
long-term colonial development plans. It was promulgated in response to 
the 1930s Depression which had revealed that most impoverished colonies 
were politically dangerous and could barely afford to buy British goods, 
hence preferring to buy cheap Indian or Japanese goods. The Act also 
aimed at countering German propaganda during the War, neutralizing 
American anti-imperialism, and compelling the colonies to refrain from 
making demands until the War was over.1B The Act was a product of 
campaigns by Lord Hailey, Arthur Creech Jones of the Fabian Colonial 
Bureau, A.W. Lewis, Lady Margery Perham, and others who believed in a 
colonialism with a human face. Lord Hailey had called for the necessity 
of a political strategy in the colonies for fear that nationalism was 
likely to become a very powerful force after the Second World War in 
Africa, due to the forces both in Europe and in the colonies which 
pressurized for political institutions for self-government and the 
incorporation of the colonial subjects into them. It was necessary to
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have a political strategy for the colonies, if the worst was to be 
avoided.1e
The watershed in these policies and strategies in the case of East
Africa, and Tanganyika in particular was the crisis in the British
economy which became critical in 1942-3. By early 1942, the British
colonies in Asia were collapsing before the Japanese troops; the Suez 
Canal was almost captured by the enemy forces and India was making 
preparations to defend herself. As a result of this situation, Britain 
was losing an important source of raw materials, such as jute and rubber 
which were produced in South East Asia and were badly needed during the 
War. The British government ordered the East African colonies to step up 
production of raw materials— e.g. sisal— -and food so as to replace the 
resources that were falling into the hands of the Japanese.17 The 
revival of the rubber estates at vast expense in Tanganyika is one 
example of the activities engendered by the crisis in the British
empire.
The War conditions also forced the colonies to depend on their own 
resources and those of their neighbours. This was because imports from 
Britain or other traditional exporters to the colonies were hard to come 
by, as production in the metropolitan countries was by then mainly 
geared to War needs rather than exports to the colonies. The danger 
that the colonies could be cut-off from the mother country, as the Asian 
experience was demonstrating, was apparent. Therefore the colonies had 
to provide substitution of their imports. Hence the birth of the famous 
Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) strategy which aimed at the 
provision of consumer goods for the colonies and to supply even the 
mother country with them if the necessity arose.
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In July 1942, Sir Arthur Dame, the senior official responsible for
East Africa declared that the old nineteenth century conceptions were
dead. The War was increasingly demonstrating that self-government was
becoming an expectation of all colonies. Britain was faced with the
problem of formulating methods to reconcile the new forces and the
future British interests in Africa. He rhetorically posed the question:
How are we to bind these people to us in such a way that their 
moral and material resources of strength will continue to be 
ranged on the side of Great Britain? It is to be expected that 
after, this war this island will be much exhausted and weakened 
by its long ordeal. It will be natural that, when we are weak at 
the centre, the territories overseas which are still bound to us 
by the old Crown Colony relationship will seek to improve their 
position and to obtain a wider measure of control over their own 
affairs....1e
As a result of the War situation and its requirements the administrative 
and economic structures of Tanganyika were profoundly altered: the
government was forced to extend its control over the life and activities 
of the colonized subjects. Moreover, government control and supervision 
of the economy increased because of the necessity to organize production 
for war efforts— as supplier of Britain's needs more than ever before. 
During the War, the government took over the control of marketing for 
all commodities needed by Britain and the armies, and free market values 
were replaced by fixed price contracts between the producers and the 
government which, then, started to guarantee purchase and better returns 
for the producers, thereby hoping to encourage more production. The 
government became the broker for peasant exports and took off a 
considerable surplus, reserving it for development of the country after 
the War.19
The War had weakened Britain's position economically and 
financially. She was faced with a balance of payments crisis,
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specifically in relation to the United States; and, she was also 
burdened by War indemnities. Britain's imports from United States, which 
included food and machines, were vastly above her exports. The 
difference had to be paid in dollars; and this resulted in a "dollar 
crisis" in Britain. For Tanganyika, this meant the reduction of dollar 
imports and the increase of exports to the United States directly or 
through Britain where they were re-exported to USA or sent to Britain as 
substitute for imports from the USA. Between 1937 and 1947 Tanganyika's 
exports to the United States increased by 850 per cent, and the control 
over the economy exercised during the War was extended to the peace-time 
period. Even the working class victory in Britain, in terms of squeezing 
some concessions from the bourgeoisie in the form of welfarism, could 
hardly be sustained without increased production in the colonies,20
In the 1940s, the Colonial Office began increasingly to give 
attention to the possibility of full utilization of the "ability and 
resources of the immigrant communities, while leaving open to the native 
races the opportunity to participate in the social, economical and 
political life" in East Africa, as G.F. Seel, the head of East African 
Department in the Colonial Office stated in 1943.21 This is the 
direction which the Tanganyika administrators took after the Var. They 
began to view European agriculture as the only means capable of fast 
expansion in terms of output. They argued that peasant agriculture was 
inefficient because of the systems of land tenure which were marked by 
impersonality and militated against improvement, and the systems of land 
use (for example, shifting cultivation and burning of areas in the 
process of clearing) caused reduced soil fertility and diminishing 
yields. As far as they were concerned, it was European methods which
were capable of sustained development, and only the immigrant 
communities were capable of employing them, with machines, chemicals and 
improved seeds.22 In the meanwhile, Africans could not be left alone as 
anticipated by Seel in 1943: the government had to compel them to adopt 
new European methods of agriculture. These methods were embodied in the 
Land Development and Soil Conservation Schemes, and they involved the 
compulsion of the peasants by threats of fine or imprisonment to 
undertake agricultural practices which were deemed correct by the 
government.
There were generally six schemes which broadly covered the whole 
country when it came to peasant producers; and they were enforced 
through by-laws laid down under the 1927 Native Authority Ordinance by 
the chief and native courts. The largest of these schemes were: the
Sukuma Development Scheme, Mbulu Development Scheme, Usambara 
Development Scheme, Upare Development Scheme and Iringa cattle dipping 
scheme. All these schemes were established under the belief in the 
"correctness of government technical prescriptions and military type 
organization". Therefore, rules were laid down about terracing in 
Uluguru (Morogoro) as measures to prevent soil erosion, tie-ridging in 
Usukuma for soil and water conservation, cattle dipping in Iringa for 
better animal husbandry, destocking of animals in Singida, etc., for 
better animal husbandry and prevention of soil erosion.23
The pretensions about the "preservation of peasant agriculture" and 
the fabric of African society and communal land-use which were pursued 
in the inter-war period, in essence had only comprised of the tip of the 
iceberg. Land policy before 1940s had prevented alienation for private 
use without consideration of the needs and interests of the indigenous
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inhabitants; and the argument about land alienation or white settlement 
had been around this issue of interests for political, social and 
economic reasons as pointed out in Chapters Three and Four. But during 
the same period, vast areas of land had been alienated when creating the 
national parks and game reserves and populations had been resettled when 
this process was taking place. These aspects, added to those of 
differentiation which had already taken place among the direct producers 
had resulted in overcrowding.
The new 'settlements which were created had in most cases been 
established in drier areas where production could not increase except by 
concentrated injection of new husbandry,2* This was in direct contrast 
to the pre-colonial settlements which had been established in fertile 
areas with enough rainfall.2® As a result of these problems, cash crop 
farming among Africans had in most cases been undertaken in the same 
farms in which food crops were cultivated. The combination of all these 
aspects— the overcrowding in fertile areas and over-utilization of the 
thin soils in the newly established settlements— had resulted in an 
ecological crisis in the form of soil erosion and diminishing fertility; 
and hence the fall in production. Due to these problems and the threat 
they posed socially, economically and politically, the government lost 
faith in "peasant agriculture". To deal with these problems, the 
government had to introduce these land rules, so as to improve 
agricultural production.
Encouragement and facilitation of European settlement, encouragement 
of some forms of industrialization and enforcement of new methods of 
agriculture and animal husbandry were the cornerstone of the post-Var II 
imperial policies in Tanganyika. It was the way Tanganyika could be
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modernized. The 1937-8 Vest Indian riots, as far as the Colonial Office 
was concerned, had been due to the impoverished state of the colonies. 
To avoid the recurrence of such disorders it was necessary to develop 
the colonies; and this could not be undertaken otherwise than through 
the encouragement of private enterprise and centrally, government 
initiative and participation in the economy— particulary in agriculture, 
infrastructure and social services.2® There were the political 
considerations which were corollary to the economic motives mentioned 
above.
The post-Var British Labour Government brought a new impetus to the 
objective of development and inqsrovement of the colonies by making 
Arthur Creech Jones, the founder of the Fabian Colonial Bureau, the 
under-Secretary and later on Secretary of State to Colonies from 1946. 
In this period, conceptually, development/growth/modernization was 
synonymous with capital formation. In the classical formulation of A. V. 
Lewis, who was a member of the Advisory Committee of the Fabian
Colonial Bureau and also associated with the International Labour 
Organization:
The central problem in the theory of economic development is to 
understand the process by which a community which was previously 
saving and investing 4 or 5 percent of its national income or 
less, converts itself into an economy where voluntary saving is 
running at about 12 or 15 percent of national income or more.
This is the central problem because the central fact of economic
development is rapid accumulation (including knowledge and 
skills with capital)27
Development or modernization was identified with economic growth,
"measured by GNP, and modernization, as found in the Western
industrialized countries". The models of economic development tended to
emphasize the beneficial "effect of intersectoral migration for more
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efficient use of labour in the highly productive sectors." Accordingly, 
the colonial economies were seen as dual economies with "modern" and 
"traditional" sectors. In this theory, it was necessary for the former 
to supersede the latter because of the latter's structural 
underemployment and underutilization of resources. For this process to 
take place, capital injection mainly from the Vest had to be effected, 
and the barriers to this process were a result of the existence of the 
traditional subsistence economy. The whole question of development was 
tied up to "specific interests as was the concept of labour shortage a 
few years earlier."2e
The practical implementation of the strategy began in 1947 when 
manpower and equipment started to arrive in Tanganyika for the Groundnut 
Scheme. This scheme and its urgency, is the best illustration of the 
shift in settlement policies and planning in general in Tanganyika in 
relation to the policy of development of the colonies and Britain's 
post-Var crisis. Only 60 per cent of the world's pre-Var period supply 
of oils and fats had entered the world market in 1946; and there was 
every indication that the shortfalls would continue for ten or twenty 
years. Besides this, there was the problem of the resettling of the 
redundant ex-soldiers. The Director of Unilever— -which was one of the 
major producers of oils and fats— had toured Africa seeking for new 
supplies. Among the countries he selected for this scheme were 
Tanganyika and Nigeria; within Tanganyika the areas chosenwere Kongwa, 
Nachingwea and Tabora. About one thousand men "with excellent war 
records and war-ingrained indifference to costs" were brought as experts 
and settlers in Tanganyika. The aim was to achieve goals by management 
of command economy engineered by the government in collaboration with
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multinational corporations, given the belief in sound administration. 
This scheme cost £35 million; and ended up in disaster. It wound up in 
less than ten years. From the target of clearing up to three million 
acres of groundnut fields, it ended up with 50,000 acres.2®
Essentially, the settler scheme and the establishment of a Land Bank 
had been suggested in 1930, but had floundered on the rocks of finance. 
A Land Bank was established after the Second World War to facilitate 
settlement. Thus in matters of land policy, from the paramouncy of 
African interests in the inter-war period there was a shift to a virtual 
acceptance of alienation of land for immigrant settlement after the 
War.30 The land policy after the War was best summmarized by the 
Secretary of State to Colonies, who in 1953 declared that the old theory 
of protection of African interests by prevention of alienation of large 
tracts of land without investigation, and the segregation of non-African 
farming from African farming had been abandoned. It had been accepted 
that the health, wealth and general interests of Africans could not be 
best served by leaving them in isolation in tracts of undeveloped land 
which may have been for their own good. The development of the territory 
depended on combined efforts of all communities "working and thriving in 
mutual interest and assistance towards a common goal of territorial 
prosperity."31
With the change of land policies, land alienation for the immigrant 
communities was undertaken on a greater scale than ever before in the 
history of British colonialism in Tanganyika. Between 1945 and 1955 
British settlers increased their holdings from 287,635 acres of land on 
lease to 1,301,654; Greeks increased their holdings from 90,803 acres to 
294,649 acres; and Indians increased their acreage from 68,110 to
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235,715. The Overseas Food Corporation which came to establish the 
Groundnut scheme and aimed at clearing 3 million acres had acquired
480,000 acres leased for 35 years— and ended up clearing only 50,000 
acres. By 1948, 55 per cent of the total export value was derived from 
sisal which was a monopoly produced crop. Also monopoly and non-monopoly 
capital was involved in the production of tea, tobacco and sugar 
plantation, Large scale enterprises were also involved in the production 
of staple grains for feeding the labour force. Only 5 per cent of the 
total land surface of the country was cultivable by the 1950s; and of 
this, 40 per cent was owned by capitalists— primarily Europeans but 
also Asians, Arabs and later Africans.32
Although the 1947 Ten Year Plan did not have a special allocation 
for industrialization, the non-industrialization strategy of the inter- 
war period was disbanded. Besides the reasons above, the agricultural 
policies and strategies of the post-war period also required the 
establishment of processing industries in order to step up exports; 
consumer goods industries for the fast growing immigrant sector; and 
workshops for servicing machinery and facilities in general. During the 
inter-war period, private investment in manufacturing industries from 
Britain was almost nil.33 The biggest industry by 1945 was the beer 
industry, established by a German capitalist in the 1930s. Other 
industries listed as small or medium establishments were: 35 cotton
ginneries, 126 sisal decorticators, 6 tea factories, 11 coffee-curing 
factories, 12 rubber processors, and 1 tannery. These were for 
processing agricultural goods in general. Others were: 103 grain mills, 
72 oil mills and soap factories, 312 milk processing centres, 44 
bakeries, 29 saw mills, and 30 furniture workshops for the local market;
- 262 -
and, 6 power stations, 30 ice and soda-water manufacturers, 4 cigarette 
or tobacco factories and 14 lime burners. This was a total of 761 
establishments. 3,4
An accelerated process of Import Substitution Industrialization 
began after World War II. By 1955, there were 20 power stations, British 
multinationals had built a can manufacturing plant (Metal Box), a paint 
mixing plant (Robialac) and a meat factory (Tanganyika Packers). They 
also had established textile and weaving factories. Industrialization 
was speeded up and it became even more rapid in the few years before 
independence. "Modernizing imperialism", according to Iliffe, was 
stressing industrial "development as a means of diversifying colonial 
economies..." After the Second World War banks were investing in local 
industries and by 1955 a Department of Commerce and Industry which the 
Secretary of State had vetoed in the 1920s was created. In a nutshell, 
between 1946 and 1960 the number of establishments employing 10 workers 
or more increased from 101 to 380.3S
Within the Ten Year Plan, education was also part of the package. 
Over the ten years of the Plan £5,550,000 were spent on education and by 
1959, about 40 per cent of African children went to school. This was 
partly a result of the demand of Africans themselves for a more rapid 
expansion of educational facilities.3S This development in'education was 
bound up to the broad aims of economic development within the post-war 
changes and control of the population.3T While primary school enrollment 
increased, the proportion of primary school leavers going to middle 
school declined from 40 to 13 per cent between 1947 and 1957. Makerere 
College in Uganda which started offering degrees for the first time in
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1953, had 41 Tanganyikan students in 1950. These increased to 150 in
1953. At this time, there were also some students in Britain.33
Paradoxically, while the colonial government in Tanganyika.(and the
East African governments in general) was quite willing to effect the
economic changes, as far as the political changes suggested by the
Colonial Office were concerned— e.g. the incorporation of Africans in
district, provincial and government administration in general— no
efforts were made towards this end in general before 1948. The
Tanganyika government "ignored the recommendation that it should be
responsive to the emergence of African nationalism and ready to concede
to rapid constitutional advance. It was untouched by the analysis on
which the recommendation was based."39 The colonial government was
completely unshaken in its self-assurance that it would rule far many
years to come: it
anticipated a long period of colonial rule; it saw no need to 
Africanize the civil service;it had no confidence in educated 
Tanganyikans; it was willing to consider significant 
constitutional advancement for Africans at the level of the
central government only after successful implementation of 
protracted and gradual conversion of the Fative Authority system 
into a representative local government system; and it relied 
upon the continuing authority of the colonial regime to maintain 
national integration, to promote development and assure 
stability during the transition to independence which was to be 
very lengthy.AO
The first unofficial members of the Executive Council were appointed 
in 1939. With the insistence of Creech Jones, the first Africans were 
appointed to the LEGCO in 1945— Chief David Makwaia and Chief Abdiel 
Shangali who were friendly to the colonial regime. The number of 
Africans increased to 4 in 1948 and there were even more in 1955. Multi­
racialism was one of the issues dominating by 1947 when the word 
"native" was dropped from most legislation and the first measures to
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abolish racially discriminating laws were introduced. But experiments 
on inter-racial local councils and parity racial representation began 
from 1949. However, it was not until 1954 that stronger measures to 
abolish racial discrimination were undertaken as part of multi-racial 
political programme.*41 The Secretary of State to Colonies, Creech Jones, 
had issued a circular for democratization of local governments in 1947; 
but, except for chief Tom Marealle who became the first elected 
paramount chief of the Vachagga in 1951, the other native authorities 
which had all' along been regarded as part of the central government were 
onlt granted some autonomy starting from'1956.**
Most of the political changes took place under the governorship of 
Sir Edward Twining who replaced Governor William Battershill. Twining 
had been a Deputy-Director of Labour before the War in Mauritius. After 
the outbreak of the War he had been promoted to Director of Labour and 
later on Acting Governor. *43 Before embarking on constitutional reforms 
in 1949, Twining had interviewed the 14 unofficial members of the LEGCO- 
-7 Europeans, 4 Africans and 3 Asians. He wanted to know their 
suggestions and views: "Each member professed to be content with
colonial rule and wished for no alterations". These passive reactions 
were a great disappointment to the Labour Secretary of State*4*4 and 
despite the reactions of these members Twining decided to embark on 
constitutional reforms. In the same year he appointed the Attorney- 
General, Sir Charles Matthew, to chair a committee of unofficial members 
who were to examine the new constitution and recommend on the future 
constitutional developments so as to increase African participation.
Economic development and constitutional reforms were the very 
aspects which TAA was demanding between 1939 and 1947. These demands
- 265 -
were also reflected in the literature which was reviewed in the previous 
chapter. Between 1939 and 1947, TAA held five conferences. In one of the 
resolutions of the 1940 Conference it was put forward that His Majesty's 
Government had to consider "the possibilities of forming Provincial and 
Inter-Provincial Boards, where Africans could represent their own 
country." The members claimed a voice in the government and in the 
LEGCO: they wanted Africans to be given a chance to speak on their own 
behalf.A& Although figures are hard to come by, it is reported that 
between 1944 and 1946 TAA experienced a spectacular expansion throughout 
the territory and its branches were mushrooming everywhere. This was 
mainly due to the politics of mass rural protests in Upare, Kilimanjaro, 
Ukerewe, Ubena, Usambara, Usukuma and many other parts of the territory 
as a result of the agricultural schemes of enforced rural modernization, 
and the struggles against the Asian traders in the sphere of marketing 
of agricultural produce.A7
In the mid-1930s, TAA had degenerated to no more than an elitist 
social club for government employees without any political pretensions, 
as a result of the temporary disappearance of the Closer East African 
Union issue which had made it active, and the pressure from the 
government. It became active again in 1939 and it was at this time that 
it began to make attempts to link itself with the mass struggles. This 
transformation within TAA was a result of the struggles that had taken 
place between TAA and Tanganyika African Welfare and Commercial 
Association (TAWCA) between 1936 and 1938. Erica Fiah, the leader of 
TAWCA had joined TAA sometime in 1934 but opted out in the same year 
because as a businessman, it did not protect his interests nor his 
politics which had made him abandon employment as a protest against
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racial discrimination. After leaving TAA, Fiah had formed the African 
Commercial Association (ACA) which consisted of shopkeepers and market 
sellers, with the aim of protecting African traders against Asian 
monopoly and government legislation through co-operation. For Fiah, TAA 
ignored the essentially political aspect of African improvement which 
required the government to change the regulations hampering the 
development of African traders. ACA was renamed TAWCA in 1936 with the 
intention of becoming a banking, co-operative, social security and 
political organization. The Association began to initiate discussions on 
sensitive issues such as the Mandate and German threat. The government 
never recognized this Association.
Because of its incorporation of wider functions, TAWCA began to get 
wider public support; and because of its claim to represent African 
interests it became a rival of TAA which claimed to be the true 
representative of Africans. Through its paper, Kwetu, TAWCA attacked TAA 
for its elitism, fear of politics and reluctance to help the bulk of 
the African population, it went as far as accusing the members of TAA of 
robbing the unskilled workers and Africans in general. Fiah attempted to 
amalgamate the two associations, and the chance to do so emerged in 1936 
when TAA was ridden with internal disputes and the President and the 
Secretary were accused of constitutional contravention. Although the 
unity was announced, nothing was done beyond that, because of the TAA 
members'fear of engaging in politics and hence their fear of the 
political inclinations of TAWCA which threatened the positions of those 
who were employed by the government. There was some truce between the 
two associations in 1937. But within TAA, there were some members who 
started protesting that the Association was entirely run by government
employeees. Consequently, elections were held in January 1938 and Erica 
Fiah was elected as Secretary alongside two of his friends as President 
and vice-President and the unification between TAA and TAVCA was 
promptly announced. With this change, TAA was not simply confined to 
social issues only: there was some intrusion of politics. The government 
employees could not tolerate this and by April 1938 a re-election was 
organized and Fiah and his allies were replaced. The long lasting impact 
of this experience was that the dissatisfied elements within TAA were 
rallied— those more radical elements. Although TAVCA had faded by 1942, 
the TAA which emerged during the Second World War was more politically 
conscious and until 1945 it was advocating the policies advocated by 
TAVCA earlier.A&
During the War, TAA went as far as advocating that cultured Africans 
should not look down upon the uncultured; the rich should help the poor 
in the struggle against poverty; the politically advanced should help to 
awaken others who are less advanced; etc. The educated who kept 
themselves aloof from the masses were castigated as not representative 
of the people; and the Association had even recognized that it was the 
masses who were its backbone. .
In the 1945 Conference held in Dodoma, TAA members pressed far the 
politicization of the Association; the possibility of making it a 
popular organization by the enrollment of more members; and 
representation in the LEGCO and all other official bodies. Other issues 
raised were: expansion of education; expansion of domestic industry and 
trade; the problem of European immigration; and the Mandate position. 
Finally, they rejected the once again proposed closer union with settler 
dominated Kenya on the basis of the Mandate position of Tanganyika. The
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demands which were sent to the government included compulsory education 
for Africans; stoppage of labour conscription; the continuance of the 
Mandate position of the territory; rejection of an East African 
Federation; and that the government allow in the country only those 
Europeans who were to be employed by the government.®0 It was this
hostility to European settlement as typically formulated in the 1945
Conference which greatly helped in the expansion of the Association in 
the countryside, given that the revolts against the agricultural schemes 
were mostly based on the fear of land alienation.®1
But from 1946, it was mainly the question of East African Federation 
which pre-occupied TAA more than any other issue. In a conference held 
in Dar es Salaam in this year, besides the routine resolutions on 
education, racial discrimination, etc., there was the question of 
constitutional advancement by means of pyramid of elected councils 
upwards from townships, chiefdoms, district councils to the LEGCO. The 
members also argued that Tanganyika should be brought under trusteeship 
"with Britain undertaking to develop it quickly 'until the Africans
reach the point where they can manage their own affairs."' The question 
of independence was raised and there was a renewal of the rejection of 
the East African federation, even if simply economically. A. Tibandage 
and J.K. Nyerere drafted the memorandum to the government for the
Association.52
The radicalism of 1945 which displayed aggressive pan-Africanism had 
declined in the 1946 Conference. This was even the case with the drive 
to popular organization. Instead the conference was dominated by the 
defence of the territory. This retreat from radicalism continued in 
1947, with the same drive towards the defence of the territory.®3 In
spite of the protest against closer union, the East African Higher 
Commission came into being in January 1948. With this move, common 
services (e.g. railway, harbours and telecoms) were centralized. The 
limit of radicalism of TAA and the intelligentsia in general after World 
War II was in the reading of Fabian scialist literature which was sent 
to individuals who corresponded with the Fabian Colonial Bureau, and 
appeals to the government to effect some reforms on some of the adverse 
aspects. Even criticism of the government was muted and there was 
generous praise of the new labour government in Britain and the 
Secretary of State to Colonies, Bwana Creech Jones, as he was then 
populary known.®*4
TAA's activities did not have any impact on the constitutional 
reforms that started taking place towards the end of the 1940s; and this 
is especially the case given that by 1948 there was an organizational 
collapse of the Association. TAA was to become active again starting 
from 1953; and it was during this period when TAA had collapsed 
organizationally that the reforms took place. This organizational 
collapse was also coupled with the retreat from radicalism. This means 
only one thing: the congruence of the demands of the "modern
Tanganyikans" and the social and economic reforms which were being
embarked upon by the government. The other more important reason for
TAA's lack of impact was the fact that TAA "tended to steer clear of
activities which could be considered 'subversive' by the government— at 
least this was the official policy of its headquarters". This was 
clearly revealed by its repudiation of its Usambara branch activities in 
1947. The Usambara branch's activities were labelled 'subversive' by the 
authorities because of its participation in the Usambara Scheme
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revolts.ss This means there was another force which was compelling the 
colonial state to effect the reforms in the political sphere; and it is 
this force which explains the usual acknowledgement by the nationalists 
that the major aspect in the 1950s was to make Tanganyikans understand 
that it was possible to achieve independence through peaceful means.56
5.2 Working People and the Post-War Reforms
TAA was effectively part of the struggles for "improvement", and
like the capitalist elements which it represented, its struggles made it
difficult to challenge colonialism openly.®7 The culmination of the
struggles by TAA and the capitalist elements in general was in the
attempts to intermarry what they considered to be African Civilization
and some of the aspects of European Civilization. From the demands they
made and the content of their literature, if examined from the point of
view of the post-Var reforms and the congruence of these reforms with
what these Africans championed, clearly African Civilization was just a
variant of modernization philosophy. The goals of African Civilization
and the aims of "modernizing imperialism" were quite alike.
This, however, was not the case with the working people, as was
shown in Chapter Three. The records of expressions of African antagonism
to Europeans date from the beginning of colonialism. These manifested
themselves in the rebellions, sacrifices and joy in every calamity that
befell the Europeans. It can be hardly claimed that Africans ever
reconciled to colonial rule:
Their religious beliefs that sovereignty was indissolubly linked 
with the forefathers buried in the land made this impossible. 
The acquiscence of the ruling houses in the curtailment of their 
powers exposed them to the attack of rival claimants who 
asserted that they would restore the past. In retrospect the 
time before the whiteman came acquired the glamour of a Paradise
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Lost. Adverse experiences with the occupying power, which had to 
put down subordination and could not prevent the excesses of the 
individuals, helped to keep the idea of independence alive.®8
It was this spirit which prevailed throughout the colonial period, and
it manifested itself in the sensitivity about the control of land and
labour— hence the rebellions in some cases.
Vith the increased differentiation among African rural producers in 
the 1930s and 1940s— an aspect which was erroneously referred to as 
"population increase and settled cultivation" in most colonial reports—  
this sensitivity to land control increased more markedly. The land use 
rules which were introduced in the 1930s and 1940s, for reasons which 
were discussed in the previous section, exacerbated the fears for land 
alienation. People like the Vasukuma, whose land had never been 
alienated, reacted violently against the schemes for improved 
agricultural production and improved animal husbandry from 1946.88 
There were riots in Bukoba and Kilimanjaro in 1937 against native 
authorities and the co-operative unions after the imposion of coffee 
rules. The peasants felt that the rules would result in the poor 
peasants being unable to produce coffee; for they forbade the planting 
of coffee bushes in the shade of banana trees. As a result of these 
riots, several people were imprisoned.60 The Vapare reacted against 
graduated local rate tax and improved methods of agriculture.81 Similar 
riots took place in Usambara, Singida, Mbulu, Iringa, Uluguru, etc. . 
Ultimately, the effects of these riots was to undermine the position of 
the native authorities.82
Peasant opposition to native authorities turned to opposition to 
multi-racial local governments which the government proposed to 
establish and attempted to do so in the 1950s. They felt, that multi-
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racial local governments would result in land alienation. Within these 
struggles, the interests of the peasants coincided with those of the
capitalist elements— i.e. in the struggles against native authorities,
opposition to Indian traders and in the defence of land. This was the
basis upon which TAA was to spread when it adopted a more radical stance
in the early 1940s as a result of the internal feuds within the 
Association. They differed in terms of the forms of resistance— whereby 
very often peasant protests turned into angry riots and demonstrations, 
while the capitalist elements' tendency was to appeal to the higher 
authorities. This is why, far example, TAA abandoned the Usambara 
peasants struggles in 1947 for fear of the wrath of the government. But 
for the peasants, it was not a matter of reconciliation with the 
interests of European civilization; but opposition.
The culmination of the peasant struggles was the Meru Land Case. 
This Case attracted international attention and contributed 
significantly to the emergence of the nationalist movement. In 1948, the 
Colonial Office had approved proposals for land alienation in Meru
(Northern Province) at Engare Fanyuki and Liguruki, in order to create a
block of European ranching between Meru and Kilimanjaro. The Meru
(Freemen) Citizens' Union had resisted this attempt up to 1951 when
government forces came into the area and drove their cattle away, 
removed or burnt their household goods and movable property and razed to 
the ground their houses, cattle pens and storage sheds. The Meru people 
opposed the evictions passively by refusing to move out and to accept 
compensation. 25 people were arrested in this incident, and two died. 
Hostility between Africans and Europeans escalated. After collecting 
funds, the Meru people sent representatives to the U.K. Trusteeship
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Council to petition against this incident in 1952. A protest was also 
sent to the Colonial Office. Kirilo Japhet and Earle Seaton went to New 
York as representatives. The former was a leader of the Meru Citizens 
Union and Secretary of TAA branch in Meru, and the latter was a Vest 
Indian lawyer. Kirilo Japhet was the first Tanganyikan to address the 
Trusteeship Council.83
As the Meru Case developed, TAA eventually recognized that the Meru 
issue was a matter of concern for all Africans in Tanganyika. In 1952, 
TAA was almost functionless. A year later, after Nyerere's return from 
Edinburgh University and election as leader of TAA, Kirilo Japhet was 
asked by Nyerere and Kandoro to travel throughout the country under the 
auspices of TAA and tell the people about the Meru evictions. This 
aroused a keen interest in many parts of the country. Thus in early 
1954, a group of activists, including Kirilo Japhet, A.S. Kandoro, John 
Rupia, the three sons of Kleist Sykes, Dossa Aziz, etc. began to discuss 
a new constitution for TAA. Kandoro was a trader from Kigoma who got 
involved in the co-operative movement in Usukuma; John Rupia was one of 
the territory's most prosperous African entrepreneurs of his time ("and 
he talked as eloquently of the virtues of hard work as any Western 
capitalist." This is the man who used to finance TANU when it had no 
money.8*); the Sykes were a business family; and Dossa was a business 
man.
The Meru Land Case marked the linking of the struggles of the 
champions of African Civilization who were now turning to nationalism. 
As far as peasant discontent was concerned, the government had all along 
viewed it as having resulted from the failure of the people to realize 
the "value and necessity for the rules which government had devised
solely in their own interests...." rather than the fact that they were 
caused by political considerations. For the government, the peasants' 
wrath was just because of the activity of a "few malcontents whose 
primary motive" was "personal aggrandisement and whose object" was 
"overthrow of established authority."8B Even as late as 1948, for 
example, "collective violence or disorder" in the countryside was 
regarded as of "minor nature, of local tribal or factional origin and 
without significance," dealt with adequately by the local authorities.88 
It was the Meru Case and the fear of land alienation which mobilized 
African opinion against the central government more than any other 
single issue. This Case also provided substantial fuel for the formation 
of TANU.87 The 1954 U.N. Mission was to point out that land and its use 
and tenure comprised among Africans "the outstanding political and 
economic issue of the day,..." The Mission acknowledged that the Meru 
Case was very important throughout the country, as a result of the 
doubts which their cause had "raised as to the whole meaning and 
intention of non-African, especially European, settlement in the 
territory". Due to the Case, political fears and suspicion had been 
created throughout the country where political leaders had a 
following. 80
The rural protests started having an impact at governmental level
from 1954— in the sense that land policies began to be changed. The
government policy up to 1955 was based on refusal to recognize conflict
*
of interests between Africans and non-Africans when it came to the land 
issue. But by 1955 the government began to recognize this fact, and even 
the district councils which were democratic were to be introduced from 
1955. Yet, as was pointed out above and in the previous chapter, the
race problem had become more significant than ever in the country in the 
1940s and the government's political reforms of the end of that decade 
were geared towards a resolution of the race problem.
Sir Edward Twining who became Governor of Tanganyika in 1949 and 
started effecting the political changes had a previous experience of 
labour matters, He was very aware of the significance of industrial
disputes in the colonies. Besides the importance of theland question in 
the formulation of policies in the colonies, the other most crucial and 
central issue was the labour problem. It was in the labour/capital
relations that racial tensions were more pronounced throughout the
colonial period— with Europeans struggling to get and control African 
labour and Africans resisting. Africans had to be constrained to enter 
wage relations not simply by economic forces, but also by political 
means. The same political means had to ensure the reproduction of these 
relations through economic and social policies, laws, sanctions, etc. In 
a nutshell, the state was the most central weapon in the creation and 
maintanance of wage/capital relations.
There was constantly an intense fear during the colonial period by 
the state, the settlers, the planters, the diggers, the missionaries,
commercialists and industrialists— the employers in general—  of any 
possibility of a labour action being linked with political actions. 
Typically, for example, the Tanganyika Standard— the mouth piece of the 
settlers--saw strikes and trade unions as having political implications. 
These complaints were not simply fantasies: they expressed the
comprehension of the state and the employers of the real significance of 
the threat posed by the workers. In the colonies, the major employers of 
labour besides the state were Europeans and Asians, and Africans were in
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the main workers and peasants. The workers in Tanganyika by the 1930s 
were at the very heart of the colonial economy, given the share of 
exports by large scale production, and therefore, their objective 
position vis A vis the colonial economy and the state in general was 
crucial. It is true that the peasants and petty commodity production in 
general produced more export crops than the settlers, as was shown in 
the previous chapter, and hence the peasant interests were very 
important within the state when it came to the choice between settler 
agriculture and peasant agriculture in the 1920s. But the fact is, 
capitalist production in general— that is settler agriculture and 
plantations (mainly sisal) accounted for a higher percentage of 
agricultural exports than peasant agriculture from the end of the 1930s 
onwards. This aspect was mentioned in the previous section. (See also 
Table 1)
Labour was employed by this capitalist agriculture; by the state 
itself which was the largest employer— in public works, railway, civil 
service, etc. ; by commerce, mining, industries, etc.; and also by some 
African capitalists. Therefore, besides being a confrontation of 
employers and workers, every strike or industrial action was a direct 
confrontation of races— whereby, in most cases the employers were non- 
Africans and the workers were Africans. It is for this reason that the 
employers viewed every strike or labour movement as politically 
motivated, because the very dominance of non-Africans and their 
privileges depended on the existence of wage labour.
As a response to the wave of strikes which took place in the second 
half of the 1930s, labour inspection was begun in 1939 and a Workmen's 
Compensation and Minimum Wage Ordinance was already under consideration
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by 1940. The Labour Inspector of the territory reported in 1939 that
<
"strikes amongst the labourers in the territory are almost a daily 
occurence."70 For example, there were 22 strikes and stoppages in Tanga 
Province in the second quarter of 1937 and 32 in the first nine months 
of 1938. Most of them were anonymous, and the most common pattern of the 
strikes in the sisal plantations of Tanga was for cutters to demonstrate 
outside the estate office, brandishing pangas (matchetes) and shouting 
for their rights. This wave of strikes continued in the 1940s. The 
working class had become permanent in the 1930s, and within this came 
the beginning of collective action on such a large scale. By 1939, there 
were 6,000 male labourers in Dar es Salaam, of which 25 per cent were at 
any time unemployed and 60 per cent of those in employment earned less 
than Shs 15/= a month. Besides this, only half of the children of school 
age went to school and 1,000 under the age of 14 were employed. Between
20,000 to 25,000 Africans were crowded in approximately 3,200 houses.72 
The 1940s strikes also involved picketing. The government was forced to 
amend the 1932 Trade Union Ordinance in 1941 so as to include a 
provision on picketing.73
There was a wave of strikes in Lindi and Dar es Salaam in 1943. 
These strikes ended in a brutal victimization of the workers by the 
state, and strikes being declared illegal in war-time. Many workers were 
arrested and tribunals were held. Norman Pearson, who was sent to 
Tanganyika by the British Trade Union Congress in 1946 to help organize 
"healthy and desirable trade unions"7* by potential trade unionists 
themselves, was to recollect that in his travels within the country he 
found that more time in those years was lost in strikes "and certainly 
tremendously more productive effort lost by industrial frictions which
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were smouldering on, than was lost in Britain." There were no statistics 
available to show the figures of strikes occurrences. All the same, he 
got the impression that "strikes took place on many occasions in all 
parts of the territory." In his travels around the country, he was not 
only constantly hearing of strikes "but on several occasions ran into 
places where strikes were actually taking place."78 One of the big 
strikes had taken place in Dar es Salaam in 1945.
Pearson was sent to Tanganyika because of the problems of post-Var 
unrest. There were very few trade unions registered by the time he 
arrived in the territory, and in the minds of practically everybody—  
Europeans, Asians or Africans— trade unions were most often synonymous 
with strikes. The Europeans usually refused to negotiate with the 
workers; and the African workers wanted to negotiate conditions, and 
were ready to do so, but "with the Government officers, and the 
Government to impose them on the employers!"78 In his account, Pearson 
also amply demonstrated the pervasiviness of the problem of race in all 
spheres— and especially in the worker/employer relations. In his 
investigations, he admitted, he got "sick of listening to the 
inordinately selfish views of people." There were grievances everywhere, 
and various cases were being quoted and misquoted by the workers to 
support their arguments. He heard "leading British socialists 
unblushingly misquoted in order to support the most reactionary 
capitalist views, and die hard-tories cited in support of policies which 
would make Lenin pale pink."77
That was done by the workers when they were pushing for better pay 
and better working conditions. Everywhere he visited in the country, 
racial relations in the enterprises were hostile: Africans wanted equal
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treatment in jobs and in every respect. He recorded the following 
discussion with a group of craftsmen in 1946 as a typical attitude of 
African workers:
CRAFTSMEN: 'Bwana, why do our masters give so much [more]to
Indians than us? Ve are craftsmen like they are.'
PEARSON: 'But you are not such a good craftsmen as they are.' 
CRAFTSMEN: 'When it came to fighting for King George in the Var 
we were better then and not now?'
PEARSON: ' It is the skill and the products of your skill which 
determines your wages, and your skill is low'.
CRAFTSMEN: 'But we are craftsmen the same as they are: what is 
the difference?'
PEARSON: 'The difference is mostly one of training. In Britain a 
man must serve at least five years lowly-paid apprenticeship 
before he can become a craftsman. Vhat man among you has served 
such an apprenticeship?'
CRAFTSMEN: 'Bwana we are not Europeans, we are Africans. An
African does not need to waste such a long time learning!' 
PEARSON: 'Do you think yourselves better than Europeans?' 
CRAFTSMEN: 'Veil it seems so Bwana!'73
Pearson and the Labour Department's attempts to create "sound trade 
unions", so as to avoid industrial disputes, had virtually failed by 
1947, as Pearson's account suggests. From 5th September 1947 there 
started a General Strike which spread like a prairie fire in many parts 
of the territory. It ended after one month. In Dar es Salaam alone, 
there had been eight strike threats in that year previous to the General 
Strike.73 The government had been anticipating unrest in general because 
of commodity shortages and, high living costs. This resulted in the 
government raising the wages of its employees and private employers 
following suit.30 In spite of the government's efforts to avoid unrest, 
the strike took place.
The strike began with the Dar es Salaam dock workers who were 
demanding 100 per cent rise in wages. Two days later, they were joined 
by the railway workers under the Railway African Association. Then the 
strike spread along the Central Railway Line— Morogoro, Kilosa, Dodoma,
Tabora and Kigoma. It also spread to Mwanza, Kongwa, Mpanda, Arusha, 
etc. The sisal plantation workers, the groundnut scheme workers, and 
others also joined; in Tabora, the African teachers of the two
government schools joined— the only teachers to participate in the 
strike. When trouble began to brew among the sisal workers on the
Central Railway line, the police increased force by the recruitment of
the staff of other departments, and especially the Department of 
Agriculture— the provincial, district and farm offices staff.31 In the 
Eastern Province, the strike spread to all the sisal plantations (in
Kilosa, Ngerengere, Ruvu, etc.). In Ngerengere, near Morogoro, the 
police and the agricultural workers were issued with arms and "tin 
hats". Their instructions "were to restore order on the estate with the 
minimum force. The only item missing was the magistrate to read the riot 
act before authorizing" them to take such action as they "deemed 
necessary under the circumstances." They met 400 African workers armed 
with sticks, who demanded a rise in wages "because all the goods they 
wanted to buy in the shops were so expensive that they could not save 
money from their wages to take back home.,.." In a matter of days their 
wages were increased.32
In Kigoma, the strike was spearheaded by the railway workers; and in 
Mwanza it was the dockers. In the latter case, the dockers moved into 
town and called other workers to join them. They even stoned the 
Barclays' Bank; and then they spread to the other trading places. There 
was a brief stoppage in Arusha on 17th September; and the salt miners of 
Uvinza were on strike until 22nd September. Finally, the last workers to 
go on strike were the miners in Mpanda, and they went back to work on 
6th October. This General Strike was Tanganyika's "most widespread
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protest since the Maji maji rebellion",33 and it brought about "a 
serious situation" all over the country.3*
The way the strike was conducted in Dar es Salaam reveals the 
seriousness of the situation. The dockers were joined by other workers—  
including government workers, casual workers, unemployed and self 
employed in general. There were pickets throughout the town— even in the 
European and Asian residential areas— to stop workers, domestic or 
otherwise, from going to work. The strike was marked by violence and 
intimidation:
....we found gangs of Africans rushing about the town 
brandishing sticks and stones. They considered that all Africans 
should join them in this grand saturnalia and show the Vazungu 
(Europeans) 'what was what'. Most joined too willingly— after 
all, they thought, it isn't often one is able to get into the
middle of a first class spree like this one—  and they found it
most exhilarating.38
Those who broke the strike, especially the house servants, hid
themselves in their work premises. Europeans and Asians were forced to
do their work previously done by their workers. Worse still, even
organized trade was grinding to a halt in the days of the strike. It was
very amusing for Mr Hatcher, an officer in the Labour Department, when
he came across a self-employed flower seller who was striking "against
every one" and also representing "every one".38
The police were scattered all over the town, and the government
became even more concerned with the maintenance of its life than ever
before. It used propaganda very efficiently, including the broadcasting
station— never used before— and loudspeakers to maintain law and order.
The wages of the workers were increased six days after the strike by 40
to 50 per cent. The casual daily wage workers of Dar es Salaam got an
increase also. The workers were also given bonus for regular work,
regular free meals and free hospital treatment. The strike had managed
to paralyse the heart of the colonial economy and administration. The
employers were for the first time defeated before the hitherto hostile
government machinery; and during the tribunal after the strike, the
dockworkers "recognized that their real negotiating partner was not
employers but the government."67’ In a minute to the Governor, it was
stated that the dockers
seem to imagine that Government has taken over this dispute and 
that it is Government, and not an independent Tribunal, who is 
going to assess the amount of award. It is significant that in 
the record the leader of the dockers has stated that the dockers 
are prepared to work for Government, but not for companies.60
Unlike the struggles of the peasants, whose wrath against enforced 
land usage laws and other grievances was directed against the native 
authorities— i.e. the chiefs, native courts, etc,— and wich were 
localized even when the district authorities intervened; with labour 
disputes it was most often an intervention by the government with armed 
force. Colonial administrators were very suspicious that labour 
movements would confuse their "economic" protests with political 
criticism of colonialism and thereby encourage demands for 
independence.33 The strikes by the workers in 1937, 1939, 1943 and 1945 
were put down by armed force— these strikes were mainly concentrated in 
Tanga, Lindi and Dar es Salaam. In the 1943 Dar es Salaam dockworkers 
strike the Governor authorized the arrest of strikers (143 were arrested 
and tried) and banned strikes under defense regulations. In the 1945 Dar 
es Salaam strike, workers were arrested and more than 300 special 
constables patrolled the town.30 The government had to suppress them in 
this way because of the fact that relations between the employers and 
the workers were, besides those of capital and labour, relations of race
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and also relations of colonizer and colonised. Inevitably, any 
confrontation between the workers and the employers brought to the fore 
all these questions whether they were explicitlypart of the demands or 
not, as the 1947 strike demonstrates.
Some trade unions were registered by the end of 1947. One of them 
was the Dockworkers and Stevedores Union, formed soon after the general 
strike without prior reference to the Labour Department as required.31 
The other trade unions were: African Cooks, Washermen and House Servants 
Association; Morogoro Personal Servants' Association; and the Dar es 
Salaam Motor Drivers' Association.32 Due to the government's fear that a 
strong body such as the Dockers Union might come under the influence of 
communism, it was necessary to direct it into 'constructive' channels. 
The government, therefore, appointed Abdul Sykes, a son of a famous 
African businessman and member of TAA, as secretary of the Union.33 
Abdul Sykes, like the rest of the Sykes family had no links nor sympathy 
with the workers. He belonged to a family which believed that only 
wealth and business could make people uplift themselves. In 1949, 
leadership of the Union passed to Erica Fiah— who disliked both the 
government and the moderation of the African civil servants and 
businessmen,3* Fiah held the office for two months and was removed by 
the workers because he opposed a projected strike. His radicalism had 
become too moderate for the workers by this time.38
There was a wave of strikes in almost all the regions throughout 
1948. The hardest hit by these strikes were the sisal plantations, the 
mines and the ports.38 There were 50 strikes in 1950, and most of these 
were in the most important industries which formed the backbone of the 
colonial economy— the ports, plantations, construction, etc. A one week
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strike by the dockers in Dar es Salaam in 1950 resulted in the worst 
forms of violence the town had ever experienced before independence, as 
a result of the government's attempt to use blackleg labour. The most 
serious riot took place in the area separating the African and Asian 
residential zones where a police squad was surrounded and stoned by the 
workers. The police had to use their guns against the workers in the 
third day of the strike. 19 colonial police members were killed in the 
course of this strike; and among them was a European officer and an 
Asian superintendant. 145 workers altogether were charged with offences 
as a result of the strike. One of the strikers claimed that the strike 
had taken place because of oppression. Otherwise, besides this reason, 
nothing is known about the cause of the 1950 strike. The Labour 
Department had completely failed to advise and create the desired trade 
unions. Consequently the dockworkers union was closed down and its 
property confiscated after the 1950 strike.37
Way back in 1947 before the General Strike, the government had 
introduced The Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Inquiry) Bill. According 
to the Labour Commissioner, this Bill was aimed at making provisions for 
settlement of trade disputes and inquiring into economic and industrial 
conditions in the territory, because the government anticipated a 
frequent occurence of disputes as the territory "was advancing in 
civilization and development." This Bill was to provide a machinery for 
settlement of disputes. It was to help protect the essential services, 
and quiesce trade union militancy.33 This attempt was defeated by the 
General Strike. And as a result of the General Strike, there was even an 
attempt by the government to dissolve most of the trade unions which 
were in existence on the pretext that Africans were not ready for
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responsible and sound trade unions.39 In the government's view, the 
frequent strikes and stoppages which were on the increase usually 
developed as a "means of achieving some political object...."100 The 
Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) Ordinance was passed in 
1950. It aimed at the formation of works committees, as a form of 
industrial democracy for joint consultation between workers and 
employers.101 By 1953, the minimum wage and terms and conditions of 
employment were set. The terms included medical examination, adequate 
medical facilities, food and housing, sickness allowance, leave 
allowance, disturbance allowance and encouragement of provision of 
provident fund facilities.102
The government was not successful in the formation of works
committees, and by 1953 trade unions were resurfacing again. The
government's effort this time was as usual to try and prevent them from
becoming politically involved. A worker of Cooper Limited Arusha, F.E. •
Omido, who was also a member of TAA was to write to the Fabian Colonial
Bureau that there was a big drive towards the organization of trade
unions, but the government's attitude towards this process was shocking:
In fact, many of them would rejoice at the suppression of Trade 
Union Movement in this country. The fact is that there is a
serious lack of encouragement towards the formation and
establishment of the Trade Union movement and yet they are there 
to help towards that end can speak for itself. The Dock Workers 
Union at Dar es Salaam to which you referred in your letter has 
already been strangled. I have failed to obtain the help to 
which I am entitled from the Department of Labour at Arusha. All 
I can get is the most British liked nick-name— 'agitator'. 
However, I am quite confident that the time will come when my 
fellow Africans will organise themselves and constitutionally 
bargain for their labour, etc.103
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In short, the government was extremely sensitive when it came to 
industrial disputes, more than to any other single issue in the 1940s 
and 1950s.
It was in the towns where the colonial government lost control first 
in Tanganyika.104 The 1947 General Strike marked the climax of the 
colonial crisis. The nationalist movement was to emerge long after this 
crisis. TAA did not have a hand in the strikes which took place in the 
1940s as is assumed in some studies.106 In fact, the political reforms 
which began to take place towards the end of this period were an attempt 
by the colonial government to co-opt some of the Africans so as to stop 
the rebellions of the working people. It can be said that the emergence 
of the nationalist movement after the crisis was a compromise between 
the "modern Tanganyikans" and the colonial regime. If TAA had a hand in 
the strikes which took place in the 1940s, the government would have 
come down hard on it, the way it did when it came to the labour 
movements, for linking "economic" and "political issues". This did not 
happen.
As far as the government was concerned, the behaviour of TAA was 
generally good during these rebellions. The government co-operated with 
TAA on many issues: TAA acted as a "mediary for both dissidents and the 
government, TAA lacked the organizational strength either to discipline 
the tactics of the former or to resist being used by the latter". Most 
often, TAA was notified whenever there was a visit of important 
government officers, and itwas also consulted on many issues.106 Vhen 
the news of the General Strike reached Mwanza, for example, the workers 
urged the leader of TAA to convince the government to consider their 
wages; otherwise they would go on strike. The workers went on strike the
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same day they asked the TAA leader, Mr Chombo, to talk to the 
government:
In the face of this calamity, Chombo the following day agreed at 
the behest of the Provincial Commissioner to arrange a meeting 
to explain to the strikers the necessity to return to work 
before their demands could even be considered. By the third day, 
however, most workers had returned to their jobs, and the 
administration told Chombo to cancel the meeting. 107
TAA was the only organization which survived the onslaught of the
colonial administration during the inter-war period and after. After
1945, the lea4ership of TAA had fallen back to the civil servants. As a
result of the General Strike which the civil servants had not joined
"Under the fear of repression and dimissal from their jobs even after
the strike, the civil servants in TAA withdrew from militant politics to
concentrate on their group and so made TAA in Dar es Salaam dormant".106
In other words, the crisis in TAA after 1947 was partly due to the
General strike. If TAA had participated in the General Strike it would
have faced its demise.
According to Pearson, it was the comparatively few educated Africans 
who went on working during the Strike. The teachers at the African
secondary school in Dar es Salaam "very summarily sent about their 
business the mobs who called at the school with the view of compelling 
the teachers to join the strike". The educated Africans "stood out
against the mob hysteria which swept the town and threats which
accompanied it."106 The educated had excluded themselves from the 
"ignorant mass"; and that is why the "bad behaviour" had taken place: if 
the educated Africans had advised their brethren, the General Strike
would not have occurred. Therefore it became necessary to bridge the gap 
between the educated and the "ignorant mass". The only problem was how
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to bridge it; so that the educated Africans could spread the knowledge 
they had acquired and show the less educated the way to progress.110
Thus, the political reforms which started taking place in the late 
1940s were a result of the severe challenge posed by the working class 
movement. It was the workers who were at the core of the colonial 
economy, and it was the workers who brought to the climax the colonizing 
mission's crisis and forced the government to accomodate the moderate 
demands of the "modern Tanganyikans"— the educated and the wealthy; 
hence the multi-racial patterns of constitutional development * and the 
so-called "unintended support of TAFU by the government," as Pratt puts 
it. According to him, "[the] first policies which served greatly to 
assist the emergence of TAFU as a powerful movement was Twining's 
decision to move only slowly and cautiously with the development of 
representative African local government to replace Fative Authorities". 
The government had ignored the advice by the Colonial Office to form 
representative local institutions so as to provide "a channel for 
political ambitions which would otherwise flow into national anti­
colonial channels" before 1947.111 The constitution which was introduced 
from 1948 involved the balancing of racial composition of the unofficial 
side of the LEGCO. The constitutional reforms introduced from 1949 
involved the enlarging of the unofficial side of the LEGCO, equalling 
the number of African representatives to that of Asians and Europeans 
combined, and the question of election of Africans in the native 
authorities and the wish to create multi-racial provincial councils 
"which would provide a governmental level between the African Fative 
Authorities and multi-racial Legislative Council" by the 1950s.112
At the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s the fear of 
nationalism was rife among the non-Africans in Tanganyika. And this was 
during the period when TAA had collapsed organizationally. At this time, 
administrators were more concerned with the protection of the interests 
of the racial minorities than to prepare Africans for self-government. 
The Provincial Commissioners asked Twining in 1950 to "issue a public 
affirmation on the rights of the minority communities." In the following 
year:
a dozen senior members of the administrative service 
individually presented evidence to Constitutional Development 
Committee. Fone of these voiced the trusteeship values to which 
the administrative service had been profoundly committed before 
the war. Fone argued for the paramouncy of African interests. 
Most of these officers shared Twining's concern to apply a brake 
to African political advancement and to find ways to entrench 
safeguards within the Constitution to protect the position of 
the minority communities.113
This fear of nationalism was due to the actions of the workers more than
any other section of the population because, as a German socialist
working in Tanganyika then wrote to the Fabian Colonial Bureau in 1945:
the "race— and class groupings being very marked here and often
identical here...."11A Hence the political reforms. The racial
minorities were the employers; and the ones who posed the threat were
the workers. Somehow, it was necessary to accommodate this severe
challenge from below.
5.3 Nationalism and the 1950s Struggles
As it was pointed out in the previous chapter, the struggles of the 
educated and the wealthy in the 1940s were confined mainly in the quest 
for equality with the other races. Fyerere wrote a manuscript entitled 
"The Race problem in East Africa" in 1949 while a student at Edinburgh
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University. 11 e This article is perhaps the best summation of the 
struggles of the "modern Tanganyikans" at the end of the 1940s and their 
transition to nationalist politics which were to emerge from 1953. In 
this manuscript, the problem of East Africa was seen as that of the 
relation of the different races. These different races needed to live 
"together in harmony and mutual respect." Racial hatred in Tanganyika, 
according to him, existed among Africans, Asians and Europeans, and this 
hatred could not be cured by hypocricy. Africans did not believe in the 
liquidation of non-Africans nor relegate them to second place: all they 
wanted was the right to be masters of their own fate. The minority's 
vested interests and their exploitation of Africans was the basis of 
racial disrimination. The causes of this, rather than being cultural, 
were political and economical. The resolution of this problem depended 
on the "distribution of political control... upon the acceptance by all 
communities concerned of the principle of social, economic and above 
all, political equality."116
East Africa belonged to both Africans and non-Africans. It was wrong
for a minority group from outside to dominate the indigenous people and
tell them that they were not people of the country. Africans were not
going to tolerate any more such insults:
The day may come when someone may want to incite them. How easy 
it is to inflame an insulted people! I shudder when I think of 
the terrible possibility, ,but it will not be a mere possibility 
if our white Neighbours insist on this vulgar doctrine of the 
Divine Right of Europeans and refuse to live like 'ordinary sort 
of fellows'. Such a doctrine may have to be uprooted with all 
the vulgarity of a bloody revolution. I say this in perfect 
honesty. ...A day may come when people will prefer death to 
insult and woe to the people who will see that day! Voe to them 
who will make that day inevitable!117
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It was by the recognition of the fact that Africans had rights, that 
Africa belonged to Africans that the various races in East Africa could 
live in harmony.
The Meru people evictions in November and December 1951 in which
1,000 men, women and children were moved; 492 huts and stone houses
burnt or destroyed; and 400 cattle and 1,200 sheep impounded and
removed, served as the catalyst and provided the ralying point for the
nationalist forces in existence. This case provided them with cohesion
and a sense of purpose, Tanganyikans were able to speak before the
United Nations for the first time. Africans who were in the LEGCO by
this time— Chief Kidaha Makwaia, Chief Abdiel Shangali, Chief Adam Sapi
Mkwawa, Chief Tom Marealle and a few others— -who were also members of
TAA, were a force which the government relied upon for support because
of their friendliness to the government. As a result of the Meru Case
and the inability of Africans in the LEGCO and government to defend the
Meru people, TAA members began to split, with the majority rallying
around the radical nationalists. For example, when Kirilo Japhet, the
energetic secretary of the Arusha branch of TAA, wrote to Dar es Salaam
Headquarters on behalf of his proposed journey , with Seaton to the UN,
not much came out of this officially. This was because people like Tom
Marealle did not want to take sides: "the Africans said, probably
rightly, that he did not want to offend the British."11e But the radical
section of TAA decided to help; and this inevitably entailed the
rallying of wider forces.119 Kirilo Japhet and Abbas Sykes met in Dodoma
and went to Mwanza and Arusha, where they met the peasants.
Even in tiny villages their meetings were attended. Land, and 
the ownership of land, struck a sympathetic chord in African 
peasants, many of these simple people did not have one penny, 
but promised to sell a calf or a goat and contribute its price
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to the fund enabling the Meru people to go to far away America
'for justice'. They were as good as their word and the money
raised,.... 120
The Meru case was regarded by the government as simply a local 
issue. But as a result of the split within the TAA members the issue was 
blown up out of all proportion to its realities. The core nationalists—  
outside the LEGCO and civil service consisting of people like Abbas 
Sykes, John Rupia and Dossa Aziz, etc. all of them being capitalists in 
Dar es Salaam— were the ones who went even to see the Chief Secretary to
arrange for Kirilo Japhet to travel to New York. The attempt by the
government to co-opt the "modern Tanganyikans" in the government had by 
1952 floundered on the rock of the land question. The Meru evictions had 
dispelled all the hopes of multi-racialism and revealed the racial 
overtones which hampered the economic freedom of Africans, and the 
result was generalized unrest.
In other words, the nationalists were facing a sustained challenge 
from below— from the peasants and workers. The challenge involved 
bourgeois aspirations given that it involved land and racial issues; but 
aspirations which were also opening a way for other perspectives. It was 
a challenge which posed the fundamental question of land, which at the 
same time offered support for the demands of the "modern Tanganyikans" 
for racial equality and economic freedom which were systematized in the 
philosophy of African Civilization. The nationalist position was 
hardened further by the fact that the British Labour government which 
had seemingly supported the nationalists' demands and economic reforms 
at the end of the 1940s was out of power in the early 1950s. Fears had 
begun to mount among the educated and wealthy, especially due to
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escalating literature in the local press full of settler and European 
interests in general.
The pressure from below as a challenge to the nationalists is also
demonstrated by the activities of the Vazaramo Union in the Eastern
Province which was established in 1938. The people of Uzaramo had
established this Union with the object of assisting members who were in
distress. By 1945, the Union was involved in petitioning for grievances
and asking that the government deal directly with the Union in matters
concerning the people instead of the local government representatives
who were always "yes men" and were afraid "of being taken away from
government service once they try to fight for their people."121 In 1946,
they were demanding self-administration and the right over their tribal
land, and by 1948 they were demanding that the Secretary for Native
Affairs should have Africans on his staff.122 From the end of the same
year to 1953 they were campaigning for an African Zaramo Liwali or Kadhi
(judge) for the township of Dar es Salaam123 rather than an Arab who
knew nothing or very little about their traditions. By this time, the
Union was also advocating the preservation of democracy as a form of
government of the people, by the people and for the people: "a rule in
which every man and woman has got a say in the running of his-her
country." They went on:
This is how the democracy would be introduced in Africa. Every 
village, location, or town will have a communal hall....Men of 
every village, location, or town will choose their 
representatives who will be responsible to see that the village 
or town is provided with good drinking water, good roads, 
schools, dispensaries, and a pub, shop, and good hygenic 
houses....
I very much sympathize with the four representatives of 
African interests in Tanganyika Legislative Council, because 
they have no proper and clear way of getting information from 
the five and a half million backward people.12*
For the first time, TAA openly supported the views of the Vazaramo 
Union for the replacement by Africans of the Arab judges in the 
territory in 1953.126
Before 1953, the nationalists' view had not reached that level. 
Hamza Mwapachu, one of the nationalists had written to the Fabian 
Colonial Bureau in 1950 that Dar es Salaam was developing very rapidly 
into an industrial centre; although, unfortunately, everything was 
concentrated in Dar es Salaam at the expense of other centres in the 
territory. He further stated that Africans were very optimistic and 
hoped that they would not be disappointed with the constitutional 
changes.126 Mwapachu's views and optimism, perhaps, reflected the 
general attitude of the educated and the wealthy who hoped for co-option 
before the Meru Land Case came to the fore after the events of 1951. 
Mwapachu was the kind of a nationalist who was, as he called himself, a 
socialist by then.127 Before the Meru Land Case, the educated 
Tanganyikan had been participating in suggestions about constitutional 
reforms; demanding that Africans be given more responsibility; in 
castigation of the resolutions and utterances of the minorities (for 
example the Capricorn Society); showing bitterness to the racial 
relations; wanting democracy and a common electoral role; and 
demanding town council, district council, provincial council, 
representation in LEGCO and in the executive.12e The Meru Case marked 
the transition to overt confrontation between TAA and the government. 
K. Japhet and E. Seaton were faced in the U.N.O. by Governor Twining who 
went there to defend the government's action: "The tall imposing
Governor and the young nationalist went for each other at full tilt. 
Some wild, unsubstantiated accusations were flung at Twining, but he was
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equal to the occasion."129 The government lost the case in the U.N.O. ; 
and this was the first time that the government was defeated by the 
Africans.
In 1953, Governor Twining banned the civil servants in the junior 
and senior sevices from being members of political organizations. This 
was an attenqpt by the government to beat the waves of the rising 
political storm, as a result of the link which was being forged between 
the mass struggles and the nationalists after the Meru Case, After 
coming back ‘from New York, Kirilo Japhet was asked to tour the ^country 
and tell the people about the Meru Case and what had happened in the 
U.N.. The civil servants quit TAA in August 1953. In April 1954, Twining 
introduced the Societies Bill, which made compulsory the registration of 
all organizations with a list of the aims and rules, organizers and 
their names, occupations and addresses.130
With the Meru Case, the tensions of the peasants in Kilimanjaro, 
Bukoba, Sukumaland, etc. began to flow into the framework of territorial 
politics— specifically into TAA. In Mwanza, for example, it was the co­
operative organizers— people like Paul Bomani and S. Kandoro who were 
concerned with commercial affairs— who made it possible for the 
political energies of the countryside to flow into TAA. The challenge 
from below was so sustained, to the extent that, after Nyerere became 
the President of TAA, and given the growing hostility of the government 
towards TAA after the Meru incident, TAA began to work on the 
possibilities of transforming itself into & full political organization. 
The nationalists were by now concerned with both territorial and local 
issues— ranging from opposition to cattle culling, destocking, etc. and 
land use rules in general, to demands for elected representatives and
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independence.131 With this championing of local grievances, it was 
possible for TAA to gather wider support. Most of the impetus towards 
nationalism initially came from the lake regions and North Eastern 
Tanganyika.
In December 1953, Nyerere hastened to investigate the conflicts
which were taking place in Lake Province, where TAA was locked in a
conflict with the government. Already, there was a danger that the
"unsophisticated militants of Lake Province might provoke disorder and
thereby break TAA's unity" by acting against the leadership ashad
happened in Kenya where the Mau Mau struggles had broken out by then, or
the incidents of Sierra Leone and Senegal; or involve TAA in an open
confrontation with the government and hence complicate the nationalists'
task,132 In 1954, Mwapachu wrote from Ukerewe to the Fabian Colonial
Bureau explaining this dilemma. He wrote that on closer investigation,
African opinion revealed growing suspicion of the government and more
developed consciousness than had been the case a decade earlier:
Vhat is lacking is leadership. All potential leaders are in the 
civil service and the element of hazard is still great for them 
to leave their secured positions to offer the people their 
leadership. In fact a deplorable and serious situation is fast 
developing whereby this leadership is being snatched by an ill- 
informed, ill-fitted element of the community in attempts to 
meet the demand. It is a challenge to all educated Africans in 
this territory.133
In early 1954 the TAA activists, including Kirilo Japhet, Saadani 
Kandoro, John Rupia, the Sykes brothers, etc. under the leadership of 
J.K. Nyerere drafted a new constitution,— on the basis of the 
constitutions of the British Labour Party and Ghana's Convention 
Peoples' Party. This new constitution opened membership to any African 
on payment of entrance fees. It also allowed trade unions, co-operatives
and tribal associations to affiliate themselves, and tried to centralize 
the decision making process of the organization and increased central 
control.13*
TAA was changed to TANU (Tanganyika African National Union) on July 
7, 1954. It became a political party and it took over all the branches 
which had been established by TAA, The aims of TANU were: to fight for 
Tanganyika's self-government and independence; "to build up a united 
nationalism"; to struggle for "elections for all bodies of local and 
central government" so as to have African majorities; to fight for the 
establishment of small industries, artisanal training schools, fair 
prices for producers and consumers, assisting farming, compulsory 
primary education and a minimum wage. It was to fight for the 
encouragement of co-operatives and trade unions; to fight against 
"tribalism and isolationist tendencies among Africans...."; to fight 
against "racialism and racial discrimination", also against land 
alienation and foreign immigration which was detrimental to African 
interests and the so-called federation with the other territories—  
unless Africans wished so.136 TAA was reorganized at a time when it was 
expected that elections for the new legislative council based on racial 
parity representation would be held. TAA prepared to organize the 
voters, but eventually the government announced that the LEGCO members 
would be nominated as was the usual practice.136 In September 1954 
Nyerere took the place of Chief Kidaha Makwaia in LEGCO who was then 
absent for a while. Writing to Nicholson of the Fabian Colonial Bureau, 
Nyerere informed her that it was the government and the majority of the 
unofficial members of the LEGCO who opposed elections. He further 
informed her that they had reformed TAA, a thing which resulted in gross
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misinterpretation in the East African Press, Europeans accused them of
practicing racial politics; of aiming at a policy which was contrary to
the government's policy; of demanding independence within a period of
five years; of campaigning for self-government, etc.
Our aim is certainly self-government; when to attain it the
people of Tanganyika will decide. Ve are not racial; but I
emphasized that we must aim for democracy in Tanganyika, and 
those who fear democracy need not remain in the Territory. But 
at the moment our greatest concern is the educational and 
economic developemnt of our people,137
According to him, the aim initially had been to build a "well knit
organization" steadily, which would truly "serve the interests of the
country" rather than satisfy their own "vanity". They were not
interested in the numbers of the members.133 One year after the
formation of TANU, Nyerere wrote to Lady Selwyn-Clarke of the Fabian
Colonial Bureau that in spite their "reluctance to let TANU swell out
into a mass movement TANU is swelling out very rapidly". They had to
call off mass recruitment. 139 TANU, as Nyerere was to recall later, had
to start by "making people understand that peaceful methods of struggle
for independence were possible and could succeed."1*0 In which case,
given the forms of resistance which have been demonstrated, much as TANU
emerged as a response to the pressure from the. mass of workers and
peasants, it has been observed that the "connections between resistance
and nationalism were overwhelmingly negative."1*1 In fact, TANU remained
true to Pan-Africanism in which force was not advocated as a means to
achieve freedom and democracy except as a last resort; while positive
action was the main slogan.1*2
The negative connections between TANU and resistance were not due to
the belief by the working people in violent methods of struggle or non­
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belief in peaceful methods; rather it was a difference in perceptions in
terms of the essence of the struggles. Nyerere was later to recall that
he was philosophical in his approach during the struggles. It was this
aspect which "removed the bitterness from the campaigns";
I was not saying, 'Today a man was refused a beer', but just 'Ve 
must govern ourselves'. Veil, politically, this is the wrong
way. In the Lake region, the colonial government was saying,
'There are too many cattle.' I said we can't campaign against 
cattle de-stocking because we may have to de-stock when we come 
to power.' There was one TANU man in Iringa who campaigned 
against cattle dipping. He made dipping extremely unpopular. I 
was very angry with him! But politically, of course, you exploit 
every grievance.1*3
The TANU man in Iringa, who was a Party Secretary, was expelled from the
Party because of his campaigns against cattle dipping.1** There were
several times when TANU reacted thus towards primary resistance.
Vith further growth of TANU's membership, there was more
diversification of the social composition until not only one social
group predominated. The main support firstly came from areas such as '
Usukuma, where "traders, teachers, mission employees or catechists;
former government clerks, police officers or medical aides— men who had
broken the bonds of rural life through education, experience, travel,
study and employment" joined.1*6 It was the members of this group who
came into contact with the traders in the trading centres and
fraternized with them. Vhen they tilled their fields, the traders in
turn were neighbours of the farmers. Behind the support for the
nationalists in Sukumaland was the hostility to Sukuma Land Scheme and
the government and chiefs who enforced it.1*6
The co-operative was also one of the mainstays of TANU supporters in
many areas. In Mbeya, for example, to be a member of a co-operative
union was also to be a member of TANU.1*7 Support also came from the
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tribal unions. Such was the case in Usambara, Uluguru, Uzaramo, Uzigua, 
Irangi, Umakonde, etc. where there was mobilization of agricultural 
grievances within the struggles against native authorities and Land Use 
Rules. It was the local elite with ambitions or the less privileged 
clans who sought to control the processes in their areas who tended to 
link their local grievances to national politics. Broadly, the support 
came from the various associations and unions which were recognized by 
TANU in the 1954 Constitution. While mobilization played a role in some 
areas, in ottiers, it was mainly the pressure from below which formed the 
support.
As has already been pointed out, local grievances were not 
necessarily supported by TANU. A local TANU branch chairman of Usambara 
declared in 1957 that people did not need to obey the terracing rules, 
because self-government was nigh. This declaration came out after a 
"progressive farmer" (a rural capitalist) had been murdered during an 
opposition riot. The Party headquarters officially dissociated itself 
from this action. Looking at the peasant reactions and development of 
nationalism with the perspective of Tanzania in the 1970s, L. Cliffe 
rightly questioned the precise role of rural protests and their 
implications:
in the light of our more detailed knowledge today, just how far 
the local 'cells around which nationwide political organization 
could be constructed' were 'essentially rural'. Granted there 
was rural protest, but how far did this lead to peasant 
interests being geared organizationally into the political 
movement? I am not sure there wasn't still (in Fanon's language) 
'a separate dialectic' in the development of the 'rural' and 
'urban' movements.1*e
In fact, although the nationalist movement fed itself on the peasant
grievances, their logic was fundamentally different, given the
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ideological and social composition of the nationalist movement. The 
nationalists were the "modern Tanganyikans" who, given their 
dissociation from the protests against the rules which were for 
"improvement of agriculture", regarded the rural people as "inherently 
conservative", and even tended to view this conservatism as a product of 
certain "cultural factors".1*3 But it was the rural protests against the 
rules and the native authorities which contributed significantly to the 
breakdown of colonial administration.
Governor Twining— "the last of the Kipling era". 160— was to admit
some years later that the agricultural policies under his governorship
were among the blunders he committed. These were those very policies
which the peasants opposed, whose grievances the "modern Tanganyikans"
utilized while dissociating from the "conservative" aspects of them. In
Bates' formulation:
Government agricultural plans were not only formulated without 
consulting Africans, there was very little explanation of their 
utility or purpose. The farmer in the Southern Province who was , 
ordered to tie-ridge to preserve water, when his major farming 
problem was too much rainfall and his crops rotted in the 
fields, not unnaturally saw the regulations as means of ruining 
him. Schemes were burdensome in other ways: at the height of its 
operation, the Uluguru Land Usage Scheme demanded that African 
farmers work three days a week on terracing. In 1955 grievances 
in Uluguru exploded into riots and demonstrations against the 
government administration in the area. Governor Twining 
admitted, some years later, that agricultural policy had been 
one of his major mistakes of his governorship.161
Opposition to the Land Rules and the native authorities was strong
because the peasants felt that the rules hit their economic and social
roots of their way of life and challenged their economic security,
demanding hard work without acruing to them any benefits. The reactions
were strengthened further by suspicion of the motives behind the
government's actions: "Cattle destocking was, for instance, viewed as a
measure merely for the benefit of Tanganyika Packers' underutilized 
factories at Arusha and Mwanza ."1452
Nyerere was to point out on the eve of independence that, basically, 
the major issue which concerned all the nationalists in the 1950s was 
that of unity. Other issues, such as economic ones, which had bearing on 
particular interests were postponed until later.163 In other words, the 
mobilization of the grievances were a means to achieve unity rather than 
acceptance of the content of those grievances. TANU's initial intention 
was not to became a mass movement; even the pressure from below, it 
would seem, was not enough to push TANU to become a mass organization 
and that is why there was an attempt to halt further enrollment of 
members in 1955 only to revoke that decision soon after. In the eyes of 
the colonial government by this time, TANU activists were hooligans, 
irresponsible and racialists; and the latter aspect was due to their 
advocacy of Tanganyika being primarily African. In 1955 Governor Twining 
encouraged the formation of a multi-racial party by men close to the 
Government House. The result was the formation of United Tanganyika 
Party (UTP).
The formation of UTP created a new situation for TANU which called 
for a new policy.16* This was in relation to the LEGCO, in which only 
the nominated members could enter, and TANU's policy to non-Africans. 
TANU asked for the dissolution of LEGCO as it had formed itself into a 
rival party. Because UTP attacked TANU for its racialism on the grounds 
that it admitted only Africans, the TANU conference in 1956 made a small 
concession by accepting that persons of mixed African and other blood be 
admitted.1SB The formation of UTP forced TANU to re-examine its
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premises— organizationally and even ideologically— while at the same 
time discrediting UTP. A few words on UTP are in order here.
Dr Malam, in the Union of South Africa, who outlined the theory of 
apartheid began to put it into effect in 1947 at a time when the Labour 
Party was in power in Britain and was advocating multi-racialism in the 
colonies. The administrators in Tanganyika, as was pointed out above, 
did not see the necessity of the creation of multi-racial organizations. 
It was Colonel David Stirling, who went to live in Rhodesia, who in 1949 
formed the Capricorn African Society which was to incorporate Southern 
Rhodesia, Kenya, Uganda, Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and Tanganyika. 
This society got support from people like Dr J.H. Oldham, Alan Paton the 
South African writer, and others who were alarmed with the development 
of the race relations in the colonies. The Society had members among 
liberals and even settlers. According to this Society, the salvation of 
Africa fromimpeding disaster as a result of the bad racial relations—  
especially with the emergence of Dr Malam's doctrines--was to come from 
Africa. It was necessary to recognize that all men were born equal and 
that the differences between them, whether of creed or colour, were 
honourable differences.1BS The Society aimed at a self-governing East 
and Central African Federation under the British Crown; and the duty of 
"the Europeans was to develop the African continent jointly with the 
Africans and give them 'both incentive and opportunity to achieve a 
higher standard of life, and so as to make possible a true partnership 
between the races.'" At the same time, European guidance and leadership 
in the federal and territorial governments was essential. The Society 
also aimed at quickening Africa's development, increase in Western 
immigration and technological skill combined with the "latent capacity
of the African and other races". Accordingly, no European was to own 
land in African reserves; and no Africans were to own land in areas to 
be developed— except for houses in the urban areas.16'7
The main stress was on racial relations: it was necessary to accord 
the responsibility of franchise to those Africans who had the necessary 
social and economic background or standards. This was to be a multi­
racial organization which in effect represented the settler interests. 
It was an invitation of the Europeans to Africans and other races to 
joint development of the continent. In Tanganyika, Chief Kidaha Makwaia 
among some other Africans joined this society. The society was widely 
supported by liberal circles in Britain. But within Africa— from both 
European and African sides, among those outside the society— matters 
were different. Europeans in East Africa protested against it and saw 
the Society as an attack on their birth rights. For most Africans, as 
was pointed out in the previous chapter, the Capricorn Society was 
nothing more than an attempt to facilitate and protect settler interests 
while at the same time cunningly blocking the advancement of 
Africans.156
The philosophy of the Capricorn Society was 'multi-racialism'. By 
mid-1950s, this philosophy had become a derogatory term for racialism 
despite its aim of setting up a "nationalism of the human race".153 
Although the Capricorn Society did not take deep roots in Tanganyika, 
some of the prominent members of this society were: R. Johnston (former 
District Commissioner of Kongwa, by then a settler in Kilimanjaro and 
representative of the Society in Tanganyika), Derek Bryceson and Susan 
and Michael Wood. The members were mainly Europeans who wanted to break 
the race barriers. While Nyerere had agreed with Stirling in 1952 on the
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need for racial co-operation as the Capricorn Society advocated, he at 
the same time pointed out that this could not be a "generous gesture on 
the part of the Europeans".160
After the formation of TANU, Twining decided to use the Capricorn 
Society as a weapon against it. Thus from the Capricorn Society was 
published The Tanganyika National Society Manifesto in 1955 and UTP was 
formed in 1956. The manifesto was signed by 12 Europeans, 12 Asians and 
8 Africans. Among the Africans were Chief Kidaha Makwaia and Chief Haron 
Lugusha. This Party declared itself against "Colour Bar" and racial 
discrimination, and stood for equality of all people and the dependence 
of the races in Tanganyika upon each other "for their peace and 
happiness and prosperity, and for their upward progress towards 
nationhood."161 The objective of the Party was to respect the 
established government, to expose all attempts at unconstitutional or 
seditious changes in the constitution, to raise the standards of living 
and education, to promote the utilization of resources, free enterprise 
and co-operative efforts, etc.. The constitution of the Party took in
some aspects the model of the British Conservative Party.162
In August 1956, Nyerere came out with a critique of the Capricorn 
movement, specifically, the Capricorn Handbook for Speakers of 1955 and 
Capricorn Contract of 1956. This critique was in fact an attack of the 
views of UTP. Capricorn was denounced for wanting to substitute the
colour bar "with a money bar plus special Capricorn political bar"; of
putting proposals which "if ever adopted, put over in Tanganyika and the 
rest of East Africa the same old perpetuation of minority domination and 
special privilege which Africans everywhere" found "increasingly 
intolerable".163 Besides castigating racial domination, Nyerere also
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raised other social, political and economic issues. The land reforms
proposals of the Capricorn Society which stood for recognition of 
individual rights and the purchase of land by all persons of all races 
was rejected. According to him, it was only the immigrants with the 
money and backing from overseas who would afford the land. Very few 
Africans had money to spend on land: "Our customs of land use and
transfer are based not on buying and selling and speculation manipulated 
by those with money, but upon the actual primary needs and usage of each 
head of a family with his wife, children and other dependents within his 
clan"1G*
Those views on land ownership were part of TANU's economic policy. 
Furthermore, the talk about improving people's livelihood by attracting 
foreign capital for economic development, whereby foreign companies 
would be given subsidy and protection from competition was also 
rejected. The example given was that of Kilombero Valley where a sugar
company from South Africa was proposing to invest. Such a policy of
protection and subsidy, meant Africans paying for sugar and subsidy and 
inviting managerial ineffiency by removing "capital risk". It was in 
this way that European farmers had been able to shut off Asians while 
buying off Africans.165
East African Federation against the wishes of the people was 
rejected once again. But also, there was an affirmation of the 
commitment to "mature and co-operative internationalism arising from 
trusteeship under the United Nations." European Civilization was 
questioned by Nyerere in the very typical characteric manner of the 
1930s and 1940s. To quote in extenso:
Ve of TANU are convinced that there are indeed many values 
in fields of governmental and economic organization, the Common
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Law tradition, the appliction of science and cultural and
educational advantages which the people of Africa need to learn 
from those of Asia and Europe. Ve are also aware that there are 
glaring weaknesses and failures in the non-African civilizations 
that have resulted in the dragging of the whole world to the 
• verge of mutual suicide. For many of the European peoples the 
supposed advantages of urban industrialized living brings a 
nightmare of insecurity and futility and drains the joy out of 
life. Africans are revolted by the uncontrollable love of power 
we see in the 'civilized' nations in recent times and their
blind obsession with scientific mass annihilation so that it is 
now boasted that a single push - of a button can extinguish 
instantly or gradually all life over an area as large as East 
Africa,... Our revulsion cannot be dismissed with aspersions at 
the petty raids and minor wars of African history before the 
slave,trade was brought from the civilized nations of the north. 
It would be foolish for anybody to assume that all Africans are
in a haste to abandon their relatively stable, sane and non­
violent standards of civilization for integration into 
Europeanized culture.166
The formation of UTP and its campaign against TANU, and the fact
that by 1957 two thirds of its members were Africans as a result of the
divisions among the nationalists,167 meant mobilization of support by 
TANU and also the necessity for a political base on a wider scale. It 
was in this context that its support from the mass movements was 
crucial. Some of the educated elements, as a result of this, sought to 
organize the labour movement nationally. Among them were M. M. Kamaliza 
and M. Mpangala who had been close to TAA and TANU. Their struggles
culminated in the formation of Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL) in
October 1955 after the visit by Tom Mboya, the Kenyan trade unionist. 
TFL was formed after a meeting of the leaders of the African Commercial 
Employees Association <ACEA who were mostly clerks), Tanganyika African 
Government Servants Association (TAGSA), and the Railway African Union 
(RAU). The first president of TFL was Mr J.B.A. Ohanga from RAU, and the 
general secretary was Mr Rashid Kawawa who was the president of TAGSA.
Trade unions were to affiliate themselves to TFL, but TFL itself was
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not to be affiliated to TANU. Tom Mboya (and Henry Gay who came with him 
to Tanganyika) had been sent by the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions.
The government had smashed the trade unions in 1950 after the 
dockers violent strike, and by 1951 there were virtually no trade 
unions. Despite that, trade unions were being formed again and 
registered as associations by 1952. Only RAU was able to register as a 
union. These trade unions which were formed after 1950 were localized, 
craft based and without a national organization to co-ordinate them. 
Besides the above mentioned staff associations there were localized 
unions in Tabora, Kilimanjaro, Kigoma-Ujiji, etc.163 More unions were 
established in 1953 and 1954. There was a sharp increase in the number 
of unions in early 1955.16,3 It was the requirement of the Labour 
Department that these unions remained localized and craft based, as an 
attempt to avoid the labour problems faced up toi 1950.
The early 1950s trade unions were generally formed from below. The 
nationalist influence in the formation of trade unions first became 
apparent in Mwanza, where after the banning of all TANU activities by 
the government in 1954, TANU activists such as Bhoke Munanka turned to 
the formation of trade unions as a possible vehicle for advancement of 
nationalist goals.170 It was within such a context that there was an 
attempt to register a territorial "Federation of all workers and Trade 
Unions".171 The Labour Department refused to register it on the grounds 
that there had been no consultations between the organizers and the 
registered unions which according to the Mwanza Labour Officer, had no 
desire to participate in such amalgamation. From here efforts 
concentrated on the formation of localized craft based unions. 10 unions
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had applied for registration by the end of 1954 of which 7 were 
registered in March 1955.172
In Dar es Salaam, the African clerks unions in private commercial 
firms and the civil service, which existed as counterparts of Asian and 
European Associations, were able to survive during the period of 
suppression of trade unions because they existed as no more than social 
clubs of the educated elite with little trade union inclinations.173 
Their main demand was equal treatment with Asians. The impetus for the 
formation of TFL came finally from the educated elites, and what they 
did was to attempt to almagamate the existing trade unions. 30 delegates 
from 11 unions attended the meeting which ended up in the formation of 
TFL in October 1955. Of these, two-thirds came from predominantly white- 
collar unions and staff associations. In spite of the opposition by the 
Labour Department which was in favour of small localized unions; TFL was 
highly successful.
As a territorial movement, TFL was formed from above— by the 
educated elite rather than the rank and file, and its leadership was 
predominantly white-collar and clerical workers. According to 
Friedland's study, by 1960, 83 per cent of the full-time leaders were 
white-collar and clerical workers— while over 70 per cent of the 
workforce consisted of unskilled workers.17* Kawawa who became the 
General Secretary of TFL soon after its formation was to recount later 
that, while the government was opposed to the formation of TFL, it also 
tried to win the leadership by organizing trade union courses. The 
leadership attended them initially but boycotted them within no time 
because the government was teaching them how to keep accounts, "but not 
how to bargain with employers."176
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Although, as in the Lake Province (Mwanza and areas around Lake
Victoria) the role of the' nationalists is clear in terms of their
attempts to form trade unions, and TFL was formed and manned by
predominantly white-collar employees, TFL did not commit itself
organizationally to TANU. This was in spite of the fact that TFL
endorsed TANU's goal of independence at an early stage. The two
organizations were separate and distinct. In fact, "the degree to which
TANU played a part in the formation and organization of TFL or any
unions was ’minimal".176 Kawawa, for example, who was the General
Secretary of TFL, like all civil servants was not a member of TANU when
TFL was formed. He became a member of TANU when he became a full-time
leader of TFL after relinquishing his position in the government.177
More than that was the fact that union leaders such as Kawawa or Michael
Kamaliza who were engaged simultaneously in TANU and the trade unions
raised some doubts "in the minds of union leaders as to the
appropriateness of their actions".17e In an annual conference held on
5th-7th October 1956, TFL resolved that:
'no Trade Union which is affiliated with TFL should affiliate 
itself with TANU at the moment'. Another resolution stated that, 
at the moment, trade union leaders should not accept positions 
of leadership in political organizations, and the trade union 
movement should be represented in the Legislative Council.173
The formation of the government sponsored UTP in 1956, which was 
dominated by government sponsored expatriate settlers, particulary the 
sisal plantation owners, was an impetus behind TFL’s endorsement of 
TANU's main feature— a call for independence without openly supporting 
it by 1957. The TFL general meeting in July 1957 resolutions demanded 
that Africans be left to govern themselves and a date for Tanganyika's
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independence be fixed. The resolutions demanded that Africans be given
the right to vote so as to establish a majority government:
Workers and unions cannot keep away from government affairs 
because we are citizens like other people. Our unions are not 
political but we must be given opportunity to express our views 
and be heard on all issues concerning our lives and the progress 
of the country. Our unions must have representatives in the 
Legislature of the country to speak on behalf and defend the 
rights of workers.1®0
This stance was also fuelled by the government's struggle against
TFL. In 1956 the government introduced "An Ordinance to Provide for the
Registration.and Control of Trade Unions and Matters relating Thereto",
in an attempt to control and regulate the activities of TFL and the
mushrooming trade unions. Mr Sanders who moved the Bill explained:
The Bill now before the House is in no wise, as has been 
suggested in certain quarters, intended to restrict or inhibit 
the proper development of trade unions, but rather designed to 
provide clear guidance backed by statute as the manner in which 
such organizations should guide their affairs in order to bring 
nearer to practical realization of the aim of Government policy, 
which is that the conclusion of freely negotiated collective 
agreement should be possible between organizations of workers 
and employers which provide for terms and conditions of 
employement which are acceptable to the majority of the workers 
in craft or industry and are also economically practicable from 
the point of view of the employer.1®1
In order to avoid general strikes, which would probably involve the
workers of the whole country, the Bill emphasized the need for trade
unions to maintain autonomy from TFL. TAMU leaders who were in the LEGCO
by then, like Paul Bomani and other Africans, neither opposed nor
supported the Bill on the pretext that it was introduced without the
consultation of trade union leaders for consideration; and some European
members saw the Bill as a manifestation of the failure of the government
to resist pressure from a Party which was in power a few years back and
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the society behind it— people with "Fabian tendencies, and from a
certain organization in New York."1®2
The object of the Bill was to deal with "undesirable" forms of trade 
unions. The Bill was passed, because the urgency arose from the fact 
that there was a wave of strikes throughout this period. For example, 
there were 21 strikes with 3,927 workers involved and 5,205 man days 
lost in 1955 in the Tanganyika Sisal Estates alone; and 22 strikes with 
3,596 workers involved and 9,101 man days lost in 1956 in the same
estates.1,33 In 1956, the local government workers in Dar es Salaam 
threatened to strike for wages increase and a cost-of-living allowance. 
The deadline of the strike expired on the day that Princess Margaret was
scheduled to begin a formal visit in Tanganyika in October 1956. The
political manifestations of this act and the action itself angered the 
government very much. According to the government, this action was 
probably a result of the nationalist influence.1SA In the same year, the 
quarry workers of Kunduchi had gone on a strike; it was the first time 
that the workers went on a strike officially and won.1SS Soon after 
Princess Margaret's visit the hotel employees and domestic workers in
Dar es Salaam went on strike for outstanding wage demands. When the
government advised the employers to sack them, the workers in the
construction, commercial and industrial activities went on strike in 
sympathy with the domestic workers.iee Broadly, there was a sense of 
general strike in 1956, because, even the Dar es Salaam Dockworkers and 
Stevedores and Tanga Dockworkers threatened a strike in support of the 
striking workers by December of the year.lor
Given such a situation, in the course of the introduction of the 
above mentioned Bill, one colonial official rightly remarked: "...at
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present we are going through a difficult period.... I must emphasize that 
at present we must exercise restraint". It was also remarked by another 
official that, "some of the exorbitant demands being made are to benefit 
nobody and illiberal increases of wages without corresponding increase 
in output is beyond the capacity of this territory to stand."1ee There 
was an amendemnt of the Bill in 1957, in an attempt to centralize and
control TFL in terms of finances and other activities. In sum, while
between 1951 and 1955 there was an average of 60 strikes per annum;
between 1956 and 1960 there was an average of 146 strikes per annum with
an average of 59,457 workers involved every year.108
The close alliance between TANU and TFL in 1957 was further boosted 
by the Dar es Salaam Motors Transport Worker's strike of March-April 
1957 for wage increases. The workers went on strike, and the employer 
attempted to use European and Asian labour to maintain the operation of 
services. As a result of this, the unions called for a boycott of the 
buses. TANU played a significant role by "organizing the communication 
network [and] calling on Africans to support the boycott. Because of the 
success of the boycott, the strike ended after 24 days in a victory for 
the union.180
TANU also played a role in the beer strike of 1958 in Dar es Salaam. 
Early that year, the Commercial and Industrial Workers Union had 
demanded a minimum wage of Shs 150/= per month for its members from East 
African Breweries. When the employers refused to heed the demands the 
270 workers went on a two days strike from 16th March. The employer was 
forced to negotiate, but refused to pay more than Shs 72/= to 80/= per 
month. In April the workers staged another strike. This time the 
employer used European, Asian and Somali blackleg labour and harrassed
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the workers by evicting those who were staying in company houses with 
the assistance of the district authorities.'81 On the 24th April 1958 
TFL came out with a statement appealing to all residents of Dar es 
Salaam to boycott drinking of European beer of any kind, because Asians 
and Somalis were breaking the strike and had ignored the call for co­
operation. Blackleg labour was being paid Shs 26/= per day with food and 
beer. TANU supported the boycott and the strike. The boycott was very 
successful, and the employer was forced to negotiate.
When the workers were being evicted from Breweries Quarters, TFL in 
revenge campaigned for African landlords to evict Asians, Arabs and 
other non-African tenants from their houses. A number of landlords did 
this. The government became very frightened with this move, and it was 
forced to interfere by advising the employer against accepting the wage 
demands of Shs 150/= per month for fear that it would have repercussions 
on the government wage structure.182 The strike lasted some six weeks 
and the boycott was effective for four weeks. The demands were finally 
accepted. It was finally agreed that the minimum wage should be at Shs 
130/=.183
The sisal industry accounted for 46 per cent of the total industrial 
disputes, 75 per cent of the total number of workers involved and 77 per 
cent of total man days lost in 1957 and 1958.18A The employers under the 
Tanganyika Sisal Growers Association had resisted their demands: to
recognize their unions and increase wages— and at times threatened to 
use the police to break the workers strikes as they did in Korogwe in 
1958.18S While most strikes took a relatively short period to end in 
the sisal industry, one of the strikes which took a long time was that 
of the workers at Mazinde. This strike started on November 25th, 1958
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and lasted for 68 days. It involved 2,500 workers. The estate manager
was a member of UTP who was against trade unions and TANU and went as
far as repatriating the workers when they staged a strike. TFL and TANU 
intervened by supporting the workers. Already there were rumours that 
the Tanga Dock and Stevedore Workers Union was planning to boycott 
imports and exports from Mazinde Estates.178 On the 17th December 1958, 
TFL called for a three year boycott of the Mazinde Estates; but the
leadership of TANU surprisingly, "pointed out that the conflict was 
limited to the Mazinde Estate and was not a battle between all 
plantation workers and all employers." It backed the boycott of the 
Estate and called upon African workers to support the strikers with food 
and housing.187 The removal of the workers from the estate and the
refusal to enlarge the conflict beyond Mazinde, weakened the Union's 
bargaining power. The leader of the sisal workers was Mr Victor Mkello, 
who was to be at loggerheads with the independent government as a leader 
of TFL later on.
The labour movement was very crucial in the struggles for 
independence in the 1950s. Besides endorsing the demand for 
independence, it used its organizational "machinery to build up TANU, 
being specifically effective in membership recruitment. TFL's large 
membership and nation-wide organization provided a ready made structure 
for rallying political support in both urban and plantation areas 
especially when TANU was suffering setbacks and its branches were being 
closed by the government".188 It was the wave of strikes— especially on 
the European plantations in 1956, 1957 and 1958— which had led to the 
tremendous strengthening of TANU in this period. There were some trade 
unionists who even took part in membership drive for TANU. 188 When TANU
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threatened to "take a 'positive action' should the British government 
fail to grant responsible self-government in 1959", TFL was ready to 
call a country-wide general strike in support of TANU's demand for self- 
government. 200
The Tabora TANU Conference of 1958 endorsed TANU's participation in 
the elections which were to take place in the same year and the 
following. In this Conference, TANU acknowledged "the services the 
labour organizations render in areas where Tanu was banned", and that, 
therefore "it suited the party to keep the two movements separate." TFL 
was given two seats in the central committee of TANU in the same year, 
and at the same time insisted that no TANU official could be an office 
bearer in the unions.201 With the September general elections which 
ushered into the LEGCO 15 TANU supported candidates out of 15 seats 
against the UTP, there was nothing else for the British to do but to 
announce in October 1958 that Tanganyika would develop as an African 
state. "On a wider front, the years 1958-9 were the time when in all 
parts of Tanganyika Tanu followers were talking about kugoma, which is a 
Swahili word meaning 'to strike'". This was taken very seriously by 
Richard Turnbull, the new governor from 1958 who was determined to stamp 
out "romantic lawlessness"; and prompted the concessions to the demands 
which TANU put forward.202
The efforts to promote rural development through the coercion of 
peasants— the land usage rules of terracing, cattle culling and dipping, 
etc.— were abandoned by 1958 as a result of the riots in Morogoro in 
1955, resistance in Usukuma from 1955, resistance in Iringa from 1957, 
resistance in Mbulu, Mlalo, Usambara and other areas. That is, by 1958, 
there was "nearly universal breakdown of the government's efforts to
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secure the enforcement of these rules and orders..."203 The universal 
breakdown was also reflected by this year in the blows the government 
was suffering from the working class. As a consequence of all this, the 
government failed completely to impose even its multi-racial policies, 
and in 1958, after the departure of Sir Edward Twining, the new 
Governor, Sir Richard Turnbull announced that Tanganyika would develop 
as primarily African. This announcement was made soon after TANU's 
victory in the 1958 elections— elections which were based on income and 
education, dqspite TANU's protest.
Nyerere was to recall later that 1958 was the turning point for the 
nationalists. This was after the election "results showed the 
irresistability of [their] overwhelming popular movement and its 
leadership...the British decided to co-operate." TANU's victory had 
confirmed the opinion that Tanganyika could govern themselves: "As a
result, the formal turning point came the next year, 1959, when the 
direction of political power was explicitly settled."20,4 In March 1959, 
Turnbull appointed five ministers from among the elected LEGCO members. 
Chief Fundikira, George Kahama and Solomoni Eliufoo were the three 
Africans among the ministers. The remaining two were an Asian member and 
a European member, all of them members of TANU or supported by it during 
the elections. The two non-African ministers were supporters of TANU. In 
the August 1960 general elections based on the same franchise as the 
1958-9 elections, TANU won 70 seats out of 71. Nyerere became the Chief 
minister.
The participation of TANU in the elections and the debates which had 
taken place in the decision to do so, to which Nyerere was committed, 
had resulted in the first breakaway of some members of TANU. Zuberi
Mtemvu, a one time organizing secretary of TANU decided to form the 
African National Congress (ANC) which held the policy of Africa for 
Africans only and self-government for Africans only.208 Besides 
attracting very few members— among whom was Christopher Tumbo who was 
later to become a leader in TFL, F.E. Omldo who in the early 1950s was 
trying to organize trade unions in Arusha, and a few others— the ANC was 
not really effective even by the time it was formed. This party was a 
"violent racialist group" of people who did not want the idea of TANU or 
Africans voting for Asians and Europeans who sympathized with the 
nationalists.208 There were Asians who as early as 1956 supported the 
nationalists in Tanganyika. This was also the case with some Europeans. 
For example, the Asian paper, Crossroads, of 20th August 1957 (No 2) 
praised the nomination of Nyerere to LEGCO in 1957 as of utmost 
importance, and there were Europeans such as D. Bryceson who supported 
TANU.207 Asians who vacilated and those who looked upon the Europeans as 
eternal rulers were attacked by the Asian Association from 1956: "the 
days of sitting on the fence are gone. Ve have to make a decision and 
act."20s In the same year Nyerere had made an "impassionate appeal to 
Europeans and Asians in Tanganyika to forget their fears of black 
domination to co-operate with TANU towards creation of a happy multi­
racial state which could well be the wonder of Africa." He assured them 
that their rights and freedom would be safeguarded.208
TANU's victory in the elections in 1958 marked the beginning of 
"peaceful transition" to independence marked by "non-violent methods". 
Nyerere was to write in 1966 that "[until] the end of the nineteen- 
fifties. .. TANU was campaigning for equality from motives of expedient 
self-interest. As that decade drew to a close, however, the test came.
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Were those who claimed equality for themselves willing to accept the
other side of the coin— the equality of others?"210 Richard Turnbull, 
who recognized the war which had been waged all along against the
administration, sought to negotiate with the nationalists and get them 
to accept some of the changes. By March 1959 the government was faced
with either having to declare a state of emergency— given the threat of
a general strike— or to set a date for responsible self-government.211 
There was already a state of emergency in Geita District, where people 
had "dismissed their chiefs and the police had tear-gassed the people in 
1958".212 Self-government was finally achieved in 1960; the same year 
when elections were to take place again on the same franchise as the 
previous elections. Turnbull's concern was more or less an echo of what 
Mr Jimmy Betts of the Fabian Colonial Bureau had written to Mr H. Beer, 
a conservative settler critic and totally opposed to nationalists:
"Perhaps we are inclined to pay more attention than you do to the young
African Nationalist leaders, because although we realise that they 
sometimes make regretably extremest statements, we are also aware that 
the discredited leaders of today may be ministers of tomorrow."213
After the 1958 victory, TANU's major concern became that of the 
transition from opposition to authority and the question of
Africanization of the government; unity and liberation of Africa in
general (Pan-Africanism); and economic development.214- From 1958 TANU 
stood for government ownership of land and water and opposed the 
leasehold system, championed the eradication of poverty, ignorance and 
disease.218 These latter issues were conjoined with the question of 
pressing for "full industrialization and enhancement of co-operative 
methods and control of the major means of production by the peoples
themselves through their democratically instituted government", as it 
was put in the Freedom Charter of the Peoples of East and Central Africa 
(PAFMECA) in 1958 in Mwanza218 From around this time, the main concern 
was with the establishment of the economic base. According to TANU, it 
was only the efforts of Africans which would make this possible. It was 
necessary for the Central Committee to make efforts to establish co­
operative movements; encourage traders to form co-operatives; help 
Tanganyika African Traders Union (TATU) which was formed in 1956; urge 
the government to raise the incomes of Africans, to encourage people to 
acquire loans for economic enterprises or building houses; and urge the 
government to lessen the stringent rules governing the giving of loans 
to Africans.217
TANU had expressed the view that while it was opposed to land 
alienation to individual non-Africans, it was quite willing to accept 
lease of land to non-African commercial corporations if beneficial to 
the country's economy. Otherwise, it was the peasants who had a 
limitless potential capacity to contribute to the economy.218 Tanganyika 
was to build a society in which the colour of a person had no meaning: 
"The division of any society into 'haves' and 'have nots' 
is...dynamite." In Tanganyika, this division was aggravated by its 
identification with the racial division also. "The 'haves' here are 
generally the immigrant minorities; the 'have nots' are the indigenous 
majorities." This was considered to be very dangerous, and it was 
necessary to rectify the situation in as humanly way as possible.218 
When TANU held a meeting in Tanga in November 1959 the paramount 
questions were: the governing of the country— in relation to whether
TANU was ready for that; and the need to formulate policies on
education, economic development, social development, etc. It was agreed 
that an economic expert was to be invited to Tanganyika to advise; and 
development was to be the major pre-occupation of the new government.220 
The main slogan by this time became: "Freedom and Work". The TANU
leaders got economic advise from Western sources. These policies will be 
discussed in the next chapter.
It was in July 1960 when TANU's National Executive announced that 
opposition to capitalism and support for "African democratic socialism" 
and the co-operative model of development was to be adopted by the new 
government. It was accepted that where co-operative methods could not be 
used, the capitalists would play the role.221 This announcement came out 
when an era of conflict between the nationalists and the trade union
movement had begun. The conflicts began with TANU's refusal to support a
series of protracted strikes; in some cases it even stood against the 
workers. These conflicts will be reviewed in the next chapter.
5.4 Conclusion
What can be observed from the discussion so far is the fact that the
1950s struggles and the triumph of nationalism also carried seeds of
conflict with the workers and peasants. This aspect became even more 
apparent with the victory of the nationalists after 1958, The conflict 
was inherent in the nature and logic of the struggles by the 
nationalists and those of the workers and peasants; given the general 
social conditions of the territory. During the transition, the 
nationalists were attempting to put into practice what they earnestly 
believed would result in the modernization of the country— what they had 
championed since 1930s and 1940s. Their victory was not a result of
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individual efforts, but spontaneous, irresistable manifestations of 
national wants and necessities more or less comprehended, but very 
distinctly felt by the various classes in the territory.
What was happening, in terms of the relations between the working 
people and the nationalists as soon as the latter began to go into 
power, was not betrayal of aspirations— in so far as the nationalists 
were part of the "modernizing process" and they believed in the 
modernization of the country. Taken as a betrayal or a contradiction, 
then it is simply impossible to grasp the essence of the struggles which 
started taking place between the working masses and the nationalists 
during the transition, as it has already been hinted, and were to 
continue after independence.
The leadership of the nationalist movement was allowed to 
participate in the power machinery after 1958; and that was just the 
question. To grasp why the nationalists were taking such a cause during 
the transition, let us examine the state of the Tanganyikans at the eve 
of independence— i.e. the composition of the people who formed the 
groundwork of the political and social organizations behind the 
nationalist movement. The bourgeoisie in Tanganyika was pretty 
fragmented. In manufacturing, there were the massive foreign and Asian 
community investments especially since the post-Vorld War II period. 
According to the 1961 industrial census which covered industrial 
establishments irrespective of size, there were 1,026 manufacturing 
establishments in the country. Of these, only 68 establishments or 6.6 
per cent were considered as large scale— in the sense that they had an 
annual bill of £50,000 or more. The Asian bourgeoisie were the richest 
local capitalists, and were predominant in manufacturing before 1945—
"except for those industries at the two extremes— those requiring least 
and most capital— despite the tendency for the state to constrain 
them from entering the manufacturing sector. Their dominance received a 
new impetus from the post-Vorld Var II government policies which 
encouraged industrialization.
In the 1930s, the Chamber of Commerce section of the Indian 
Association had passed the resolution that it was undesirable for the 
colonial state to press for further development of co-operatives, since 
it was premature given the economic conditions of the territory. It 
advised the government to do so only when the territory’s economy had 
been placed "on a basis of intensive and extensive protection and 
industrial development so that the trading population which might be 
displaced by the co-operative institutions might be suitably absorbed in 
other spheres of economic fabric of the territory."223 Up to the 1950s, 
Asian industries were owned by one family or in partnership,but towards 
the end of this decade, "Tanganyika Asians began to finance their bigger 
projects by forming partnerships with foreign firms, or more often, with 
Asians in Kenya and Uganda."22"1 An example of the latter is the Chande 
family of Tanganyika which expanded to a local monopoly position in the 
1960s and 1970s as a result of being tied to the Madhvani family of 
Uganda through marriage arrangements.
From 1955, there commenced a vigorous movement by Asians into 
manufacturing, because Africans were increasingly moving into the 
commercial sector, By 1961, Africans who held retail trade licences 
numbered 34,581 as opposed to approximately 7,500 Asians— although the 
latter still controlled two-thirds of the trade.22S Increased 
participation of Africans in trade was one of the major demands of the
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nationalists, and the struggles of African traders against the Asian 
commercial capitalists and the state's action against them had started 
in the 1920s. In the 1958 resolutions, TANU had pledged to support the 
Tanganyika African Traders Union which was formed in 1956. But trade and 
commerce in general could not stand on its own nor be able to develop 
without development of productive investment— e.g. manufacturing, 
construction, etc.
Local manufacturing interests had become strong enough to force the 
unwilling government to notice them especially after the Second World 
War, given the necessity to establish local processing industries and 
Import Substitution Industrialization as a result of the crisis which 
gave birth to "modernizing imperialism". These manufacturing activities, 
local or foreign or joint, were intimately linked with imports and 
exports and they had little or no interest in common with the necessity 
of creation of a "national economy"— besides demands for protection, as 
was demonstrated by the example of Kilombero Valley discussed above. 
Certainly, the demands for industrialization of the country as 
championed by the nationalists were quite promising to the manufacturing 
bourgeoisie. The nationalists' struggles to participate in trade meant 
the Asian commercial bourgeoisie had to move into manufacturing and 
other non-agricultural activities which were quite essential to the 
nationalists. Thus, the support by a substantial section of the Asians 
for the nationalists in the 1950s was rooted in the complementarity of 
interests.
If anything, the Asians and foreign capital had to be defended for 
the sake of development of the country within the nationalist 
conceptions of development. What all this meant was, Africans could
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enter into commerce and Asians could pursue the manufacturing interests. 
Asians' support of the nationalists was based on the fact that the 
development of their most important interests were checked by the 
colonial political constitution of the territory: by its racial division 
with conflicting tendencies and caprices; the colonial fetters upon 
industry and trade; and superintendence of their activities by the 
state. Thus the passing to nationalist opposition. This change may be 
dated from mid-1950s when some Asians began urging others not to stand 
on the fence but support the nationalists, as was pointed out above. 
Given the victory of the nationalists, by 1959 Asians from all over East 
Africa were flocking into Tanganyika, escaping the threatening situation 
of their interests in other countries.228
The small traders and small capitalists were exceedingly numerous in 
Tanganyika. This was a very important section of the population in 
nationalist politics because of its intermediate position between 
capitalists, traders, manufacturers, workers, etc. While this section 
aspired to become capitalists, its individual members were being hurled 
down to the working class position. It was this class which played a 
very significant role in terms of mobilization of rural grievances—  
those of the poor peasantry and semi-proletarians. To all these 
sections, national independence had advantages to offer. But these rural 
sections could only be organized above all in general, by the urban 
nationalists, given their conditions of dispersion over a great space 
and their diverse interests.
Let us now turn to the working class. As can be observed from the 
above exposition, while its movement and advanced struggles date back to 
the late 1930s, this movement was never independent— never exclusively
proletarian in character because of the colonial capitalist and 
paternalistic relations of domination. The conflicts between the 
employer and the employed were also conlicts between the colonizer and 
the colonized and Africans against the Europeans and Asians. This 
resulted in the working class finally tailing behind the nationalists in 
the late 1950s, although it still maintained its independence as a 
class. The working class, like other classes, had advantages to gain 
from independence, but unlike the other sections of the population, it 
had reached ‘ a position whereby it could organize itself and wage 
decisive battles. This is demonstrated by the 1947 General strike for 
example, and the struggles which followed after that— also the threat 
for a general strike in 1958-9. And the nationalists were aware of this 
power— given that the government was the largest employer besides the 
immigrant nationalities in general.
The political movement of the nationalists or the bourgeois elements 
(the educated and the wealthy), created by the colonial transformations, 
may be dated from the 1940s, as has been shown so far. Under the 
colonial forms of domination, they had reached a stage which could no 
longer allow them to be passive and apathetic given the pressure from 
both above and below. Their utter impotence in the working class 
upsurges between 1947-50 and their significance by their writings and 
particular forms of criticism of the colonial regime could not pass 
unnoticed by the colonial government as a sign of their importance 
politically. Their literature had demonstrated nothing more than the 
necessity to integrate European and African "Civilization" which was 
not contradictory to western civilization. Literary production of the 
intelligentsia teemed with this tendency. Their political opposition was
a mixture of ill-digested African civilization as synthesized and 
systematized by the missionaries, colonial administrators, 
anthrolopologists, European 'humanists in general and the British Fabian 
socialist tendencies.Behind this was the influence of "modernizing 
imperialism" under the post World War II British Labour government which 
was viewed as a supporter of the reforms in the colonies.227 Lastly, the 
most complicated was the developmentalist/modernization tendencies—  
which declared development and the welfare of the colonial subjects as 
the ultimate* goal of the civilizing mission. These were to culminate in 
the Pan-Africanst tendencies which embodied Africanist, socialist and 
modernizing themes. The Pan-Africanist socialist tendencies had become a 
fashion in the 1950s, they were a result of the translation of the 
Fabian socialists thinking since the 1940s as a synthesis for a 
humanistic solution to the social questions which involved class, race 
and colonial domination. Within these conceptions, the state acquired a 
centrality in effecting or not effecting processes of development and 
social change. It was the educated classes and those, whose position in 
life enabled them to gain some political information from the government 
or the Fabian Colonial Bureau, etc. and form opinions against the
colonial system and hence oppose the slowness of the reforms, who could 
become the leaders of the mass of the Tanganyikan people.
By 1958 the colonial government realized that it could not continue
to reign without making concessions to the popular demands of
representation in the LEGCO and responsible self-government— the 
forgotten promise of Sir D. Cameron in the 1920s Indirect Rule
doctrines. Thus the elections which ushered into the state Africans, 
Europeans and Asians; the former being the nationalists and the latter
their supporters. Given the crisis prevalent by 1958, it became 
necessary to co-opt the nationalists who had already drawn the support 
of the rebelling working masses.
It. was the educated classes which went into office after 1958. As
nationalists, they professed to hold power in trust of the whole
population. With ascension to power, the classes of the society began to
divide themselves and the nationalists began to turn around upon their
former allies, assuming an indifferent or hostile attitude against every
class or organization which contradicted the "modernization" goals, and
concluded alliance with the colonial and bureaucratic interests. These
aspects will become even more obvious in the next chapter where the
struggles between the state and the working people are shown. The new
rulers proclaimed that they embodied the essence of equality, education,
development and science and were waging a war against ignorance, disease
and poverty. The aspects of the struggle against the trio of enemies—
poverty, disease and ignorance— in essence summed up the assumptions of
modernization/development and the general thinking of the educated in
general. There was no divergence from the early colonial thinking:
"poverty and ignorance are always linked in English and other European
languages" in which ignorance is taken to mean lack of knowledge and
proper culture. While poverty can be a fact and a reality,
However, the myth that poverty somehow results from ignorance is 
an elitist, ethnocentric interpretation of an international 
problem, the roots of which lie not in reality but in prevalent 
middle-class attitudes originating in the North. These attitudes 
are espoused by professionals educated in European tradition.228
With the nationalists assuming power, another crucial dimension was 
added in the conceptualization of the state. Like in any bourgeois 
state, the new members were bequeathed with the principles of a
"rational bureaucracy" in which power and wealth had to be separated, 
because the government was supposed to work for the people in general 
without identifying itself with any group of people or class. Thus the 
Governor was to issue leadership rules which were prepared by the
Colonial Office for the newly elected ministers in 1959. There is a 
striking similarity between these leadership rules and the Leadership 
Code which came out with the Arusha Declaration in 1967; and although 
it will be discussed again in the next chapter, it is worth mentioning 
their content here. These rules demanded that leaders should not be 
directors of commercial enterprises; should not be employed or in
receipt of salaries from trade unions or co-operative unions; should not 
involve themselves in businesses which will interfere with their 
ministerial jobs; should not use secret information obtained within 
their positions for their own benefit or that of their friends; should 
not support any project/plan in which they hope to benefit; should not 
use their positions to favour people where justice is required; should 
not buy shares in companies; and should not announce news or write books 
or articles in newspapers while still ministers.228
Development/modernization as such, as shown earlier, was the 
ideology of the post-Vorld War II period. It was the ideology of the
bourgeoisie which saw development in terms of industrialization of the
colonies and the ex-colonies and the systematic transfer of resources 
from the "traditional" to the "modern" sector, with capital and 
technology being injected from the Vest for development. This would 
result in rising standards of the people as measured by GDP. Therefore, 
the nationalists were not neutral, and they had consistently championed 
the same interests as exemplified by their attitudes towards the peasant
rebellions. Independence was to mark the beginning of the process to 
disarm the working population, starting with the working class which 
was the most organized.
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Adamu na Hawa walipoumbwa walipewa amri za kufuata ili 
waweze kuishi maisha mema. Katika bustani ya Eden waliambiwa 
wanaweza kula matunda ya mti wowote 'bali matunda ya wa 
katikati kamwe hamtakula. Siku mtakapoyala matunda ya mti wa 
katikati kufa mtakufa. ' Sasa Bwana Makoloni ametoa amri 
ambazo Mawaziri wetu wakizivunja watang'olewa bila ngoja 
katika baraza la mawaziri.
Matunda ya mti wa katikati ambayo Mawaziri wetu hawana 
kula ni:-
1. Kusimamia kampuni yoyote ya biashara;
2. Kuajiriwa au kupokea mshahara katika vyama vya 
wafanyakazi au ushirika;
3. Kujiingiza katika mambo ya biashara ambayo yanaweza 
kuhitilafiana na kazi za uwaziri;
4. Kutumia habari za siri ambazo wanapata katika uwaziri kwa 
kujipatia faida wenyewe au kuwapatia faida rafiki zao;
5. Kuunga mkono mpango wowote ambamo wanatumainiwa kupata 
faida;
6. Kutumia vyeo vyao ili kuwapendelea watu katika haki;
7. Kupokea rushwa;
8. Kununua hisa katika biashara;
9. Kutangaza habari kwa simu ya upepo au kutunga vitabu au 
kuandika makala katika magazeti wakati wowote wanaposhika 
uwaziri.
The Editor accepted the usefulness of most of these rules, 
except number 8 and 9. He could not see the reason why ministers 
should not own shares in commercial enterprises or write 
articles, even if they would favour those enterprises. His 
argument was that such a denial was a denial of citizen rights: 
were they to sell the shares they already held? the Editor 
quipped.
CHAPTER SIX
Independence and the Institutionalization of Ujamaa
Chapter Six
INDEPENDENCE AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF UJAXAA 
With the triumph of the nationalists in the 1958 and 1959 elections, 
the differences between the nationalists and the working people began to 
come to the fore. These differences resulted in intense struggles at the 
eve of independence and after. The struggles by the state against the 
workers were waged under the banner of development of the country and 
the welfare of the peasants. In the process of fighting the workers, 
from the very, early days, questions about poverty, the sufferings of the 
people, universal brotherhood, education, economic development and 
reconciliation and welfare of all social groups were raised within the 
context of socialism. These struggles were to culminate in the 
breaking of the autonomy of the mass and social organizations. In this 
process it was the democratic revolution which was being defeated, and 
the state, at the same time, was being raised to a "monolithic organ 
epitomized in the concentration of power in the execuctive"1
This chapter outlines the struggles which took place from around the 
eve of independence to the promulgation of the Arusha Declaration in 
1967. At the same time, it shows the changing ideological forms within 
those struggles. Attempts are also made to shoW, the way the working 
masses were defeated, and the particular interests which were being 
defended by the ideology of Ujamaa.
6.1 The Nationalists, the Workers and Development
As far back as 1957, to the nationalists, the major demands were: 
self-government and development of the country. This amounted to a 
democratic majority rule government which protected the minority rights-
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-those of the Asians and Europeans— and equal and fair treatment under
the law. By 1956 the Asian Association was advising its members not to
subscribe to the government-formed United Tanganyika Party (UTP); that
UTP's support for parity constitution amounted to entrenchment of racial
differences while its franchise proposals were counter to all democratic
principles. The Association had asserted:
As stated in the past, belief in non-racialism and nationhood is 
a matter of conviction with us, and not expediency. Ve take this 
opportunity of reiterating these principles and are prepared to 
join hands with others in taking practical steps to achieve the 
nationhood of Tanganyika, without presumptions, without 
reservations and without fear.2
It was not the Asian Association only which supported TANU: even among
the Europeans, it was mostly the settlers who still thought in terms of
domination of Africans who did not support TANU.3 After 1957, many
Europeans were unwilling to support every British policy in Tanganyika:
they had reached a stage where they accepted a timetable for political
reforms.
From being viewed as extremists in their demands in the early days 
of the formation of the nationalist movement, Nyerere and TANU were by 
1958 being viewed as moderates. This was mainly because of TANU's 
attitude towards primary resistance on the one hand, and its support for 
the government's quest for law and order and its development programmes 
on the other. When protesting against the government's attempt to muzzle 
TANU in some areas which were rife with struggles in 1957, Nyerere 
admitted that the government had the right and obligation to keep order 
in the country: "'Ve preach all over the country obedience to Government 
and respect for authority, ' he said. In one of the speeches in 
question,. .. Nyerere had attacked certain aspects of government policy,
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but had exhorted his audience 'to be civilized' since it was the duty of 
all races to try and cooperate and live peacefully together in the
country."A
In Mwanza, where TANU had built itself up by soliciting support on 
the basis of opposition to government's agricultural policies as a 
threat to people's way of life, after the 1958 TANU victory in the
polls, the people took it that self-government was imminent and they 
increased opposition to all native authority rules. The situation had 
become so serious by November 1958 that Nyerere went to Mwanza to make a 
special appeal. In his address to a group of 10,000 people, he 
emphasized that law and order must be maintained: "TANU intends its
members to obey the laws of the country.... All other countries have 
laws, irrespective of the party in power". TANU's policy was not to 
disobey laws, and it was wrong to do so. "He added without further 
explanation that the 'TANU of today' was quite different from the 'TANU 
of yesterday.'"6
Europeans and Asians who were elected in the 1958 and 1959 polls 
were those who were backed by TANU. Among the successful Asian 
candidates were M.N. Rattansey and Amir Jamal, both leaders of the
Asian Association. Amir Jamal was to become a minister. Jamal maintained 
and argued that the only way for Asians to live in Tanganyika was to 
identify themselves with the indigenous majority. As for the European 
candidates, the most prominent was Derek Bryceson.6 The franchise 
qualifications in these elections were: 21 years of age or above and 
residence in the country of three years or more; possession of either 
educational training equivalent to standard VIII or higher, or an income
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of more than £150 per annum, or qualifying experience. The same
qualifications were used in the 1960 elections, despite TANU's protest.
By this time, it had become clear to the nationalists that for the 
territory to have political stability based on a rapidly expanding 
economy, Europeans and Asians had a major role to play. Beyond that, the 
last years of the 1950s also witnessed the attack by Nyerere and the 
nationalists on racialism whether in its scientific guise or otherwise, 
and urging of the immigrant nationalities to regard themselves as
Tanganyikans.7 To demonstrate genuineness in these respects, in the 1958 
campaigns, non-Africans were even invited to address meetings of TANU 
supporters.® Addressing the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and 
Central Africa (PAFMECA) in September 1959, Nyerere affirmed his stance 
on equal rights of all citizens regardless of race in the following 
terms:
Here we are, building up sympathy of the outside world on the 
theme of human rights. Ve are telling the world that we are
fighting for our rights as human beings. Ve gained the sympathy
of friends all over the world— in Asia, in Europe, in America—  
people who recognize the justice of our demands for human 
rights.... Are we going to turn round then, tomorrow after we 
have achieved independence and say, 'To hell with all this 
nonsense about human rights; we were only using that as a tactic 
to harness the sympathy of the naive'? Human nature is sometimes 
depraved I know but I dont believe it is depraved to that 
extent. I don't believe that the leaders of the people are going 
to behave as hypocrites to gain their ends, and turn round and 
do exactly the things which they have been fighting against. I 
say again to my friends the non-Africans in East Africa, that 
when we say we want to establish the rights of individuals in 
our countries, irrespective of race, we mean it.®
By 1959, through the Tanganyika Standard, some non-Africans were 
calling on TANU to open its membership to people of other races. The 
non-Africans were voicing their commitment to the nationalist
leadership. To many observers, racialism had practically vanished from
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the political scene by 1959; and the tendency was to regard everybody as 
a Tanganyikan, as a result of which Asians did not see any necessity for 
minority privileges politically.10 TANU membership for non-Africans was 
opened in 1960; and two Asians and one European were named to the new 
executive committee of the TANU parliamentary party. In October the same 
year, Tanganyika was granted "responsible government" when the new LEGCO 
met for the first time. The new LEGCO had 81 members, of which 52 were 
Africans, 16 Europeans, 11 Asians, 1 Arab and 1 Goan.
This first new LEGCO was marked by a developing gap between the TANU 
leadership and the nationalists on the back benches, as a result of the 
question of Africanization of the civil service. TANU had promised to 
carry out a programme of Africanization as quickly as possible, but by 
October 1960 it was voiced that TANU believed in localization rather 
than Africanization, i.e. preference was for local people of any race 
rather than Africans only. The pressure for Africanization had begun to 
build up within TANU, and it had become a major issue before 
independence, as the 1958 TANU Conference in respect to the question of 
participation in the elections had shown, given the racial parity issue 
in the elections, This had resulted in the formation of the splinter 
group— African National Congress <ANC>— whose motto was "Africa for 
Africans". It was the TANU back benchers who were the most vociferous in 
the opposition with support and pressure from the white collar 
government and East African High Commission employees.11 The opposition 
felt that the pace of Africanization was not rapid enough and advocated 
that Africans be given preference over non-Africans. At the same time, 
the state machinery was predominantly manned by Buropeans and Asians. 
Africans were mostly in the low clerical posts at best: "In the civil
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service Africans held 1,170 of the 4,452 senior and middle grade posts 
in 1961. The position in the professions was worse. In 1962 only 16 out 
of 184 physicians, one of 84 civil engineers, and 2 of 57 lawyers were 
Africans.!! ’2
The differences developed further when it came to the question of 
school integration in order to abolish the separate school system. This 
was in relation to the Education Ordinance of 1961, whereby it was 
proposed that the separate school system be dismantled within three 
years. The TANU government announced that this process of integration 
would take place gradually, at which C. K. Tumbo, the leader of the 
Railway Union declared: "I am for revolution. If we want integration, 
we should integrate, and we should not embark on half measures.M13 All 
these aspects were to be taken up again in 1961 when the National 
Assembly (formerly LEGCO) debated the government policy on Tanganyika 
citizenship.
The government had proposed that citizenship be granted 
automatically to any adult person who was born in Tanganyika, and any 
born of one or both parents neither of whom were born in Tanganyika was 
to be given two years to decide if he or she wished to become 
Tanganyikan citizen. The system of dual citizenship was to be ended. The 
opposition wanted to withhold citizenship from all non-Africans; even if 
their parents were Tanganyika-born they wanted them to apply on 
individual basis for citizenship. The opposition was profoundly 
suspicious of Europeans and Asians. The arguments of the opposition can 
be summarized in the words of one member of Parliament who was to become 
a regional commissioner and a parliamentary secretary:
I think 75 per cent of the non-African population still 
regard an African in Tanganyika as an inferior human being. Vhy
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is it so? It is because the white population has been dominating 
us, both economically and politically, and their neighbours, 
the Asians, have been economically dominating us, we
Africans.... Do you think the individual African forming the vast
majority of the population will agree to have equal rights with 
the Europeans and the Asians? My answer is no....All foreigners 
who are living in Tanganyika and have transferred their money to 
their home countries should within the period of five years 
bring their money back. I repeat... they must bring it back. From 
now on those foreigners who are rich...should contribute at 
least 15 per cent of their money to us, the Tanganyika JTational 
Fund.1A
In fact, the Citizenship Bill provoked anti-Commonwealth and racialist 
sentiments ampng those who were in the opposition.
Nyerere attacked those in the opposition as glorifiers of race just 
like Hitler, "the Verwoeds of South Africa", as racialists who saw it as 
perfectly all right to discriminate against Europeans and Asians, but 
wrong when it was an African who was being discriminated against. 
According to Nyerere, the crime of the world consisted in the
"oppression of man by man". It was the treatment by those in power of
those without power as if they were animals and not human beings, a
crime which they had been fighting against: "this government has 
rejected , and rejected completely any idea that citizenship with the
duties and the rights of citizens of this country are going to be based
upon anything except loyalty to this country."1®
Underlying these debates, in essence, was the question of capital 
accumulation/acquisition by the government for the improvement of the 
economy and the question of distribution of those resources between the 
different sections of the population. For the government, it was
absolutely imperative that the economy should expand rapidly; and this 
was the challenge facing the nationalists. The nationalists had been 
given economic advice by the World Bank, which drew up the Three Year
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Plan for the Development of Tanganyika (1961-64). The Plan had
recommended the country to embark upon Impart Substitution
Industrialization and industrialization for processing raw materials for
export. Because the government had limited resources, it had been
suggested that the only efforts which would yield effective results
would be to encourage private investment, and this should be greater
than government investment. To achieve the optimum industrial
development it had been recommended that the government must:
... maintain and enhance the presently favourable climate for 
private investment. This is necessary to encourage groups such 
as foreign investors, already established residents of 
'European' and 'Asian' descent and indigenous 'African' 
population to risk an investment of time and funds to develop 
Tanganyika's industrial potential. Ve found no evidence of 
government attitudes or policies inimical to industrial 
development; but, with independence and the natural desire to 
improve the economic status of the general population, however 
strong political pressure may develop against profits. Specific 
government action may be necessary to encourage public 
understanding of the complex factors which make industrial 
enterprise attractive to those who provide capital and 
management, as well as those who provide labour and raw material 
resources. In a very real sense, Tanganyika must sell its labour 
in the world market in competition with other countries.16
It was necessary for the government to offer special inducement to
accelerate expansion of industrial activities with a minimum drain upon
government resources, for example, by "tax reductions or exemptions;
protective tariffs; tariff rebates; aid in securing sites, building, and
raw materials; licencing; training grants; favourable loans; and even
subsidies."17 A public development corporation to attract additional
capital was also proposed.
The government passed a Foreign Investment Protection Act in 
1963.10 The Act incorporated all the above aspects. Besides that: .no 
industry could be nationalized without full compensation. The terms of
repatriation of earnings from Tanganyika and the protection of companies 
and shareholders in this Act, as pointed out in the 1967 A Short Guide 
to Investors, were in accordance with the principles of English 
Commercial Law.19 Opening the Association of Chambers of Eastern Africa 
in the same year, Nyerere told the members: "There is a great deal to be 
done in Tanganyika, the combined resources of the government and private 
investment are inadequate to do all these things which need doing in the 
country. I repeat, therefore, that the government wishes to work with 
private investors for the development of Tanganyika."20 Private 
investment, according to Nyerere, was required because of the need to 
improve the lives of the people of the country rather than a simple 
fancy for machines and "erecting complex systems of distribution and 
exchange" or because factories improve the scenery. The terms of the 
investors:
...when we say we want private investment on our own terms we do 
not imply a limitation on the purposes and practices of private 
investment in Tanganyika. Private capital cannot just 'take'; it 
cannot just exploit the workers or the society for the interests 
of the owners. Workers must have reasonable conditions, and 
salaries in proportion to their output in a well managed
concern. And they must have respect. These two things are
essential for the health of any enterprise in the new 
Tanganyika.21
Beyond that, "however good the conditions in a particular factory or 
industry," the workers could not be isolated from the rest of the 
society: "We are committed to a philosophy of African socialism, and
basic to this is the principle of human equality. One of our concerns
therefore, must be to prevent the growth of a class structure in our 
society..."22 This meant, it was essential to bridge the gap in incomes 
between those who are employed and the "vast mass" of the people 
existing at subsistence level. It was necessary to improve the wages and
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conditions at the "bottom of the economic scale, with the avowed 
intention of reducing the present inequalities of earnings," He 
concluded: "Let no one base a claim for increased income on the fact 
that his position has been worsened relatively to those below him— for 
it is our intention that it should be."23 These statements were in fact 
an affirmation of what he wrote in December 1959 on the need for foreign 
investments in the earliest stages of independence so as to "raise the 
standards of living of the common people here in the shortest possible 
time."2*
The arguments about reducing inequalities between the employed and 
the vast majority of the population working on the land were directed to 
the workers and their demands. So far, the discussion has laid the 
groundwork for a consideration of the workers struggles at the eve of 
independence and after.
The conflicts between the nationalists and the workers began with 
the nationalist victory in 1958-59. It started with TAJTU's refusal to 
support the strikes by the sisal workers in Tanga, the mine workers in 
Mwadui and the Railway and Postal workers. The biggest strike just 
before internal self government was the 82 days strike by the Railway 
workers which fallowed on the heels of the postal strike which had begun 
on 24th December 1959 and involved 1,250 workers. Both the Railway and 
Postal services were under the East African High Commission. Among the 
issues involved in these strikes was the political inaccessibility of 
the High Commission and its lack of sensitivity to local pressure, as 
one of the problems which exacerbated the situation.2® The East African 
Railways and Harbours was the largest service of the East African High 
Commission— an interterritorial body of the East African colonies
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administered and controlled from Nairobi with very little regional 
representational powers in the constitutient countries. When the Railway 
and Postal workers who pressed for wage demands, Africanization of jobs, 
housing, etc. went on strike in 1959, TANU did not support the workers 
as it had usually done before that.26 This enraged the unionists, 
because they could not understand why even at "TANU's accession to 
power, the management of the high commission services remained 
politically inaccessible." This resulted in demand by trade unionists 
that the High Commission be ended and the services taken over by 
Tanganyika ministers in the government.27 By June 1960, TANU was 
supporting the federation of East Africa and the High Commission was 
seen as the basis for future federation. This incident resulted in the 
split within TFL— between those who supported TANU (M. Kamaliza's 
faction) and those who were against it (K, Tumbo's faction). In the same 
year, the Mwadui Mine workers had called for a strike to demand high 
wages and improved conditions. They expected the support of a fully TANU 
government; instead, the TANU government stood against them.20
In the debates on Africanization TFL was part of the opposition. It 
believed that a direct and open policy of Africanization was the only 
way which could remove the racial imbalances in employment and enable 
African workmen to achieve progress.29 This issue was to develop through 
a series of crises, "in which unions implicitly threatened an ultimate 
seizure of the railways and the sisal plantations".30 There were 203 
industrial disputes in 1960 which involved 89,000 workers; 101 disputes 
in 1961 involving 29,000 workers; and 153 disputes in 1962 involving 
48,000 workers.31 Thus the debates were taking place in the midst of a 
wave of strikes.
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The threats by the workers to take over the enterprises were not 
empty. After engaging in a series of strikes from the end of the 1950s, 
the Dar es Salaam Dockworkers and Stevedores had reached a point where 
they were transcending a purely industrial relations consciousness. They 
began to look on the possibility of replacing the private ownership of 
the enterpise. The enterprise was controlled by the East African Common 
Services Organization which owned a 51 per cent interest in the landing 
and shipping•company, and stevedoring was owned privately. According to 
Iliffe, the General Secretary of their Union— Mr Jfgahyoma— was by early 
1961 vaguely contemplating "some form of cooperative control" of the 
harbour:
He knew that there was a form of workers' control over ports in 
Israel, and during 1961 he visited Israel to study this. On his 
return late in 1961, Ngahyoma announced that the dockers would 
form a Docker Workers Welfare and Economic Investment Fund, to 
which each union member would contribute Shs. 500.00...This fund 
would finance two sorts of economic undertaking, cooperative 
welfare projects and the operation of the port...After 
discussing the proposal a general conference in June 1962 added 
to the union's aims those of making 'proper provision for the 
adequate participation of workers in the control and management 
of the industries' and assisting 'the formation of workers' 
cooperatives such as industrial cooperatives, Productive 
cooperatives, Consumers' cooperatives and such other 
cooperatives as will be deemed fit financially or otherwise thus 
taking the effective step towards the establishment of a truly 
democratic socialist state'....32
The workers finally succeeded in excluding private ownership in 1963,
but the government declared that the profits of the industry were to go
to the nation, and not the dockers.33 The sisal workers had also
threatened to take over the sisal plantations.
There were disturbing reports from the upcountry districts in 1960, 
for example, from Lake Province where Asian shopkeepers were being 
threatened. On several ocassions just before independence, the Minister
- 356 !-
for Home Affairs, George Kahama, had to warn the people against their
hostile behaviour to the immigrant nationalities and and urged them to
treat people of other races with respect. There was a possibility of
upcountry unrest, as the cases of Mbeya, Iringa and other places
demonstrated— where there were reprisals and violence.3* Besides the
strikes which were taking place, various unions, among the the teachers'
and medical workers' unions, were threatening strike action.3®
The government had to take a strong stance against all this. It was
necessary to do so because with independence approaching, the government
was already facing a financial crisis due to its depndency on British
funds for development purposes. Nyerere declared that the country could
not afford to meet the wage demands of the people. He threatened to
dismiss all the government workers who went on strike after their
demands had been considered. This statement provoked some of the most
"concentrated and persistent criticism Nyerere had ever faced".36
Through a circular letter in early 1961, Nyerere had informed the
trade unionists that trade unions formed a political wing of the party,
and that it was absurd for them to talk about independence from the
party. It was necessary for the party and the trade unions to co-operate
in order to achieve the desired goals.37 He was to repeat this message
in June 1961 when he pointed out that TANU and TFL are the same body,
and therefore inseparable:
If I try to walk from point A to B, by definition of 'walking', 
my legs will cooperate in taking me there; I do not even have to 
appeal to logic. Still less do I have to worry about whether the 
independence of my right or left leg is being undermined by its 
need to seek cooperation of the other! Either both legs are mine 
or they are not. If both are mine they must cooperate; to 
contemplate anything else is to contemplate absurdity. If,
however, I may indulge in such an absurdity for a moment, the
inference is obvious: if either one of my legs were to be
persuaded that too close co-operation with the other would be an
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infringement of independence, neither one of them would arrive 
anywhere at all! Similary, either the trade unions and political 
organization are prongs, or 'legs' of the same nationalist
movement or they are not. If they are, then the question of
whether they would or should not cooperate in getting the
country from point A to point B ‘does not arise. They must
cooperate.30
The workers and the trade unions were refusing to co-operate, because 
for them, "independence meant, among other things, independence or 
freedom to stage strikes" and demand higher wages and better living 
conditions.30
In the February 1960 Railway strike, which began in Dar es Salaam 
and involved all railway workers in all the towns, the workers were 
demanding higher wages and better working conditions, In Tanga, workers 
who refused to join the strike were beaten by the strikers, and 
passangers were threatened by the workers and people were called upon to 
boycott the trains and railway buses. Police patrols became necessary 
all over Tanga.*0 TFL supported the railway workers and condemned all 
Europeans and Asians who black-legged. The President of TFL expressed 
his shock at the actions of the Europeans and Asians for volunteering: 
"It is most unfortunate that while in Tanganyika leaders of all 
communities talk of how to build a country in which people of all 
origins and creeds shall live together in peace and as members of one 
nation, some elements engage themselves in perpetuating racial
prejudice".*1 The Asian Harbours Workers' Association asked its members 
not to blackleg after this appeal. The secretary of the Association 
wrote that they should not regard themselves as Tanganyikans if they did 
not support their African brothers in their utmost need: "It must be 
understood that our African brothers are fighting for a better living 
and as such no Asians should stand in their way."*2 Finally, it was only
Europeans who went on blacklegging. This strike ended after eleven and a 
half weeks, and it was a great blow to the national economy.
The railway strike was immediately followed by the postal strike in 
June 1960. This strike began in Dar es Salaam and spread to Morogoro, 
Dodoma, Iringa, Mbeya, Tabora, Mwanza and Bukoba. TFL supported the 
strike by giving Shs. 10/= to each worker per day. The strike went on 
for three weeks until the postal partially authority conceded the wage 
demands. In all these strikes which involved essential services— the 
communication system— it was the government which was most hit. The TANU 
general meeting of 1961 vehemently condemned the strikes, and "called 
upon the government to take stern measures against any workers who would 
unlawfully indulge in strike action."*3
Soon after independence, the government began to look for 
possibilities of restructuring the trade union movement and 
strengthening its links with the Ministry of Labour. Mr Michael 
Kamaliza, a former trade unionist, then Minister for Labour and Health 
suggested that TFL become part of the ministry. ** By the beginning of 
1962, total and unconditional Africanization had become the catchword 
among the trade union leaders. Some workers, for example, the
Tanganyika Plantation Workers' Union, went on strike with demands for 
Africanization and wage increases and they called upon TANU to 
Africanize or face a general strike.*® In most of the strikes at this 
period, as was openly declared by thb plantation workers, the railway 
workers and the dockers, the workers threatened to take over the 
enterprises from the owners and put them into their own hands.
The workers struggles were condemned by the government— in the words 
of Nyerere— as "evil things", as the "law of the jungle",*® although
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during the breweries strike in 1958, they had been viewed by the 
nationalists as the last weapon of the workers.*7 The government was 
forced to increase the minimum wage in 1962, and also provide fringe 
benefits. At the same time, three bills were passed so as to curb
industrial disputes: (1) Trade Disputes (Settlement) Act No 43, (2)
Trade Union (Amendment) Act No 51, and (3) Civil Sevice (Negotiating 
Machinery) Act No 52. The right to strike was made illegal by making 
arbitration compulsory by the first Act mentioned. The second Act sought
« v
to create a strong TFL to which all trade unions were obliged to
affiliate. TFL, in turn was to be under the control and supervision of 
the state through the Minister of Labour and the Registrar of Trade
Unions. Thus the colonial banning of strikes in "essential services" of 
the 1940s and 1950s was by 1962 generalized and made applicable to all 
sectors. With the third Act, all civil servants earning above £702 per 
annum were prohibited from becoming members of trade unions.
TFL was more or less brought under government control by 1962. 
Introducing the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act, the Labour Minister, Mr 
Kamaliza declared that the trade union legislation which was introduced 
under colonialism made it easy "for a few dissidents to set up a 
federation in conflict with the federation" which provided "the 
effective leadership of trade union movement.... Nothing but harm can 
come out of such divisions. The government wants a united leadership in 
the interests of the workers and the country."*® The Act empowered the 
Registrar of Trade Unions to suspend from office the officials he 
considered responsible for mismanagement in the trade union; and the 
government was to check over the accounts of trade unions.*9
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These Acts were condemned by the trade unionists. Victor Mkello, 
one of the trade unionists, remarked that this attempt to control the 
trade union movement "would destroy its independence and would take from 
the workers the right to determine and pursue their own policy and 
freely utilize their finances.MSO Another trade union leader was to 
declare: the "forcible way of treating the trade union will show how 
much the government is scared of well-organized bodies in the country. 
These proposals are a national shame— and the TFL is ashamed of the 
Government's desire to oppress workers".®1 The Tanganyika Postal Workers 
Union claimed that if these Acts were passed, then a "perpetual war 
between the Government and the workers will start— a war which will cut 
Tanganyika completely from foreign investment."®2 The Acts were viewed 
as an abrogation of "human rights to the working people of [the] 
country".®3 It was asserted that the bills made one conclude that "we 
have come out of the clutches of colonialism and are fast moving into 
totalitarianism", and freedom, it seemed, meant freedom for ministers to 
assume dictatorial powers rather than further democratization.®-4- All the 
trade unions condemned the bills in the strongest terms.
The Area Commissioners, Regional Commissioners and some of the 
elected members of the Rational Assembly who supported the Trade Union 
bill, elaborated the arguments of the Minister for Labour and Health and 
emphasized that the government was a workers' government and could not 
possibly legislate against the workers. They argued that it was 
necessary for the workers to remember that they formed only a small 
minority and that the government had to take into consideration the 
interests of the vast majority of the population.
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These arguments tallied with Ryerere's elaboration of the philosophy 
of African Socialism and the problems of development in the same year. 
Ryerere had pointed out that Tanganyika was a poor country where living 
standards of the people were shamefully low. All people were required to 
take up the challenge and work to the limit of their ability for the 
good of the whole society so as to enable Tanganyika to prosper and 
become self-reliant; and this prosperity was to be shared by all the 
people:
The true socialist may not exploit his fellows. So that if the 
members of any group within our society are going to argue 
that, because they happen to be contributing more to the 
national income than some other groups, they must therefore take 
for themselves a greater share of the profits of their own 
industry than they actually need; and if they insist on this in 
spite of the fact that it would mean reducing their group's 
contribution to the general income and thus slowing down the 
rate at which the community can benefit, then that group is 
exploiting (or trying to exploit) its fellow human beings. It is 
displaying a capitalist attitude of mind.ss
In more explicit terms, the wages and better conditions demands by the
workers were a display of capitalist tendencies. This was wrong and it
needed to be corrected if socialism was to be built. In spite of the
resistance by the trade unionists the bills were passed. Hitherto, the
state's control over trade unions had been through powers of
regstration: with the 1962 Act <Ro 51) there was further consolidation
of the control.
The Trade Disputes (Settlement) Act 1962 (Ro 43) outlawed strikes 
and set up conciliation and arbitration, whereby disputes could only be 
settled by negotiations. Lock-outs and strikes became illegal: they
became offenses which were punishable by fine or imprisonment. This was 
an abolition of collective bargaining and the loss of independence of 
the trade union movement. With this legislation, the number of strikes
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fell. In 1963, there were 85 strikes which involved 27,207 workers as 
opposed to 1962 when there were 152 s t r i k e s . B u t  the dispute between 
the government and TFL simmered on. In December 1962, the General
Secretary of the Plantation Workers' Union, also president of TFL, Mr 
Victor Mkello, and the Organizing Secretary of TFL were rusticated to 
Sumbawanga— one of the most remote areas of Tanganyika— following the 
strikes in the sisal industry; Tumbo from the Railway Workers Union, 
also leader of TFL had by then been posted as a High Commissioner in the 
U.K. as a means to eliminate the opposition.67 Tumbo returned within a 
few months to form an opposition party— Peoples' Democratic Party. The 
public attacks on the government for pressing the hated legislation,
lack of Africanization and other matters continued, with the trade 
unionists as the most vociferous critics.se
The attacks resurfaced with more acuteness after September 1963 when 
the Minister for Labour, Mr Kamaliza circulated a secret proposal for 
reorganizing TFL as a national workers union to be integrated in the 
ministry.ss> Except for the Transport and General Workers Union and the 
Domestic and Hotel Workers Union, TFL and all other trade unions 
rejected these proposals. In January 1964, the final blow was delivered 
upon the trade unions. In this month, the Tanganyika Rifles (the army)
mutinied, with demands for higher pay and Africanization of the officer
corps. The mutiny was finally suppressed by British troops. As a result 
of this mutiny some 200 trade union leaders, including many members of 
the TFL executive committee were detained on the pretext that they had 
attempted to make contact with the mutineers.60 With this mutiny, the 
previously long-hesitant government had the justification for 
drastically curbing both the trade union movement and the army as major
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sources of opposition. Within a month of the mutiny, the government 
hastly passed in the parliament the Rational Union of Tanganyika Workers 
(Establishment) Act Ro 18 of 1964 (RUTA), which dissolved the TFL and 
its member unions and established one union. RUTA was not to be a 
voluntary organization of the workers: membership was constituted by 
law. The law also gave power to the President of the Republic to 
dissolve it if he was satisfied that the union had failed to carry out 
its objectives. The General Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of the 
Union were to be appointed by the President of the country, and the 
General Secretary was to appoint the financial Secretary.61 These 
positions were to be executive. Some of the provisional rules and 
objectives of RUTA were:
(1) The principle objects of the Union shall be the regulation 
of relations between workmen and employers and between workmen 
and workmen, and the provision of benefits for its members.
(2) The Union shall become affiliated to the Tanganyika African . 
Rational Union and shall do everything in its power to promote 
policies of Tanganyika African Rational Union, and shall 
encourage its members to join the Tanganyika African Rational 
Union.62
The first Secretary General of RUTA was also the Minister for Labour. 
RUTA was essentially part of the state; and the autonomous trade union 
movement was dead.
In the same year, the government passed the Security of Employment 
Act No 62 of 1964, and the Rational Provident Fund Act of 1964. The 
former legislated for the formation of workers committees— something 
which was attempted by the colonial government in 1951— which were to be 
consultative organs on matters concerning workers welfare. In essence, 
their functions were reduced to the enforcement of discipline and
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helping the employers.63 The committees were to encourage industrial 
peace, productivity and efficiency at the factory level.64
The Rational Provident Fund Act (RPF) was established on the advice 
of the International Labour Organization <ILO), ILO had been advising 
the government on this matter since 1962, after it had successfully 
established such a Fund in Rigeria. The Fund was to be established as a 
social security scheme with the aim of providing benefits for old age. 
It entailed contribution of 5 per cent by both the employer and the 
employee. According to Kamaliza who introduced the bill, this scheme was 
introduced in view of the recognition that the workers had no 
comprehensive social security scheme. The colonialists had denied the 
workers such a scheme on the pretext that the wage earners had sbambas 
(farms) in the country where they would return after the wage days were 
over: "What an attitude for any government to adopt in the twentieth 
century."66 According to Kamaliza, beyond the considerations of the 
provision of benefits to the workers in times of need (for example, in 
sickness or unemployment for more than three months), it was important 
to legislate the Act because it did not involve government financial 
risks nor administrative costs. The government would benefit from this 
scheme, because the RPF would be investing in government securities. The 
existing schemes, such as the Workmen's Compensation and Severance 
Allowance of 1962 already invested assets in securities in Tanganyika 
(13.5 per cent), Bast Africa (38.4. per cent), England (35.5 per cent) 
and else where (12.6 per cent). The government was to make sure that 
such a situation did not arise with the RPF. RPF was to play a very 
important role in capital formation by investing its surplus monies in 
trustee within Tanganyika, as capital for further development. RPF would
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become the largest Institutional investor in Tanganyika, and it was 
expected to contribute £9 million in the First Five Year Development 
Plan (1964-69). RPF was to help the workers as well as the development 
plans. Accordingly, this scheme was the first step in the provision of 
a solid foundation of a "welfare state of which we, as socialists, can 
be proud."66
The government was quite determined to bring about development by 
any means. Thus from 1964 the number of strikes fell, and the few 
strikes which took place after that were sporadic and spontaneous and 
were waged without the leadership of RUTA. The structure of RUTA did 
"not augur well for the control of the union by its members";67 and this 
was even revealed by the Presidential Commission which investigated RUTA 
in 1966. It was observed that there was no "adequate and visible means 
of democratic expression."ee
These struggles against the workers and for development were taking 
place within the process of strengthening the state machinery; a process 
which was to condemn to political nullity even the capitalist elements 
alongside the other classes and raise the state as a monolithic 
structure which was to dominate the civil society completely and 
arbitrate social struggles from above. The next section deals with this 
process.
6.2 Ideological Consolidation and Institutional Changes
The Independence Constitution was tabled in early 1961. The 
Constitution took the Westminster model, with a head of state (who was 
the Governor General by then) and a head of government (who was Prime 
Minister by then). The former enjoyed no real powers and the latter
- 366 -
wielded real authority. Sir Richard Turnbull was the first and the last 
Governor General acting on behalf of the Queen before Tanganyika became 
a Republic with a new constitution in 1962; and J.K. Nyerere who was the 
Prime Minister before independence continued in the same capacity before 
Tanganyika became a Republic. At the same time the Legislative Council 
was transformed to a Rational Assembly— as a parliamentary form.69 All 
the institutions of the colonial state were virtually retained, as were 
the provisions of law from the colonial government and all the officers 
holding posts under previous orders. Despite the increased number of the 
elected members of the Parliament to 71 and its reconstitution by the 
introduction of the speaker, the Rational Assembly remained 
fundamentally unchanged, in that the executive's dominance remained 
intact. The system of government was such that the Governor and his 
council of ministers were not accountable to the Rational Assembly.70
The debates in the LEGCO on citizenship, Africanization, education, 
trade unions, etc. were taking place within the above power framework. 
At this time, TARU had constituted itself into a government: its leaders 
had become ministers and out of the 71 seats in the LEGCO, 70 were held 
by TARU members. The role of the Party and its relation to the grassroot 
levels significantly changed with TARU constituting itself as a 
government. At this time, there was no more talk about TARU representing 
the will of the nation or setting policies for the government to 
implement. It was accepted, as the members were informed by 1960, that 
policy was decided by the central government and not the party local 
representatives; that party political organizations were not the 
implementors or executors of policies: in Ryerere's own words,
"Political parties and therefore members of the Legislative Council, can
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certainly play their part by ensuring a good public reception for 
government policies.... the responsibility for carrying out government 
policies lies with the civil service."71 In a nutshell, the Party was 
seen as a conveyor belt between the government and the people.
The above move was in response to the conflict situation which
existed in the LEGCO, where it was not only the trade unionists who were
in the opposition, but also radical party members. Despite the strength
of the executive, parliamentary democracy was already posing problems
because of this rebellion among the party members. It was simply
impossible to ignore the opposition, given the unrest resulting from
the workers actions and the rising expectation of the people in the
country at large with the approach of independence. Despite the leaders'
call that there was need for greater efforts after independence, with
its approach there was general disappointment in that, economically,
For the first time in recent years there was no increase in the 
national income, and a decrease in exports and in imports of 
consumer goods caused government revenue to fall. Farmers were 
suffering from heavy rains and depressed world prices for their 
goods...The government had hoped that the three-year development 
plan would lessen popular resentment of economic-racial division 
of society, but the goals of the plan seemed far off to the 
workers and villagers.72
Besides this, the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund had initially
cut the projected funds for the first year of the Three Year Plan by
more than half, while at the same time insisting that Tanganyika should
pay retirement benefits to colonial officers. Although the British
government finally conceded to give more, this aspect had resulted in
high anti-Commonwealth sentiments in the LEGCO in 1961 and aggravated
the debates on the questions of citizenship, Africanization, etc.
discussed above.73
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The differences in TARU in 1958 had resulted in the formation of a 
splinter party. There was a possibility that this could happen again by 
the time TARU went into government, given the situation pointed out 
above; and if this occurred, it could be more serious because of the 
possibility of mobilization of the general disaffection. Tanganyika had 
witnessed the extent to which people could rebel in the 1940s and 1950s, 
and these rebellions were still taking place. By 1960, Ryerere began to 
express the undesirability of democracy in the European sense in Africa- 
-a democracy.in which one party was in the government and another in the 
opposition. He painted out that this was not an essential part of 
democracy: democracy meant government decisions were reached by
discussion. Opposition parties were a mockery to democracy: in African 
traditions problems at the family level were discussed in order to reach 
agreement and find solutions. Transferred to a clan, tribe, or beyond 
that, the purpose of the discussion was to reach an agreement. Ryerere 
felt that it was wrong in Africa to impose organized opposition for the 
sake of opposition: this was contrary to the basic attitudes of Africans 
and people would not understand this at all.74
These conceptions were evolving within the framework of the 
objectives and aims of TARU, whereby, by 1960 Ryerere and his Party 
colleagues had prepared a statement which committed them to the creation 
of a democratic and socialist state in Tanganyika.76 At the same time, 
these views were a continuation of the political, economic and social 
views which have been reviewed in the preceding chapters; only this 
time, they were being institutionalized in a situation where the 
government and those who were expected to help in the development of the 
country— the capitalists— were under threat as a result of the general
unrest. The state and the capitalists— mainly Europeans, Asians and some 
few Africans— depended on the effective control of the masses of the 
workers and peasants for stability if the goals of development were to 
be achieved as laid down in the Three Year Development Plan and later 
on in the First Five Year Plan (1964-69). In this respect, there was a 
fundamental unity between the capitalists and the state. Under the 
conditions of rebellion outside and inside the parliament, the very pre­
conditions of existence of both the state and the capitalists were at 
stake.
In 1961, Ryerere was to publish an article which rejected the 
suggestion that a two-party system was necessary for democracy. 
According to him, what was necessary for democracy was "discussion, 
equality, and freedom" with the latter being implied in the former two. 
There was no doubt that Africans had the ability to discuss— and this
t
was African and so was the sense of equality. Vhere there were distinct 
aristocratic Africans by birth (for example, among the Vahaya and Vaha), 
these were to be traced historically to sources outside the continent. 
Africans, traditionally knew no 'class' and it was doubtful whether 
there was an equivalent for 'class' or 'caste' in African languages. 
African societies, whether ruled by chiefs or riot, were societies of 
equals and business in these societies was conducted through discussion. 
Organized opposition was not an essential element in African societies 
because it was not possible to talk about classes or groups where none 
existed. The establishment of a one-party state was desirable because 
there was no need of artificial distinction between politicians and 
civil servants76:
In our traditional society the African has always been an 
individual, very much a member of his community, but seeing no
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conflict between bis own interests and those of the community. 
This is because the structure of his society was, in fact, a 
direct extension of the family. First you had the small family 
unity; this merged into larger 'blood' family which, in its 
turn, merged into the tribe. The affairs of the
community.... were conducted by free and equal discussion, but 
nevertheless the African's mental conception of 'Government' was 
personal— not institutional. When the word 'Government' was 
mentioned, the African thought of the chief; he did not, as does 
the Briton, think of a grand building in which a debate was 
taking place.'77
The struggle for freedom from foreign domination in the new nations, 
according to Ryerere, was a patriotic one which necessarily left no room 
for differences. The struggles for independence united all elements in 
the country facing a similar challenge. It was the nationalist movement 
which led the people; and having united and led them to independence it 
inevitably formed the first government of the new state: "It could
hardly be expected that a united country should halt in mid-stream and 
voluntarily divide itself into opposing political groups just for the 
sake of conforming to what I have called the 'Anglo-Saxon form of 
democracy' at the moment of independence."70
As has been pointed out, these conceptions were a continuation of 
the views outlined in the earlier chapters. After resigning from his 
post as a teacher in 1956, Ryerere worked as a translator for the 
Marknoll fathers in Musoma. One of the fathers was to recall that there 
were times when Ryerere said that the British had romanticized the 
Maasai, but the Maasai would have to develop like anybody else. They 
would have to fall in line. Given the vicious circle of not enough food 
to be able to work hard and not enough money to buy food, "He said he 
knew that Tanganyika would have to build a strong Presidency into its 
constitution, and yet somehow protect the individual, a big problem."70
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The reality at independence was far from merely discussions and 
reaching agreements, or questions of organized opposition. Organized 
opposition to TARU in Tanganyika whether before independence or after in 
the form of political parties had always been weak.eo The political 
parties were not the major problem; rather, besides the problem posed by 
the workers, the general public had taken the view that TARU's sole 
purpose had been to achieve independence, and thus, there was no need 
for any futher contributions to the party funds. Such people were backed 
by chiefs, headmen, elders, witchdoctors, etc., people who were 
apprehensive of the new regime which threatened to sweep away their 
authority.01 Also, people had come to believe that with independence 
they would not be compelled to pay taxes, there would be easy jobs and 
higher wages, "others no further need to work at all." Then there was 
the drought, and the fact that although Sir Ernest Vasy, the Finance 
Minister, had predicted a stable regime because foreign capital would 
pour in to develop the country, there was no sign of this happening.02 
The number of the unemployed was on the increase with independence, as a 
result of the young people flocking to the towns clamouring for jobs. 
There was also the clamour for schools, hospitals and other social 
services. More appalling was the fact that the average African family 
income remained at less than £100 a year while the average non-African 
family income was more than £1,000 a year— thus the class hostility 
which was defined racially.
Several violent attacks on non-Africans were taking place, and the 
Minister for Home Affairs, Mr George Kahama, was often making appeals to 
people to practice restaint. Kahama was at one point forced to rebuke 
publicly the TARU Youth League members who, "often with genuinely good
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intentions and convinced that they were serving the public will but
without a shred of constitutional authority, had arrested, questioned
and punished people."®3 This contempt for authority and usurpation of
the powers of the police had been manifesting itself since the end of
the 1950s. When Ryerere became Chief Minister in 1960 "many Tanu
members, especially Youth Leagues, were under the impression that power
had fallen into their laps. They proceeded in a number of instances to
take law in their own hands."®4 From 1960, the TARU government had to
attack such elements; it also had to insist on the need to pay taxes and
obey authorities. In early 1961
Kahama warned minority political groups that they must end their 
disrespect for the Government, or be suppressed. He and other 
ministers launched strong attacks on parties based on tribal or 
religious affiliation. In August 1961, the Meru Citizens' Union, 
formed ten years earlier to resist the colonial Government over 
the Engare Ranyuki evictions was wound up because it had gone on 
fighting the new central government....®6
It will be recalled that the Meru Citizens' Union, and the Meru Case in
general, in the early 1950s precipitated the rise of nationalist
politics on a territorial scale. It was poignantly ironical that this
union should be wound up by the nationalist government even before the
actual attainment of independence.
A one party-system was defended on the grounds of national unity and 
the inability of the country to afford divisions as a result of 
opposition. It was held that there was no room for differences or 
divisions when the object was to build a nation: "Tanganyika was faced 
with an emergency in the war against poverty, ignorance and disease, 
hence opposition could not be allowed to divide the people."®6 The new 
government insisted that, in order to develop, people had to organize 
themselves in 'self-help' projects to construct roads, schools,
hospitals, and other projects. By 1962, people had to work for free one 
day a week on local self-help projects and anyone who failed to turn up 
was jailed.
Independence was achieved on 9th December 1961. In mid-January 1962 
the TARU Rational Executive met when the air of disquiet and 
disillusionment was still prevalent. There were attacks from the radical 
wing of the Party on the moderate policies pursued by the government.07 
This was besides the open rupture which had already occured between TARU 
and TFL. Ryerere explained his policies, how such policies had been able 
to achieve independence, and what the future plans were. He then 
proposed that if the Rational Executive did not approve what he was 
doing, he was going to resign and dedicate his time to the 
reorganization of the Party, "so as to create the unity badly needed in 
the difficult years ahead".00 The government did not have a firm 
political base for the political and economic policies which it was 
following, as the citizenship bill and others' introduction had shown in 
the course of the debates discussed above. The debates in the Parliament 
had increased the frustrations within the Party. Most leading articles 
in Uhuru, the Party paper, were full of racialist abuses of the 
minorities and anti-British Commonwealth sentiments.00
The early political and economic policies stood for continued close 
dependency upon Britain; and the Three Year Development Plan stood for 
the continuation of the colonial policies. The problem was, the classes 
which would have defended and supported such a development policies— the 
professionals, non-agricultural bourgeoisie and specifically the 
industrial bourgeoisie— were entirely non-African: "Far from providing a 
political base for a government pursuing this strategy, the existence of
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this bourgeoisie, racially and culturally so distinct from the African 
majority, was itself a barrier to the general acceptance of the 
stategy".30 That is the stategy demanded accelerated Import Substitution 
Industrialization which depended on foreign capital and mostly the non- 
African nationalities in the country. As far as the chiefs were 
concerned, they could not provide a political base for the strategy,
because they had all along been associated with the colonial regime; arid 
even the civil service itself was rife with the struggles for 
Africanization. Rot even the police and the military could be relied 
upon because of the same problem of Africanization.9,1 The Party was
ridden with these tensions and its support had begun to erode. In short, 
even the very development programme which promised to raise the 
standards of living of the people was in danger of being undermined. The 
racial tensions were not simply because of the inequality in wealth
distribution; in reality, many of the non-Africans still remained as 
arrogant as in the old colonial days. There were cases of racial
arrogance and discrimination which were reported even as late as 1964.92
Ryerere resigned as Prime Minister in mid-January 1962, and Kawawa 
took his place as Prime Minister. Ryerere was to dedicate himself to the 
reorganization of the Party which would enable "people to take full and 
active part in the fight against povery, ignorance and disease". 
Accordingly, this could only be achieved by a creation of a "strong 
political organization active in every village which acts like a two-way 
all weather road along which the purposes, plans of the government, can 
travel to the people the same time as ideas, desires and 
misunderstanding of the people can travel direct to the government." And 
that was to be the task of TARU, of the independent government.93 It was
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not necessary for Tanganyika to copy the institutions of other 
countries: she had to work her own pattern of democracy.94
The development of a strong party which would act as a conveyor belt 
and also force the mass and social organizations, such as the working 
peoples' movements to become part of the party; and play an effective 
role in the development process which it had mapped out inevitably meant 
the development of a one party-state. If this was to be effective, it 
also meant the strengthening of the whole state machinery. After his 
resignation, Ryerere spent his time travelling all over the country 
organizing the Party down to the smallest unit of the frame. Regional 
Commissioners and District Commissioners were appointed to replace the 
non-political Provincial and District Commissioners— something which was 
initially suggested by Ryerere in the LEGCO in 1960. The new 
Commissioners were TARU members who were to report directly to the 
Party Chairman: the Party, and not the elected members of Parliament was 
becoming the source of authority. By 1963, new political geographical 
boundaries were introduced instead of the old provinces and districts.
In June 1962, a White Paper was published spelling out the form of 
republic Tanganyika was to take. The principles on which the new 
constitution was to base itself, according to Ryerere, were: (1) Given
the light of the experience, the Republic was to have an executive 
President; <2) The President, besides having the responsibility for 
actions of the government, had to have full powers to fulfil his 
responsibilities; (3) The sovereignty of the Parliament was to remain 
and this body had power to legislate laws, raise taxes, and vote money; 
and, (4) Freedom was to be based on the rule of law. What was taking 
place was the process of concentration of power in the executive and
within the executive, in the office of the President.96 The 1962 
Republican Constitution "made the Presidency an all-powerful institution 
and the President an absolute ruler who could exercise his powers 
without any real constitutional inhibitions."96 In sum, while the role 
and the status of the Parliament started with a position of "grandeur 
and omnipotence" in 1961, "it lost its majesty in 1962 when the 
government ceased to be accountable to it."97 The splendour of the 
Parliament was further reduced in 1965 with the introduction of the 1965 
Interim Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania which made even 
the membership of Parliament co-extensive with the membership of "the 
party and its life became dependent upon the pleasure of the 
president...."90
Writing to the London Observer on 3rd June 1962, Ryerere admitted 
that at times there would be clashes in the four principles of the 
republic listed above. In order to prevent unnecessary conflict, it had 
been necessary to be clear in regard to where "the ultimate power and 
responsibility lie." Thus, the President, "who will be Head of State, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and will have full executive 
authority, will not be bound to accept the advice of his cabinet".99 The 
President of Tanganyika was to have more sweeping powers than even the 
President of United States of America. Checks and balances, according to 
this article, were breaks on change— i.e. development— something which 
Tanganyika did not need at all; . This was because, lack of capital 
resources and trained manpower and the unpredictable climatic conditions 
were already effective brakes to change. What Tanganyika needed were 
powerful accelerators to "overcome the inertia bred of poverty and the 
resistance inherent in all societies". Accordingly, there was no place
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for "neutral administrators", and hence the proposal of "giving the 
President power to appoint, promote, dismiss and exercise disciplinary 
control over civil servants and police...while judges will have complete 
security of tenure once they are appointed, the man who appoints them 
will be the President". The President was also to have powers to give 
instructions to the Director of Public Prosecutions. He could dismiss 
the Parliament, while the Parliament did not have even the power for 
vote of no confidence; and the President was not to be a member of 
Parliament, although he could address it whenever necessary. 1 0 0  Such was 
the logic of the Republican Constitution, and to complete the changes, 
it was announced in January 1963 that the one-party system of government 
would be introduced. 1 0 1 Under this system, only the national ethic of 
faith could ensue a government of the people. In other words, the whole 
philosophy of African democracy, African socialism and the perfection of 
the state and concentration of the powers in the Presidency within the 
executive was based on developmental reasons.
Although the need to protect human rights following the United 
Rations bill of rights was recognized within the preamble of the 
Republican Constitution as a means to protect democratic rights, this 
was never embodied in the text, and therefore never had the force of 
law. In 1962, also introduced by the executive was legislation to 
curtail the rights of individuals: The Preventive Detention Act of 1962 
(Cap 490). Ryerere, then a private member of Parliament stated in a 
press conference that " the Government was prepared to take the risk of 
locking up innocent people in order to prevent harm to the state".102 
According to Kawawa, who was then the Prime Minister, "A Bill of Rights 
merely invites conflicts of luxury which we can hardly afford to
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entertain."103 The Preventive Detention Act aimed at nipping in the bud 
all the political trouble makers, opponents, those who plotted to 
overthrow the government, etc. In this Act people could be detained 
without trial for an unspecified period. Section 2<1) of the Act 
stipulated: the President could detain any person where it was shown to 
his satisfaction that the person was conducting himself so as to be 
"dangerous to peace and good order in any part of Tanganyika or in a 
manner prejudicial to the defense of Tanganyika or the security of the 
state" or when the President was satisfied that under this section it 
was necessary to "prevent any person acting in a manner prejudicial to 
peace and good order of Tanganyika or the security of the state." The 
President could order "under his hand and Public Seal direct detention 
of that person."104
Underlying all these "African democratic" developments, together 
with the question of "African socialism", whose philosophy was 
systematized in 1962, was the crisis of economic development which was 
being aggravated by the rebellion of the working masses. It was assumed 
that there is an "inherent resistance to change"; and this resistance 
could only be overcome by strong institutions and a strong individual at 
the top. The most significant feature of all these policies, including 
African Socialism was the identification with economic development. The 
government was to play the most central role in economic development by 
planning, provision of capital and guidance of the economy in general. 
The government was to encourage private entrepreneurs, but the process 
of capital accumulation was seen as primarily a responsibility of the 
government itself. TARU had pledged to build a democratic socialist 
society in which the major means of production would be in the hands of
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the government.106 Tanganyika became a republic and hence cut its last 
political links with Britain on the 9th December 1962. Nyerere became 
the first President of the Republic.
According to Ryerere, the major task in the transformation of the 
country was to change the habits of the past and try what was new. One 
aspect of the "traditional way of life" which needed to be changed, so 
as to develop agriculture was the old methods of cultivation and the old 
ways of living. It was necessary to begin using the plough and the 
tractor, but because people did not have money, and nor did the 
government have the ability to provide each family with a tractor, it 
was necessary to make a group of farmers get together and share the cost 
and the use of a tractor between them.106 This meant people could not 
go on living scattered over a wide area "far apart from each other, and 
still haunted by the old superstitious fear of witchcraft, just as in 
the old days of our grandfathers". People had to begin living together 
in proper villages: the task of the government would be to make farmers 
live together in village communities in order to simplify the provision 
of social services and even village industries. Moreover, "the growth of 
village life will help us in improving our system of democratic 
government". He went on: "It is true that at present both the central 
Government and our Local government bodies are elected by democratic 
methods. But, although the methods may be democratic, the operation of 
democracy itself is not yet what it should be, nor can it be while the 
majority of our rural population remains so scattered.,.107
The Three Year-Development Plan was to continue, and the government 
was to start working on another plan which would include the setting up 
of villages as one of the priorities, as well as projects which would
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help the development of villages. In this endeavour to build a socialist
society in Tanganyika, "two very important instruments we shall use for
this purpose are the Government itself and the Co-operative
Movement."100 As for the differences which existed between races, tribes
and social groups in general, it was necessary to understand the
problems within the perspective of the past history, and it did not pay
to blame each other instead of pooling the resources of all Tanganyika
citizens together in order to build Tanganyika:
To our European and Asian citizens I say: 'I know it is true
that the front-rank positions in politics have been taken by 
Africans. But this is no reason for you to feel yourselves 
rejected or despised; for on the other hand, where education and 
wealth are concerned, Europeans and Asians are still in the 
fore front'. To our African citizens I say: 'Forget the past. It 
is true that in education and wealth many of the Europeans are 
still far better off than you are— but political control is in 
your hands. The Europeans and Asians, even if they wished to do 
so, cannot use their property or education to harm you'. And to 
ALL OUR CITIZENS as whole, I say: 'My friends, let every one of 
us put all he has into the work of building a Tanganyika in 
which there will be no such distinctions and divisions. Those of 
you who are educated, make use of your education to help build 
Tanganyika in which everybody will have opportunity you have had 
to acquire.... Those of you who have capital or who own property, 
do not try to use your wealth as a weapon with which to oppress 
your brothers; but use it instead like a trust fund in helping 
to build a prosperous Tanganyika in which there will be no more 
gaps between the rich and the poor, but in which the wealth of 
the nation will be 'family property'--the property of every 
member of our family. And you, my friends, who have political
power do not make use of that power to oppress any of your
fellow citizens, or to take revenge, but use it to build a 
Tanganyika in which there will not be so much as one individual 
citizen who is made to feel that he is a second class 
citizen.109
In an earlier paper on African Socialism in the same year (1962), 
socialism, just like democracy, was viewed as an "attitude of mind", and 
not the "rigid adherence to standard political pattern" in order to
ensure the care and welfare of the people. This attitude of mind had
nothing to do with the possession or non-possession of wealth:
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"Destitute people can be potential capitalists— exploiters of their
fellow beings. A millionaire can equally be a socialist; he may value
his wealth only because it can be used in the service of his fellow
men."110 According to this paper, a capitalist was a person who used his
wealth to dominate others. Socialism was a matter of distribution and
not what was produced or how production was organized. What
distinguished capitalism and socialism was the way wealth was
distributed rather than the methods of production. Exploiters who were
castigated were landlords and the '"loiterer' or 'idler"* (the
unemployed). These were called parasites and exploiters. Similarly, if
even workers demanded a "fair share of the profits of their labour"
which was greater than the country could afford "having to penalize some
other section of the society", then it was not a fair share:
Trade union leaders and their fellows, as long as they are true 
socialists, will not need to be coerced by the government into 
keeping their demands within limits imposed by the needs of 
society as a whole. Only if there are potential capitalists 
amongst them will the socialist Government have to step in and 
prevent them from putting their capitalist ideas in practice!111
One of the members of Parliament, Mr Tunze, went as far as declaring
that the workers were among the three enemies (poverty, ignorance and
disease) the country was fighting against in 1964,112 Socialism was not
to be based on class war as was the case in European socialism, and
there was nothing like the idea of a class or caste in African society.
The foundation of African socialism was the extended family: "The true
African socialist does not look on one class of men as his brethren and
another as his natural enemies. He does not form an alliance with the
'brethren' for the extermination of the 'non-brethren.'"113
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African socialism and democracy reflected the dilemmas of control 
and class formation. It was necessary to get the enthusiastic co­
operation of the population for sustained economic development which 
would aid in capital accumulation without at the same time creating new 
imbalances in the distribution of national income.114 As shown above, 
the conditions of the population were not changed after independence: 
unemployment was sky-rocketing with its attendant social problems, the 
workers were still waging war for better wages and better living 
conditions, and the population at large expected better conditions and 
exemptions from tax payments, forced labour, etc.. The peasants, 
specifically, expected that the end of colonial rule would bring to an 
end the use of compulsion for the implementation of agricultural 
policies. ~
For example, there were intense struggles among the Vambugwe of 
South of Lake Manyara in the early days of independence between the 
"young generation" and the "old generation". The young generation had no 
belief in ancient lore and regarded the past as a matter of history.116 
Mbugwe had been afflicted by famine for three years before independence. 
This resulted in the belief in rain makers increasing. As independence 
approached, all doubts were thrown aside and instead, there was only 
rejoicing. The Vambugwe believed that freedom meant people were to rule 
themselves, and this self-rule was interpreted in different ways to the 
extent of causing misunderstanding and quarrels. The elders were 
grumbling that despite the freedom:
conditions were much the same as under British. If we are really 
ruling ourselves, they said, should not each district have its 
own msungati. traimaker chiefs as opposed to the paramount 
chiefs imposed by the British with their forms of authority—  
C.S.L.] If we are now free, why do we still pay taxes? If we are 
supposed to be independent, then surely every man should be
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allowed to do as he pleases, for example, hunt game without 
being required to get a licence.116
The younger TARU people tried to explain to the old generation what
freedom meant under the new conditions, but the older generation could
not accept it as something new and different to the British rule.
The Vambugwe elders held a very big meeting in 1963, at which they
discussed the need to return to the traditional ways of protecting their
farms. "They affirmed that the reason for rejoicing our freedom was that
now the old customs would replace modern innovations as taught in
school." The elders from all over Mbugwe came to this meeting, and their
first resolution was: "the native medicine men must thereafter be
respected, especially those who practiced shamba medicine,.."; that
people must follow the advice of the medicine men concerning house
medicine— i.e. for "prevention of sickness from appearing in the
community'; that people return to the old customs which had been
neglected by the youths (e.g. sacrifice). The youths were startled by
this and saw no sense in "the custom of making medicine to prevent
communal sickness". Medicine was administered in that year, but the
crops were destroyed by pests. The youths were accused of having spoilt
the medicine. Vhen the elders were told by the agricultural officer
about agricultural practices, insecticides (DDT), etc. they were
dissatisfied— after all, for the elders stated openly that it was the
catholics who obstructed the traditional customs and destroyed the
country. There was a considerable struggle between the "Pagans", and the
Catholics, and the Catholics were accused before the TANU officials:
'Now that we are independent,' one of them said, 'we can do as 
we wish. Our first desire is to make our country pure so that it 
will again produce sufficient food. Ve have medicinemen who are 
expert at treating the crops so that they will not be 
destroyed.... If we are truly free, then we have the right to do
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anything that is for the good of the community. But we are 
obstructed in our attempt to purify this country by mission 
people, who refuse to participate in the mpefo ritual.... Now we 
have decided there is only one thing to do: the mission people 
must live apart from us and their shambas must be separated from 
ours, for they do not wish to cooperate with us'117
The Catholics complained that the Mbugwe country was being divided
between "Catholics and Pagans". The reporter of all the above was a
Mbugwe Catholic who in his presentation ignored the impact of the
colonial experiences within the particular forms of differentiation
socially, which were expressed in those politics by the elders— the very
desire of the Vambugwe to do away with all forms of arbitrariness, the
desire to be free from want as a community, and the desire to be free
from the divisions brought about by colonial capitalism. The reporter
was obsessed by the seemingly superstitious statements and practices,
rather than these attempts to bring back the unity of the community.
They rejected innovations from the point of view of the community and
the desire to have prosperity of the whole community, rather than simply
superstitions.
Given the general interests embodied within the development 
objectives which required improved and increased production, compulsion 
continued after independence. Compulsion was being used in many areas by 
local leaders and officers who also began to demand new agricultural 
laws for people to produce export crops. This was the case in Kigoma 
where people were forced to produce cotton, and by-laws were even 
passed to this effect; also in Ruvuma where people were prescribed a 
minimum of one acre tobacco production; etc.110
By-laws were the method which was used by the colonial government to 
secure changes in farming habits— through Native authorities and later
District Councils. There was an extension of the by-laws after 
independence, and some districts had laid down minimum acre rules. For 
example, Law 3 of Songea District Council (Cultivation of Agricultural 
Land) By-laws 1965 reads: "Every resident who holds agricultural land in 
accordance with the local customary law relating to land tenure shall 
cultivate and maintain an acre of a cash crop or cash crops and food 
crops." The cash crops were such as tobacco, cashewnuts, simsim, pepper, 
groundnuts, coconuts and coffee. The food crops were maize, rice, 
cassava, vegetables, potatoes and beans. By-law 7 stated: "Any person 
who contravenes or fails to comply with any of the provisions of these 
by-laws shall be guilty of an offense and shall be liable on conviction 
to a fine not exceeding two hundred shillings or a sentence of 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two months or to both such fine 
and imprisonment. " 119
The thriving capitalist agriculture, based on plantations, settler 
farms and an expanding African capitalist agriculture which was 
inherited by the nationalists at the eve of independence was not, in 
general, expanding substantially. This was most obvious in the sisal 
industry— the major export crop— where production remained static, 
although small scale African capitalist farmers continued to expand, 
with cotton at 13 per cent, coffee at 12.5 per cent and cashewnuts at 9 
per cent annually. Gross Domestic Product between 1961 and 1966 grew at 
4.8 per cent per annum in real terms and there were surpluses in the 
balance of payments.120 Foreigners who owned the settler farms and 
plantations had begun leaving in large numbers from 1960 onwards, taking 
most of their capital with them— at least £3 million.121 Through the 
Department of Community Development, the government attempted a "focal
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point" or "improvement approach" which began in 1956 and was further 
recommended in the Three-Year Development Plan. The government undertook 
to supervise it, provide agricultural extension services and credit 
facilities to small farmers and large farmers so as to improve 
agriculture.
Such a move involved concentration on small selected points and to 
"progressive individuals"; in the hope that the benefits— in terms of 
methods— would trickle down to the other peasants. It also involved the 
establishment' of rural elites with progressive attitudes. Settlement 
schemes on unoccupied land were created, and farmers were given land on 
"condition that they followed the rules and regulations that defined 
'modern' agricultural techniques." There was a proposal in the First 
Five Year Development Plan to establish more than 60 pilot settlement 
schemes by 1970, and it was hoped that the number of these schemes 
would rise to 200 by 1980.122
This "transformation approach" was abandoned in 1966 as a result of 
the government's failure to create a class of capitalist farmers. The 
reasons for this will be highlighted below. On the other hand, the 
settlers, suspicious of the intentions of the new government, had 
started leaving the country in large numbers from 1960. With the 
settlers abandoning tracts of land— in the Southern Highlands, Usambara, 
Tabora and Arusha— some of the farms were taken over by Africans (as was 
the case in Tabora and Mbulu), and much of the land was to return to 
bush. Despite this failure by the government to create an African 
capitalist class in agriculture and the flight of settler capital, large 
scale capital in agriculture did not diminish completely after 
independence: there still existed plantation owners and settlers who
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were "reassured by British support for peaceful transition to African 
rule, and by the promises of Nyerere" and also African capitalists who 
were emerging and expanding and "every study of peasant farming in the 
1960s found that large farmers contributed a disproportionate share of 
marketed production."123
Examples where capitalist farming was expanding were in such areas 
as Ismani in Iringa where maize production had expanded rapidly by 
African farmers who employed mechanized methods and wage labour, and 
provided a large proportion of marketed maize in the country.124, Other 
cases were those of Mbulu and Hanang in Arusha, where African farmers 
began to expand in the mid-1950s after the Meru case. The farmers of 
these areas produced a large amount of the increased wheat production in 
the 1960s and 1970s. These were also using mechanized methods— from 
ploughs to tractors. They even hired their tractors to the expanding 
capitalists of Maswa.12B There were also the African tobacco growers of 
Tabora in the abandoned Urambo Groundnut Scheme. These farmers were a 
very powerful group of medium and large scale capitalists, who borrowed 
large sums of money to finance fertilizer purchase, hired labour, and 
even firewood collection.126 Others included the rice growers of 
JTorthern shore of Lake Hyasa, the tea growers of Usambara, the famous 
Kilimanjaro and Bukoba coffee growers, the cashewnut growers of the 
coastal areas, etc.12,7
The increase in the marketed produce was also due to the large 
increases in the acreage under small owner peasants production all over 
the country without there necessarily being an improvement in technique. 
The increase among the small producers was generally because of the use 
of compulsion by the government. Long before 1965, it was observed that
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in a situation where leaders were eager to achieve fast development they 
tended to resort to coercion. There were the rules which stipulated the 
minimum acreage of certain crops to be grown which were passed by the 
districts and even villages; the government ordered the farmers to
plant sisal, coffee, cotton and tea because of their export value. 
Furthermore:
In order to increase agricultural productivity, rules have been 
made by district councils which prohibit the drinking or selling 
of alcohol beverages except on weekends...Hyerere also said, in 
a speech made in 1964 while on tour in Southern Tanganyika, that 
farmers who were lazy might go to prison where they could learn 
model farming techniques. Regional authorities in Vest Lake
threatened to close the poabe (beer or wine made from palm
trees) shops unless people started growing tea.
.... In early 1965, there were reports that an area
commissioner had used his detention powers to arrest community 
leaders in a district where government met resistance in trying 
to increase sisal production.120
In Kigoma, for example, where peasants were ordered to plant a minimum
of one acre of cotton in 1954, an agricultural officer expressed the
view that compulsory agricultural programme was bound to be unpopular,
"but as the Republic's economy is at present entirely dependent upon
agriculture, the Development Team must act in a responsible way to see
that acreage targets are achieved."120
These coercive measures were being used as part and parcel of the 
other policies— expansion of co-operatives, establishment of marketing 
boards, extension workers schemes, community development schemes, and 
settlement schemes within the transformation and improvement approach. 
All these policies were justified by the appeal to build and modernize 
the country: a commitment to modernism. Given the link between class 
formation and education, the nationalists and the educated in general 
believed that "they, rather than the workers or peasants, have the
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answers to the problems of development." This was demonstrated by the 
First Five Year Development Plan, for example, which was dominated by 
the view that "peasants are primitive, backward, stupid— generally 
inferior human beings— "130
At the same time, the co-operative movement which expanded rapidly 
in the 1950s, expanded even faster in the 1960s. But its expansion in 
the latter years was due to compulsion: the government had given a
"Compulsory marketing order", whereby the co-operative became the only 
legal purchaser of particular crops, and most in cases, despite the 
smuggling of small quantities to towns or Kenya and Uganda, there were 
no other outlets for the crops besides the co-operatives. Food crops 
could not be sold to private traders or outside the district where they 
were grown without permission: it was considered an offence to do so,
and this was despite the fact that there were times when private 
traders offered much higher prices than the cooperatives.131
The decision to establish co-operatives throughout the country was 
made in 1961, according to the government, as a means of economic 
control by indigenous people rather than expatriates or non-Africans. 
The number of co-operatives rose from 857 in 1961 to 1533 by April 1966. 
The Co-operative Societies Ordinance was amended in 1963 so that there 
was no question of refusal to register any co-operative. Most of these 
co-operatives were organized from "above" and that was the case even in 
areas where there was no demand for them.132 The Presidential Special 
Committee which investigated the co-operative movements and marketing 
boards in 1965, noted that as a result of inefficiency, corruption and 
undemocratic nature of the co-operatives, the farmers had lost control 
of the movements, and they were virtually controlled from above.133
By the mid-1960s, the marketing of peasant produced export crops and 
many food crops was being "handled by co-operatives generally under 
compulsory marketing orders" which ruled out "channels for selling one's 
crop". Every district had at least one co-operative union and some of 
the well-off districts had two or three. They were supposed to be the 
key bodies in the development process; affecting prices, material 
incentives to the farmers, credit, provision and distribution of
fertilizers, insecticides and other inputs.134 These organizations, as a 
creation of the central government, were in essence an encouragement to 
"imaginative entrepreneurs to benefit from whatever patronage was 
available from the government".136 And this manifested itself in 
inefficiency, corruption and opportunism.136 In a way, it was the same 
move which had been attempted by the colonial government after the
failure of the marketing boards in the 1920s, being effected on a wider 
scale in the post-colonial era.
The co-operatives were, however, just part of the general policies 
to control the peasants and their produce by the government. The
colonial government had attempted to introduce boards to control
production, cultivation, and marketing of agricultural products in the
)
1920s and failed. In 1949 there was introduced an African Agricultural 
Products (Control and Marketing) Ordinance no 57. This was repealed in 
1962.137 In this year, the Minister for Agriculture was empowered to 
declare an area controlled, whenever he was satisfied that the
production, cultivation or marketing of any agricultural product was 
likely to advance and improve the area.133 The responsibility of the 
boards was:
to give directions as to preparing the ground for the sowing, 
planting, harvesting, grazing, cropping, drying, storing,
- 391 -
processing and marketing of specified agricultural product sown, 
planted, and harvested, reared or grazed, as the case may be, 
within the area for which it is established, and as to the 
timing of such operations; and to give orders that any such 
specified agricultural product be graded, packed or marketed in 
such a manner as the board may direct.139
Anyone who contravened any of the orders of the Board was to be fined a
maximum of Shs. 500/= or imprisoned for three months. These boards were
set up in almost every region by 1963, Other boards which were set up
for the whole country were such as the Rational Agricultural Products
Board (1962) for the control and regulation of maize; Tanganyika
Tobacco Board (1963); Rational Sugar Board (1964); Rational Wheat Board
(1967); etc. The Act which introduced the boards empowered them to
direct all producers to sell the products to them through their
agencies— mainly co-operatives. They also had the discretion to
determine the prices of the goods. Many people were prosecuted for
contravening marketing orders.140
The essence of these moves was not to push the non-Africans or
expatriates from the commercial sphere or increase African control as 
was stipulated by the government: they were set up as a "means of
siphoning off surplus from the producer, be he peasant or capitalist 
farmer. The Board is an important source of funds for the state".141 
This fact is revealed by the Lint and Seed Board report of 1967 whose 
investments breakdown were as follows:
TABLE 3: PRICE ASSISTARCE FURD IRVESTMERTS AS OF JURE 30, 1967
(in Shs. T)
Tanzania Government Stock at Market Value 7,382,899
Tanzania Government 20 Years Loan (due 1974) 20,000,000
Co-operative Unions and Societies less Provision
for Doubtful debts of Shs 500,000 11,352,548
Funds on Call in London 5,979
Current and Deposit Accounts at Bank 774,414
Account on Interest due 155.616
TOTAL . 39.671.456
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SOURCE:H.H. Binhammer, "Institutional Arrangements 
for supplying Credit and Finance to the Rural Sector
of the Economy in Tanzania", Economic Research
Bureau Paper No 68.17, University of Dar es Salaam,
p. 20.
As can be observed from the table the major share of the investment 
funds of this Board were in the government itself. According to the 1977 
ILO Report on Tanzania, the barter terms of trade for the peasants fell 
by 22.5 per cent between 1964 and 1973 and the terms of trade for the
farmers (rural capitalists) fell by 19,1 per cent in the same period.143
The surplus was siphoned through price mechanisms whereby the terms of 
trade were turned against the producers. According to the Presidential 
Special Committee's estimates, the average coffee farmer in Kilimanjaro 
paid 64.1 per cent of his gross proceeds in production costs, 6.3 per 
cent export tax, 4.7 per cent in development levy, 3.8 per cent in 
losses, 6.9 per cent in union and society levies and 7.7 per cent in 
marketing board deductions.143
These inroads into marketing and commerce by means of co-operatives 
and boards had an advantage from the point of view of development of the 
economy in the sense that they were pushing the commercial bourgeoisie 
to move into manufacturing and other productive sectors. In the late 
1950s and early 1960s, His Highness the Aga Khan had already started 
encouraging the Ismailia group in Tanganyika to invest in industry so as 
to protect their future in the country. Even without this encouragement, 
Asians had started moving vigorously into manufacturing since 1955, 
given the kind of protection the government had began to give to the 
local industries— in terms of protective tariffs which were imposed in 
1954, 1957, and 1961,144 Asians had begun to migrate into Tanganyika en 
masse from Kenya and Uganda at the end of the 1950s. They were quoted as
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saying Tanganyika was a good country with peaceful people who did not 
know very much about business; that there were no conflicts, and they 
had a good leader and the people were, hard workers.146 Uganda and Kenya 
were considered unstable, and Asians were taking their money out of 
them and pouring it in Tanganyika. Such were the actions of the Hadhvani 
family which joined by marriage with the Chande family (one of the most 
dynamic Asian business family in Tanganyika) in 1957. The Madhvani built 
up grain-milling and oil-crushing interests of the Chande industries. 
There was the Chandaria family of Kenya who set up an aluminium factory
in Tanganyika, and the first two textile factories, etc.149
Some of the large companies which were being established at this
time involved settlers, trading companies, and multi-nationals working
together. The beer factory was established in this way, and so were
other companies such as Unga Limited (grain factories in Arusha and
Iringa) which was established by Lord Delamere— a settler from Kenya.
Established at this time were also a cement factory, canning factories,
paint mixing industries, etc. In sum:
about three years before independence, the private sector 
started investing in manufacturing for local market. Within six 
years, nine factories had opened, plus another brewery, 
factories producing corrugated-iron sheets, aluminium cooking 
utencils, shoes, and cigarettes, three sisal spinning factories, 
another sugar estate and factory, and at least twelve factories 
that made chemical, plastic, or rubber products from imported 
ingridients. By 1963 seven building contractors had facilities 
to make pre-cast concrete articles, a reflection of the building 
boom that was taking place and the type of technology used in 
large construction projects. By 1965 a cement factory, a glass- 
bottle factory, and an oil refinery were under construction.147
While there were 101 large scale manufacturing units which were
established before 1946 in Tanganyika, their number rose to 569 by 1965
of which 279 were established between 1946 and 1960 and 184 between 1961
and 1965.140 Most of these Import Substitution Industries were 
established with ease at this time because the government protected them 
by tariffs and guaranteed compensation in case of nationalization, and 
provided land and other services to potential investors.149
Although there were these developments because the bourgeoisie was 
was protected; generally, the bourgeoisie was politically disorganized 
at the eve of independence given the racial question and the strength of 
the organized workers who were at war with the nationalists because of 
the interests they sought to defend. After 1960, a good number of 
expatriate capitalists who feared the impending independence and the end 
of colonial rule in general started remiting their money out of the 
country. About Shs. 40 million left the banking system in a year and 
Shs. 15 million left the postal savings bank in a year before 1964.160 
This outflow of capital escalated in 1964 as a result of the events 
which were to affect Tanzania's relations with the international 
community: the Zanzibar revolution in January 1964, the army mutiny in 
Tanganyika which also swept the whole of East Africa, the Union of 
Tanganyika and Zanzibar to form the United Republic of Tanzania, 
FRELIMO's declaration of war on Portuguese rule in Mozambique (FRELIMQ 
was based in Tanzania), Tanzania's support of the opposition forces in 
Zaire, and the acceptance of refugees from Ruanda-Burundi, Other events 
were: China's military and financial aid which was firmly offered in 
1964, breaking of diplomatic relations with Britain after Ian Smith's 
unilateral declaration of independence in 1965, and Tanzania's 
allegation that the United States had attempted to overthrow its 
government. 161
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As a result of these events there was a capital outflow of about 
Shs. 290 million "as opposed to approximate equilibrium in 1963". In 
1964,.the gross capital formation was Shs. 603 million. This means the 
capital outflow was of a significant magnitude, and it increased the 
difficulty of financing the First Five Year Development Plan which was 
launched in July 1964. Therefore, it was necessary to augment the 
external finances which were available with a larger proportion of 
domestic finance. But internal borrowing was also a problem for the 
government because of the nature of the banking system in the country, 
whereby all the banks were privately owned. If the government were to 
resolve such problems it was necessary for it to control these economic 
institutions— the banking system.162 And such a move entailed a conflict 
of interests with the banking capitalists.
The government had by then established an Agricultural Credit Agency 
(ACA) which took over the businesses of the Land Bank which was 
established during the colonial period. This was succeded by the 
National Development Credit Agency (NDCA) in 1964. Besides this bank, it 
had established a Co-operative Bank in 1962 for financing seasonal 
crops. Although these banks had no major impact, they were seen as a 
threat to private banking given that they had direct state backing.163 
The government established the National Bank of Commerce (NBC) with 60 
per cent government shareholding in 1965, to ensure that profits on 
government banking stayed in the government sector; and previous to 
that, it had established the National Housing Corporation for provision 
of 'low cost' houses by building or advancing loans, and the National 
Insurance Corporation for facilitation and promotion of economic 
development. For the private banking sector, this seemed a beginning of
replacement of private banking by government banking. The establishment 
of National Provident Fund in 1965 made it the single most important 
purchaser of government bonds. To control any further outflow of funds, 
the government began to exercise some direct discretion on the 
utilization of domestically produced surpluses in 1965 for the first 
time. These powers were enhanced further in 1966 with the replacement of 
the East African Currency Board by the Bank of Tanzania which was given 
powers of monetary control "subject to which it could print money and on 
the minimum level of foreign exchange reserves". This bank was also 
"empowered to call for information from other credit institutions and 
control the volume, direction and terms of business...."164
The government was being compelled to make inroads into the economy
by direct participation through control of agricultural marketing, and 
hence capital accumulation, encouraging investments by protection of 
manufacturing, and in monetary institutions because the capitalists, who 
were mostly non-African did not necessarily accord to the priorities of 
the state. The state was compelled to struggle even against the 
bourgeoisie in so far as the bourgeoisie could not prove its worthiness 
of being defended. The bourgeoisie, on the other hand was not so
nationalistic as was desired, and was moreover frightened by the 
socialistic pronouncements of the leaders. It was especially the latter 
aspect in association with the 1964-65 events which frightened some of 
the investors, as Nyerere was to point out in 1966, which resulted in 
the inability to achieve the desired goal of development. Vhen 
expounding the Principles of Development in 1966, on the theme of 
African Socialism, Nyerere pointed out that:
The word itself may have frightened off certain specifically
sensitive investors, but most who are really seriously
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considering investment look at the investment guarantees 
legislation and institutions which have been established to help 
them. There is no evidence of what this commitment to human 
equality really costs in the way of outside private investment 
but it may have discouraged some wealthy businessmen and may 
have also affected the interest institutions like the World Bank 
which put a very heavy priority on private as distinct from 
public investment.1 se
It was the rule of mainly the non-agricultural bourgeioisie which 
was being defended politically, ideologically and economically. It was 
specifically the industrial bourgeoisie who was being protected as is 
clear from the above; for it was believed that industry was "associated 
with modernity and dignity", and the agrarian economy was viewed as 
backward. 1 Addressing the National Assembly during the introduction of 
the First Five Year Development Plan, Nyerere pointed out that it was 
necessary for Tanganyika to "end her absolute reliance on prices of 
primary commodities", that it was necessary to have "an industrial base 
to our economy". It was only with the achievement of this that the 
future of the country would be safeguarded.167
The Marxists from Zanzibar who were in the Union Government— \A. M, 
Babu (Minister of State in the Directorate of Planning and later 
Minister for Commerce and Co-operatives) and K. Hanga (who became 
Minister for Industries, Mineral Resources and Power)— , though not 
necessarily defending private capital, went further to add to what 
Nyerere had pointed out. They argued that it was necessary to build up 
heavy industries as the only way to safeguard independence. Hanga 
pointed out that investment in industry which required a lot of capital 
could be financed by increased exploitation of agricultural resources by 
the state. There was need for strict economy and sacrifices if the iron 
and steel industries were to be established. Tanzania had to be
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transformed from a weak, agrarian country which was dependent on other 
countries to a powerful industrial country, an independent and self- 
reliant socialist country.169
Before the discussion on how the Arusha Declaration came about, it 
is worth considering some of the reactions in the countryside, given the 
erosion of the independence of the civil society actions by the state.
6.3 The Countryside and the State
At the eve of independence, there were sections of the population 
which expected more fundamental changes than simply the expectation that 
the state was to play the central role in development processes or even 
providing them with everything. There were people who expected their 
transformation and that of their circumstances. This was the case with 
even with some of the groups which were mentioned in the previous 
sections. For example, in September 1959 a group of 90 people left 
Horogoro town for an unknown destination. The group was composed of 
peasants, unemployed, a medical worker, and an agricultural teacher. 
After a week it became known that they had gone to Kilombero to 
establish communal farming. They were able to clear 45 acres of land 
within a week. After learning about this, TANU volunteered to help the 
group, and it promised to supply them with a tractor. The Asian 
capitalists of Morogoro volunteered to help them in various capacities: 
Mr Fazal Kassam gave them a tractor, and others gave them agricultural 
tools.159
The era of "spontaneous settlement schemes" had begun. It is 
estimated that about a thousand such schemes were established between 
1960 and 1963.160 It is documented that about a half of that total were
- 399 -
established by TANU Youth League, with the aim of settling the youths on 
the land after the example of Kilombero. Many of those schemes grew 
sisal, .and the members of the settlements were ex-sisal workers who had 
expected to take over the sisal plantations after independence, but were 
told instead by the government to go and produce on their own. Some of 
these were also established by the unemployed. The difficulties in the 
establishment of these settlements were immense: they ranged from
problems of acquiring good land to those of obtaining food for the time 
when they had to wait for their first harvest. The gestation period for 
sisal is three years. One of the villages which was founded by the ex- 
sisal plantation workers was Mbambara village in Tanga, which by the end 
of 1965 had planted 139 acres, was largely self sufficient in food, had 
started building a dam for fishing and was holding literacy classes.161
Nyerere gave the Mbambara villagers a lorry in 1969. But with the 
1970 drought, and as a result of the village's dependency on the 
government famine relief— like most of the spontaneous settlements in 
Tanga— it broke down by around 1972. Those who documented this village 
show that the village members in Mbambara had reached a stage where they 
understood very well the essence of communal living, the problems of 
leadership and the need for villagers to take their own decisions and 
responsibilities rather than the officials. It was observed that the 
government officials and experts— local and in Tanga— had often misled 
them. The economic situation of the village was quite low, partly due to 
the choice of sisal production.162
There were also some other successful villages in other parts of 
Tanga— some of which were established in the hope of getting possession 
of areas of land previously owned by settlers or demarcated forest
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reserves, and others as a means to obtain government services and 
capital investments. That is, it is not all villages which were 
established for communal work in those years.163 The most often cited 
case of successful communal villages is that of the 17 villages under 
the Ruvuma Development Association in Southern Tanzania.164 The efforts 
to establish these villages began in 1960 when some 15 members of TANU 
Youth League started a settlement scheme at Litowa, 26 miles from 
Songea. These, early members disappeared within three months. The village 
was refounded in 1961. Under the leadership of N. Millinga and the 
advice of Raph Abbot from Rhodesia, the various settlement schemes were 
registered as Ruvuma Development Association (RDA) under the Societies 
Ordinance with a total number of 17 villages. Except for Litowa, none of 
these villages had more than forty families. Although very slowly, these 
villages were able to make progress. While "traditional villages 
stagnated, and the settlement schemes of the Village Settlement Agency" 
which were established under close government supervision in the bid to 
create "progressive farmers" who were supposed to be rich in a few years 
"collapsed, the RDA villages became self sufficient in food, improved 
their health and nutrition, built a school and water supplies, and 
started village industries. Slowly other villages asked to join 
them."1es
The RDA was turned into a co-operative body in 1965, and its 
constitution followed along those lines. The co-operative body was to be 
owned and controlled by its members. According to their constitution, 
the meetings of the village representatives (and some of these villages 
were a hundred miles apart) were to be held every three months. Other 
matters were those concerning decision making and financial control.
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This constitution also incorporated what it called Social and Economic 
Revolutionary Army (SERA). This was a group of people within the 
projects who were supposed to make the members understand the idea of 
socialism in all the 17 villages. They were to be "soldiers of peaceful 
economic development helping to bring about the Social Revolution 
necessary to enable people to lift themselves from the clutches of the 
enemies. "iee
Most government or Party supervised settlements under organizations 
such as, for example, Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation, Licenced 
Producer Schemes, Village Settlement Pilot Schemes, World Food Programme 
and Village Settlement Agency, Cattle and Coconut Schemes, Co-operative 
Sisal Farms, and TANU Youth League Schemes, had generally collapsed by 
mid-1960s. These were generally set up by the government agencies with 
direct control and supervision exercised over the settlers. Some of 
these settlements were established since 1958, with capital injected 
into them in the hope of creating a "healthy, prosperous yeoman farmer 
class, firmly established on the land, appreciative of its fruits, 
jealous of its inherent wealth, and dedicated to maintaining the family 
unit on it" as a way to stabilize African community and transform it 
into modern society.167 The attempt in the establishment of these 
settlements was to segregate the "progressive farmers" from the 
disturbing influences of the peasants who resisted the enforced 
agricultural changes. Behind these schemes, "Both expatriate planners 
and the nationalists politicians and the bureacrats wanted a vehicle far 
'modernization'. Each for different reasons, believed that the complete 
break with the past was necessary for real agricultural development."iee
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They were established with the major objective of producing cash crops, 
and hence to facilitate development and nation building.169
That was not the case with the villages under RDA. The RDA villages
were voluntary in which co-operation was full or partial involving the 
pooling of resources by the participants. The participants gave up their 
former holdings and homes for communal living and working with a firm 
belief on development as "development of people and their capabilities". 
Their working principles were based on:
(a) That people are building not just a productive farm but a 
community of people; and that 'a successful community cannot be 
"planned" from outside'.
(b) That most of the other settlements, and other development 
efforts have been essentially authoritarian and, 'people are not 
willing to submit the whole of their lives to this type of 
rule.'
<c) 'That assistance is advice, and not outside management—  
groups (should) maintain control of their development— then they 
will suffer through their mistakes and benefit from their 
success. This is a hard method of education but the best.'169
These villages were democratic, self-reliant, and socialist evolving
communities which attracted the attention of many outsiders, including
the President and cabinet members.
Writing about one of the villages, Matetereka, Roger Lewin170 noted
that the democracy practiced in these villages was quite radical and
very different from what was practiced in the other villages. Unlike
people who were in the supervised and controlled settlements,
people in Matetereka are never in a position of implementing 
plans whose purpose they do not understand or about which they 
have grave, if not unspoken, doubts. Whatever is proposed is 
explained and examined.... In accordance with traditional 
familyhood decisions are very rarely taken by vote. Rather the 
people seek to reach solutions that satisfy every one so that 
all may work energetically to put them in practice.
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In sum, the practice of palaver was undertaken to the highest level in 
these villages; and in this process people were able to educate 
themselves through ongoing examination of their own experiences.
It was within this context that the villagers in RDA were able to 
evolve their own pattern of education system. They established a primary 
school at Litowa in 1964 which, unlike the ordinary schools, did not 
divorce the children "from life of the community" and the tradition they 
were building in their communities,'1'71 Their education aimed at helping 
the children get accustomed on their own to think and work together and 
adopt revolutionary morality. Children would be sent to different 
villages during holidays to assist in work and also to learn from the 
problems by themselves "and to discover 'that often the best leaders do 
not come from the educated elite."'1'72
Among the achievements of these villages were: self-sufficiency in 
food supply; the buying of a maize-mill which was owned by an expatriate 
so as to process the food they sold; establishing their own dispensary 
and attempting to send a villager to learn from a local hospital; 
purchasing a saw-mill from a capitalist for wood processing; and 
attempting wool processing— washing, cording, dyeing, knitting and 
weaving— as a form of cottage industry while at -the same time keeping 
sheep. These villages were attempting to integrate industry and 
agriculture.
Certainly, agricultural production in these villages was increasing 
steadily. The incomes of the villagers had not substantially increased 
but their life standards improved in every respect. They had some 
economic problems and shortcomings too. But as far as their problems
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were concerned, they had developed "a simple and down-to-earth
understanding of their situation". In Matetereka, for example,
What is encouraging is that they have come to see that farming 
. better requires that they learn, that they seek out new sources 
of knowledge and experiment with new techniques..., the idea of 
alternatives and experimenting to choose between them seems to 
be taking firm root....The people at Matetereka are, as are the 
other villages of RDA well on the way to developing an economic 
consciousness more advanced than that of any gropup in rural 
society. [Development comes only when people change their ways 
of thinking so that they can understand the reasons for doing 
things in new ways and figure out how to conquer the myriad 
practical difficulties that they ineviatably will meet as they 
try to do new things. This is not something that anyone can do 
for the people.] What makes it possible for the people of 
Matetereka to change themselves— and no bureaucrat should ever 
be allowed to obscure this fact— is their ideology and their 
social organization.17’3
The cash crop which was approved in Ruvuma Region where these 
villages were situated, was fire-cured tobacco. Initially, in some of 
the villages, for example, Litowa, tobacco was grown in several acres by 
1963/64. The peasants finally realized that it required a lot of labour 
for very little reward, and that most often, the crop required 
fertilizers and other inputs which were very expensive. Due to periodic 
leaf-spot disease, production of this crop was declining; and also the 
processing factory in Songea was inefficient and was loosing a lot of 
money. The RDA villages disliked the crop, though they still grew it to 
a limited acreage due to the district by-law which required this.
The by-law was introduced in 1965 by the Regional Commissioner, Mr 
Peter Barongo, and it required that every family should cultivate a 
minimum of one acre of tobacco. This law was resented by most of the 
peasants in the region, and the peasants in RDA articulated their 
discontent through their organization. This discontent fuelled further 
opposition against RDA by the regional officials which had begun from
1963. The officials felt that RDA would attract their potential 
"progressive farmers" whom they sought to settle under close 
supervision.
There was opposition from the Party leaders in Songea Town, who 
feared the democracy of the villages and the school, and the 
self-confidence of the villagers and school students who argued 
publicly against some of their policies (the compulsory growing 
of tobacco in particular). These fears were aggravaterd when the 
RDA achieved economic power by purchasing two or three local 
industries, the grain-mill and the saw-mi11.174
Their grain-mill was threatening the co-operative movement in the region
by paying better prices and providing the peasants with another outlet
for their grain, while at the same time supplying timber for government
projects. RDA was an autonomous body, independent of the government and
the Party, and received even personal funds at times from abroad. It was
"promoting a form of socialism which did not depend on a strong central
party. If RDA organizations became the norm nationally, the professional
politicians would be in a much weaker position."176 On the 25th of
September 1969 the Minister for Rural Development and Reginal
Administration announced that the RDA was dissolved. The assets of RDA
were confiscated with the use of "the police, and the teaching staff of
their school was transferred."176
The peasants who were sent to the supervised settlements, it has 
been noted by various studies, in some instances referred to themselves 
as "Vatumwa wa Serikali (slaves of the government)". The result of this 
was that "they put in very little work as they could get away with and 
expected at least the equivalant of a minimum wage— the normal behaviour 
in capitalist enterprise."177
The co-operative movements which were established as a result of the 
state's compulsion were reported to be corrupt, dishonest and
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bureacratic as a result of being dominated by traders and businessmen
and "some TANU officials, Members of Parliament, Regional
Commissioners", who allowed "themselves to be used as tools by. ..enemies
of the co-operatives, accepting directorships and financial
participations in their firms, and using their influence to harm the
interests" of the movement.'170 The Special Commission which examined the
activities of the co-operatives showed that it appeared there was a
failure of the movement by 1965. The co-operative societies were
accumulating 'losses, were mismanaged, corrupt, and marked by failures,
petty thievery, etc. It also noted that the peasants were discontented
and had expressed their resentment of the co-operatives, most
characteristically in the following terms:
'Ve regret that after having achived Uburu in this country' they 
said, 'we, the farmers, have been deprived of all blessings of 
Uhuru; our incomes have been dwindling, and what is worse, we 
are continually over taxed, For example, we pay two types of 
Development Levy: the Local Council cess and the National
Development Levy. Under these circumstances, we feel ourselves 
to be the forgotten children, and we can see nothing better than 
the total ruin of this country and our children in the long 
run....we assure the President that we appreciate the 
desirability of substituting co-operatives for the private 
traders, so far we strongly object to the way in which this is 
being done.179
The issue is not that the peasants could not come out with alternative 
forms of organizations, rather, it was the fact that besides the co­
operatives which were being encouraged by the government and 
associations which were to be affiliated to the Party, most other social 
movements were being refused registration or prevented from emerging. 
This was being done under colonial legislation— the Societies Ordinance 
of 1954.
In Geita District, for example, many associations were refused 
registration between 1958 and 1964. Some of these associations were for 
self-help, commercial unions and production associations.100 One of the 
associations which was refused registration, as a way of example, was 
the Mwanza African Mutual Aid Association. This was a self-help 
association with objectives such as helping those with problems, bailing 
out those on remand and ensuring that they got a fair trial; to ensure 
that the indigenous people of Tanganyika <— in towns and country) 
benefited and were satisfied by the government and protected by it; to 
consult with the central government, the various authorities and the 
departments on various issues; to disseminate any news in the country; 
to help people in their struggles against national weakness, to attain 
modern development, and enable them to obtain help; to inspect prisons, 
market places, hospitals, hotels, etc. to ensure justice and 
cleanliness, and to help ex-convicts to get jobs; to investigate and 
take measures to reduce prostitution and investigate traditional 
marriage; etc.101
In a nutshell, there was a general tendency by the state to restrict 
the formation of autonomous organizations independent of the government 
or Party, and political rights of opponents/critics were curtailed. TANU 
had won the war against the colonialists, and therefore opposition to it 
was easily felt as opposition to the national interests. The political 
leaders of TANU who had won the independence "had, themselves, long been 
without secure employment or regular incomes. They had now become the 
inheritors of the colonial regime.... For many, therefore, a loss of 
political office would have meant eventual return to peasant farming. It
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is small wonder that many TANU leaders tended to jump rather swiftly to 
the view that critics of TANU ought to be restrained."1e2
6.4 The Arusha Declaration and its Context
Summarizing Tanzania's progress and achievements as well as the 
problems after ten years of independence in 1971, Nyerere pointed out 
that TANU's commitment to socialism was made in 1962 when the Party 
constitution • was changed. He noted that Tanzania's early socialist 
developments started with the 'self-help' schemes when people built 
schools, dispensaries, roads, etc. on their initiative; the expansion 
and the development of co-operative movement in agricultural marketing 
and trade in general; the nationalization of land in 1962; the 
establishment of the Tanganyika Development Corporation in 1962 which 
was to be changed to National Development Corporation <NDC) in 1965
4ft
with the task of building an industrial base for the country; reform of 
the trade union movement in 1962 by centralizing it and later its 
reorganization by replacing it with NUTA as a means to prepare the 
labour for its "role in a socialist economy"; the reorganization of the 
army in 1964; and the establishment of one-party democracy in 1965. The 
commitment to socialism in 1967 was a reaffirmation of a principle which 
was already in existence: it was a further step to consolidate a process 
which had been on-going.103
In other words, the 1967 Arusha Declaration and its aftermath was a 
continuation of struggles which had already been taking place. Therefore 
its significance and general orientation lies in the opposition and 
unity: state/working people, and state/bourgeoisie, within the context 
of what has been discussed so far in the preceeding sections. The view
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that the Arusha Declaration was a result of Nyerere's disappointment 
over the state of the country, the state of the peasants whose 
conditions had changed very little since independence, and his awareness 
of the tendency towards corruption which was developing in the country—  
and hence that these influenced the move, was rejected by Nyerere 
himself. '"If you knew the whole truth', he told a visitor a few months 
later, 'it would not be so exciting.'"1SA
The most important aspects in the Arusha Declaration— aspects which 
dealt with Self-reliance and development through people's own efforts 
for their benefits— were already contained in the 1962 pamphlet: Ujamaa, 
the basis of African Socialism.1Be One of the resolutions of the TANU 
National Exuctive Committee which was appended to the Arusha Declaration 
congulatulated the "Government for the steps it Chad] taken so far in 
the implementation of the policy of socialism", and called upon it take 
further steps in the implementation of this policy in terms of control 
of the major means of production.100 And this question of control of the 
major means of production was already contained in the Party 
Constitution since the early 1960s. It was stated in the 1965 Party 
Constitution that one of the objectives and principle aims of the Party 
was: "(j) To see that the Government exercises effective control over 
the principal means of production and pursues policies which facilitate 
the way to collective ownership of the resources of this country."107
What was new in the Arusha Declaration and even the Party policies 
in general was the Leadership Code. It will be recalled that, in the 
preceeding Chapter it was pointed out that the Secretary of State to 
Colonies had also issued leadership rules for the newly sworn-in African 
ministers, which prevented them from being directors of commercial
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enterprises; from being employed or receiving salaries from trade 
unions or cooperative unions; from involvement in businesses which would 
interfere with their ministerial duties; from using secret information 
obtained within their posts for their own benefit or that of their
friends; from using their positions to favour people where justice was 
required; from buying shares in companies; and from announcing news or 
writing books or articles in newspapers while still in their
positions.ies The 1967 Leadership Code stated that TANU or Government 
leaders were * to be peasants or workers who had no association with 
capitalist or feudalist practices; that leaders were not to: hold shares 
in companies, receive two or more salaries, or own houses for 
renting.ies' According to this resolution, leaders were: members of TANU
National Executive Committee, Ministers, Members of Parliament, senior
TANU and affiliated organizations officials, appointees under TANU 
Constitution, councillors, and civil servants of high and middle 
cadre.130 In other words, the leadership code was an introduction in the 
Party of more or less the same thing which was introduced in 1959; but 
this time under changed conditions and with some modifications, in terms 
of generalizing the rules to apply to a wider category of leaders. As 
typically expressed by Kwafrika (A TANU sponsored paper) of 11th July 
1959, most of the requirements were accepted by Africans, but there was 
a grudge against the question of buying shares and announcing news. This 
explains why the leadership requirements were totally forgotten to the 
extent that when they were introduced in 1967 they appeared as something 
new.
The Arusha Declaration was announced on the 5th February 1967. On 
the 7th February, the government nationalized all commercial banks,
eight import/export firms, eight milling firms, took total control of 
the National Insurance Corporation, and announced the intention to 
acquire compulsorily up to 60 per cent of shares in 7 firms. The list of 
nationalizations implied in the Arusha Declaration were completed with 
the nationalization of 60 per cent of the sisal industry. There was full 
and fair compensation for the nationalized firms, and the amount 
totalled £20 million.131
While nationalization was affected immediately, the Leadership Code 
was not brought into effect at once. It was endorsed by a TANU Special 
Conference in March that year, and after that it was incorporated in the 
civil service regulations. Compromises were made in the course of the 
endorsement, by allowing leaders to transfer their propery ownership to 
a trustee or put it in the name of their children. Thus it allowed 
investments for the provision for the future of the leaders' children. 
Another compromise was in terms of a limited ban on employment of wage 
labour: this permitted many leaders in the countryside who were
substantially rich to continue employing seasonal wage labourers.132
The leaders were given a year to 'purify' themselves, and those who 
had inherited property were given three months to sell it or give it 
away or resign. This Code affected most of the National Executive 
Committee (NEC) and members of Parliament. The leaders were unhappy with 
the rules, "even distressed" by them, although they did not have a sense 
of outrage that the rules were unjust or unfair.133 The reception of the 
rules and the immediate follow-up to the Arusha Declaration was marked 
with unease and discontent with them: "[the] whole issue was dominated 
by this issue. Time and again, members expressed their unhappiness over 
these restrictions on their income-earning activities."1341 The factor
which facilitated the acceptance of the rules was the nationalizations 
more than any thing.199 This is because the nationalizations were 
popular for reasons which went beyond even the socialist purposes, as 
had been earlier reflected soon after independence in the demands of 
Africanization. Nationalizations in the main affected Asians and 
Europeans and foreign companies in general.19® It was after one week of 
massive nationalizations, that the government halted the process and 
"concentrated upon winning a real acceptance of the leadership 
rules".197
This issue of leadership rules had begun in December 1966 when
Nyerere drafted a pamphlet on the question of stopping house building
loans "made to political people like regional and area commissioners".
These kind of loans had already been discontinued to civil servants
because they built houses for renting. Kawawa announced in the
Parliament that such loans were going to be stopped.199 The problem,
however, was how to present this issue to the NEC so that it was not
rejected. It was felt that, they "cant merely talk about houses": they
had to talk "about leadership in relation to property." Within this
context, according to Nyerere, they had to talk about:
'...the responsibility of leadership in terms of property. The 
best way was to argue socialism, and to define socialism as lack 
of exploitation, and then draw up a list of what this is. So it 
struck me: instead of a pamphlet I issue out of the blue, this 
should be the theme of the meeting, and this is how it came 
about. No'— he grinned— 'it wasn't so much out of frustration as 
inspiration. It was a confirmation of what we ought to be 
doing 1199
Socialism was the peg on which the doctrines of the leadership code were 
hung, and the nationalizations were corollary of the decision to present 
the main proposals as part of the overall move. This leadership code, of
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course, had its anchorage within the struggles which have been outlined 
in the preceding sections.
In early 1966, Nyerere had defined again the socialist objectives 
and its philosophy.200 He had also expressed the urgency of building 
communal values which were being eroded by individualism as a result of 
economic development. This was the main concern, although it was at a 
time when many government and Party policies which were associated with 
him "had floundered": the village schemes were halted, the Five Year 
Plan so far did not seem to promise a sustained and integrated
development— nor to any increased flow of external aid. This was besides 
the problems facing the co-operative movement and the trade unions.201
The elaboration of the socialist philosophy and practice was done 
at the time when the "development process" as envisaged by the 
nationalists was in a crisis. In 1965, the Special Presidential
Commission which investigated the activities of the co-operative
movement had revealed losses, mismanagement, and corruption of the union 
officials and employees, failures, petty thievery, etc. As a consequence 
of this, the peasants had expressed their discontent, as already shown 
in the preceeding section. The peasants had expressed their discontent 
mainly because of overtaxation and exploitation in the form of turning 
the terms-of-trade against the countryside, an aspect which had an
impact even on rural capitalists. Most rural capitalists who had already 
emerged or were emerging after independence, as typically demonstrated 
by the case of the tobacco capitalists of Tabora, did not invest their 
money for further expansion of agriculture. By mid-1960s this money was 
being "invested in businesses, trade, bars, hotels, transport, maize- 
mills, or in town houses for renting...." These capitalists had
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withdrawn completely from agriculture "or in some cases reduced their
agricultural enterprises to a smaller scale, mostly to concentrate on
their non-agricultural activities" which had higher rates of profit than 
the former.202 The problems of the capitalists who were in the village 
schemes were highlighted above.
In April 1966, Nyerere announced that he would establish a
commission to investigate the activities of NUTA— a decision which was
cheered. The investigations showed that NUTA was unpopular, 
bureaucratic, ineffective, corrupt and had no legitimacy within the rank 
and file. It was revealed that there was no genuine workers 
participation within the structures which were closely integrated to the 
Party and the government. The workers had complained that they had 
little or no faith in NUTA; that, its officials had very close and
suspicious relations with the employers. The NUTA structures, according
to the Commission, did not provide "adequate and visible means of
democratic expression". At the same time, despite the call by the
government to the workers to practice restraint, the workers had gone on 
demanding higher wages, and the result of this had been the government's 
decision to hold wage increases to a maximum of 5 per cent per annum.203
In the meanwhile, the life style of the civil servants and 
politicians had become different from that of the masses of the working 
people. This was a result of the high salaries they received and the 
practices they had begun to involve themselves in since independence. 
They were ignoring financial regulations and purchasing luxury cars 
which befitted their dignity, drawing generous allowances even when 
their expenses were met when on trips, seeking new perquisites 
additional to their salaries, and seeking gratuity in addition to their
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salaries as compensation for their job security. In sum, they were 
possessed by the spirit of acquisitiveness.ZOA This was besides the fact 
that some of them had begun to take directorships in private companies 
and were getting more than one income, and beginning to own houses for 
rental which they leased to embassies, international organizations and 
internatinal companies, etc. The bureacrats by this time had become 
populary known as Vabenzi, i.e. "the tribe of Mercedes-Benz" and the 
Mercedes-Benz had become a status symbol. This was especially the case 
after the Minister of Regional Administration had ignored a Presidential 
instruction and ordered 17 Mercedes-Benz for the Regional Commissioners. 
The term Vabenzi was contrasted to Kabwela i.e. the common man, and 
Mercedes-Benz at that period connoted unyonyaji (parasitism).205
It was under such circumstances that the re-emphasis and further 
elaboration of the socialist philosophy was made. The watershed of all 
the above was the problems posed by the University College of Dar es 
Salaam in October 1966. In this year, the government had introduced a 
National Service Scheme which required all secondary, college and 
university leavers to undergo a five months military training, followed 
by 18 months of working while receiving only 40 per cent tax-free of 
their salaries. The balance of their salaries were to become savings for 
the state for development purposes.20® The introduction of this scheme 
resulted in bitterness among the students, and some 400 students marched 
in their academic gowns to the State House in October 1966 in protest at 
this scheme, despite the attempts by Nyerere and Kawawa to win their 
acceptance on several occassions.
The students were met by Nyerere, Kawawa and most of the cabinet 
members at the State House. The students declared that the government
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was trying to throw the burden of financing an extensive scheme on them, 
and demanded to be paid full rights of their earnings "or else all those 
in high-income brackets should also be in the category which could be 
interpreted as a form of sacrifice rather than a form of exploitation". 
They declared that "unless the terms of reference and attitude" of the 
leaders towards the students changed, they would not accept national 
service in spirit, "and the battle between the political elite and the 
educated elite" would continue.207 The placards they carried condemned 
the national service terms and Kawawa who was in charge of the scheme, 
declared that colonialism was better, and reminded the government of 
Indonesia where the students had been a force politically against the 
government.200
The educated, who regarded themselves as privileged, saw the scheme
as an attempt by the politicians to marginalize them; that is why they
took it as a battle. Nyerere reacted by expelling them from the
university. In his reply speech to the University students, Nyerere
reacted by cutting down salaries: "You are right when you talk about
salaries. Our salaries are too high. You want me to cut them?.... Do you
want me to start with my own salary? Yes I'll slash mine. (Cries of
'No!') I'll slash the damned salaries in this country. Mine I slash by
twenty per cent as from this hour...." He painted out that it was the
high salaries which built attitudes of acquisitiveness and individualism
in the country among the educated:
Ve belong to a class of exploiters. I belong to your class.
Where I think three hundred and eighty pounds a year (the 
minimum wage that would be paid in the National Service) is 
prison camp, is forced labour. We belong to this damned class on 
top. Is this what the country fought for?.... In order to 
maintain a class of exploiters on top?
....Everbody in this country is demanding a pound of flesh.
Everybody except the poor peasant. How can he demand it? He
doesn't know the language. Even in his language he can't speak 
of forced labour. Vhat kind of country are we building?*0*
With this confrontation between the students and the government, the 
result was an upsurge of Nyerere's popularity with the masses. This was 
due to his gesture to reduce his salary and those of his ministers by 20 
per cent. The whole event had created an atmosphere of crisis whereby 
sacrifices for the nation seemed acceptable. At the same time, the 
ministers were ordered to change their Mercedes-Benz for cheaper models. 
The popularity of Nyerere for this move was revealed by the 
demonstrations and the response he got during his biggest tour of the 
country since independence in December 1966 and January 1967. Nyerere 
had became the champion of the interests of the peasants and hence a 
hero, as a result of the confrontation with the university students. In 
a meeting with the Univerity College of Dar es Salaam staff members 
towards the end of December 1966, Nyerere remarked that "he had the 
feeling that he had not fully exploited the chance which the student 
revolt had given him".210
Coupled with what has been pointed out so far, on the life 
standards and practices of the bureacrats and politicians, the student 
revolt raised the fundamental issue of good leadership and the question 
of inculcation of relevant values among them. The Arusha Declaration 
pointed out that self-reliance depended upon the people, land, good 
policies (socialism and self-reliance) and good leadership. The question 
of leadership was the most central: "TANU recognizes the urgency and 
importance of good leadership. But we have not yet produced systematic 
training for our leaders". A programme was to be set up for training 
leaders so as to make them grasp the political and economic policies.
Leaders had to set a "good example to the rest of the people in their 
lives and in all activities."211 Education, then, was central in the 
inculcation of sound attitudes, and that was the fact which was revealed 
by the 1966 student revolt: "The events of 1966 do suggest, however, 
that a more thorough examination of the education we are providing must 
be made. 212
Thus in March 1967, the leadership issued another policy directive: 
on education. The purpose of education was to transmit the accumulated 
knowledge of society from one generation to another and to prepare the 
young "for their future membership of the society and their active 
participation in its maintenance or development."213 No thought so far 
had been given to the type of education which was inherited, except in 
terms of obtaining teachers, engineers, administrators, etc. 
Individually and collectively, education had been taken as a means to 
obtain skills required to earn high salaries in the "modern sector of 
the economy".21A Henceforth, education would be geared to the 
preparation of the students for life in the villages and the countryside 
in general. Students were to contribute to their own upkeep, and schools 
were to be economic, social and educational communities. The colonial 
education which was inherited had "emphasized and encouraged the 
individualistic instincts of mankind, . instead of his co-operative 
instincts. It led to possession of individual material wealth being the 
major criterion of social merit and worth". But the education provided 
in the country had to serve the purpose of Tanzania: it had to encourage 
the growth of socialist values, and encourage the "development of a 
proud, independent and free citizenry which relies upon its own 
development, and which knows the advantages and the problems of co­
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operation." It had to ensure that the educated got to understand that 
they were part of the nation and "recognize the responsibility to give 
greater service the greater the opportunities they....had."21®
Another major policy document was issued in September 1967: 
"Socialism and Rural Development". This document recommended the 
formation of Ujamaa villages— a form of co-operative production units 
that would facilitate both socialist principles and rural 
transformation. Unlike the supervised settlement schemes which were 
abandoned in 1965, these villages were to be units based on co­
operation, equality and democracy; they were also to be less capital 
intensive and formed on a voluntary basis. It was acknowledged that the 
implications for a capitalist development in agriculture which was in 
existence was at the time not a threat— except where there were already 
land shortages. People still had a choice to work for themselves or for 
others: but if these developments were allowed and encouraged to go on 
taking place, then, inevitably there would emerge a "'farmers' class and 
labourers' class....[the latter] will become a 'rural proletariat' 
depending on the decisions of other men for their existence...." This 
was not desirable, because as a result of such developments, where 
"subsistence agriculture" was still practiced, the young and active men 
were leaving their homesteads and going to towns or seeking "elsewhere 
for the modern world". Such developments were breaking up the 
traditional concept of equality and the universal obligation to work.217
In sum, the 1967 formulations were based, as had been the case all 
along, on the fact that socialism was to be built on the foundation of 
the past without importation of any foreign ideology, while attempting 
to embrace modern technology. The major emphasis was on rural
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development as the majority of the people still worked on the land. The 
Arusha Declaration had stated that it was an error to rely on money as a 
major instrument of development, and to emphasize industries at the 
initial stage of development and consequently concentrate the resources 
on urban development. Vhen the country was industrialized, it would 
certainly be possible to say that there is development, but the mistake 
was to think that this development started with industries. This mistake 
had resulted in spending most of the money in urban areas, while it was 
the countryside which generated the foreign currency from the sale of 
exports for all the projects in the urban areas: agriculture was the 
basis of development and it was only fair that the countryside should 
benefit from development rather than being exploited by the 
urbanites.219 This was not a de-emphasis of industrialization: 
"Industries will come and money will come but their foundation is the 
people and their bard work, especially in AGRICULTURE".219
The Arusha Declaration became immediately widely popular all over 
the country. Massive demonstrations by workers and peasants were held 
all over the country in support of the move, and there were huge marches 
by groups of people in many parts of the country. One of the youths, 
Seth Benjamin, died in a four-hundred-mile march from Arusha to Dar es 
Salaam in support of the Arusha Declaration and became a national hero. 
By September 1967, marching columns from all over the country were 
converging in Dar es Salaam in support of the Arusha Declaration, the 
President and the Party. Such scenes had never been seen since 
independence. Then Nyerere also went marching for eight days in October 
1967 from Butiama (his birth place) to Mwanza ( a distance of 138 miles)
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where a TANU Conference was held. The Nationalist described the arrival 
in Mwanza:
•Heralded by peasants' war cries, strains of brass-band tunes, 
and a din of women's ululation, the President, beaming with 
revolutionary confidence, steered the Presidential column into 
the streets of the summit of the town hedged with crowds of 
cheering masses.... Kwalimu rs brisk march into the town stunned 
the masses who on seeing him in sound health were driven with 
wild admiration and exitement to borders of near frenzy. The
entire town was gripped with the revolutionary fervour of the
Spirit of Arusha.220 
Nyerere and the Party were heroes, "the villains were the politicians 
and civil servants who had been growing fat at the expense of the masses 
('blood suckers', 'ticks' and 'parasites', were the three words used to 
describe them)"221 Thus despite the grudge by the leadership that the 
leadership requirements went too far, these requirements were 
incorporated into the Interim Constitution.222
The leaders had to declare their incomes and wealth, and were 
deprived of the luxury cars and told to take ordinary models. Those who 
received more than one salary had to forego their other salaries. By
late August 1967, 30 parliamentarians had decided to forego their
parliamentary incomes. Incomes were to be harmonized by reduction in 
practical terms of the top salaries even in the parastatals. And this 
was to be done by a Presidential Committee which was appointed in that 
year. From the 31st December 1967, all emoluments, for example, free 
housing, free car, servants, expense accounts, and other benefits which 
the bureaucrats and politicians enjoyed were drastically curtailed. The
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private sector was also told to revise the top salaries so as to fit 
with the Arusha Declaration requirements.223
Vithin this context, the workers were also required to sacrifice and 
raise productivity and thereby contribute to development. By this time, 
given the nationalizations, the government controlled more than a half 
of the wage-bill. It was held that the workers gained at the expense of 
the peasants, given the general urban bias. This view came to a head 
when Professor Turner of the Internatinal Labour Organization produced a 
report on wages, incomes and price policy.22* The main contention in 
this report was, the workers had managed to get wage increases at the 
expense of the peasants and that, general employment opportunities had 
fallen as a result of wage increases;— although the profits of the 
enterprises had increased during the period. Prof. Turner recommended 
that measures were to be taken to restrict wage increases. This report 
and the recommendations were accepted by the government as being in 
close accord with the principles of the Arusha Delaration.22S
The acceptance of the recommendations culminated in the
establishment of the Permanent Labour Tribunal (PLT) in 1967, as a means 
to increase the government's control over employment and wage-bill, and 
also to close the gap in incomes between the workers and peasants. The
PLT was to implement the policy of wage restraint: it was to arbitrate
all matters related to wages, and no wage increases could take place in 
enterprises without its final decision. Among its seven functions were:
(a) To register all negotiated agreements and voluntary
agreements between the employer and the employee and to hear and 
determine matters relating to such agreements;
(b) To maintain high levels of domestic capital accumulation in 
the view of increasing the rate of economic growth and providing 
greater employment opportunities;
(c) To develop payment by result schemes or other wage incentive 
structures which will induce an employee to make greater effort
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and relate increases in remunaration to improvement in labour 
productivity.229
While with the formation of NUTA it was the autonomous existence of the 
trade unions which was done away with, with the PLT, collective 
bargaining was dealt a final death blow. To maintain the high rates of 
capital formation, wage increases had to be restrained. The PLT was not 
to allow an increase of more than 5 per cent annually. Between 1968 and 
1971 the average wage increased altogether by only 8 per cent, and the 
minimum wage was raised only once— in 1969— from Shs. 150/= per month to 
Shs. 170/=.227
All the above demonstrate that there was no deviation ideologically 
after 1967. The major aspect of the matter remained that of development 
and the best ways to effect this process. As far back as 1965, Derek 
Bryceson, then Minister of Agriculture, had argued the creation of 
genuine Farmer's Unions which would speak for the interests of the 
peasants, separate from the Party and the government. This proposal 
never won much support. Paul Bomani, a Minister whose career begun with 
the Victoria Federation of Co-operative Unions fought a protracted 
battle to protect the co-operative movements “from being converted into 
control agencies through which the government extracted economic surplus 
from the countryside for governmental development expenditures". It was 
not possible to secure a policy of independence of the co-operative 
movement: "Not only was there a general ideological bias against it and 
reluctance in TANU to permit important African interests to organize 
autonomously of the party, but as well, the unions had become too 
important for the government to leave them alone."22® And this is why
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the government had brought all the unions into the government sponsored 
Co-operative Union of Tanganyika.
The reality of all these aspects demonstrated so far was in the 
state's'interests which was essentially reflected in the various bills, 
laws and directives passed by the government, and found their 
expressions in some of the leaders' pronouncements. The most significant 
pronouncement by Nyerere immediately after the Arusha Declaration which 
accorded squarely with the interests which the state had hitherto 
championed within the various moves since independence was "Economic 
Nationalism". This was made on the 28th February 1967 when the 
government was announcing its intentions to secure majority ownership of 
Tanzania Breweries Limited (Dar es Salaam Branch). Nyerere pointed out 
that the decision to secure majority ownership in the industries had 
been taken because those industries were "key points" in the economy and 
therefore it was necessary that they should be under the control of 
Tanzania. "Our purpose was primarily a nationalist purpose;" he said, 
"it was an extension of the political control which the Tanzanian people 
secured in 1961". He went on:
Such an economic expression of nationalism is nothing new in 
the world although the manner of action may have, been peculiarly 
Tanzanian, its motivation is common enough. Every country—  
whether it be capitalist, communist, socialist or fascist— wants 
to control its economy. It does not necessarily exclude foreign 
participation in the economic life, but it does insist as soon 
as it can that the major means of production, distribution and 
exchange are in the hands of its own nationals....229
He further insisted that "economic nationalism" had "nothing to do with
the ideologies of socialism, capitalism, or communism," that, what ever
the economic systems adopted by the different African countries, it was
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quite certain that people would sooner or later "demand that the key 
positions of the economy are in their own citizens."230
The nationalizations were part of the inroads which the state had 
been attempting to make into the economy since independence, by the 
establishment of various institutions as was shown in the preceeding 
sections. It was necessary for the state to make such inroads because 
some sections of the bourgeoisie— as reflected in the flight of 
settlers, expatriates and capital in general which escalated from 1964—  
had become an impediment to the general national interests of 
development. This was mainly the financial capitalists, import/export 
capitalists and all those who did not adhere to the national ethic. 
Initially, the state had responded by establishing the various 
institutions— financial and others; and the bourgeoisie had viewed such 
steps as an attempt by the state to erode their positions.231 Within 
these contradictions between the bourgeoisie and the state, it had 
become necessary to break further the power of the bourgeoisie so as to 
resolve the contradictions between the general interests of the state 
and those of the bourgeoisie— mainly the financial bourgeoisie who 
worked contrary to the general interests.
And so all the groups had to be tackled if development were to take 
place and the benefits to go to the people themselves, Nyerere was to 
comment. They could not tackle one group and another later: one could 
not say, "We'll tackle just the Indians, Use the African to help fight 
the Indian, and the African will help because he can replace the Indian. 
Tackle your immigrants. You could do that." But that would just postpone 
the problem. The socialist goals had already been set, and there was no 
point of allowing the exploitation of the indigenous few. And so they
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had to be taken all of them together— "foreign investors, local 
capitalist, our own political leaders. In a sense, we tackled the masses 
at the same time. Ve took on everybody."232
That was the essence of the matter from the point of view of the 
state. Underlying all these moves, was the rule of the industrial or 
manufacturing bourgeoisie whose ideological expression was manifested in 
the developmental ideological positions. In December 1967, the Ministry 
of Commerce and Industries issued a manual with the intention to make a 
follow-up of the "Arusha Declaration which says that we shall continue 
to welcome private investments in those areas not reserved for the 
government." Private capital was welcomed to invest in twenty major 
groups of industries, and they included: textile mill products; lumber 
and wood products; printing, publishing and allied industries; chemical 
and allied products; rubber products; stone, clay, and glass products; 
and machinery. In these industries, companies could be formed with "100 
per cent private shares or with minority shares by the national 
organizations.1,233
Another Manual was issued by the same Ministry at around the same 
time. This manual spelt out that investment ownership in the country 
fell under: purely public ownership; partnership between the government 
parastal organizations and co-operatives, and local and foreign 
investors; and, privately owned industries by both local and foreign 
investors. It was pointed out that the terms of protection of foreign 
industries operated under the 1963 Investment and Protection Act which 
guaranteed full and fair compensation in case of nationalization. There 
were, of course, foreign exchange controls, which restricted 
repatriation of earnings from the country without the foreign investor
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acquiring an "approved status". According to this Manual, companies and 
shareholders were protected in accordance with the Principles of English 
Commercial Law.23*
The above manuals were to enable the private investor to know the 
field of industry in which his investment would be welcome and "receive 
full cooperation from the government and people in establishing a 
factory, as spelt out in the Arusha Declaration". It was noted further 
that, although these industries were "open to complete private 
ownership, should a potential investor wish government participation in 
his undertaking, he can approach the government in the normal manner 
through the N.D.C."239
As for the financial institutions which existed by then to help 
promote development, while only the National Development Credit Agency 
<NDCA) and the Cooperative Bank financed agricultural projects, in the 
industrial sector there were: (1) The Tanganyika Development Finance
Company Limited which was internationally based, and was established 
during colonialism. It still exists up to the present. (2) Industrial 
Promotion Services (T) Limited which was also internationally based, 
sponsored by His Highness the Aga Khan mainly to help the Ismailia group 
in Tanzania. This also still exists. (3) The Commonwealth Development 
Corporation which was and still is internationally based. And <4> The 
Small Industries Agency which was government owned and was changed to 
Small Industries Development Organization (SIDO) in 1973. These four 
major financial institutions financed industrial projects to private 
investors, companies, etc, and were backed or helped by the state. In 
1971, Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB), which was wholly government owned
was established for the same purpose, hence adding to a total of five 
major institutions for financing indutrial projects.236
The state had all along, even after 1967, consciously pursued a 
policy of industrialization. In the government owned enterprises, and 
even in the selection of parastatal projects the primary determining 
factors were national costs and benefits and foreign exchange effects; 
and the secondary factors were public interests in terms of employment, 
location, industrial linkages, burgetary impact and investible surplus. 
In the course of pursuing this policy the state had to accomplish the 
essential task of establishing its hegemony over the working people 
materially by effective control of the mass movements and ideologically 
by the promulgation of the Arusha Declaration. The latter aspect is 
confirmed by the initial massive response and support it evoked. It was 
in the wake of the declaration of the socialistic policies of 1967 that 
the role of the mass movements was completely wiped out. As a result of 
this defeat of the working people by the state, A Manual for Investors 
of 1980 which was issued for the same purpose as the 1967 manuals, 
acknowledged that investment rates in Tanzania had been quite high 
throughout the 1970s— -about 20 per cent. In the section dealing with 
incentives for investors and promotion of private investments 
(specifically foreign) it was stipulated that besides the country being 
politically stable and pursuing consistent policies, "labour relations 
are good and labour costs lovt' (besides the availability of raw 
materials):
A national wages policy seeks to restrain wages and 
encourage the accumulation of domestic capital to expand local 
industry and create more jobs.
The regulation of Vages and Terms of Employment Ordinance 
prescribes minimum wages....
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The Standing Committee on Parastatal Organizations (SCOPO) 
fixes wages and salaries for parastatal organizations.
According to the National Wages Policy, the increase in 
wages and fringe benefits for a year should not exceed 5 per 
cent of the previous year's bill.237
6.5 Conclusion
The immediate period before and after independence up to mid-1960s 
was a period of profound conflicts. These conflicts brought to the fore 
the social, economic and political questions in relation to the meaning 
of self-determination as grasped by the different classes within 
attempts to control processes. It was a period marked by people's 
struggles to control processes and determine their lives and hence, 
transform themselves by learning from their own experiences and 
shortcomings. When assessing the struggles for independence and the 
victory of the nationalist forces, Shabaan Robert, the prominent 
literary figure who died in 1962, wrote in 1960 that the transformations 
in relation to colonial rule were viewed from two perspectives by the 
people: some people saw them as outcomes of struggles against unequal
distribution of wealth, profits and authority among the people of the 
country; and others saw them as due to an inevitability given the 
changes which were taking place throughout the world.239 He had written 
a long poem in 1957-58 in defense of love among the people, and by 1960- 
61 he wrote a novel which was full of insights on developemnt and 
welfare of the people; peoples' desires and needs which would enable 
them to transform their lives, given the transformations which had taken 
place under colonialism; on lack of faith in religion or regularities of 
life; on women's quest for equality and opportunity to participate in 
decision making; and destructions which had resulted from events and
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changes in the life-style over a period of decades in the East African 
countries. This novel depicted the attempts by people to organize 
themselves in rational communities in the typical utopian socialist 
formulations. From African Civilization, Shabaan Robert was gravitating 
towards utopian socialism and taking the standpoint of the producers.233
Around the same time, Sophia Mustapha, one of the Asian supporters 
of TANU in the 1958/59 elections, predicted that while Tanganyika was a 
one-party state, there was every indication that an opposition party 
would arise: she would "not be surprised if it is a sort of left-wing 
movement".2*0 These observations by Shabaan Robert and Sophia Mustapha, 
when related to the struggles of the working masses which have been 
shown in this chapter, demonstrate the kind of challenge which 
confronted the colonial regime in the 1950s and the nationalist regime 
after that.
The nationalists were committed to modernization, and this was a 
continuation of the 1940s African Civilization conceptions via Pan- 
Africanism in the 1950s, in the form of African Socialism in the 1960s. 
The ideas of African Civilization, influenced by the statist Fabian 
socialist tendencies of the British Labour Party which heavily 
emphasized the role of the government and the educated elements (or the 
modernized), had in fact signalled the victory of the civilizing mission 
in the 1940s despite the radicalism displayed by them.2*1 Even after 
independence,the policians viewed the mass of the people as ignorant, 
primitive, superstitious, lazy, resistant to change and backward— the 
very language which was used by the Europeans during the colonial period 
against the Africans. As can be seen from what has been observed so far, 
the ideas of modernization represented bourgeois interests. Thus in the
process of bringing about development it was necessary for the state to 
defeat the working masses by concentrating all the powers in the state, 
and because of the belief in the role of individuals within those 
conceptions the powers were concentrated in the executive and within the 
executive in the presidency; at the same time, it was necessary to strip 
off the independence of the civil society.
The state had to make inroads into the economy by direct 
participation in the process of development through control of 
agricultural -production and marketing and hence capital accumulation; 
and the encouragement of investments by protection of manufacturing 
establishments and its own direct participation in investments. Within 
this context, it had to wage struggles against the working people in the 
name of nation-building and development as a form of African socialism. 
It was the rule of the manufacturing bourgeoisie and the non- 
agricultural bourgeoisie in general which was being defended by others. 
The bourgeoisie— mostly non-African or foreign— could not defend their 
own interests in Tanganyika: they had to be defended, given the racial 
question which was involved. In order to protect the social power of the 
capitalists it was necessary to break the political power of all 
classes— including the capitalists'— though the individual capitalists 
could go on exploiting the other classes and enjoy protection of 
property. In order for this to take place, inevitably, the power of the 
parliament had to be broken alongside the independent mass movements and 
all the autonomous regional, district, etc. entities so as to create 
unity and tranquility of the nation, in order to effect the process of 
development.
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The common interests had to be detached from the civil society and 
made subject to government activity— from building schools, 
dispensaries, etc. to village communal property, trade unions, the 
national wealth, etc. Because all the powers were amassed in the 
Presidency, it seemingly became the incumbent of this office who was 
the best defender of the best interests of the nation and the only one 
who advanced and understood best the socialist ideas. The state was 
further strengthened by the introduction of repressive measures such as 
the Preventive Detention Act, by-laws for compulsory production of 
specifed crops, etc. It was these repressive measures which enabled the 
victory of the state vis A vis the civil society. All this was done in 
the name of socialism and development and the welfare of the peasants 
who were the most exploited and needed to be developed. In sum, the 
state became monolithic. A nationalist poet, Saadani Kandoro, once a
member of TAA and a founder member of TANTJ, who was to become an Area
Commissioner after independence articulated the sentiments of the
nationalists and the moves which were being taken in his eulogization of 
independence. In a poem, he asked the President to hold the uppermost 
position and protect the country: all men were awaiting for this happily 
and no women were to advance forward. He wrote that it was necessary to 
revive the law which legalized whipping because the issue at stake was 
that of building the nation.2*2
Kandoro's poem was the best summation of the essence of the
nationalists' activities after independence. The ideas expressing these 
opposing movements, as is self-evident from what has been shown, were 
not simply an attribute of some individuals; they were an expression of 
real practical movements. Even the fall of some of those ideas and the
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victory of others was an expression of the victory or defeat of those 
movements. The early 1960s conflicts between the working masses and 
government and TANU officers who enriched themselves was acute. The 
feelings of the ordinary people were succinctly summarized by a song 
which was sung throughout Sukumaland:
Ve Tanzanians rule ourselves
But only some enjoy the fruits of the independent people.
Those with high positions in the government 
Receive high salaries,
But the cultivators shall not profit;
Bondage remains.
The rainy season approaches 
And we cultivate cotton:
Ve shall see that the cotton price goes down.
Gents, we are enriching others,
Making them fat and prosperous.
Look at their wrist watches
And the way they use handkerchiefs to wipe their noses!2*3
And it was within this context that the Arusha Declaration was born in
1967. As can be observed from the exposition, this move, fundamentally
did not result into the overhauling of the system which prevailed;
rather, it strengthened it and sounded the complete defeat of the mass
movements.
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Chapter Seven 
SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study has dealt with the question of the social-historical 
formation of an ideology: Tanzania's Ujamaa ideology. The attempt was to 
to locate the evolution, systematization and institutionalization of the 
ideology in Tanzania within the broad history of social and political 
struggles (within material production) and demonstrate their connection 
with the social and political structures and how the state evolved out 
of them. The study has demonstrated that the history of the dominant 
ideology in Tanzania is intimately connected to the particular forms of 
capitalist relations in Tanzania, introduced as a result of imperialist 
and colonial invasion of the country and their development. A 
substantial amount of empirical verification has been done in regard to 
this. By way of conclusion, we return to the appraisal of the 
circumstances which brought about the dialogue with the past in this 
study— the socio-economic crisis and the theorization on development. 
The aim is to show the significance of the findings in this study in so 
far as the dominant theories and practice of development are concerned.
The socio-economic crisis in Tanzania began around 1973. 
Consequently most Tanzanians began to suffer a real loss of incomes. 
Officially, while among the wage/salary earners the average nominal 
wage/salary per month increased from Shs 340/= to Shs 723/= between 1969 
and 1980, real wage/salary per month fell from Shs 340/= to Shs 189/= in 
the same period. 1 Estimations showed that when the nominal minimum wage 
was at Shs 480 in 1980/81, the minimum budget for food only in an 
average household of four persons per month at 1980 official price level 
was at more than Shs 600/=. The majority of the wage earners in this
year earned up to Shs 750/=. Officially, inflation rose at the rate of 
26 per cent annually in the five years preceeding 1982.2 As far as the 
peasants are concerned, the 1978 ILO report documented that the barter 
terms of trade for the peasants fell by 22.5 per cent between 1964 and 
1973 and the terms for the rural capitalists fell by 19.1 per cent.3 
Other findings revealed that this decline of the terms of trade for 
agricultural products fell by 23.2 per cent between 1969/70 and 
1978/79.* Alongside this loss in real, incomes was a gap in the balance 
of payments ‘ for the country, low utilization of industrial capacity, 
shortage of essential consumer goods, food shortage, and a fall in the 
production of export crops.3
It is industrial low capacity utilization which resulted in the
shortage of the essential consumer goods.There were very few industries 
which operated at above 50 per cent of optimum by 1982. There were some 
which operated at less than 20 per cent, and the average capacity 
utilization was at about 35 percent. While manufacturing accounted for 
10.4 per cent of the GDP in 1977, its contribution fell to 5.8 per cent 
of a smaller GDP by 1981.e The fact is that by this period Tanzania was 
quite capable of supplying most if not all the manufactured consumer 
goods. This is because Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) was 
more or less completed by the early 1970s. The verification of this is 
in the records which show that there was a rapid decline in consumer 
goods importation in the 1970s: from 30.3 per cent of the total imports
in 1967 to 11.2 per cent in 1979.y (See Table 4 below) That ISI was
completed by this period is further confirmed by Nyerere's opening 
speech to the 1969-1974 Second Five Year Development Plan. It is
painted out that::
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Ve shall continue to expand simple manufacturing, the processing 
of primary commodities and the provision of basic construction 
materials; but we have reached the stage where we think 
seriously about the next and more difficult phase of 
industrialization...capital goods which are used only in the 
.. production of other things,... such a move is essential for long 
term growth.®
A Twenty Year Plan for heavy industialization was under preparation by 
1972; and its implementation was to begin in 1975, only to be suspended 
as a result of the crisis.
Capacity underutilization was attributed to inputs shortages, 
inadequate transport facilities and lack of spare parts due to shortage 
of foreign currency as a result of the balance of payments crisis. 
Balance of payments crisis was caused by the fall in the volume of 
exports. The volume of exports fell by one-third between 1973 and 1980,
i.e. from an index of 137 to 87; as a result of which export earnings 
had a purchasing power of only 57 per cent in 1980 of what they had in 
1973. The trade gap was at over Shs 6 billion by 1980.® While 
officially, the tendency has been to attribute the causes of this 
problem to the terms of trade in the world market, the fact is, 
generally, the terms of trade in the world market in relation to 
Tanzania over this period were more or less constant. Export unit value 
in this period increased on an average of 11.1 percent annually while 
the import unit value increased on an average of 15.7 per cent 
annually.10
Most revealing in this period is the composition of the imports in 
the total import bill over these years. The figures reveal that there 
was a tendency for the share of capital goods to increase throughout the 
1967-79 period. These consisted of machinery and equipment. Intermediary 
goods, in which spare parts and fuel were included, tended to remain
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constant and the share of food and consumer goods tended to decline. 
While the government alleged that oil consumed 60 per cent of the export 
earnings which was correct given that the export volume had declined, 
the fact is, it accounted for 7.7 of the total import bill in 1967 and 
15 per cent in 1979.1:2 This aspect is revealed in Table 4:
TABLE 4: COMPOSITION OF IMPORTS, SELECTED YEARS 1967-1979
( Tshs 'million)
1967 (%0 1972 (%) 1979 (%)
Capital goods 385 (20.2) 730 (21.4) 4,171 (37.2)
Transport
Equipment 135 (7.1) 194 (5.7) 1,752 (15.6)
Intermediary goods 662 (34.7) 1,320 (38.8) 3,752 (32.5)
Consumer goods 578 (30,3) 828 (24.3) 1,254 (11.2)
Food.... . ..... 150.. (7,9) 332 (9.8) 391 (3.5)
TOTAL__________________1,910 (100.2) 3.404 (100) 11.212 (1QQ)________
SOURCE: E.E. Hanak, "The Tanzanian Balance of
Payments Crisis: Causes, Consequences, and Lessons
for Survival Strategy", M. A. Dissertation,
University of Dar es Salaam, 1981, Table 5.
Broadly, the economic picture presented by the decade after the
Arusha Declaration was the tendency for agricultural production to fall 
in general, coupled with a rise in investment rates in the non
agricultural branches of the economy and a fall in capacity utilization 
in industries. The manufacturing sector grew at a rate of 7.5 per cent 
annually between 1965 and 1975. In terms of contribution to the GDP, the 
percentage share of agriculture declined from 56 per cent to 42 per cent 
between 1961 and 1975 and that of manufacturing went up from around 4 
per cent to 11 per cent in the same period, and fell to 5.8 per cent in 
1980 of a smaller GDP. In terms of value added in manufacturing, it went 
up from Shs 446/= million between 1965 and 1974 (at 1966 prices) with a 
faster growth in large scale manufacturing enterprises.13 An observation 
was made that throughout this period, there was a very high rate of
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value added, and the rate was at more than 13 per cent annually. There 
were exceptionally high rates in 1966 (30 per cent) and 1969 (20.4 per 
cent). These appeared to be "deviations from that trend; in a 
relatively small economy such as Tanzania's they could as well arise 
from some large new factories coming 'on stream' in those particular 
years".1A In fact, the 1970s were marked by high investment and capital 
formation rates.
These growth rates in value added, capital formation and investment 
rates in manufacturing, were possible in this period, despite the 
beginning of the crisis, because of the actions of the National Price 
Commission which was introduced in 1973. This body was introduced with 
the task to regulate non-agricultural prices, with the following 
determining aspects:
(a) The need to preserve and promote competitive position of 
local products;
(b) The need to allow local firms to maintain efficiency and 
expand their businesses;
(c) The need to prevent unjustified price increases having 
adverse impact on the incomes of peasants and workers;
(d) The need to induce orderly development of trade
(e) The need to generate finance for development programmes and 
recurrent expenditure.1®
The Price Commission was endowed with the powers to fix prices at all
levels— from wholesale to retail levels, from manufacturing to imported
goods. In areas where the price commissioner had not fixed the prices,
the Regional and District Development Directors could do so.
Thus the rates of growth in value added, capital formation and 
investment rates were due to the pricing mechanism, whereby, 
manufacturers could afford to produce less and the government allow 
arbitrary price increases while at the same time keeping the wages and 
prices of raw materials law so as to compensate for losses and ensure
accumulation. The situation in Tanzania, it has been noted in relation 
to the parastatals, is regrettable, because besides the subsidizations 
when productivity fell, "most of [the] parastatals are in a monopolistic 
situation in their subsectors. And the Price Commissioner is not known 
to have refused a request of price increase which has been a reflection 
of inefficient operations".1® This mercantilist form of accumulation 
also applied to private enterprises. The Minister for Planning, 
Professor Kighoma Malima, explained to the National Assembly in 1984 
that "Frequent price increases are...caused by underutilization of 
industrial capacity..." caused by raw material shortages, wage increases 
and devaluation of the currency. He further informed the assembly that, 
"High increases in commodity prices were also a reflection of a decline 
in efficiency and diligence in the productive sector, which had led to 
decreased production". The government sanctioned price increases as a 
"last resort after thorough scrutiny of proposals of manufacturers and 
other producers". One of the Members of Parliament recommended scrapping 
the Price Commission "because its pricing system favoured industrialists 
and trading companies at the expense of consumers.ir
These aspects of the crisis were in essence an expression of the 
expansion of capitalist relations in the country after 1967. This
expansion was best reflected in, among others things, the process of 
urbanization. Urbanization is an indication of the levels of development 
of exchange under capitalism: it demonstrates the'separation of capital 
and landed property and the existence of property having its basis on 
the selling and buying of labour power. In 1952, only 2.75 per cent of
Tanganyikans lived in the 33 gazetted townships and by 1957 urban
population accounted for 4.1 per cent of the total pupulation. More
rapid urbanization was experienced after independence: from 364,072
people in 1957 it rose to 685,547 and 2,173,816 in 1967 and 1978
respectively— i.e. from 5.7 per cent of the total population in 1967 to 
12.7 in 1978.18
The process of urbanization as an indicator of expansion of
capitalist relations is best grasped within the forms of differentiation 
in the countryside and the development of wage labour in general.
Differentiation in the countryside had continued unabated after
independence and even after the Arusha Declaration. The difference was, 
especially since 1964, large scale capitalist farmers and settlers, as 
was explained in Chapter Six, had continually dwindled numerically. This 
was due to the flight of settler capital and the tendency for capitalist 
farmers to invest in non-agricultural enterprises which had higher rates 
of profit. In the 1970s, large scale farming (state and private)
occupied 15 per cent and small holder agriculture occupied 85 per cent 
of the area under crop production. Of the 2.5 million holdings under
small holder agriculture by 1980, with an average of 1.2 hectares, 31
per cent of them were in holdings of an area less than 0.5 hectares, 27
per cent were in holdings of an area between 0.5 and 1.0 hectares, 23
per cent were in an area between 1.0 and 2.0 hectares, and 9 per cent 
were of an area between 2,0 and 3.0 hectares. Only 8 per cent had an 
area over 3.0 hectares. Hand farm implements were mostly used in farms 
with an area below 3.0 hectares, and mechanized farming methods of 
varying degrees were used in holdings of 3.0 hectares and above.13 In 
other words, roughly 90 per cent of the small holders belonged to the
category of middle and poor peasants, and 10 per cent were in the
category of rural capitalists.
Most available figures for the wage earners are mainly for the so- 
called modern sector only: they tend to exclude those working in small 
enterprises or those who are employed in small holder agriculture and 
handicraft industries— those enterprises employing below 10 persons in 
International Standards of Industrial Classification. The only figures 
which paint a more reliable picture are the National Provident Fund 
figures, whose membership extended to establishments employing four or 
more permanent workers and excluded civil servants; although again it 
was mostly the urban workers only. There were 411,009 workers registered 
with this Fund in 1968/69. This number rose to 1,017,665 in 1977/78 and 
(provisionally) 1,647,930 members in 1982.20 The National Provident Fund 
figures are a better approximation because of what is revealed by the 
census figures for 1967 and 1978. From the 1967 reports, out of a 
population of 12,313,054 with an active population of 5,678,680, people 
who were permanently employed were 499,826, family workers were 645,284 
and the unemployed were 109,952. Employers were 28,728 and self employed 
were 4,125,890.21 In which case, broadly, the working class22 accounted 
for 1,255,062 or 26.8 per cent of the active population— i.e. the 
permanently employed, the family or casual workers and the unemployed. 
The latter under capitalism constitutes the "reserve army" of the 
working class or that section of the working class which is thrown out 
by capital or already proletarianized by it but not yet employed and 
ready for exploitation.23 The 1978 Census did not include the category 
of employers and the unemployed. The latter was included in the category 
of the "unoccupied" (old people, disabled, young people and unemployed 
who accounted for 6,336,268). Out of a total population of 17,048,329 
peole in 1978, the active population accounted for 14,334,192 people.
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The permanently employed were 602,568, the temporary employed were 
232,502, the casual employees were 84,503 and family workers were 
1,530,502.2‘d In other words, broadly, the working class accounted for 
about 20 per cent of the active population or 2,450,140 workers. This 
was a relative growth by 1978, given the size of the active population 
as compared to 1967.
The urban growth rates, the differentiation among the producers and 
the growth of the working class had an association with the expansion of 
non-agricultural activities of the economy in general. In the 
construction industry for example, while there were 50 registered 
contractors in Dar es Salaam in 1968/69 and all of them were foreign 
owned; by 1979 there were 330 firms in the country and they rose to 419 
by 1980. These firms were mostly dominated by millionaires— and out of 
the 419 firms in 1980, only 17 were foreign owned: "The number of
African-owned contractors has increased tremendously compared to 1968/69 
when there were none".2®
More interesting was the expansion in the manufacturing sector. The 
1967 nationalizations of industries had mainly affected the large scale 
firms which were mostly foreign and few large local ones. Otherwise, 
they did not alter the numerical dominance of private firms. According 
to the 1972 industrial survey which was able to cover 497 large 
establishments in ISIC terms, 43 or 8.55 per cent were wholly government 
owned, 49 or9.89 per cent were joint government/private firms and 402 or 
81.49 per cent were wholly private owned. Similarly, of the 524 recorded 
large scale firms in 1976, only 47 were government owned.2® Between 1977 
and 1982, 43 big state owned or jointly owned industries came into
operation, and 28 were at an advanced stage of installation. These
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industries were being established through loans, aids and grants or in 
partnership with foreign firms. Also, Swedish capital, through the state 
organization— Small Scale Industries Organization (SIDO)— helped 
enterpreneurs in the establishment of industries in this period. These 
on average employed 13 workers and by 1977/78 SIDO had been able to 
establish 3,978 units in the country.2'7' The survey of industries in 1979 
recorded that there were 1,178 industrial establishments.28 In which 
case, by ISIC criteria, these figures taken together show that there 
were about 5,* 156 establishments by 1979.23
Besides the state being the largest owner of capital as a result of 
the nationalizations and foreign capital participation through it, there 
were already in existence private local monopolies and big capitalists, 
some in partneship with foreign capital. Among the local monopolies and 
big capitalists30 were: Industrial Management Services (IMS) famous as 
K.J. Group (Karmali Juma). This group dealt with Isuzu trucks, tipper 
buses, Honda, KOMATSU, folk lifters, ITT telephone exchange systems, etc 
and manufactured oil, fuel and petrol filters; diesel engines for cars, 
tractors, pick-ups, industrial engines, etc. Their headquarters were in 
Dar es Salaam and they had branches in Arusha, Mbeya, Tanga, Dodoma, 
Iringa, Morogoro, Moshi, Lindi, Mwanza, etc, and a few in Kenya and 
Zambia. They had associate offices in USA, UK, Canada, Singapore, 
Malaysia, India, Pakistan, Zambia and Kenya. This company had 42 firms 
by 1978.
Other monopolies and big capitalists were: the J.V Group (Juthalal 
Verji) which had 12 firms by 1978; the Somaia Group of Companies of 
Tanga which had 17 firms by 1982; the Sachak Group which had several 
firms and used to own sisal industries in Tanga; the Karimjee Jivanjee
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Group which had several firms, incorporated foreign shares and had 2 
Africans participating in it; the House of Manji (which used to own the 
Food Corporation of Arusha)— it had some share holders from Kenya; the 
Amboni Group of Companies with industries and sisal estates; Mansoor 
Daya which dealt with pharmaceuticals; and the Chandaria Group who were 
based in Nairobi and Mombasa, holding shares in big state owned 
industries such as Aluminium Africa, Kibo Match, etc.
After it was observed that the private sector's share in the GNP had 
dropped to 74‘ per cent in 1974 from 86 per cent 14 years earlier and 
that it had risen to 78.7 per cent by 1978, President Nyerere 
acknowledged that the private sector had a role to play in national 
development. He went further that, it had grown considerably after the 
Arusha Declaration, and its "growth was deliberately sanctioned by the 
government. The capitalist sector is there....we are .still a dual 
economy. Vhat has been lacking is proper methodology to co-ordinate the 
activities of the sector."31 The growth in this sector was partly 
assisted by the politicians and the bureaucrats. The Commission which
V.
investigates the conduct of leaders in relation to the 1967 leadership 
code, noted in 1984 that politicians and bureaucrats were able to evade 
the leadership requirements by utilizing finances through various 
loopholes for building capitalism. It was observed that the leaders had 
been establishing companies under provision 212 of the Law of Tanzania 
which allowed people or groups (of private individuals) to establish 
businesses in the country. It was pointed out that, while there were 880 
private business companies in 1974, these rose to 16,007 by 1984. The 
leaders had also facilitated capitalist expansion by providing tenders 
to ex-leaders in private business, for the benefit of both parties.32
All these observations and what has been demonstrated in this study 
point to the centrality of the state in the process of capitalist 
transformation historically in Tanzania. It was observed in Chapter Two 
that the state, under capitalism, constitutes a section of the material 
ruling class; that it comprises the group of people under whom power is 
concentrated. It was further pointed out that the foundation of the 
bourgeois state which enables it to impose itself socially and 
politically upon society by establishing norms, regulations and 
sanctions while at the same time remaining part and parcel of the 
material relations, is its externality in relation to the civil society. 
That is it exists as "a public power distinct from the mass of the 
people". This foundation rests on: (1) The fact that production and
circulation of commodities does not automatically reproduce labour power 
as the most important commodity under capitalism, which is external to 
it. Hence the centrality of the state in the process of divorcing the 
producer from the means of production and the continuous process of 
instituting policies, laws, norms, sanctions etc. relevant to this. (2) 
The fact that labour power is not reproduced as a capitalist commodity, 
and hence its value being determined not only by socially necessary 
labour, but also by the value of the means of subsistence necessary for 
its maintenance. Means of subsistence are obtainable in circulation and 
not in production and hence the struggles between the workers and 
capitalists. And (3) The fact that there is competition between capitals 
as the fundamental logic of existence of capital.
The above amount to the fact that under capitalism, the bourgeoisie 
is compelled to entrust political rule to its ideological and political 
representatives if these relations are to be reproduced.. This aspect
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complicates matters in the sense that in the hands of the 
representatives, automatically, the first task of the state becomes its 
own maintanance and reproduction as an institution. Given this 
situation, it thus becomes necessary in some instances for the state 
machinery to completely dominate the civil society and strip-off its 
powers. This means there is always a room for conflict of interests 
between the state and the bourgeoisie or some of its fractions depending 
on the general requirements of the reproduction of the system as a 
whole. This conflict becomes even more obvious when the ideas of the 
representatives do not seem to be the ideas of the dominant class and 
the bureaucracy is seemingly having an autonomous power from the 
class.33 The conflicts between the bourgeoisie and the state are on the 
whole non-antagonistic, because what defends the bourgeoisie under 
capitalism is the juridical framework which protects the free exchange 
of commodities— including labour power itself— ; and also represses any 
rebellions of the working masses. But more than that is the factf that 
there is a fundamental unity between the state and the bourgeoisie, in 
the sense that the state has to defend the reproduction of the whole 
system because it also lives on the surplus produced by the working 
people and is also threatened by them as the bourgeoisie. Thus, the fact 
that individual members of the state can express ideas which seem to 
contradict capitalism or even express quasi socialist ideologies, does 
not transform the state into an anti-bourgeois, or a socialist state. 
What is fundamental is the juridical framework which protects commodity 
production and property.
This study has revealed such aspects, whereby, the state has 
consistently legislated against the working people, protected the
interests of capitalist production, while at the same time being 
compelled to struggle against certain sections of capital, depending on 
the historical conjucture and the particular forms of resistance it had 
to pacify. Thus the state was seemingly pro-African and anti-capitalist 
in the 1920s when it was mostly concerned with its own survival and 
reproduction of the social system and the privileges. This self defence 
of the state demanded that it limited all the forms of capital which 
threatened the production of raw materials and the supply of labour or 
those which, could cause a rebellion. The Africanist ideology was a 
result of re-examination of the foundations of the civilizing mission, 
influenced by the resurgence of the cult of the "noble savage" and 
African studies which produced a partial knowledge related to African 
societies and aimed at the resolution of the crisis of the civilizing 
mission given the rebellion against it. For the colonialist, it was a 
question of how to make the African effectively civilizable; and the 
answer was found in the co-option of some of the elements of the people 
to be civilized. The Africanist ideology, had nothing to do with the 
commitment to the perpetuation of the "African" social; political and 
economic structures as such; and this was admitted by its ideologues. 
Rather it was a question of the particular forms 4 n which the system had 
to be reproduced, and also of breaking the resistance.
The state, in the 1920s, not only struggled against settler capital 
which posed a big menace in relation to land and labour— aspects which 
were at the heart of the rebellions— -but also against commercial capital 
in the sphere of rural produce marketing in favour of monopolistic 
marketing, and in the sphere of manufacturing given the general 
interests of capital. It also fought against African capitalist
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elements In the sphere of commerce and general participation in the 
colonial system. The colonial paternalistic relations alienated even the 
very elements created by it, despite their being civilized. This was 
notwithstanding the revision in the civilizing mission which now 
acknowledged that the African was not only a human being, but also had a 
civilization which had the same objectives as Western civilization. The 
major difference was the fact that although it was true that the African 
had a civilization, he was incapable of systematizing it: it still had 
to be stimulated by European example and guidance.
The state found the justification of its existence in its alleged 
centrality to the process of development after the Second World War, 
This was the time when the development of the colonies began to occupy a 
special place in world literature. At this time, development/growth was 
synonymous with capital formation and industrialization. This was also 
the time when the state began to heed the demands of the "modern 
Tanganyikans" who stood for a fast tempo of development of the country 
by the government, although it still denied them a place in the key 
positions in the state because there remained were also the interests of 
the other sections of the bourgeoisie which had also to be taken into 
consideration which would be contradicted by them. The advanced 
capitalist countries, at this time, were heading towards the so-called 
post-industrial stage which favoured the industrialization of the 
colonies. The era of "modernization, theories" had dawned. These theories 
argued that the development of the third world countries could be 
possible through further integration into the world market, which in 
turn would result in the injection of capital, technology and values. It 
was such a process which was to enable the possibility of closing the
gap between the poor and the rich and the agrarian and industrial 
societies. The third world countries were to follow the same stages of 
development as the western capitalist societies. In these theories, 
third world countries were characterised by two sectors: the modern and 
the traditional. Traditional economy was to be transformed to modern 
economy, and the barriers to economic development were in the 
traditional economy. 34
The nationalists who were to take power after independence were 
trained in this tradition. In the 1940s and during the nationalist 
struggles their main concern was the development of the country through 
active government involvement in the economy, protection and Impart 
Substitution Industrialization, typically in the modernization fashion. 
The nationalists had emerged as a result of the disenchantment with the 
dream of developing Tanganyika in co-operation between Europeans and 
civilized Africans. The inability to blend in naturally under the 
colonial system had pushed them to resistance and to refute Eurocentrism 
theoretically. For them, this entailed the rejection of European 
Civilization and development of the idea that to be civilized was first 
and foremost to be African. Indeed even the civilizing mission had 
acknowledged that the African was a human being with a civilization 
which had no other objective than that of Western civilization; he also 
had been able to share in the systematization of this civilization, and 
proved that he could share the universal views on development. He too 
had the right to participate in universal history in the development of 
his own country. Thus the nationalists views, based on partial knowledge 
of African societies (a knowledge which picked from African societies 
only those elements which were acceptable by the West) did not
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contradict westernality, despite their radical denial of Western values. 
Injection of capital and technology and even the science of economics 
were accepted; as for the values, Africanism was more humane than
European civilization which was seen as cruel and based on the 
exploitation and domination of people.
According to the modernization views, injection of capital and 
technology was meant to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor, 
industrial and agrarian societies. The sewing in of the Fabian socialist 
tendencies was passible and even attractive during this period because, 
they also championed the development of colonies and were sympathetic to 
the nationalists. Fabians also emphasized the key role of the state. 
More fundamental, is the fact that socialism by this period was
increasingly becoming a development strategy, demobilized politically, 
and was in general being transformed into an elitist ideological
guideline to scientific and technological development, and hence 
standing in defense of the role of the state and individuals— such as 
the educated and bureaucrats.
What was institutionalized after independence were the African 
socialist ideas which were essentially modernist. The aim and most 
important task was to modernize the "primitive agricultural sector"; 
while at the same time building a base for the modern economy by
acceleration of industrial investments. Such a conception could not 
entertain or encourage any self-activity of the common working people, 
the illiterate, the 'uncivilized', etc. which ran counter to development 
goals. It could not entertain any view that transformation of society 
was possible through social struggles or conflicts; because development 
in the modernist sense required unity, and the urgent question was that
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of settling accounts with backwardness and "resistance to change".
Fundamentally, society had to be rescued from conflicts characteristic
of the western societies if development was to be attained. This unity
was only possible through the state, an institution which was seen as an
embodiment of the principle of consensus. Nyerere was to write in 1962:
Both the 'rich* and the 'poor' individual were completely secure 
in African society. Natural catastrophe brought famine, but it 
brought famine to everybody— 'poor' or 'rich'. No body starved,
either of food or of human dignity, because he lacked personal
wealth; he could depend on the wealth possesssed by the 
community of which he was a member. That was socialism. That is 
socialism.3B
The means to be used to effect development, it was argued, was the 
state— the bourgeois colonial state which was and remained part and 
parcel of the social relations of capitalism in dominance. It was within 
this context that the civil society had to lose its power and 
independence: the mass and political organizations were either abolished 
or brought under direct state control in so far as they were in 
opposition to the general interests which the state sought to defend. 
The outcome was to leave the working people defenceless vis A vis the 
state and capital in general. Alongside this process, the bourgeoisie 
also lost political power, although protection of their interests 
continued. This entailed the concentration of power within the executive 
arm of the state and within the excutive in the presidency so as to 
stifle opposition from some of the sections of the bourgeoisie given the 
racial aspects involved within the. forms of social struggles after 
independence. The history of post-independence Tanzania has been the 
history of effecting the "process of development", i.e. the further 
entrenchment and consolidation of capitalist relations. Vithin this 
process, the dominant ideology has been its theoretical expression in
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the process of disarming the resisting masses in the name of protection 
of the interests of the peasants who need most to be modernized.
The criticism of orthodox and liberal economists and also orthodox 
Marxism by the "Dependency" theoreticians in terms of exploitation of 
the "periphery" by the "centre" and the impossibility of autonomous 
industrialization in the third world countries under the hegemony of 
world capitalism and hence the problems of poverty and unemployment; and 
the alleged impotence of the bourgeoisie in the third world countries; 
in essence, ‘ended in providing a further cloak over and protecting
bourgeois interests. Effectively, the socialist strategy, as a solution 
for the crisis in the process of development only ended up in 
legitimating the developmental1st conceptions which stood for
industrialization and active state intervention in the economy by
protectionism and creation of an industrial base. It could be said, 1967 
was more or less an overthrow of orthodox modernization ideas (which 
believed in philanthropic imperialism to help in the process of
development) given the struggles between the state and the civil 
society and the institutional conditions behind the production of 
ideas in the country. It was a nationalist solution to the crisis of 
development as grasped by the state. No wonder that "Dependency" 
theories began to lose their ground when the world crisis began.
In the examination/analysis of social formations by the "Dependency 
School" (broadly) the controlling paradigm or the point of departure 
was industrialization and its nature, relations of dependency, forms of 
capital, productive forces, etc.. Hence the debates vegetated around the 
questions of whether there is capitalism, capitalists, workers or 
peasants or not in the third world social formations. Orthodox Marxism
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and orthodox modernization theories were challenged on the pretext that, 
although capitalism developed and integrated the third world countries 
into the world market, it also stopped them from fully entering. 
Socialism was taken as a strategy or technique to deal with the problems 
of the crisis of development. And it was these aspects which paved the 
way for the revival of orthodox arxism and modernization paradigms as 
altenative models of development. This is because, the difference had 
been in terms of the strategy— -whereby the "Dependency School" 
emphasized the contradictions of capitalism while the orthodox schools 
did not.
The critique of "Dependency" involved questioning so-called neo- 
Marxism as a divergence from classical Marxist theory— an indication of 
the fundamental unity of the orthodox theories and the "Dependency" 
theories. Among those who criticized the "Dependency" theories was the 
late Bill Warren. Warren revived the idea of capitalism and imperialism 
as historically progressive.3e In his conception, "imperialism was the 
means through which techniques, culture, and institutions that had 
evolved in Western Europe over centuries...sowed their revolutionary 
seeds in the rest of the world".37 He argued that imperialism and 
capitalist development in the third world countries led to 
industrialization, and this was especially true since the Second World 
War. If such development did not occur the reasons had to be sought in 
the ideologies/strategies/policies pursued by the countries in question. 
As far as Warren was concerned, prospects of industrialization were 
quite good, and all arguments about imperialism and dependency were 
"reactionary petty bourgeois outlooks of Proudhon" which rejected "the 
progressive outlook of John Stuart Mill". For him, socialist ideologies
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in the third world countries were primitive radical interventions which 
rejected the progressive nature of capitalism to the detriment of 
development.361 Hence the liberal solutions of encouragement of market 
forces, as if they were ever constrained.
The revival of orthodox Marxism with the demise of the "Dependency 
School" was a response of what E.P. Thompson called "the much publicised 
'revival of Marxism'... in the last two decades,..."39 The critics of 
"Dependency" school have insisted on the necessity to base analysis on 
the sphere of production. As a consequence,, some of them have declared 
that there is a difficulty in the acceptance of the labour theory of 
value, and hence it is impassible to reduce history to class struggle. 
Vhat has become of paramount importance and a very powerful "tool" in 
analysis of historical processes is the concept of mode of production. 
Thus, it is this concept which has been taken as the embodiment of the 
fundamental principle of Marxist methodology which makes it possible to 
grasp the dynamics of society.-40 Put in other words, it is the 
appearance and disappearance of modes of production which is the motor 
of history; and industrial, technological, green, etc. revolutions are 
the locomotives: it is the "articulation" or transformation of modes of 
production which constitutes the materialist conception of history.
Thus, theorization on development, whether in its crude 
modernization guise, or in "Dependency" theories and the critics of 
"Dependency", has been reduced to an ideological guideline to scientific 
and technological development. Hence, its focus, implicitly or 
explicitly, has been on the failure or success of ideologies, 
strategies, policies and plans pursued by the state; and, relations or 
modes of production which impede or accelerate the development of
"productive forces". Even sociological theorization of development has 
centrally viewed the problems of development/underdevelopment in the 
same light. It is in this context that ideology in Tanzania has been 
held responsible for retardation of capitalism, or for not being 
"scientific" or for failure to "capture the peasant" so as to effect 
development, and hence the socio-economic crisis. Capitalism or 
socialism has been reduced to productive forces and technology; and the 
fact that capital or commodities are not things but social relations 
has been suppressed. To see the crisis in that light is to completely 
forget the fact that crash or crisis is the "horrible, cronic disease of 
capitalist society, which recurs so regularly that its coming can be 
forecast" given its logic. Crises are an inevitable result of the 
process of subordination of social production to private appropriation; 
and hence, even close supervision does not "prevent the capitalists from 
setting up enterprises in the times of boom which must inevitably become 
bankrupt later on".'41
Vhat this study has been able to demonstrate is the fact that 
development is an aspect which is not free of class interests. 
Therefore, theorization about it cannot be reduced to erudite refutation 
of ideologies, policies, plans, and strategies, as if "erudite 
refutation of false theses of ideologies.... of domination,... annul their 
material efficacy for domination". The fact is, it is "material 
relations of domination which give power, pertinence or force to those 
false theses and not the other way around."42 The so-called solutions 
for the problems in Tanzania or Africa in general in terms of creation 
of a New International Economic Order, "heavy industrialization", 
technological transfer, application of Marxism-Leninism as if it were a
spanner, assistance from socialist countries, liberalization of the 
economies, aid, etc; derived from developmentalist/modernization 
ideologies are basically a product of such theorization. Such solutions 
entail the patronization of the working people by a caste of people, 
such as, those armed with "scientific ideology", modernizing agents 
(such as bureaucrats and "Modern Africans"), good politicians, good 
planners, etc. This is an idealistic problematic which sees the hegemony 
of ideas and objects in the life of people— their material world and 
relations airiong them. It is an economistic and technocratic approach 
which takes productive forces as the motive force of history and which 
embraces the elitist thesis which advocates the dictatorship of the 
intelligentsia. The end result has been in the legitimation and defence 
of capitalism, as it has been done typically by Bill Warren.
The trick in the debate on development has been to relegate to the 
background the question of the conditions of social struggles for self- 
defense, self-emancipation and self-determination of the people and 
hence the peoples' own weaknesses and strength. It has been a refusal 
to bow to the fact that it is people who make their own history in the 
transformation of their circumstances and themselves— a process in which 
productive forces, policies, ideologies, plans, etc. are grasped as its 
part and parcel. It is only when things have not worked out properly or 
gone wrong that appeal for support of ideologies or policies has been 
made to people whose capacity as history makers is systematically 
denied. The undelying reason for all this is the fact that 
developmentalism is the religion of capitalism since the Second World 
War; and central to all developmentalist/modernization perspectives is
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the role of the state and individuals (bureaucrats, politicians, cadres, 
modernizing agents, etc) and repudiation of peoples' experiences.
To take it that people make their own history means to acknowledge
the centrality of social struggles in processes, which amounts to
examining/theorizing processes from the point of view of how people
continually struggle and resist all forms of arbitrariness,
hierachization and the whole question of the liberation of the civil
society from the oppression of the state and capital in general. A
knowledge which does not reflect the social conditions of struggles
through which men and women are simultaneously transforming
circumstances and themselves— as, for example, the peasants of the 17
Ruvuma Development Association were attempting to do— ; a knowledge
which views the vast majority of people as unscientific, backward,
ignorant of their own interests, superstitious, etc. even if Marxist or
socialist; is fundamentally oppressive, arrogant and authoritarian,
which reinforces hierachization. It is all reminiscent of Eurocentrism
and the civilizing mission in general which viewed colonized/oppressed
masses in the same manner. It is an elitism which:
stands as direct successor in the old lineage: Benthamism,
Coleridgean 'clerisy', Fabianism, and Leavisism of the more 
arrogant variety. Once again, the intellectuals— a chosen band 
of these— have been given the task of enlightening the 
people..,.[it is] marked by...very heavy emphasis upon the
ineluctable weight of ideological modes of domination—  
domination which destroys every space for the initiative or 
creativity of the mass of the people— a domination from which 
only the enlightened minority of intellectuals can struggle 
free.43
The question in Tanzania and most of the third world countries is 
not that of failure or success stories of ideologies, models, plans, 
strategies, etc. in effecting development; rather, it is that of defeat
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or victory of certain social groups.AA The evolution and transformation 
of the dominant ideology in Tanzania has been part and parcel of the 
struggles of the state against social movements, such as trade unions, 
co-operative unions and other forms of opposition against arbitrariness, 
leaving the civil society defenceless against its rapaciousness and that 
of capital. The result has been the inability for the people to fight 
for better living conditions, higher wages, better remuneration for 
their produce; or even effectively control processes and transform or 
influence them.
African Civilization and African socialism was partly generated as 
an answer to European prejudice: it was an attempt to show the being-in- 
the world of the African. It was not an attempt on the part of the 
educated to become organic thinkers of the masses; but to attain 
universal recognition. It is in this respect that it became part of 
developmentalism, which like all modernization thinking looks down upon 
the ordinary people as incapable of their own emancipation.
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